Innovative services induced by blockchain technologies have social, economical, legal and technical impacts. For this reason, the project smart Internet of Things (IoT) for mobility has adopted a transdisciplinary scientific approach to investigate how blockchain technology would enhance confidence in IoT based services. More precisely, it focuses on services whose systems are decentralized, mainly based on the adoption of the execution of Smart Contracts (intelligent contracts), the whole being really adaptable to the rising generation of IoT. The study targets the social impacts of smart contractsâ adoption within IoT. Its aim is to design a smart contract based on a well understanding of its social acceptance and its legal context and prerogatives. In this paper, it is presented the context, the social study, the use cases targeted and finally first analysis
Abstract This paper delves into the question: How does an entrepreneur commercialising an open source technology (an âopen entrepreneurâ) respond when an underlying infrastructure that is maintained by a distributed and heterogeneous community become stigmatised, particularly when the source of the stigma is unclear? Research has found that, when faced with stigma, the most effective and robust strategy for established nondigital firms is to try to and create a distance from it. Open entrepreneurs with different ideologies would likely benefit from similar actions; however, the interdependencies created when they rely upon a digital infrastructure may make this strategy impossible. Given the tensions between ideological heterogeneity and a shared infrastructure, howâand whyâdo open entrepreneurs respond to stigma? This paper extends existing literature on stigma by developing a model of ideologically mediated responses to stigma by open entrepreneurs through an inductive study based upon interviews, archival, and forum data. We further contribute to extant literature on open entrepreneurship by proposing a model of ideologically mediated responses to stigma, which is grounded in group identity theory. We also build on digital infrastructure literature by proposing the concept of digital infrastructure anchoring . Lastly, we show how ideological heterogeneity leads to business model heterogeneity among open entrepreneurs and discuss the practical implications of this research.
Abstract Access to housing is a crucial issue worldwide. It is still under discussion whether collaborative economy is enhancing or, on the contrary, constraining access. In this context, the concept of âcollaborative housingâ (collaborative economy applied to the funding, access and organisation of housing) arises to address a range of situations that might potentially help people to access housing, such as co-housing or the so-called âintermediate tenuresâ. Disintermediation through blockchain technology, and the resultant effect of a reduction in the transaction costs of access to housing, is one of those trends regarding collaborative housing. Accordingly, the adaptation of the disintermediation mechanism to the real estate conveyance and land registry, as in many other sectors of the collaborative economy, is timely. This can be achieved by exploring the potential of this mechanism in enhancing traditional methods of this sector through possible technological solutions. This paper presents a preliminary discussion on the different types of collaborative housing and the potentials of the blockchain technology to facilitate access to housing in relation to real estate conveyancing and registration.
This article studies the emergence of Share&Charge, a German platform that organizes the sharing of charging stations for electric vehicles (EVs) and the billing for the energy transactions. Share&Charge follows a peer-to-peer fashion, enabling direct transactions between charging station owners and EV drivers. On the demand side, the platform, with its interactive map, makes it possible for EV owners to find a charging station in the most suitable location, for instance, at their place of work or where they live. On the offer side, Share&Charge enables station operators (private individuals or companies) to rent their charging stations and eventually to sell the electricity they produce. Charging tariffs within the charging station network are determined by the charging station operators themselves, but the platform provides indicative tariffs. Launched in September 2017, Share&Charge follows other initiatives, such as the French platforms Wattpop and ChargeMap, and the Swedish Elbnb. Share&Chargeâs network is already proven to be successful with German citizens. Share&Charge adds certain elements of value at different stages of EV utilization. First, this model allows for a co-financing of charging infrastructures by individuals and businesses in the private sector by sharing the infrastructure costs among EV drivers. Besides the purchase price of EVs, the implementation of charging infrastructures and their financing represent a significant barrier to the rise of e-mobility. Share&Charge helps remove this obstacle without adding a further burden on the governmental budget. In addition, this approach follows the âuser pays principle,â which engages in fair and effective financing. Second, the platform increases decentralized production value and facilitates its expansion. It also helps in avoiding grid congestion and energy loss, as well as increasing flexibility within the electricity market. Third, data use enables the optimization of energy demand and supply, and the optimal determination of tariffs, although these remain facultative. Models like Share&Charge could thus positively impact energy policy by tackling several upcoming obstacles associated with the development of EVs and decentralized energy production capacities. However, new forms of network structures (decentralized networks, sharing economy) and new actors (prosumers, platforms, etc.) also raise regulatory challenges. This article presents some of the legal issues associated with the development of models like Share&Charge. In particular, we study the tax framework applicable to this model, assuming that as such, it would be introduced into the Belgian market.
