This paper provides the first evidence of a moral hazard in signaling in an entrepreneurial finance context, by examining token offerings or Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Entrepreneurs' ability to signal quality is crucial to succeeding in the competition for growth capital. However, the absence of institutions that verify endogenous signals may induce a moral hazard in signaling. Consistent with this hypothesis, artificial linguistic intelligence indicates that token issuers systematically exaggerate information disclosed in whitepapers. Exaggerating entrepreneurs raise more funds in less time, suggesting that investors do not see through this practice initially. Eventually, the crowd learns about the exaggeration bias through trading with other investors. The resulting investor disappointment causes the cryptocurrency to depreciate and the probability of platform failure to increase.
Abstract Blockchain technology represents an emerging source of venture capital crowdfunding for creative ventures, specifically in the music industry. Although music streaming is often portrayed as a success story, the internet has in fact been something of a false dawn for the recorded music industry—particularly for emerging musicians. New music ventures might obtain alternative entrepreneurial finance through token sales or Initial Coin Offerings. Policymakers can play a role in developing this form of seed finance for the creative industries and beyond.
Modern patent systems are slow, inefficient, expensive, and may result in outcomes that actively harm technological progress. This paper proposes a substantive re-think of these systems and lays a foundation upon which practical solutions can be built. Many solutions proposed in the past, such as prior-art bounties, outsourced examination, and dynamic fee setting, have gone unheeded due to the cost of administering them and the rigidity of the patent system. We explore how distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) enable these major changes by altering the way stakeholders are able to interact with the patent records system. We find that transitioning to a DLT-based patent records system can enable many previously suggested improvements to current patent systems in a flexible, scalable, and transparent manner. The case for such a transition is strengthened when jointly considering the complex but common roots of problems facing modern patent systems, rather than a balkanised set of technical solutions to address each issue independently. Noting that a DLT-based system is not a panacea, we also provide comment on the political, legal, and organisational challenges that must be overcome for such changes to be implemented at scale.
The rise of the crypto economy brings promises and perils to the venture capital industry. Distributed ledger technologies offer new investment opportunities to venture capitalists (VCs). Traditional VCs are gradually diversifying their portfolios to invest in crypto-assets and blockchain technology projects, as well as launching crypto-centric funds. Simultaneously, venture capital funds are developing various hybrid financing models to adopt and imitate the fundraising mechanism of initial coin offerings. However, the polymorphous and evolving features of crypto-assets also introduce new risks to the venture capital market. The paper therefore examines the emerging models in the venture capital crypto landscape, identifies the new risks, and examines the current regulatory and contractual solutions. The paper also proposes recommendations for the venture capital crypto landscape going forward, including heightened regulations on crypto-centric funds and fund managers.
Decentralized finance has evolved as a major contender for traditional banking systems over the last few years. Evolution in blockchain and cryptography technologies are the driving forces for decentralized finance’s growth. The emergence of Bitcoin in the finance system was a major driving force toward the tremendous growth of decentralized finance. However, with various platforms merging every day, the decentralized finance sector is still in its early, unorganized stages. The current decentralized finance market is chaotic. With a new “coin” being introduced almost every month, standardization is highly lacking in the system. DeFi already has several different applications available. For instance, one can purchase stable coins, or assets pegged to a national currency, on decentralized exchanges, move the assets to a lending platform that is also decentralized to earn interest, and then add the interest-earning instruments to a decentralized liquidity pool or an on-chain investment fund. DeFi enterprises frequently aim at decentralized decision-making, or governance, in everything from the user fees to the products they provide. A decentralized program may be started by one person or a small number of individuals, but as the project gathers traction, its leaders frequently try to step down and cede control to the user base. A decentralized autonomous organization that has its rules and regulations written into computer code and that may issue governance tokens, which allow its holders a voice in decisions rather than allowing the decision-making to a centralized government authority as in case of traditional finance, could represent this transition. While on one side, world governments are still trying to grasp and regulate the sector, on the other side, the technology’s reach has been very limited. Undoubtedly, the emergence of blockchain-based decentralized finance is massively influencing our current finance technology industry. In this chapter, we discuss the current growth in the FinTech industry and the blockchain-based decentralized finance sector. Furthermore, we discuss how decentralized finance can be used in the current FinTech industry.
