Elena Sinelnikova-Muryleva, Kirill Shilov, Andrey Zubarev
The aim of the article is to systematize the views on the concept of cryptocurrency from the literature and among international and national organizations and regulators, to analyze its economic essence and the place in the modern monetary and financial system. The definition and the functions of cryptocurrency are discussed in the framework of descriptive and theoretical analysis. The paper systematized the existing approaches to the concept analysis of cryptocurrency; the place of cryptocurrency in modern economic theory is shown.The article concludes that cryptocurrencies are often determined through the set of basic characteristics. Cryptocurrencies are not money, though they can perform the main function of money â to be a means of payment; they can be a means of making settlements, assets, platforms for concluding smart contracts, a means for crowdfunding. They are not private money in Hayekâs interpretation. Cryptocurrencies can be described in the framework of the models of new monetarism (payment economics).
Reilly White, Yorgos Marinakis, Nazrul Islam, Steven T. Walsh
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have fascinated technologists and investors alike. They have become prevalent, with over 2,000 Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies now in use. Most jurisdictions have not regulated cryptocurrencies. Whether existing regulations apply to cryptocurrency turns ultimately on if we classify cryptocurrencies as currencies, securities, or derivatives, or a money services (transfer) vehicle. In this set of exploratory analyses we seek to classify Bitcoin. We utilize a variety of methods to compare aspects of its behavior to: currencies, asset classes such as derivatives, technology-based products and possible technology-based products such as Ether and the security SPY, and speculative financial bubbles. We find that Bitcoin's behavior more closely resembles a technology-based product, an emerging asset class, or a bubble event, rather than a currency or a security; such that it is correct that existing currency and security laws should not apply to cryptocurrencies.
This paper aims to examine the relationship between Bitcoin and preeminent financial indicators using Copula-GARCH method. In the study, we use closing prices of Bitcoin and US 10-Year Bond Yield, Gold Spot US Dollar, US Dollar Index, S&P 500, FTSE 100 and NIKKEI 225. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine this issue empirically. Analysis results show that there is no strong interdependence between Bitcoin and preeminent financial indicators. These findings provide new information that will benefit policy makers, banks, financial investors, and risk managers in trading activities for both long-term and short-term strategies.
We propose a mean field game model to study the question of how centralization of reward and computational power occur in Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies. Miners compete against each other for mining rewards by increasing their computational power. This leads to a novel mean field game of jump intensity control, which we solve explicitly for miners maximizing exponential utility and handle numerically in the case of miners with power utilities. We show that the heterogeneity of their initial wealth distribution leads to greater imbalance of the reward distribution, and increased wealth heterogeneity over time, or a ârich get richerâ effect. This concentration phenomenon is aggravated by a higher Bitcoin mining reward and reduced by competition. Additionally, an advantaged miner with cost advantages such as access to cheaper electricity, contributes a significant amount of computational power in equilibrium, unaffected by competition from less efficient miners. Hence, cost efficiency can also result in the type of centralization seen among miners of cryptocurrencies. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Funding: A. M. Reppen is partly supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation [Grant SNF 181815]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4798 .
Cross correlations in fluctuations of the daily exchange rates within the basket of the 100 highest-capitalization cryptocurrencies over the period October 1, 2015-March 31, 2019 are studied. The corresponding dynamics predominantly involve one leading eigenvalue of the correlation matrix, while the others largely coincide with those of Wishart random matrices. However, the magnitude of the principal eigenvalue, and thus the degree of collectivity, strongly depends on which cryptocurrency is used as a base. It is largest when the base is the most peripheral cryptocurrency; when more significant ones are taken into consideration, its magnitude systematically decreases, nevertheless preserving a sizable gap with respect to the random bulk, which in turn indicates that the organization of correlations becomes more heterogeneous. This finding provides a criterion for recognizing which currencies or cryptocurrencies play a dominant role in the global cryptomarket. The present study shows that over the period under consideration, the Bitcoin (BTC) predominates, hallmarking exchange rate dynamics at least as influential as the U.S. dollar (USD). Even more, the BTC started dominating around the year 2017, while other cryptocurrencies, such as the Ethereum and even Ripple, assumed similar trends. At the same time, the USD, an original value determinant for the cryptocurrency market, became increasingly disconnected, and its related characteristics eventually started approaching those of a fictitious currency. These results are strong indicators of incipient independence of the global cryptocurrency market, delineating a self-contained trade resembling the Forex.
