Blockchain Papers

Zhankui He, Zhouhang Xie, Rahul Jha, Harald Steck · 9 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Wenli Wu, Jinyi Zhao, Taowei Chen, Yimin Yu

Currently, with the continuous in-depth research and application of blockchain access control, security issues on the blockchain have become a focus of attention. Based on CPABE, this paper proposes a trusted and secure blockchain access control scheme based on ciphertext policy. Firstly, a decentralized attribute-based encryption algorithm (DABE) is adopted to achieve distributed calculation of user attribute private keys, effectively solving the problems of high trust cost and single point of failure caused by the key center generating private keys in traditional CPABE. At the same time, a private key consensus verification protocol based on zero-knowledge proof is designed to ensure the correctness and security of user attribute private keys without leaking private key information. Through the analysis of on-chain security and experimental simulation, the results show that this scheme has better performance while maintaining high security and is more suitable for distributed access control with large attribute scales.

Ziyan Cai, Xin Chang, Li Ping

Healthcare chatbots are becoming increasingly popular, but with their use comes the issues of excessive personal information collection and privacy leakage. To address this issue, we propose a Healthcare Chatbot-based Privacy Preserving (HCPP) Framework that adopts a data-oriented approach to reduce the excessive disclosure of personal information. HCPP consists of two main components: the Healthcare Chatbot-based Minimized Personal Information (HCMPI) method and the Healthcare Chatbot-based Zero Knowledge Proof (HCZKP) method. HCMPI leverages large language models (LLMs) to minimize the acquisition of unnecessary personal health information without significantly affecting healthcare service. HCZKP further encrypts a part of the minimized information, making the data available but invisible. The experimental evaluation results demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of our approach.

Nguyen Van Nghi, Do Quang Trung, Dinh Tien Thanh

The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is a key exchange protocol that is widely used in information technology systems. However, the ECDH protocol still has inherent weaknesses due to the lack of a user authentication mechanism and is affected by man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper, we propose two novel variants of the ECDH protocol using Schnorr Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) for Client-Server network model. We aim to integrate the user authentication mechanism into the key exchange process for the Client-Server network model with higher security than applying the original ECDH protocol. To achieve this goal, we compare and analyze the network model utilizing the original ECDH protocol versus the proposed protocols. Therefore, we draw some conclusions about the advantages, disadvantages, and feasibility of the proposed solution.

Eason Chen, Justa Liang, Ray Huang, Pierce Hung · 8 authors

Randomness plays a pivotal role in modern online gaming, but disputes have arisen over the accuracy of stated winning chances, resulting in legal issues and financial setbacks for gaming companies. Fortunately, blockchain-based games offer a solution to the transparency and fairness issue regarding randomness. Furthermore, emerging blockchain technology like Sui Network enhances the efficiency of smart contracts by eliminating traditional web3 barriers, such as inefficiencies and expensive transaction fees. This unlocks the potential for extensive decentralized gaming applications. This paper aims to provide insights into designing a fair, verifiable, and efficient smart contract game on blockchain by the example of building raffles on the Sui Network. We explore efficient methods for implementing randomness on smart contracts, including DRAND committee-based decentralized random beacons and single private-key-based verifiable random functions (VRF). Then, progress from basic to comprehensive smart contract design. We addressed limitations in developing blockchain games in general, such as data input and storage space constraints. We propose corresponding solutions, encompassing the utilization of Object Tables, Delegate Object Creation, and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) to optimize storage and input efficiency. After testing our designs, we found that the transaction fees for DRAND beacons and private-key-based VRFs are similar. Moreover, Object Tables incur higher overall transaction fees, while the ZKP setup fee is cheap but becomes very expensive during the verification process. Moreover, we identified suitable designs for different application scenarios by comparing the pros and cons of different smart contract implementations. Our findings provide valuable guidance for future researchers and developers in building random, fair, and verifiable games with smart contracts.

Liguan Wang, Yuan Li, Haibin Kan

No abstract is available for this record.

