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1,455 results · page 13 of 61
Lei Wang, Hao Cheng, Zihao Sun, Aixin Tian · 5 authors
No abstract is available for this record.
Rim Ben Fekih, Mariam Lahami, Melvin Ifeanyichukwu Eze, Salma Bradai · 5 authors
No abstract is available for this record.
Xiaorui Nie, Meng Wang
As an effective technology for detecting vulnerabilities, symbolic execution has been applied to detect vulnerabilities in smart contracts. However, it faces challenges such as low detection efficiency. Existing parallel symbolic execution techniques for vulnerability detection of smart contracts lack load balancing mechanism, resulting in unnecessary overhead. To address this issue, we propose a load-balanced parallel symbolic execution approach to accelerate the vulnerability detection of smart contracts. In the approach, the main process first explores and assigns an initial path to each worker process. The worker processes then explore different paths in parallel and utilize a work stealing algorithm to balance the workload among them. By allowing multiple worker processes to explore various paths on different CPU cores and ensuring the load balance, we enhance the efficiency of symbolic execution. We implement a parallel symbolic execution tool called PMyth based on Mythril and evaluate our approach by experimenting on two third-party datasets. The experimental results show that PMyth can provide up to 4.36x acceleration compared to Mythril.
Vasundhara Sharma, Ashish Agarwal, Anitesh Barua
Many digital products follow an open-innovation model, wherein the open boundaries facilitate copying (forking) the codebase and creating new products, which may compete with the parents for user demand. Although a rich body of literature highlights the benefits of open source such as the availability of developers with diverse skill sets and accelerated innovation, the competition effects of forked products on the demand of their parents remain understudied. Using data from major cryptocurrencies and their forked products created between 2011 and 2021, we study how these entrants impact the demand for parent cryptocurrencies. We categorize cryptocurrencies as transaction or platform types. Transaction coins are primarily used for the exchange of goods and services, whereas platform coins offer additional capabilities such as hosting applications or third-party services. We find that parents with only transaction capabilities experience a negative impact on demand. Although popularity may shield the parents to a certain extent, the substitution effect is still dominant. However, popular coins with platform capabilities do not experience a decrease in demand when competing with forked entrants; an increase in smart contract transactions due to their compatibility with the competing forked products offsets the negative substitution effect observed for regular transactions. Our study underscores the competitive dynamics of open innovation and provides managerial insights for firms considering open models for product development. Our results highlight the importance of considering both substitution and complementarities when assessing the risks and benefits of the open-innovation model. This paper was accepted by Anindya Ghose, information systems. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03132 .
Peiqiang Li, Guojun Wang, Xiaofei Xing, Jinyao Zhu · 6 authors
No abstract is available for this record.
Haoqian Zhang, Michelle Yeo, Vero Estrada-Galiñanes, Bryan Ford
No abstract is available for this record.
Jiahui Shao, Maochao Xu, Rui Fang, Xiaoxiao Hu · 6 authors
No abstract is available for this record.
Xu Liu, Junwu Zhu
Smart contracts , being security-critical code, facilitate consensus among players and ensure secure and accurate value transfer, and formal verification is necessary to guarantee functional correctness of contracts. Game theory serves as one of the tools in formal verification by assessing whether the outcomes of contract executions meet the expected goals. While most studies employing game theory to verify smart contract functionality assume rational players, in practice, players may invoke and deploy smart contracts involving irrational behavior, casting doubt on the correctness of verification results. The aim of this study is to propose an alternative game model to verify smart contract functionality in dynamic player interactions where irrational behavior is involved. Specifically, a belief-based smart contract execution game (BSC-game) model was introduced, utilizing belief – the probability that a player believes in the irrationality of others – to capture how the irrational behavior of others affects a player’s contract execution decisions. Reasonable economic incentives were introduced to encourage honest behavior of players. Moreover, a computationally feasible method was designed to update players’ beliefs in large-scale dynamic smart contract executions. Theoretical analysis discloses the existence of equilibrium in the BSC-game, as well as the conditions for the number of faulty players within the system’s fault tolerance . We conducted the simulation experiments, and verified the business-oriented smart contract written in G language by the BSC-game model. The results further indicate that although players’ beliefs impact their decisions to execute contracts, reasonable economic incentives can motivate players to execute contracts honestly. This ensures that smart contract functionality aligns with expected goals, showing that the BSC-game model can verify and guarantee the correctness of contract functions. This new approach significantly contributes to bolstering smart contract security and credibility, positively influencing blockchain stability.