Blockchain networks and similar cryptoeconomic networks are systems, specifically complex systems. They are adaptive networks with multiscale spatio-temporal dynamics. Individual actions may be incentivized towards a collective goal with âpurpose-drivenâ tokens. Blockchain networks, for example, are equipped cryptoeconomic mechanisms that allow the decentralized network to simultaneously maintain a universal state layer, support peer-to-peer settlement, and incentivize collective action. These networks represent an institutional infrastructure upon which socioeconomic collaboration is facilitated â in the absence of intermediaries or traditional organizations. They provide a mission-critical and safety-critical regulatory infrastructure for autonomous agents in untrusted economic networks. Their tokens provide a rich, real-time data set reflecting all economic activities in their systems. Advances in network science and data science can thus be leveraged to design and analyze these economic systems in a manner consistent with the best practices of modern systems engineering. Research that reflects all aspects of these socioeconomic networks needs (i) a complex systems approach, (ii) interdisciplinary research, and (iii) a combination of economic and engineering methods, here referred to as âeconomic systems engineering,â for the regulation and control of these socioeconomic systems. This manuscript provides a conceptual framework synthesizing the research space and proceeds to outline specific research questions and methodologies for future research in this field, applying an inductive approach based on interdisciplinary literature review and relative contextualization of the works cited.
Robert Mundell (1961 Mundell, R. A. 1961. âA Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.â The American Economic Review 51 (4): 657â665.[Web of Science Âź] , [Google Scholar]. âA Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.â The American Economic Review 51 (4): 657â665) framed the fixed-versus-flexible exchange rate controversy in a novel way when he focused attention on currency areas and the ingredients necessary for a group of nations to form an optimal currency area (OCA). This paper proposes an analogous theory for cryptocurrencies, called optimal currency scope (OCS), and explains the conditions necessary for an OCS to exist. In contrast to an OCA, which is defined by its non-overlapping geographic areas, an OCS is defined by its multiple-overlapping attributes and the needs they solve, which we call scope. Scopes are not geographic and have fuzzy boundaries; so, the possibility of competing currencies in a single scope needs to be considered. The central issues surrounding an OCS are the optimal number and magnitude of currency attributes, rather than whether nations should adopt fixed versus fluctuating exchange rates. Similar to the findings since Mundell first introduced his OCA Theory, we find that the optimum number of cryptocurrency attributes and, therefore, the optimal number of cryptocurrencies must be determined empirically rather than theoretically.
Purpose The development of blockchain and cryptocurrency may alleviate the economic strain associated with recession. Economic recessions tend to be aggregate-demand driven, meaning that they are caused by fluctuations in the supply of or demand for money. Holding monetary policy as solution assumes that stability must arise from outside of the economic system. Under a policy regime that allows innovations in blockchain to develop, blockchain technology may promote a money supply that is responsive to changes in demand to hold money. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that cryptocurrencies present an opportunity to profitably implement rules that promote macroeconomic stability. In particular, cryptocurrency that is asset-backed may provide a means for cheaply attaining liquidity during a crisis. Design/methodology/approach The role of cryptocurrency in promoting macroeconomic equilibrium is approached through the lens of monetary theory. Moves away from macroeconomic equilibrium necessitate either a change in the average price of money or a change in the quantity of money, or a change in portfolio demand for money. Cryptocurrency promotes an increase, however this requires the alignment of policy regulating the use of cryptocurrency, reduction in taxes placed on the use of cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency protocol. Findings Cryptocurrency is unlikely to become legal tender, but it may alleviate macroeconomic fluctuations as a near money that provides liquidity and whose supply is sensitive to changes in demand to hold money and money-like substitutes. This role might be inhibited if policy stifles the development of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology. Research limitations/implications New financial innovations like cryptocurrencies can be analyzed applying the equation of exchange in light of the mechanics of money creation under conditions of disequilibrium. Monetary disequilibrium may be promoted by policy that causes bottlenecks in financial markets. Originality/value Theory of monetary disequilibrium has broad implications for the development and regulation of financial markets. This theory has not been applied to the development of cryptocurrency markets.