Zichen Zhu, Jing He, Xiaofeng Ma

Data leakage, result tampering, and oversight issues are issues with traditional capital verification. These issues can be successfully resolved using a combination of blockchain technology, smart contracts, cryptography, and other technologies because it is a traceable and tamper-proof data structure. In order to prevent data leaking, this article suggests a blockchain-based capital verification methodology that uses zero-knowledge proof technology. Using smart contracts, the possibility of result fabrication is automatically verified and removed. Additionally, this approach establishes a penetrating supervision scheme, and regulators are heavily involved in every facet of capital verification. The results of the experiment demonstrate that the plan is reliable and effective, has low storage costs, and can successfully safeguard personal data.

Miquel À. Cabot-Nadal, Brendan Playford, M. Magdalena Payeras–Capellà, Sebastian Gerske · 6 authors

The need for self-sovereign and privacy-preserving identity solutions is becoming more critical, due to increasing concerns about privacy and data security, especially when it involves highly sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII). In this article we propose a protocol based on blockchain technology, Soulbound tokens (SBT) and zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) to address these challenges. By using the public key of the identity holder address to encrypt the data, our protocol can represent various identity attributes while ensuring privacy. We explore the concepts of self-sovereign and privacy-preserving identity and discuss the advantages of using blockchain-based SBTs and ZKPs in identity verification systems. Moreover, this article provides an overview of the state of the art in privacy-preserving identity using SBTs and ZKPs within the blockchain ecosystem, highlighting the potential benefits and future directions for this emerging field.

Kasthuri, Ashok, Pahuja, Aseem, Guo, Zhiling, Jiang, Lingxiao · 5 authors

NFT marketplaces have witnessed exponential growth. The unique attributes of NFTs, encapsulated by the acronym CRAVED (concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, disposable), make them susceptible to multifaceted thefts. In response, we introduce "SafeNFT Mart," an NFT marketplace architecture devised to thwart counterfeiting and uphold both asset and ownership integrity. We leverage Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) for ownership verification and integrate a stringent punishment protocol to deter illicit activities. Our design draws from the design science research (DSR) approach. Expert interviews were conducted to fortify our findings, focusing on relevance, adaptability, and technological viability in tandem with real-world and strategic implications. An initial analytical model is provided to gauge the efficacy of our punitive mechanism. This research culminates with future work, outlining the further development and refinement of the proposed marketplace solution.

Mohammadtaghi Badakhshan, Guang Gong

Although employing blockchain in supply chain management (SCM) can provide benefits in numerous aspects such as traceability, transparency, and more, using public blockchain for SCM may compromise the privacy of the supply chain participants and their business secrets. In this paper, we review recent papers that integrate blockchain with SCM and the papers that propose privacy-preserving approaches for public blockchain. Then, we identify the problem in the existing solutions. Additionally, we present an outline of a framework that enables entities in a supply chain to upload their data records anonymously. This framework preserves unlinkability when transferring product ownership. The proposed scheme allows data auditors, who can be the end customers of a supply chain, to access a product's history and verify the authenticity of the data while preserving the privacy of the data uploader. We demonstrate that supply chain data records follow a directed acyclic graph (DAG), similar to the data structure that maintains data records in version control systems (VCS). Hence, this insight could make the framework applicable for anonymous version control systems based on blockchain.

Wervyan Shalannanda

The role of digital identity systems in today’s cyber infrastructure is pivotal to providing secure access to online services. Privacy-preserving mechanisms, however, are becoming more important as cyber threats develop. Especially in large networks, zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are an effective way to enhance privacy in digital identity systems. When used during authentication, they protect the privacy of user data by verifying knowledge to another entity without unveiling the actual data. A ZKP can also reduce identity theft risks, mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks, and enhance security when integrated into privacy-preserving networks. In this paper, we examine the role that ZKPs play in privacy-preserving networks and the possibility of using them in this regard, in order to gain insight into their application in digital identity systems.

Wennan Wang, Lin kai Zhu, Shiyang Song

With the acceleration of global economic integration, cross-border transactions are becoming more and more frequent. However, traditional cross-border transaction systems generally suffer from inefficiency, high cost and privacy leakage. In this paper, we study the privacy protection problem in cross-border transactions and propose a privacy protection scheme for cross-border transactions based on block-chain technology. First, this paper briefly introduces the basic principles of block-chain technology and its application scenarios in cross-border transactions. Second, to address the shortcomings of existing privacy protection technologies, this paper proposes a privacy protection scheme that combines data encryption technology, zero-knowledge proof and hybrid network. The scheme achieves automatic execution and verification through smart contracts, which effectively protects the privacy of cross-border transaction participants. Finally, the effectiveness of the privacy protection scheme proposed in this paper in improving the level of privacy protection for cross- border transactions is verified through experimental evaluation and result analysis. This study is important for promoting the development of cross- border transactions, improving transaction efficiency and protecting user privacy.