All contracts are necessarily incomplete. The inefficiencies of bargaining over every contingency, coupled with humansâ innate bounded rationality, mean that contracts cannot anticipate and address every potential eventuality. One role of law is to fill gaps in incomplete contracts with default rules. The blockchain is a distributed ledger that allows the cryptographic recording of transactions and permits âsmartâ contracts that self-execute automatically if their conditions are met. Because humans code the contracts of the blockchain, gaps in these contracts will arise. Yet in the world of âsmart contractingâ on the blockchain, there is no place for the law to step in to supply default rules â no legal intervention point. The lack of a legal intervention point means that law on the blockchain works in a fundamentally different way from law in the corporeal world. Business organizational law provides a prime example of how the law uses default rules to fill gaps in an incomplete contract and how the law works differently in the blockchain context.
This chapter discusses the implications of blockchain technology for income inequality. Although inequality is identified as a complex and emergent (rather than simple and static) phenomenon, we nonetheless are able to identify channels through which blockchains are likely to affect the distribution of income. Any erosion of economic positions held by third-party intermediaries, charged with maintaining the integrity of conventional ledgers, is likely to reduce inequality. On the other hand job-creation opportunities which emphasize the need for specialist technical skills in the blockchain-enabled economy may increase inequality. The net effect of these two forces alone is ambiguous. There is the alternative possibility that the inequality-reduction potential of blockchain activity could be mitigated by the appropriation of distributed ledger technology by incumbents. To help prevent the possibility of income inequality being reproduced through the blockchain, an open and permissionless environment for blockchain participation should be maintained to the greatest extent possible.
Abstract This study investigates the impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on worker autonomy and monitoring using the second wave of the German Linked Personnel Panel, a linked employer-employee data set. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of ICT on workplace organization is ambiguous. On the one hand, the fast diffusion of ICT among employees makes it possible to monitor professional activities, leading to greater centralization. On the other hand, ICT enable employees to work more autonomously, so that workplace organization becomes more decentralized. Based on ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimates, we find that ICT promotes both centralization and decentralization tendencies. Furthermore, managerial employees are more affected by ICT-induced monitoring and autonomy than their non-managerial counterparts. Finally, the effect of digital ICT on employee autonomy is more pronounced than the corresponding effect on employee monitoring. Again, this does especially hold for managerial employees. All in all, our results support the view that unlike prior technological revolutions digitalization primarily affects the employment prospects and working conditions of employees at medium and higher hierarchical levels.
Der vorliegende Beitrag beschĂ€ftigt sich mit dem PhĂ€nomen der DAO, einer neuartigen, dezentralen und digitalen Organisationsform, und ihrem VerhĂ€ltnis zur Blockchain. In dem Zusammenhang stellt der Verfasser des Beitrags â in Auseinandersetzung mit der im österr Schrifttum erst vor Kurzem vorgenommenen Einordnung der DAO als Gesellschaft sui generis â auch grundlegende Ăberlegungen zur Frage der rechtlichen Qualifikation der DAO an.
Drawing on an empirical study of cryptocurrency white papers, this paper proposes an actor-based taxonomy of cryptocurrency blockchains. First, it describes the evolution of blockchain architecture with reference to the economic services that blockchains supply. Second, it discusses the socio-technical platform of blockchains as proposed in cryptocurrency white papers. Third, it analyses the socio-economic consequences of these technically diverse blockchain platforms, by proposing a taxonomy of their digital architectures in reference to two groups of actors that maintain blockchain infrastructure: transactioners and accountants. Defining cryptocurrency as data money, and locating cryptocurrency ownership as the possession of an exclusive right to move data privately in a public or private space, the paper describes a blockchain as a digital actor-network platform that makes it possible to define and distribute these data transfer rights.