Juliandson Ferreira, Pedro Antonino, Augusto Sampaio, A. W. Roscoe · 5 authors
No abstract is available for this record.
Kuldeep Singh Kaswan, Jagjit Singh Dhatterwal, Kiran Malik, Meenakshi Sharma
Smart contracts have been identified as the technological innovation in the Converged Internet of Things (CIoT) with solutions in automation and security improvements. This chapter specifically discusses the incorporation of smart contracts into CIoT and mainly on the ability to automate tasks and increase security. First of all, the concept of smart contracts and CIoT is explained, stressing on the paramount importance of automation and security as the brief interaction is provided. The reader can find here the general information about the smart contracts, their functioning, and principal characteristics. We then look at the architectural model and the deployment scenarios of smart contracts for CIoT systems with real-life examples. The issue solved here is the weakness and massive connectivity of classical IoT systems, for which smart contracts enhance IoT systems by employing automated data processing, self-executing contracts, and inappropriate streams of processes. The objective is to show that smart contracts can be used to bring novelties in the CIoT's automation and security levels. We discuss how they are used for the protection of message transfer, users' authorization and identification, and for threat identification and prevention. Some of the actual uses include smart homes, IIoT, healthcare IoT, and the supplies chain showing that this technology is versatile. This analysis shows that there have been enhancements in the aspect of automation and security but at the same time, there are challenges like scalability, interoperability, and there are legal and regulatory issues. Analyses indicate that the future trends will be associated with the AI, the development of new and superior methods of blockchain technology, and the emergence of decentralized IoT networks that will lead to optimum CIoT systems.
Shangqi Liu, Yuntao Xu, Xingyu Yang, Bozhi Hui · 5 authors
As one of the technical elements supporting the blockchain to realize decentralized autonomous organizations, smart contracts are crucial for understanding the inherent properties of blockchain systems through formal research. Most existing formal models of smart contracts focus primarily on static properties, lacking the depiction of dynamic processes such as conditional responses and internal state migration during contract execution, which complicates effective supervision. In this paper, a novel formal model of smart contracts, based on finite state automata, named Variable-State-Trigger (VST), is proposed, which presents state migration and conditional response mechanisms during smart contract execution. The VST model is verified to portray both the static and dynamic properties of smart contracts, providing new avenues for effective supervision during contract execution. Moreover, the VST model is used to illustrate the life cycle of a UAV mission smart contract, demonstrating its feasibility. With the growing integration of blockchain and emerging technologies, smart contracts have found applications in various fields, including drone swarm coordination. In this context, smart contracts enable secure, decentralized management and automation of interactions between autonomous drones, ensuring compliance with predefined conditions and enhancing the reliability of complex drone operations. The VST model can be extended to such applications, offering dynamic supervision and enhancing the coordination efficiency in decentralized autonomous drone systems.
Jelena Mišić, Vojislav B. Mišić, Xiaolin Chang
Both Proof of Stake (PoS) and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus schemes for permissioned blockchains incur the risk of centralization of voting power in the hands of a small number of wealthy voters. In this work, we present Qualified Proof of Stake (QPoS) scheme which alleviates centralization by rewarding truthful behavior of both voters and leaders, and penalizing their untruthful behavior. Leaders are elected according to the current stake which gives preference to more trustworthy nodes. Nodes with low stake at the end of a round which consists of multiple PBFT voting cycles are excluded from voting in subsequent rounds, while nodes with sufficient stake may leave the network temporarily without losing their stake. We consider multiple node classes with different voting behavior and model them using embedded Markov Chain which corresponds to Semi Markov Process (SMP) in order to determine system performance. Our results show the interaction of class populations, voting behavior, and mobility with round size, and show notable stake-based prioritization among the nodes for selection of PBFT leaders. Moreover, we show that higher proportion of well behaved nodes and shorter voting rounds are needed to achieve consensus with high probability.
