On-chain lending has expanded across multiple distributed ledgers as DeFi becomes increasingly multi-chain. This environment introduces novel technical and financial mechanisms, particularly cross-blockchain communication and asset transfer protocols, yet cross-chain elements remain understudied in lending protocol risk management. To address this gap, we applied panel regression fixed effects and OLS models to empirically analyze cross-blockchain interoperability solutions, using TVL and total revenue as performance proxies from October 2022 to January 2025. Our data set covers 15 decentralized lending protocols and 53 cross-chain bridges across 9 EVM-compatible blockchains, categorized as Ethereum, alternative layer-1s, and Ethereum layer-2 networks. Results reveal that cross-chain activity impacts on protocol performance. Bridge volume emerges as a critical driver, exerts a significant effect on TVL and revenue across different categories, though the direction of this effect varies heterogeneously. Increased bridge integrations are associated with decreased TVL and protocol revenue across categories, indicating liquidity escapes from those lending ecosystems. Liquidations produce heterogeneous effects across categories. New network launches do not have as significant relationships with TVL and revenue while bridge hacks show a significant and positive relationship. High R-squared values confirm meaningful explanatory power. We further show Ethereum attracts large depositors, while layer-2s skew toward retail participation. We conclude that effective DeFi risk models should incorporate cross-chain metrics and adopt a layer-aware approach to accurately reflect the evolving multi-chain landscape.
Decentralized finance introduces new business models and use cases as part of digital finance. Restaking has recently emerged as a transformative mechanism in DeFi, promising extra yields but introducing complex and interconnected risks. The paper monitors the current restaking landscape, empirically analyzes the revenue drivers of a liquid restaking protocol, and conducts a technical investigation on the emitted risk arising from the interconnection between liquid restaking and other protocols. The revenue dynamics of Renzo Protocol are analyzed by employing an OLS regression model, Granger-causality and random forest feature importance tests. Our results identify that revenue is primarily predicted by the value locked in the underlying EigenLayer ecosystem, the yield of Renzo protocol's liquid restaking token and the multi-blockchain expansion of that token. The multi-blockchain expansion of the liquid restaking token presents a double-edged sword: bridging to other networks is crucial for user adoption, but it adds the bridge risks to the existing risks of restaking. We investigate the cross-contamination risk between different DeFi services and the liquid restaking protocol. By mapping the asset flow across the decentralized finance ecosystem, it is detected that the bridge risk of the current size of Renzo's liquid-restaking assets does not impose a systemic risk on the current restaking and staking ecosystem. To address the potential consequences of the emphasized interconnection risks, we introduce two hypothetical scenarios and a stress test, assuming a large number of compromised liquid restaking tokens and a smart contract logic failure in a DeFi protocol. Considering the overall liquid-restaking protocols and the growing interconnection, this analysis requires further work to explore the growing complexities.
This paper emphasizes the critical role of interoperability in enabling efficient and secure communication for the fragmented distributed ledger ecosystem, particularly within on-chain finance. The purpose of this study is to streamline and accelerate empirical research on the intersection of cross-chain interoperability solutions and their impact within on-chain finance. The analysis examines the relationship between financial use and interoperability while comparing the properties of novel cross-chain interoperability protocols (LayerZero, Wormhole, Connext, Chainlink Cross-Chain Interoperability Protocol, Circle Cross-chain Transfer Protocol, Hop Protocol, Across, Polkadot, and Cosmos), focusing on their design, mechanisms, consensus, and limitations. To encourage further empirical study, the paper proposes a set of network metrics and sample statistical models and provides a framework for evaluating the performance and financial implications of interoperability solutions.
Smart contracts have transformed decentralized finance, but flaws in their logic still create major security threats. Most existing vulnerability detection techniques focus on well-supported languages like Solidity, while low-resource counterparts such as Vyper remain largely underexplored due to scarce analysis tools and limited labeled datasets. Training a robust detection model directly on Vyper is particularly challenging, as collecting sufficiently large and diverse Vyper training datasets is difficult in practice. To address this gap, we introduce Sol2Vy, a novel framework that enables cross-language knowledge transfer from Solidity to Vyper, allowing vulnerability detection on Vyper using models trained exclusively on Solidity. This approach eliminates the need for extensive labeled Vyper datasets typically required to build a robust vulnerability detection model. We implement and evaluate Sol2Vy on various critical vulnerability types, including reentrancy, weak randomness, and unchecked transfer. Experimental results show that Sol2Vy, despite being trained exclusively on Solidity, achieves strong detection performance on Vyper contracts and significantly outperforms prior state-of-the-art methods.