:This article suggests that current forms of crypto currencies will fail to complement or replace fiat money. We show that fixed-supply coins like bitcoin suffer from an inherently speculative and deflationary design and are not backed by a âWe Owe Youâ. Stablecoins, i.e. coins that rely on flexible supply designs, are also not backed by a âWe Owe Youâ and cannot achieve price stability because they build on outdated monetarist theories. Moreover, the algorithmically planned allocation of new coins, which is characteristic of stablecoins, is not market-based. As such, it is inferior to contemporary ways of money creation. Regarding price stability, we suggest that (crypto) monetary policy needs to overcome the illusionary dichotomy between the real and the financial circuit by accounting for systematic coordinated wage bargaining mechanisms to reflect that firms set prices according to cost-based pricing rules.
Mustapha Abubakar, M. Kabir Hassan, Muhammad Auwalu Haruna
Abstract Cryptocurrencies are hidden monies that are specifically created to be used as digital currencies while assuming the characteristics of real money. Barring the divergent opinions on whether permitted in Islamic law (that is/are halal) or forbidden in Islamic law (that is/are haram), and for which the swing tends to be in favor of its blockchain underlying technology permissibility in Islam, cryptocurrencies are undoubtedly indicating potential for relevance in the global trade, investment, and other contract settlements in some years to come. The potential of the blockchain technology is phenomenal with recent estimates suggesting it will be worth more than $20 trillion in just two years, which is more than the entire American economy. Since fortunes are made by those entrepreneurs and indeed savvy investors who have discerned its future potential earlier on, there exists some great temptation for people to jump on the blockchain bandwagon. Apparently the growing acceptability of digital fiat money as a result of technology development on one hand, and the failure of the paper money to mitigate inflation and other economic disequilibria since the disappearance of the gold standard on the other, various forms of cryptocurrencies including Bitcoins (referred to as the king) appear to roar toward wider recognition. However, an emerging phenomenon associated with cryptocurrency revolution is an observed significant fluctuation (the tide) in its value and thus a subject of discussion within Islamic finance community and beyond. In the midst of this also is the current agitation founded on some of the Islamic law (SharÄ«Êża) view on the necessity of asset-backed money, to be extended to the current cryptocurrency innovation for its transformation into a SharÄ«Êża compliant precious metal backed currency. The big question now which this chapter sought to provide the answer is, what are the implications of these developments to a more established and widening global phenomenon of Islamic finance and its development in Muslim world vis-ĂĄ-vis aspirations for sustained economic development. The work finds that cryptocurrencies would generate three advantages over all forms of money including gold through: establishing a unified financial system through its standard decentralization, being rarer than gold and its significant mitigation of inflation. It is also noted that the prevalent foreign exchange risk resulting from the underlying activities (rather than the currency itself) is free from speculation (Gharar). It is, therefore, recommended that stakeholders in the Islamic Finance world should not be passive but be proactive in commencing processes to develop technical notes, standards, and operational guidelines to partake in the inevitable migration to cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin can be exchanged for other cryptocurrencies as well as for fiat currencies on many different platforms. Nevertheless, its real convertibility may be limited by market liquidity. The main aim of this article is to characterize and compare big and small bitcoin markets in terms of liquidity. I examine four platforms with high trade volume: Kraken, Bitstamp, BitFlyer and BTCBOX, as well as small entities which enable bitcoin to be traded in Polish zloty: BitBay and BitMarket. I compare the number of trades and the time between trades on selected bitcoin markets, determine the volume distribution throughout the day and analyse the dynamics of Amihudâs illiquidity measure â ILLIQ. I find that an exchange which is among the global leaders in terms of trading bitcoin in a particular traditional currency can be considered a smaller market in terms of trade volume in another traditional currency. Moreover, the results imply that BitBay and BitMarket can be perceived as local markets. They are mainly used for trading in Polish zloty, and are illiquid in terms of trading in the remaining traditional currencies. Home bias, the fact that they offer a possibility of trading in a less popular currency (in comparison to the world reserve currencies), and that have their interface in Polish, may give these platforms a competitive advantage.