Yuan Tian, Yongda Pang, Xinke Tian

In large-scale private computing applications, various arithmetic relations appear as or can be reduced to matrix relations. In this paper, we establish the efficient zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) for the quadratic matrix relation over finite field Fp with three or four witness matrices. In private computing tasks, lots of arithmetic relations are instances or special cases of such form, particularly some matrix structural decomposition relations. Different from the widely applied vectorspecific method, our method is matrix-specific. The matrix equation is treated as a tensor equality and probabilisticequivalent reduction techniques are applied to reduce the non-linear matrix relation to simple vector relation. To the authors’ best knowledge, currently, there are no matrix-specific methods to ZKP for nonlinear matrix relations. Compared against the current general linearization (vector-specific) method, our method substantially outperforms it in all critical aspects, e.g., for n-by-t matrix witnesses the required size of common reference string (c.r.s.) can be compressed by a factor of 2nt and the number of rounds, group and field elements in messages are all decreased by a factor of ≈2 for large-size witnesses. Computational complexities are almost the same in both methods.

Yuan Tian, Yongda Pang, Xinke Tian

In large-scale private computing applications, various arithmetic relations appear as or can be reduced to matrix relations. In this paper, we establish the efficient zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) for the quadratic matrix relation over finite field Fp with two witness matrices. In private computing tasks, lots of typical relations are instances or special cases of this form, e.g., matrix multiplicative relation, inverse relation, isometric relation, etc. Different from the widely-applied vectorspecific method, our method is matrix-specific. The matrix equation is treated as a tensor equality and probabilisticequivalent reduction techniques are applied to reduce the non-linear matrix relation to simple vector relation. To the authors’ best knowledge, currently, there are no matrix-specific methods to ZKP for nonlinear matrix relations. Compared against the current (vector-specific) method, our method substantially outperforms it in all critical aspects, e.g., for n-raw t-column matrix witnesses, the required size of common reference string (c.r.s.) can be compressed by a factor of 2nt and the number of messages, group and field elements are all reduced by a factor of ≈2 for large-size witnesses. Computational complexities in both methods are almost the same.

Ruta Jawale, Dakshita Khurana

A non-interactive ZK (NIZK) proof enables verification of NP statements without revealing secrets about them. However, an adversary that obtains a NIZK proof may be able to clone this proof and distribute arbitrarily many copies of it to various entities: this is inevitable for any proof that takes the form of a classical string. In this paper, we ask whether it is possible to rely on quantum information in order to build NIZK proof systems that are impossible to clone. We define and construct unclonable non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments (of knowledge) for NP, addressing a question first posed by Aaronson (CCC 2009). Besides satisfying the zero-knowledge and argument of knowledge properties, these proofs additionally satisfy unclonability. Very roughly, this ensures that no adversary can split an honestly generated proof of membership of an instance $x$ in an NP language $\mathcal{L}$ and distribute copies to multiple entities that all obtain accepting proofs of membership of $x$ in $\mathcal{L}$. Our result has applications to unclonable signatures of knowledge, which we define and construct in this work; these non-interactively prevent replay attacks.

Christopher Wiraatmaja, Shoji Kasahara

In this paper, we propose zero-knowledge named proof, a replay attack prevention scheme that ensures the user's anonymity against malicious administrators. We begin with adopting the zero-knowledge set-membership proof into an authentication setting in which users would delegate their requests to an agent that obstructs the user's identity from the administrator. This anonymous agent carries the guarantee of authenticity, which the administrator through the set-membership proof can confirm. Next, we prevent replay attacks from other parties by binding the agent's identity to the delegation request verifiable by the administrators. By leveraging these properties, a blockchain-based authentication scheme is then built. We quantitatively evaluate the security, cost-efficiency, and performance of our scheme and provide a third-party authorization scheme from our authentication framework to demonstrate its real-world relevancy.