Sara Aguincha, Emanuel Nunes, Samih Eisa, Miguel L. Pardal
Sensor technologies have evolved to a point where it is now practical to monitor products along the supply chain. The collected data can be stored in a decentralized way using blockchain technology. However, ensuring the reliability of the sensed data is a critical challenge. In other words, we need to trust the data that we write to the blockchain. In this work, we propose ChainGuards, a decentralized system that uses product-specific rules to verify data collected across the supply chain, with particular focus on sensor-derived information, issuing warnings and triggering audits when anomalies are detected. We evaluated ChainGuards using data from a real cherry supply chain deployment. The result shows that the implemented solution provides reliable verification of supply chain data with low performance overhead, able to correctly detect data discrepancies and inconsistencies.
Privacy-preserving aggregation is a cornerstone for AI systems that learn from distributed data without exposing individual records, especially in federated learning and telemetry. Existing two-server protocols (e.g., Prio and successors) set a practical baseline by validating inputs while preventing any single party from learning users' values, but they impose symmetric costs on both servers and communication that scales with the per-client input dimension $L$. Modern learning tasks routinely involve dimensionalities $L$ in the tens to hundreds of millions of model parameters. We present TAPAS, a two-server asymmetric private aggregation scheme that addresses these limitations along four dimensions: (i) no trusted setup or preprocessing, (ii) server-side communication that is independent of $L$ (iii) post-quantum security based solely on standard lattice assumptions (LWE, SIS), and (iv) stronger robustness with identifiable abort and full malicious security for the servers. A key design choice is intentional asymmetry: one server bears the $O(L)$ aggregation and verification work, while the other operates as a lightweight facilitator with computation independent of $L$. This reduces total cost, enables the secondary server to run on commodity hardware, and strengthens the non-collusion assumption of the servers. One of our main contributions is a suite of new and efficient lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs; to our knowledge, we are the first to establish privacy and correctness with identifiable abort in the two-server setting.
We present an experience report on YouTube-Synch, a production system that replicates content from 10,000+ creator-authorized YouTube channels to a blockchain-based decentralized platform. Although replication is authorized, the system must still defeat YouTube's anti-automation defenses - API quota restrictions (10,000 units/day), IP-based rate limiting, behavioral bot detection, and OAuth token lifecycle policies - which do not distinguish authorized bulk access from abuse. Our central observation is a coupled-defense phenomenon: these protection layers are not independent, so circumventing one (e.g., API quotas) silently activates another (e.g., OAuth token expiration), producing cascading, delayed failures. We ground this in three production incidents with concrete impact - 28 duplicate on-chain objects from a database throughput failure, 10,000+ channels lost to a single OAuth mass-expiration, and 719 daily errors from queue pollution - observed over 15 releases and 3.5 years of operation. We further argue, from the system's own concurrency and rate parameters alone, that detection-driven anti-bot measures impose a download-bound throughput ceiling on the order of 10^3 videos/day per instance - at or below the steady-state demand of 10,000 channels. This analysis shows why priority-based triage and horizontal scaling are structural necessities rather than optimizations, and explains the survivability-over-throughput tradeoff that drove a 25x reduction in download concurrency. We detail the resulting architecture - a four-stage DAG pipeline, a Write-Ahead-Log fault-tolerance model with cross-system state reconciliation, and a trust-minimized ownership-verification protocol that eliminates OAuth - and distill design principles that generalize to extraction against other heavily-defended centralized platforms.
Privacy protection mechanisms are a fundamental aspect of security in cryptocurrency systems, particularly in decentralized networks such as Bitcoin. Although Bitcoin addresses are not directly associated with real-world identities, this does not fully guarantee user privacy. Various deanonymization solutions have been proposed, with network layer deanonymization attacks being especially prominent. However, existing approaches often exhibit limitations such as low precision. In this paper, we propose \textit{NTSSL}, a novel and efficient transaction deanonymization method that integrates network traffic analysis with semi-supervised learning. We use unsupervised learning algorithms to generate pseudo-labels to achieve comparable performance with lower costs. Then, we introduce \textit{NTSSL+}, a cross-layer collaborative analysis integrating transaction clustering results to further improve accuracy. Experimental results demonstrate a substantial performance improvement, 1.6 times better than the existing approach using machining learning.