Lennart Ante, Philipp Sandner, Ingo Fiedler, Andranik Tumasjan · 5 authors
This study explores the determinants of initial coin offering (ICO) success, where success is defined as the amount of capital a project could raise. ICOs are a tool for startups in the blockchain ecosystem to raise early capital with relative ease. The market for ICOs has grown at a rapid pace since its start in 2013. We analyze a unique dataset of 278 projects that finished their ICOs by August 2017 to assess determinants of funding success that we derive from the crowdfunding and venture capital literature. Our results show that ICOs exhibit similarities to classical crowdfunding and venture capital markets. Specifically, we identify resemblances in determinants of funding success regarding human capital characteristics, business model quality, project elaboration, and social media activity.
We eliminate the primary source of uncompensated risk from trading in one of the largest sectors of the global financial markets. Market infrastructure enhancements are achieved in the foreign exchange (FX) forward contract market by integrating distributed ledger technology (DLT) into the creation of collateral-linked contracts for currency forwards (CLCF). Specifically, we deploy DLT with embedded automation as the shared platform for bilateral FX forward contracts, including operational provisions of International Swaps and Derivatives Association and Credit Support Annex agreements. Through automation, we link the economics of the currency forward contract and the price-volatility-induced counterparty exposures, bringing intraday counterparty risk to within mutually acceptable ranges. The essential benefits of the over-the-counter market structure are preserved because CLCF contracts remain bilateral to allow for customized terms and conditions between market participants. Reduced concentration risk is also preserved because there is no central counterparty or central clearing organization into which all risks are pooled. As a result, liquidity is enhanced and risk is reduced in the FX forward contract market. <b>TOPICS:</b>Futures and forward contracts, currency, performance measurement, risk management
Purpose This paper aims to provide an overview of recent US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Division of Investment Management staff (“Staff”) guidance related to investment funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 that seeks to provide exposure to cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency-related products. Design/methodology/approach This paper provides analysis regarding the Staff’s view on registered investment companies that intend to invest in cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency-related products, including an overview of the questions posed by the Staff with respect to registered investment companies that seek to hold cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency-related products, which are divided into five categories: valuation, liquidity, custody, arbitrage (for exchange-traded funds) and potential manipulation and other risks. Findings The Staff is asking for additional information from industry participants to fully analyze and evaluate registered investment companies that seek to invest in cryptocurrencies. Practical implications The industry should continue to provide information to the Staff with the short-term goal of fostering an open dialogue and with the long-term goal of launching a registered investment company that invests in cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency-related products. Originality/value This paper provides practical guidance from experienced lawyers of the Investment Company Act and Securities Act.
Jun 6, 2018·World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, International Journal of Electrical, Computer, Energetic, Electronic and Communication Engineering
The JPEG Committee had its 78th meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Relevant to its ongoing standardization efforts in JPEG Privacy and Security, JPEG organized a special session to explore how to support blockchain and distributed ledger technologies to past, ongoing and future JPEG family of standards. This is motivated by the fact that considering the potential impact of such technologies in the future of multimedia, standardization will be required to enable interoperability between different systems and services of imaging relying on blockchain and distributed ledger technologies.