Shanshan Han, Wenxuan Wu, Baturalp Buyukates, Weizhao Jin · 7 authors

Federated Learning (FL) systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks, such as model poisoning attacks and backdoor attacks. Existing defense mechanisms face critical limitations in deployments, such as relying on impractical assumptions (e.g., adversaries acknowledging the presence of attacks before attacking) or undermining accuracy in model training, even in benign scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose CustodianFL, a two-staged anomaly detection method specifically designed for FL deployments. In the first stage, it flags suspicious client activities. In the second stage that is activated only when needed, it further examines these candidates using Three-Sigma Rule to identify and exclude truly malicious local models from FL training. To ensure integrity and transparency within the FL system, CustodianFL integrates zero-knowledge proofs, enabling clients to cryptographically verify the server's detection process without relying on the server's goodwill. CustodianFL operates without unrealistic assumptions and avoids interfering with FL training in attack-free scenarios. It bridges the gap between theoretical advances in FL security and the practical demands of real FL systems. Experimental results demonstrate that CustodianFL consistently delivers performance comparable to benign cases, highlighting its effectiveness in identifying and eliminating malicious models with high accuracy.

Yachao Huo, Zongqu Zhao, Panke Qin, Shujing Wang · 5 authors

Summary Secure two‐party computation allows a pair of parties to compute a function together while keeping their inputs private. Ultimately, each party receives only its own correct output. In this paper, a post‐quantum secure two‐party computation protocol is proposed that can be used to effectively block malicious parties. The protocol solves the problems of traditional protocols based on garbled circuits, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks, high communication costs and low computational efficiency. The input garbled keys of the circuit constructor is structured as a Learning with Error (LWE) equation, enabling the circuit constructor to employ a zero‐knowledge proof that demonstrates the uniformity of inputs across all circuits.In the key transfer phase, an LWE‐based batch single‐choice cut‐and‐choose oblivious transfer is proposed to avoid selective failure attacks. In addition, the protocol employs a penalty mechanism to detect if the circuit constructor has generated an incorrect circuit. We have compared the communication overhead of this protocol with three other secure two‐party computation protocols based on Cut‐and‐Choose technology. The analytical results show that this protocol has the best error probability and is resilient to quantum attacks under the malicious adversary model. In addition, with appropriate parameters, the protocol is able to reduce its communication bandwidth by an average of 40.41%.

Zhipeng Wang, Nanqing Dong, Jiahao Sun, William J. Knottenbelt · 5 authors

Federated learning (FL) is a machine learning paradigm, which enables multiple and decentralized clients to collaboratively train a model under the orchestration of a central aggregator. FL can be a scalable machine learning solution in big data scenarios. Traditional FL relies on the trust assumption of the central aggregator, which forms cohorts of clients honestly. However, a malicious aggregator, in reality, could abandon and replace the client's training models, or insert fake clients, to manipulate the final training results. In this work, we introduce zkFL, which leverages zero-knowledge proofs to tackle the issue of a malicious aggregator during the training model aggregation process. To guarantee the correct aggregation results, the aggregator provides a proof per round, demonstrating to the clients that the aggregator executes the intended behavior faithfully. To further reduce the verification cost of clients, we use blockchain to handle the proof in a zero-knowledge way, where miners (i.e., the participants validating and maintaining the blockchain data) can verify the proof without knowing the clients' local and aggregated models. The theoretical analysis and empirical results show that zkFL achieves better security and privacy than traditional FL, without modifying the underlying FL network structure or heavily compromising the training speed.

Shunrong Jiang, Jinpeng Li, Xiaoyan Zhang, Hao Yue · 6 authors

The large-scale integration of decentralized energy resources has resulted in surgical changes in energy trading systems. Traditional centralized trading systems suffer from high management costs and low efficiency. The recent advance in blockchain technology has enabled the invention of decentralized energy trading systems, which can overcome the limitations of centralized trading systems. However, security and privacy concerns have become obstacles when widely marketing and implementing decentralized energy trading systems. For example, the on-chain transactions are publicly visible, leading to the risk of trading information leakages. Moreover, in the demand response (DR) assistance process, the aggregated report of energy trading results may contain detailed trading information which results in user privacy leakage. To address those problems, this article proposes a blockchain-based privacy-aware energy trading mechanism. We design a stealthy on-chain transmission method to protect user privacy without revealing the consumer-supplier trading relationship and the exact trading data. Furthermore, we employ non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof to aggregate reports in a reliable and privacy-preserving manner. Security analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve security goals with affordable cost for decentralized energy trading systems.