Solana is rapidly gaining traction among smart contract developers and users. However, its growing adoption has been accompanied by a series of major security incidents, which have spurred research into automated analysis techniques for Solana smart contracts. Unfortunately, existing approaches do not address the unique and complex account model of Solana. In this paper, we propose SseRex, the first symbolic execution vulnerability detection approach for finding Solana-specific bugs such as missing owner checks, missing signer checks, and missing key checks, as well as arbitrary cross-program invocations. Our evaluation of 8,714 bytecode-only contracts shows that our approach outperforms existing approaches and identifies potential bugs in 467 different contracts. Additionally, we analyzed 120 open-source Solana projects and conducted in-depth case studies on four of them. Our findings reveal that subtle, easily overlooked issues often serve as the root cause of severe exploits, further highlighting the need for specialized analysis tools like SseRex.
We present NanoZK, a zero-knowledge proof system for verifiable LLM inference: clients and third-party auditors check that a provider executed the advertised model on a committed input without learning weights or activations. NanoZK introduces a layerwise proof framework that decomposes transformer inference into independently provable layers linked by a SHA-256 commitment chain, yielding constant-size sub-circuit proofs (3.5-3.7 KB; about 83 KB total at L=12), comparable in total size to and substantially more parallelizable than prior ZKML's monolithic 101-126 KB proofs. We prove compositional soundness and zero-knowledge under standard assumptions, design 16-bit lookup-table approximations for softmax, GELU, and normalization with measured perplexity degradation below 1e-4 across six model/dataset combinations, and add a Fisher-information-guided audit-budget triage as an efficiency tool (full soundness still requires verifying every layer). On CPU the MLP sub-circuit proves in about 6.3 s prove-only (about 43 s setup plus prove) with about 22 ms verification at any width; attention prove-only time scales from 0.9 s (d=16) to 184 s (d=256); full-block end-to-end proofs are measured to d=128, with a projected GPU time of about 68 s per block at d=768 from measured O(d^2) MSM scaling and a conservative 15-30x GPU-MSM speedup range based on Icicle's published 30x result for n >= 2^20 and extrapolated to the smaller-n regime. Privacy scope: NanoZK hides weights and activations from verifiers and auditors but does not hide the prompt from the prover; this is complementary to HE/MPC.
Quantum computing provides a feasible multi-layered security challenge to classical blockchain networks. Quantum blockchains that rely on quantum key distribution (QKD) to establish secure channels can address this feasible threat. Whereas, there are still architecture limitations to practical security resulted in the measurement devices while implementing the QKD-secured blockchains in physical layer. This paper presents a quantum-classical hybrid architecture in a distributed blockchain to address the connectivity and distance limitations of the blockchain-embedded quantum networks. A decoupled architecture is designed felicitously so that it pairs a linearly scalable measurement-device-independent (MDI) physical layer with a decentralized consensus. It can optimize the complexity of infrastructure from quadratic to linear scaling, ascribed to leveraging the twin-field (TF) QKD protocol with the MDI-structurized star topology. Additionally, the dual-key stratification strategy transforms symmetric information-theoretic security into publicly auditable forward-secret blockchain evidence. This architecture can integrate the exact information-theoretic security (ITS) with distributed consensus mechanisms, allowing the scalable system to overcome the potential rate-loss limits inherent in classical security-weakened blockchains.
In decentralized web applications, users face an inherent conflict between public verifiability and personal privacy. To participate in regulated on-chain services, users must currently disclose sensitive identity documents to centralized intermediaries, permanently linking real-world identities to public transaction histories. This binary choice between total privacy loss or total exclusion strips users of agency and exposes them to persistent surveillance. In this work, we introduce a Selective Disclosure Framework designed to restore user sovereignty by decoupling eligibility verification from identity revelation. We present ZK-Compliance, a prototype that leverages browser-based zero-knowledge proofs to shift the interaction model, enabling users to prove specific attributes (e.g., "I am over 18") locally without revealing the underlying data. We implement a user-governed Grant, Verify, Revoke lifecycle that transforms the user's mental model of compliance from a permanent data handover into a dynamic, revocable authorization session. Our evaluation shows that client-side proof generation takes under 200ms, enabling a seamless interactive experience on commodity hardware. This work provides early evidence that regulatory compliance need not come at the cost of user privacy or autonomy.