This article analyses the rules on wage coordination and their effectiveness in the Italian two-tier bargaining system. It seeks to cast light on bargaining coordination by starting from the analysis of collective agreements, rather than focusing exclusively on normative and institutional aspects of wage bargaining. Accordingly, the study examines a dataset of 498 company-level collective agreements concluded between 2012â2015 in three sectors â metalworking, food, banking and finance â to analyse wage developments in company-level bargaining. The study considers the extent to which local wage negotiations are consistent with the rules on wage bargaining coordination laid down in economy-wide agreements and national collective labour agreements. Wage coordination rules are generally respected, though a significant number of company-level agreements still provide fixed-rate pay rises in breach of the rule that wage increases at company level should be linked to productivity and other factors relating to the workersâ and/or the firmâs economic performance. Although the violation of wage bargaining rules between national agreements and company-level collective agreements is in line with the favourability principle, it is argued that local negotiations on fixed-rate pay rises could be regarded as a form of uncoordinated decentralization, diminishing the effectiveness of horizontal coordination policies and the normative role of the social partners.
Temporary work is an employment situation useful and suitable in all occasions in which business needs to adjust more easily and quickly to workload fluctuations or maintain staffing flexibility. Temporary workers play therefore an important role in many companies, but this kind of activity is subject to a special form of legal protections and many aspects and risks must be taken into account both employers and employees. In this work we propose a blockchain-based system that aims to ensure respect for the rights for all actors involved in a temporary employment, in order to provide employees with the fair and legal remuneration (including taxes) of work performances and a protection in the case employer becomes insolvent. At the same time, our system wants to assist the employer in processing contracts with a fully automated and fast procedure. To resolve these problems we propose the D-ES (Decentralized Employment System). We first model the employment relationship as a state system. Then we describe the enabling technology that makes us able to realize the D-ES. In facts, we propose the implementation of a DLT (Decentralized Ledger Technology) based system, consisting in a blockchain system and of a web-based environment. Thanks the decentralized application platforms that makes us able to develop smart contracts, we define a discrete event control system that works inside the blockchain. In addition, we discuss the temporary work in agriculture as a interesting case of study.
Platforms are important actors in contemporary cultural economic processes. They include social network sites, online content management systems, streaming media platforms, mobile communication infrastructures, supply chain logistics solutions, and cryptocurrencies. Analysis of platforms and their capitalization should take into account the ways they structure social practice as assets and the constitutive opacity of platforms as configured realities. It explores capitalization by focusing on the problems of counting people and things on platforms. Via a case study of the software repository platform [Github.com] (https://github.com), it analyzes how 'platform numbersâ participate in capitalization. It describes attempts to enumerate the elements of the platform by counting, mapping or listing them. The paper shows how attempts to enumerate people and things encounter forms of association, duplication, combination, imitation and configuration that are crucial to the ensemble but remain refractory to capitalization. It proposes configurative enumeration of the platform numbers as a way of conceptualizing these un-enacted excesses. In a configurative enumeration, the composition, the rhythms of imitation, variation and commutation, and constant relating, repairing and adjusting of configurations crucial to the ongoing formation of platforms come into view. Configurative enumerations engage the inventive realities of platformization, realities that precede and sometimes overflow their capitalization.
Abstract This paper investigates ontological dimensions of the blockchain by asking what kind of socioâtechnical object bitcoin is. It discusses both blockchain's political qualities and the political forms enabled by its emergence. It first observes recent approaches to the ontology of money and the political qualities of the ledgers used by the current fractional reserve banking model. It then directs the same questions at blockchain technology. The paper discusses an ontology proposed by Ole Bjerg ( 2016 ) and argues in favour of a mixedâontology approach to blockchains. It then questions the political qualities of the distributed ledger as a digital object and highlights the apparent absence of authority figures in the model. Finally, it argues that the political ontology of the blockchain can be framed as the displacement of authority from institutional actors into instrumental control of trust, in a dynamically distributed environment.
In this paper, we consider the activities of hacker's social movement through the history of hacker culture and philosophy in modern times. Some social movements of contemporary hackers are called hactivism, but if hactivism aims for social reform, peopleâs support needs to be acquired it. Therefore, this paper considers the principle of winning the trust of citizens from the viewpoint of âjustness and legitimacyâ according to the theory of Giddens and Max Weber. Futhermore, through consideration of Wikileaks and bitcoin, we point out that there are many problems in hactivism.