Tamara Finogina

(English) One of the most common fears regarding electronic voting is that a voting device will disregard the voter's intent and cast a different vote instead. An undetectable attack like that on a large scale will allow the adversary to control the election result completely. Therefore, the cast-as-intended verification, which ensures that the ballot contains the voter's choice and not something else, is crucial. Another common fear when introducing electronic voting is coercion, which captures a variety of ways the coercer can use to prevent voters from expressing their will. Hence, coercion resistance is a valuable property of electronic voting as well. One particularly challenging task is to find a trade-off between ensuring a voter cannot be coerced and, at the same time, preventing a malicious voting device from cheating. This thesis explores this trade-off to find how we can provide coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verification. The contributions can be roughly divided into three parts: (1) study in the standard settings, (2) exploration of post-quantum cryptography, and (3) practical constructions and search for the limitations of both properties. In the first part, we give an extensive overview of the current state of the art in electronic voting literature regarding those properties. Then, we put forward two formal definitions for achieving coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verification in settings without pre-exchanged data. After that, we present two practical constructions and prove their security under the proposed definitions. We also show the efficiency of our proposals by providing proof of the concept implementations. In the second part, we switch to post-quantum settings and identify the usability issues rooted in the lattice-based math affecting both proposed solutions. To address those issues, we present a generic transformation that departs from an interactive zero-knowledge system (that might require multiple re-runs to complete the protocol) and obtains a 3-move zero-knowledge system (without re-runs). The transformation combines the well-known Fiat-Shamir technique with several initially exchanged messages. The resulting 3-move system enjoys honest-verifier zero-knowledge and can be easily turned into a fully deniable proof using standard methods. In the final part, we focus on the practical aspects of the coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verification. First, we present the case of a computationally limited voter, which we consider the most realistic. We show that even a computationally limited voter can enjoy coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verification, but a help of a simple aid device for nonce generation is required. Also, we demonstrate that our generic definition easily adapts to the constraints of the limited voter. After that, we present ongoing work that focuses on the cases of extreme coercion based on new and unexplored mechanisms such as delay encryption and blockchain. We show an advanced coercive attack on our first construction and describe an improvement to the second solution that reduces the number of interactions to an optimal three rounds. To summarize, we start by studying coercion-resistant cast-as-intended verification in standard settings, which results in formal definitions and two practical solutions. Then we move into the post-quantum world, where we learn that an extra step is needed to preserve the usability of our previously proposed constructions, which results in the generic transformation to avoid protocol re-runs. After that, we concentrate on a computationally limited voter, which leads to another simple solution and shows the adaptability of our original definitions. Finally, we explore the extreme coercion threats, which result in a new coercion attack on the first construction and upgrade of the second solution. (Català) Una de les preocupacions més comunes pel que fa al vot electrònic és que el dispositiu de votació no tingui en compte la intenció del votant i emeti un vot diferent. Un atac com aquest, si no fos detectable, a gran escala permetria a l'adversari controlar completament el resultat electoral. Per tant, és crucial permetre la propietat de verificació de la intenció del vot emès, la qual garanteix que la papereta contingui la intenció del votant i no una altra cosa. Una altra preocupació és la coacció, que engloba una varietat de maneres que el coaccionador pot utilitzar per obligar que els votants expressin la seva voluntat. La prevenció de la coacció també és una propietat valuosa del vot electrònic .Una tasca especialment difícil és trobar un compromís entre assegurar que un votant no pot ser coaccionat i, al mateix temps, evitar que un dispositiu de vot compromès faci trampes. Aquesta tesi analitza aquesta problemàtica; les contribucions de la tesi es poden dividir en tres parts: (1) estudi de les configuracions d’escenaris de vot estàndards, (2) exploració de la criptografia post-quàntica i (3) construccions pràctiques i cerca de les limitacions d'ambdues propietats. A la primera part, donem una visió general de l'estat actual de la literatura sobre el vot electrònic relacionada a aquestes propietats. A continuació, proposem dues definicions formals per assolir una verificació resistent a la coacció de la intenció del vot emès, en escenaris on no existeix un intercanvi de dades previ. Després, presentem dues propostes pràctiques i demostrem la seva seguretat sota les definicions proposades. També mostrem l'eficàcia de les nostres propostes implementant proves de concepte A la segona part, canviem a l’escenari post-quàntic amb matemàtiques basades en reticles i identifiquem els problemes d'usabilitat que afectarien ambdues solucions proposades en aquest nou escenari. Per solucionar-los, presentem una transformació genèrica que parteix d'un sistema interactiu de coneixement nul (que podria requerir múltiples re-execucions per completar el protocol) i que obté un sistema de coneixement nul de 3 moviments (sense re-execucions). La transformació combina la coneguda tècnica Fiat-Shamir amb diversos missatges intercanviats inicialment. A la part final, ens centrem en els aspectes pràctics de la verificació resistent a la coacció de la intenció del vot emès. En primer lloc, presentem el cas d'un votant limitat computacionalment, que considerem el més realista. Mostrem que fins i tot un votant amb limitacions computacionals pot gaudir d'una verificació resistent a la coacció de la intenció del vot emès, però requereix l'ajuda d'un dispositiu senzill per a la generació d’una prova. A més, demostrem que la nostra definició genèrica s'adapta fàcilment a les limitacions del votant. Després d'això, presentem un treball recent que se centra en els casos de coacció extrema basats en mecanismes nous i poc explorats com ara el xifrat amb retard i la cadena de blocs. Mostrem un atac coercitiu avançat a la nostra primera proposta genèrica i descrivim una millora de la segona que redueix el nombre d'interaccions a tres rondes òptimes. Com a resum, comencem estudiant la verificació resistent a la coacció de la intenció del vot emès en entorns criptogràfics estàndard, que dóna lloc a definicions formals i dues solucions pràctiques. Aleshores ens movem al món de la criptografia post-quàntica, on cal un pas addicional per preservar la usabilitat de les dues solucions proposades anteriorment: una transformació genèrica per evitar repeticions del protocol. Després d'això, ens concentrem en un votant computacionalment limitat, que condueix a una altra solució senzilla i mostra l'adaptabilitat de les nostres definicions originals. Finalment, explorem les amenaces de coacció extremes, que donen lloc a un nou atac de coerció a la primera solució i a una actualització de la segona solució.