... The financial industry has been witnessing an exponential rise in the number of innovative start-ups. Waves of digital innovation (widely known as financial technology or FinTech) have reached the world of banking and finance, and the distributed ledger technology (DLT) is one of the leading ‘surfers’. The DLT might have been created for the main purpose of serving digital cash. Today, both the public and private sectors are actively studying the concept and seeking possible ways to extend its application to a variety of other activities and problems. The trend is growing and different DLT designs are under test. Being at a very early stage of development, there are still numerous issues to tackle before this technology eventually realizes its full potential.1 That being said, the more the DLT develops and expands, the more experts would be able to evaluate its intrinsic as well as practical risks and rewards. In other words, the concern is not only about whether the DLT is inherently good or bad; stakeholders are also looking at the purposes for which and ways in which it would eventually be implemented.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to alert international business (IB) and international entrepreneurship (IE) researchers of a new phenomenon and novel research opportunities arising as a result of digital innovations brought about by the new, decentralized internet popularly known as “blockchain”. The paper contains a general overview of the blockchain technology and maps connections with the IB/IE literature, focusing on explaining accelerated internationalization of firms that are born global on blockchain. Design/methodology/approach The paper is a viewpoint based on the author’s ongoing research on blockchain and fintech and reflections on the born global literature. The paper has benefited from the author’s insights through her involvement in the global blockchain community as an investor and advisor. Findings The author argues for establishing a theoretical link between the born global literature and the literature on the economics of information goods and platform economics to explain the pace of international growth in the context of blockchain start-ups. Research limitations/implications The author urges IB/IE researchers to pay attention to research opportunities in the blockchain area, especially those related to explaining rapid internationalization of digital start-ups and a new organizational form for organizing cross-border activities known as decentralized autonomous organization. Originality/value Three factors are shown to contribute to a rapid internationalization of blockchain start-ups: network effects, solving the chicken-and-egg problem and building an ecosystem around the evolving technology.
Every year the World Economic Forum publishes a list of the top ten emerging technologies. This list of breakthrough technologies has included 3-D printing, self-healing biomimicry materials, and human microbiome therapeutics. In 2016, the financial technology Blockchain dominated the list. Over $1 billion was invested into Blockchain technology and major financial firms are actively exploring Blockchain innovation. As innovators enter the Blockchain space, they have pushed for patent protection. This Note examines whether Blockchain is patent eligible. Patent eligibility for business methods and software patents is determined under the Supreme Court’s holding in Alice v. CLS Bank. The first section of this note discusses the technological aspects of Bitcoin and Blockchain. Blockchain was originally developed for the decentralized digital cryptocurrency Bitcoin: however, Blockchain is not tied to Bitcoin and possesses a variety of uses that could potentially revolutionize our financial system. The second section of this note discusses patent eligibility. The third section applies patent eligibility to Blockchain, discusses why Blockchain should be patent-eligible, and discusses how patent attorneys should draft Blockchain patents. The fourth section discusses the regulatory implications granting Blockchain patent-eligibility and this Note concludes by summarizing my overall thesis that Blockchain is patent-eligible.
I consider a developer working on an open-source blockchain-based software that can be used only in conjunction with a specific crypto-token. This token can be sold in an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) to raise funds, but can also be sold later on a frictionless financial market to earn a profit. I show that, if the developer raises funds in an ICO, in each post-ICO period there is a positive probability that the developer sells all of his tokens on the market and, as a consequence, no development occurs. If the developer does not need to raise funds via an ICO, the equilibrium will nonetheless be inefficient because the developer's payoff depends on the surplus generated by the protocol in a given period (when he expects to sell his tokens). He therefore fails to internalize that the protocol will be used (and generate surplus) over multiple periods.
This paper examines the market for initial coin offerings (ICOs). ICOs are smart contracts based on blockchain technology that are designed for entrepreneurs to raise external finance by issuing tokens without an intermediary. Unlike existing mechanisms for early-stage finance, tokens potentially provide investors with rapid opportunities thanks to liquid trading platforms. The marketability of tokens offers novel insights into entrepreneurial finance, which I explore in this paper. First, I document that investors earn on average 8.2% on the first day of trading. However, about 40% of all ICOs destroy investor value on the first day of trading. Second, I explore the determinants of market outcomes and find that management quality and the ICO profile are positively correlated with the funding amount and returns, whereas highly visionary projects have a negative effect. Among the 21% of all tokens that get delisted from a major exchange platform, highly visionary projects are more likely to fail, which investors anticipate. Third, I explore the sensitivity of the ICO market to adverse industry events such as China's ban of ICOs, the hack of leading ledgers, and the marketing ban on FaceBook. I find that the ICO market is highly susceptible to such environmental shocks, resulting in substantial welfare losses for investors.