Abstract We propose an equilibrium valuation model for bitcoin options by extending Cao. Bitcoin is interpreted as a foreign currency in a small open economy where money supply and aggregate dividend are exogenous. The equilibrium bitcoin prices increase with diffusive and jump risks of these two exogenous factors. Analytical option pricing formulas are obtained with Merton's model as a special case. Static analysis reveals that a bitcoin call (put) option value increases (decreases) with the money supply growth rate. Numerical analysis shows that all risks lead to a positive premium in option prices relative to the Black–Scholes model.
Bitcoin got increasing popularity and was considered by the public as a great investment due to huge overvaluation in 2017. In parallel, economists and high-level technicians started to advocate the use of bitcoin and other cryptographic currencies as an alternative to national currencies. However, bitcoin is far from being considered as money, so it is hard for a monetary and payment system to emerge based on these technologies. This paper, apart from briefly presenting the Bitcoin System, shows why bitcoin is not money in the light of the Keynesian theory. We use Keynesian essential properties of Money and Modern Money Theory to define money, and to show that cryptographic currencies are not money. We then go back to Keynes' theory of portfolio choice, established in Chapter 17 of the General Theory, to show what bitcoin really is: at most, bitcoin is a perfect virtual commodity, a virtual liquid speculative asset.
In recent years blockchain consensus mechanisms based on Proof of Stake gained increasing attention as an alternative to Proof of Work, which requires high energy consumption. In its original version Proof of Stake hinges on the idea that, for a user, the likelihood to confirm the next block is positively related to the amount of currency units held in the wallet, and possibly also on the time length which the money has been unspent for. In a simple framework with risk neutral users we provide some early insights on the monetary equilibrium of Proof of Stake based platforms. In particular, we find that the aggregate demand and supply of currency may not coincide, which implies that users could hold suboptimal quantities of the currency. Furthermore, we also discuss how symmetric stationary states of the system could be implausible. As a consequence, a long run uniform distribution of money would seem unlikely unless appropriate measures are introduced.
Ye Wang, Yan Chen, Haotian Wu, Liyi Zhou · 6 authors
Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) enable users to create markets for exchanging any pair of cryptocurrencies. The direct exchange rate of two tokens may not match the cross-exchange rate in the market, and such price discrepancies open up arbitrage possibilities with trading through different cryptocurrencies cyclically. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation on cyclic arbitrages in DEXes. We propose a theoretical framework for studying cyclic arbitrage. With our framework, we analyze the profitability conditions and optimal trading strategies of cyclic transactions. We further examine exploitable arbitrage opportunities and the market size of cyclic arbitrages with transaction-level data of Uniswap V2. We find that traders have executed 292,606 cyclic arbitrages over eleven months and exploited more than 138 million USD in revenue. However, the revenue of the most profitable unexploited opportunity is persistently higher than 1 ETH (4,000 USD), which indicates that DEX markets may not be efficient enough. By analyzing how traders implement cyclic arbitrages, we find that traders can utilize smart contracts to issue atomic transactions and the atomic implementations could mitigate users' financial loss in cyclic arbitrage from the price impact.
From 1680-1980 paper currency gained popularity and is used across the world that is how modern currency came into existence. Modern currency includes paper currency, coins, cards, and digital wallets and all of this is controlled by banks and governments which means all transactions are observed by the centralized regulatory authority. In the year 2009 cryptocurrency was born as a form of digital payment currency. Cryptocurrency value is increasing another way we can mine cryptocurrencies like bitcoin. Over the years there has been an ongoing debate regarding its use, whether it is a good and/ or safe investment, is it legal to use cryptocurrency the same way we use paper currency, etc. This paper gatherers information by analyzing and studying the different laws, legality, trading, and how different countries have used it as an approach to boost their economy, some countries have allowed individuals to trade without their profits being taxable, while those of business profits are and how some countries have allowed its use but are banned by the banks.
In the wake of financial crises, stablecoins are gaining adoption among digital currencies. We discuss how stablecoins help reduce the volatility of cryptocurrencies by surveying different types of stablecoins and their stability mechanisms. We classify different approaches to stablecoins in three main categories i) fiat or asset backed, ii) crypto-collateralized and iii) algorithmic stablecoins, giving examples of concrete projects in each class. We assess the relative tradeoffs between the different approaches. We also discuss challenges associated with the future of stablecoins and their adoption, their adoption and point out future research directions.
Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees as well as other inefficiencies. EIP-1559 is a recent, improved proposal that introduces a number of innovative features such as a dynamically adaptive base fee that is burned, instead of being paid to the miners. Despite intense interest in understanding its properties, several basic questions such as whether and under what conditions does this protocol self-stabilize have remained elusive thus far. We perform a thorough analysis of the resulting fee market dynamic mechanism via a combination of tools from game theory and dynamical systems. We start by providing bounds on the step-size of the base fee update rule that suffice for global convergence to equilibrium via Lyapunov arguments. In the negative direction, we show that for larger step-sizes instability and even formally chaotic behavior are possible under a wide range of settings. We complement these qualitative results with quantitative bounds on the resulting range of base fees. We conclude our analysis with a thorough experimental case study that corroborates our theoretical findings.
Abdulnasser Hatemi‐J, Mohamed Ali Hajji, Elie Bouri, Rangan Gupta
This paper investigates the potential portfolio diversification between Bitcoin, bonds, equities, and the US dollar. We make use of two approaches for constructing the portfolio. The first is the standard minimum variance approach, and the alternative is based on combining risk and return when the portfolio is constructed. The portfolio based on the minimum variance approach does not result in increasing the return per unit of risk compared to the corresponding value for the best single asset, in this case, Bitcoin. However, the portfolio based on the approach that combines risk and return in the optimization problem does show a return per unit risk higher than the corresponding value for any of the four assets. Thus, the portfolio diversification benefit with respect to these four assets, in terms of return per unit risk, exists only if the portfolio is constructed via the new approach.
The paper is deeply motivated by the need to explore the impressive Bitcoin price dynamics by addressing Bitcoin as money in its essential attribute as a medium of exchange. We differ from previous research on Bitcoin in investigating the Bitcoin price dynamics on the theoretical ground. First, we show that the impressive Bitcoin price development observed since its inception can be interpreted as a hyperdeflation. Second, we resort to a representative agent modelling strategy within a money-in-the-utility function framework capturing the role of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange. We show that the specific monetary features of Bitcoin, its constant nominal stock and divisibility down to eight decimal places, account for a strong possibility of speculative hyperdeflationary paths. Alternative scenarios of the dynamics of real Bitcoin balances are also open for discussion.
This paper surveys the capacity of simple macroeconomic models - 'three easy pieces' - to account for persistent and positive valuations of privately issued assets based on the blockchain. Each of these three models - transactions demand for a means of payment, consumption-based capital asset pricing, and search and matching - highlights important aspects of digital payments. The mutual interference of these jointly produced features may impede widespread use of cryptocurrencies until technological innovations have been developed to separate them.
By William Luther. How might we reconcile the regression theorem with the emergence of bitcoin? Luther responds to Pickering's argument that the "purpose and requirements of the regression theorem" have been misinterpreted.
Theresa Grafeneder-Weissteiner, Ingrid Kubin, Klaus Prettner, Alexia Prskawetz · 5 authors
This article introduces a social planner version of a model central to the New Economic Geography for explicitly answering whether the symmetric equilibrium outcome of the decentralized market economy is socially desirable. We find that savings incentives are too weak, resulting in an inefficiently low capital stock and therefore an inadequate number of product varieties. The optimal subsidy and taxation scheme to remedy these distortions resulting from the monopolistic competition structure is shown to be a sales subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax that results in marginal cost pricing. Interestingly, implementing this optimal policy might actually destroy the stability of the symmetric equilibrium and result in unintended agglomeration processes.
Abstract This chapter aims to offer readers an entry point to the deep discussion of this volume and the rationale for the “Finance 4.0” system described in later chapters. What is money, why is it designed this way, and what could it become in the crypto age? The chapter contains three parts. The first part describes in rough strokes the basic functions of money and how today’s fiat money system implements them. The second part offers a modest critique of the fiat money system, arguing that many problems take root in the intimate power relationship between “money and state.” The final part presents two cases that address some of the shortcomings. The first is Bitcoin that infamously pursues a state-independent, decentralized conception of money. The second is Finance 4.0, a system that proposes a participatory multi-dimensional money system with built-in incentives for sustainable behavior. If more readers feel empowered to enter the public debate for a better money system in the twenty-first century, this short introduction achieved its aim.
We look at the association between the price of a cryptocurrency and the secondary market prices of the hardware used to mine it. We find the prices of the most efficient Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) for Ethereum mining are significantly positively correlated with the daily price returns to that cryptocurrency.