Apurva K. Vangujar, Alia Umrani, Ji‐Jian Chin, Paolo Palmieri
Electronic Auctions (e-auctions) must be secure and reliable in the fast-changing digital world. This paper proposes a Blockchain-Based Cluster Consensus Identity-Based Identification (BCCIBI) scheme to enhance e-auction security and privacy. To establish a secure e-auction environment, the BCCIBI scheme utilises advanced cryptographic primitives such as ElGamal encryption, the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme, Identity-Based Identification (IBI), Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proof, Commitment scheme, and Non-Interactive ZK proof. In the BCCIBI scheme, bids are secure due to the homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryption, which ensure confidentiality and integrity. The BCCIBI scheme, grounded in the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, accelerates multiple bid and bidder verifications by IBI, a crucial operation for clustered blockchains ensuring authentication. Meanwhile, ZK proof authenticates bidders anonymously, safeguarding bidder privacy. Our unique scheme assigns pseudo-identities to participants to provide anonymity and ensure unlinkability. The BCCIBI scheme is resilient against cryptographic attacks in an efficient clustered blockchain scenario using smart contracts, addressing blockchain performance issues. The BCCIBI e-auction scheme is based on timestamps to provide aliveness and records on the blockchain. This paper scrutinises the BCCIBI scheme’s technical foundations and practical implications, laying the groundwork for more secure and transparent e-auction systems. The BCCIBI system advances safe e-auctions by employing a multi-faceted cryptographic technique.
Diego Marmsoler, Asad Ahmed, Achim D. Brucker
No abstract is available for this record.
Adele Veschetti, Richard Bubel, Reiner Hähnle
No abstract is available for this record.
Ernest Effah Ameyaw, George Agyekum‐Mensah, Bimal Kumar, David J. Edwards
Purpose Traditional paper-based contracts are document-intensive, insecure, susceptible to forgery and errors, detrimental to productivity improvement and require multiple intermediaries. Addressing these challenges requires computerised construction to modernise the way modern construction projects are procured with blockchain-enabled smart contracts. Smart contracts could replace paper-based contracts by improving transparency and security and automating contractual terms, processes and transacting activities. However, smart contracts are an emerging technology with limited adoption in construction projects, and the issues influencing its widespread adoption remain unclear and unexplored. Hence, this study aims at exploring and understanding the important obstacles to adoption of smart contracts in construction projects. Design/methodology/approach Using an international questionnaire survey, the study draws on experienced construction practitioners with direct involvement and knowledge in blockchain technology and smart contract initiatives and activities. Descriptive statistics and fuzzy logic techniques were used to analyse and model the quantitative survey data to establish the critical barriers to smart contracts adoption. Findings Organisational and external characteristics, personal characteristics and technology characteristics constitute major obstacles to the successful adoption of smart contracts. Construction practitioners’ limited knowledge of smart contracts, resistance to technology change, insufficiently digitalised construction industry and lack of or weak governmental support are critical to smart contracts adoption. Originality/value The research contributes to the body of knowledge on diffusing cutting-edge technology by advancing the understanding of practitioners’ perspectives on the primary obstacles to smart contracts adoption. Understanding the obstacles provides industry stakeholders (policymakers, leaders and practitioners) with underpinning knowledge with which to develop and implement corrective actions.
Myasar Mundher Adnan, Bh. Prashanthi, Modugula Siva Jyothi, Arti Badhoutiya · 6 authors
The role of smart contracts which facilitates automation of freight and logistics management is the focus of this study. As a result of the proposed smart contract integration, the study hope to eliminate some of the problems, improve the transparency, and solve the issues of high costs in the processes of logistics. The approach includes the system analysis, the concept and development of the smart contracts, integration and testing of the smart contracts, and assessment through an implementation in a pilot environment. The findings are development of time means, cost, and satisfaction level by using this automated system as compared to the manual system. The study also discusses how the functionality of smart contracts can be effectively leveraged in the context of logistics and provide more practical recommendations for the implementation of smart contracts.
Devora Chait-Roth, Kedar S. Namjoshi
Smart contracts form the core of Web3 applications. Contracts mediate the transfer of cryptocurrency, making them irresistible targets for hackers. We introduce ASP, a system aimed at easing the construction of provably secure contracts. The Asp system consists of three closely-linked components: a programming language, a defensive compiler, and a proof checker. The language semantics guarantee that Asp contracts are free of commonly exploited vulnerabilities such as arithmetic overflow and reentrancy. The defensive compiler enforces the semantics and translates Asp to Solidity, the most popular contract language. Deductive proofs establish functional correctness and freedom from critical vulnerabilities such as unauthorized access.