This paper applies biomimetic engineering to the problem of permissionless Byzantine consensus and achieves results that surpass the prior state of the art by four orders of magnitude. It introduces a biologically inspired asymmetric Sybil-resistance mechanism, Proof-of-Balance, which can replace symmetric Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake weighting schemes.
The biomimetic mechanism is incorporated into a permissionless blockchain protocol, Key Retroactivity Network Consensus (KRNC), which delivers ~40,000 times the security and speed of today's decentralized ledgers. KRNC allows the fiat money that the public already owns to be upgraded with cryptographic inflation protection, eliminating the problems inherent in bootstrapping new currencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum.
The paper includes two independently significant contributions to the literature. First, it replaces the non-structural axioms invoked in prior work with a new formal method for reasoning about trust, liveness, and safety from first principles. Second, it demonstrates how two previously overlooked exploits, book-prize attacks and pseudo-transfer attacks, collectively undermine the security guarantees of all prior permissionless ledgers.
The development of the cryptocurrency market and the implications for the whole economy and finance for all traders cause a keen interest in this subject. The chapter discusses the functioning of a financial system based on cryptocurrencies and its significance for economies. In this chapter, the development of the global cryptocurrency market was presented and the history of the most popular cryptocurrency, bitcoin, was analyzed. The analysis and the assessment of the state and structure of the Polish cryptocurrencies market were presented on the background of the global cryptocurrency market. Also, we presented the possible development paths for the cryptocurrencies market in Poland and in the world.
Abstract The growing literature on Bitcoin can be divided into two groups. One performs an economic analysis of Bitcoin focusing on its monetary characteristics. The other one takes a financial look at the price of Bitcoin. Interestingly, both of these groups have not given much more than passing comments to the problem of whether or not Bitcoin has the right monetary rule in order to become a wellâestablished currency. This paper argues that Bitcoin in particular, and cryptocurrencies in general, do not have a good monetary rule and that this shortcoming seriously limits its prospect of becoming widely used money.
Raziyeh RezaâGharehbagh, Ashkan Hafezalkotob, Ahmad Makui, Mohammad Kazem Sayadi
Purpose This study aims to analyze the competition of two financial chains (FCs) when the government intervenes in the financial market to prohibit the excessively high-interest rate by minimizing the arbitrages caused by speculative transactions. Each FC comprises an investor and one intermediary, attempts to finance the capital-constrained firms in financing needs. Design/methodology/approach Using a Stackelberg game theoretic framework and formulating two- and three-level optimization problems for six possible scenarios, the authors establish an integrative framework to evaluate the scenarios through the lens of the two main decision-making structures of the FCs (i.e. centralized and decentralized) and three policies of the government (i.e. speculation minimizing, revenue gaining and utility maximizing). Findings Solving the problem results in optimal values for tariffs, which guarantee a stable competitive market. Consequently, policymaking by the government influences the decision variables, which is shown in a numerical study. The authors find that the government can orchestrate the FCs in the competitive market by imposing tariffs and prohibiting high-interest rates via regulating the speculation impacts, which guarantees a stable market and facilitates the financing of capital-constrained firms. Research limitations/implications This paper aids the financial markets and governments to control the interest rate by minimizing the speculation level. Originality/value This paper investigates the impact of government intervention policies â as a leading player â on the competition of FCs â as followers â in providing financial services and making profits. The government imposes tariffs on the interest rate to stabilize the market by limiting speculative transactions. The paper presents the mathematical models of the optimization problems through the game-theoretic framework and comparison of the scenarios through a numerical experiment.