Canonical LST (sTEZ) is an enshrined, protocol-native mechanism designed to mitigate the centralization risks associated with liquid staking intermediaries. Intended to complement direct staking rather than replace it, Canonical LST provides a neutral, public alternative managed directly by the Tezos protocol. It allows any tez holder to participate in aggregated staking without reliance on third-party operators. sTEZ follows an accrual-based design: all slashing events and rewards are reflected in the token's exchange rate to tez, keeping balances fungible while exposing holders to the precise economics of staking. This approach ensures that liquid staking functions as fundamental network infrastructure--with deterministic lifecycle rules, transparent on-chain data, and governance anchored in the amendment process--rather than as a discretionary commercial product. This white paper summarises the motivation for enshrining liquid staking, the core mechanics, exchange-rate model, regulatory touchpoints, risk posture, and forward-looking roadmap for Canonical LST.
Michele Kryston, Edoardo Marangone, Alessandro Marcelletti, Claudio Di Ciccio
Blockchain technology enforces the security, robustness, and traceability of operations of Process-Aware Information Systems (PAISs). In particular, transparency ensures that all data is publicly available, fostering trust among participants in the system. Although this is a crucial property to enable notarization and auditing, it hinders the adoption of blockchain in scenarios where confidentiality is required, as sensitive data is handled. Current solutions rely on cryptographic techniques or consortium blockchains, hindering the enforcement capabilities of smart contracts and the public verifiability of transactions. This work presents the CONFETTY open-source web application, a platform for public-blockchain based process execution that preserves data confidentiality and operational transparency. We use smart contracts to enact, enforce, and store public interactions, while we adopt attribute-based encryption techniques for fine-grained access to confidential information. This approach effectively balances the transparency inherent in public blockchains with the enforcement of the business logic.
The high-frequency issuance and short-cycle speculation of meme tokens in decentralized finance (DeFi) have significantly amplified rug-pull risk. Existing approaches still struggle to provide stable early warning under scarce anomalies, incomplete labels, and limited interpretability. To address this issue, an end-to-end warning framework is proposed for BSC meme tokens, consisting of four stages: dataset construction and labeling, wash-trading pattern feature modeling, risk prediction, and error analysis. Methodologically, 12 token-level behavioral features are constructed based on three wash-trading patterns (Self, Matched, and Circular), unifying transaction-, address-, and flow-level signals into risk vectors. Supervised models are then employed to output warning scores and alert decisions. Under the current setting (7 tokens, 33,242 records), Random Forest outperforms Logistic Regression on core metrics, achieving AUC=0.9098, PR-AUC=0.9185, and F1=0.7429. Ablation results show that trade-level features are the primary performance driver (Delta PR-AUC=-0.1843 when removed), while address-level features provide stable complementary gain (Delta PR-AUC=-0.0573). The model also demonstrates actionable early-warning potential for a subset of samples, with a mean Lead Time (v1) of 3.8133 hours. The error profile (FP=1, FN=8) indicates that the current system is better positioned as a high-precision screener rather than a high-recall automatic alarm engine. The main contributions are threefold: an executable and reproducible rug-pull warning pipeline, empirical validation of multi-granularity wash-trading features under weak supervision, and deployment-oriented evidence through lead-time and error-bound analysis.
Cryptocurrency exchanges use proofs of liabilities (PoLs) to prove to their customers their liabilities committed on-chain, thereby enhancing their trust in the service. Unfortunately, a close examination of currently deployed and academic PoLs reveals significant shortcomings in their designs. For instance, existing schemes cannot resist realistic attack scenarios in which the provider colludes with an existing user. In this paper, we propose a new model, dubbed permissioned PoL, that addresses this gap by not requiring cooperation from users to detect a dishonest provider's potential misbehavior. At the core of our proposal lies a novel primitive, which we call Permissioned Vector Commitment (PVC), to ensure that a committed vector only contains values that users have explicitly signed. We provide an efficient PVC and PoL construction that carefully combines homomorphic properties of KZG commitments and BLS-based signatures. Our prototype implementation shows that, despite the stronger security, our proposal also improves server performance (by up to $10\times$) compared to prior PoLs.