Kholiq Abdullah, Mitsugu Iwamoto, Yohei Watanabe
The evolution of decentralized platforms has introduced significant advancements in auction systems; however, these advancements bring forth complex challenges in collateral management within sealed-bid auctions. Traditional approaches, reliant on static collateral, often fail to account for dynamic market conditions and participant behavior, thereby limiting participation from individuals with restricted capital and reducing overall auction efficiency. This research identifies a critical gap in dynamic collateral management for decentralized sealed bid auctions and proposes a novel framework to address these challenges. The proposed method integrates dynamic collateral management within the Riggs-TC (Timed Commitment) protocol, enhancing its existing capabilities to handle collateral more flexibly. By leveraging cryptographic advancements, specifically Pedersen Commitments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs, the framework ensures that collateral adjustments are made in real-time, reflecting each auction phase and participant actions effectively. This method not only secures bid confidentiality but also upholds the integrity and fairness of the auction process. Empirical results from deploying this framework demonstrate a significant reduction in entry barriers for participants, an increase in capital efficiency, and heightened security and fairness across the auction lifecycle. Additionally, the framework's adaptability to various decentralized environments suggests its broad applicative potential beyond the initial case studies.
R. K. Shyamasundar, Snehal Borse, Mohammad Ummair
No abstract is available for this record.
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre
The block-building process on the Ethereum network has changed significantly with an upgrade of its consensus protocol. Network participants access blocks through block building auctions at a decentralized financial market, termed builder market, where builders vie for the right to build blocks and earn Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) rewards. This paper employs empirical game-theoretic analysis to examine builders’ strategic bidding incentives in the Ethereum block building auctions, termed MEV-Boost auctions. We study various scenarios with different auction game settings and evaluate how critical elements such as network connectivity and access to MEV opportunities impact builders’ strategic bidding incentives. Through our analyses, we highlight the challenge of creating a decentralized yet competitive builder market.
John Mylopoulos, Sofana Alfuhaid, Daniel Amyot, Amal Ahmed Anda · 11 authors
Legal contracts have been used for millennia around the world as a foundation for business transactions. Smart con-tracts are cyber-physical systems that deploy Internet-of-Things (IoT) and blockchain technologies to monitor, automate, and control the execution of legal contracts. Because of the conceptual complexity of legal concepts and the technologies deployed, developing smart contracts is a time-consuming and error-prone task. The aim of this project is to develop concepts, tools and methods for engineering smart contracts. The contributions of the project consist of a specification language, called Symboleo, and related tools that are intended to make the engineering of smart contracts more systematic and cost effective. This paper summarizes earlier outcomes of the project and reports on new results obtained during the past year.
S. Nakatani, Hiroki Kuzuno, Makoto Takita, Masami Mohri · 5 authors
As the demand for cryptographic assets increases, so does the number of fraudulent transactions, necessitating efficient detection methods. In this paper, we propose a method to determine whether a set of transaction data contains fraudulent transactions. We apply topological data analysis, which characterizes the geometric structure of the data, to Ethereum, one of the crypto assets. Our aim is to solve the imbalance in the transaction data used in machine learning models for fraudulent transaction detection. Our method achieved an F1 score of 0.9891 on a set of transaction data containing 10 fraudulent transactions out of 10000 transactions.
Li Wei, Liang Peili, Li Fei
Abstract On‐chain sealed auctions represent a novel approach to electronic bidding auctions, wherein the introduction of zero‐knowledge proof technology has significantly enhanced the security of auctions. However, most mainstream on‐chain sealed auction schemes currently employ Bulletproofs to prove auction correctness, which leaves room for optimization in terms of verification time and inherent security. Addressing these issues, an on‐chain sealed auction scheme based on zero‐knowledge succinct non‐interactive argument of knowledge (zk‐STARK) is proposed. This scheme leverages the decentralization and immutability of blockchain and smart contracts to eliminate third‐party involvement while ensuring the security of the auction process. The Inter Planetary File System is utilized to provide a qualification review mechanism for the auctioneer, enabling the screening of unqualified bidders before the auction. Additionally, the scheme employs RSA encryption to conceal bidders' bids, Pedersen commitments to ensure the consistency of bidding information, and zk‐STARKs to verify the correctness of the winning bid. Security analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme meets the required security standards, with time consumption at various stages of the auction being within acceptable limits, and effectively reduces the time required for proof verification.