Confirmation of Bitcoin transactions is executed in blocks, which are then stored in the Blockchain. As compared to the number of transactions in the mempool, the set of transactions which are verified but not yet confirmed, available space for inclusion in a block is typically limited. For this reason, successful miners can only process a subset of such transactions, and users compete with each other to enter the next block by offering confirmation fees. Assuming that successful miners pursue revenue maximization, they will include in the block those mempool transactions that maximize earnings from related fees. In the paper we model transaction fees as a Nash Equilibrium outcome of an auction game with complete information. In the game the successful miner acts as an auctioneer selling block space, and users bid for shares of such space to confirm their transactions. Moreover, based on expected fees we also discuss what the optimal, revenue maximizing, block size limit should be for the successful miner. Consistently with the intuition, the optimal block size limit resolves the trade-off between including additional transactions (which possibly lower the unit fees collected) and keeping the block capacity limited (with, however, higher unit fees).
Michael Mainelli, Matthew Leitch, Dionysios S. Demetis
A cryptocurrency needs a relatively stable value if it is to fulfill the traditional functions of money and be useful as a currency. To achieve this, controls are needed within the ecosystem of the cryptocurrency. Although a simulation cannot predict future currency rates or other variables exactly, it is argued that a model that simulates a range of challenging behavior can be a useful testbed for control schemes. To illustrate and explore this idea, an agent-based economic model was used to simulate the early period of a hypothetical cryptocurrency and test two control mechanisms. The results suggest that this approach may be fruitful and that it may be important to include more than just coin minting within the control scheme. An economic simulation model is likely to be a valuable tool in developing and regulating effective cryptocurrency systems.
This study contributes to the existing literature on the empirical characteristics of virtual currency allowing for a dynamic transition between different economic regimes and considering various crashes and rallies over the business cycle, that is captured by jumps. We combine Markov-switching models with Levy jump-diffusion offer a new model that captures the different sub-period of crises over the business cycle, that is captured by jumps. This method also enables to test the relevance of dynamic measures of regime switching concerning the independent pure-jump process, which are not frequently used in the literature. Bitcoin offers something different than a traditional currency; there is potential value of having a network that helps as a secure repository for the common knowledge of all transactions. Besides, the value of Bitcoin fluctuates so wildly that it may be too risky to serve as a credible store of value.
Theory in Stein (1987) suggests that introducing derivative contracts, such as futures, can destabilize underlying asset prices if the contracts attract enough speculative traders. This paper examines how the introduction of Bitcoin futures influences the underlying Bitcoin market. Consistent with Stein (1987), we find that that Bitcoin's volatility increases significantly during the post-introduction period. Perhaps more importantly, however, we observe significant spillover effects into related markets. For instance, in other cryptocurrencies, the increase in volatility in these markets is greater than the post-introduction increase in Bitcoin.
We develop a generic model of money and liquidity that identifies sources of liquidity bubbles and seignorage rents.We provide sufficient conditions under which a swap of monies leaves the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged.We apply the equivalence result to the "Chicago Plan,'' cryptocurrencies, the Indian de-monetization experiment, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).In particular, we show why CBDC need not undermine financial stability.
We consider a setting where agents can choose between two currencies to conduct their goods purchases. The usage of either currency comes with currency-specific transactions costs. For example, purchasing some goods with cryptocurrencies rather than dollars is easier and may avoid taxes. We explore an extension of Schilling-Uhlig (2019), allowing for asymmetry in transaction costs as well as dollar-bitcoin exchange fees. Agents alternate in their role as buyers and sellers, necessitating currency. A central bank steers the dollar inflation path, while bitcoins are in fixed supply. We characterize the nonstochastic equilibrium and the resulting exchange rate dynamics.
This study examines whether the efficiency of cryptocurrency markets (Bitcoin and Ethereum) evolve over time based on Lo's (2004) adaptive market hypothesis (AMH). In particular, we measure the degree of market efficiency using a generalized least squares-based time-varying model that does not depend on sample size, unlike previous studies that used conventional methods. The empirical results show that (1) the degree of market efficiency varies with time in the markets, (2) Bitcoin's market efficiency level is higher than that of Ethereum over most periods, and (3) a market with high market liquidity has been evolving. We conclude that the results support the AMH for the most established cryptocurrency market.