Peiheng Zhang, Min Tang, Willy Susilo, Mingwu Zhang

Polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) are fundamental components that can effectively solve the problems arising from the combination of Internet of Things and blockchain. These allow a committer to commit to a polynomial and then later evaluate the committed polynomial at an arbitrary challenge point along with a proof of valid, without revealing any additional information about the polynomial. Recent works have presented polynomial commitment schemes based on the discrete logarithm assumption. Their schemes do not require a trusted setup, and the verifier uses homomorphism to check the polynomial evaluation proofs. However, these schemes require two-party interactions and satisfy only special soundness and special honest verifier zero-knowledge, which are infeasible for some nonsimultaneous online or decentralized applications. In this article, we propose a novel PCS inspired by the idea of the Fiat–Shamir heuristic. Our scheme is noninteractive between the committer and the verifier. Instead of waiting for the challenge values from the verifier, the committer generates the values by accessing a random oracle. Moreover, it satisfies computational soundness and zero-knowledge by using a group operation to enhance the unpredictability of challenge values. We also propose a trapdoor commitment scheme to ensure the honest use of challenge values by the committers. Finally, we present the security and performance analysis of our scheme, which shows that our scheme is feasible with an acceptable time overhead.

Ming Li, Ming Li, Mingxing Li, Mingxing Li · 6 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Carsten Baum, Samuel Dittmer, Peter Schöll, Xiao Wang

Abstract A zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic protocol where a prover can convince a verifier that a statement is true, without revealing any further information except for the truth of the statement. This article is a survey of recent developments in building practical zero-knowledge proof systems using vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE), a tool from secure two-party computation. In this work, we attempt to systematize the recent works on VOLE-based Zero-Knowledge proofs and make the state of the art accessible in one document.