Alexander Kropiunig, Svetlana Kremer, Bernhard Haslhofer
Crypto Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) shape Web3 narratives and retail investment behaviour. In volatile, high-risk markets, their credibility becomes a key determinant of their influence on followers. Yet prior research has focused on lifestyle influencers or generic financial commentary, leaving crypto KOLs' understandings of motivation, credibility, and responsibility underexplored. Drawing on interviews with 13 KOLs and self-determination theory (SDT), we examine how psychological needs are negotiated alongside monetisation and community expectations. Whereas prior work treats finfluencer credibility as a set of static credentials, our findings reveal it to be a self-determined, ethically enacted practice. We identify four community-recognised markers of credibility: self-regulation, bounded epistemic competence, accountability, and reflexive self-correction. This reframes credibility as socio-technical performance, extending SDT into high-risk crypto ecosystems. Methodologically, we employ a hybrid human-LLM thematic analysis. The study surfaces implications for designing credibility signals that prioritise transparency over hype.
Fatemeh Shoaei, Mohammad Pishdar, Mozafar Bag-Mohammadi, Mojtaba Karami
Smart contract-based ecosystems enable decentralized applications without trusted intermediaries, but their immutability and permissionless design also facilitate large-scale fraud. One of the most prevalent attacks is the rug pull, where project operators abruptly withdraw liquidity after artificially inflating token value. Existing detection methods primarily rely on reactive on-chain signals and often suffer from temporal data leakage, limiting their real-world reliability. This paper proposes a leakage-aware framework for early rug-pull detection that integrates on-chain behavioral metrics with temporally aligned Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) signals. We construct a hand-labeled dataset of 1,000 token projects, spanning DeFi and non-DeFi settings, with all features extracted strictly prior to any liquidity withdrawal to preserve causal validity. The dataset combines structural on-chain indicators with external attention signals derived from social media activity and search trends. Within this framework, TabPFN is employed as a core modeling component for learning from multimodal tabular data under strict temporal constraints. Experimental results show that the proposed framework achieves strong discriminative performance and improved probability calibration compared to classical baselines, while maintaining low false-negative rates. By framing rug-pull detection as a causal, multimodal forecasting problem, this work emphasizes the necessity of leakage-resilient evaluation and calibrated risk estimation for deployment in blockchain security systems.
EVMbench, released by OpenAI, Paradigm, and OtterSec, is the first large-scale benchmark for AI agents on smart contract security. Its results -- agents detect up to 45.6% of vulnerabilities and exploit 72.2% of a curated subset -- have fueled expectations that fully automated AI auditing is within reach. We identify two limitations: its narrow evaluation scope (14 agent configurations, most models tested on only their vendor scaffold) and its reliance on audit-contest data published before every model's release that models may have seen during training. To address these, we expand to 26 configurations across four model families and three scaffolds, and introduce a contamination-free dataset of 22 real-world security incidents postdating every model's release date. Our evaluation yields three findings: (1) agents' detection results are not stable, with rankings shifting across configurations, tasks, and datasets; (2) on real-world incidents, no agent succeeds at end-to-end exploitation across all 110 agent-incident pairs despite detecting up to 65% of vulnerabilities, contradicting EVMbench's conclusion that discovery is the primary bottleneck; and (3) scaffolding materially affects results, with an open-source scaffold outperforming vendor alternatives by up to 5 percentage points, yet EVMbench does not control for this. These findings challenge the narrative that fully automated AI auditing is imminent. Agents reliably catch well-known patterns and respond strongly to human-provided context, but cannot replace human judgment. For developers, agent scans serve as a pre-deployment check. For audit firms, agents are most effective within a human-in-the-loop workflow where AI handles breadth and human auditors contribute protocol-specific knowledge and adversarial reasoning. Code and data: https://github.com/blocksecteam/ReEVMBench/.
Existing high performance blockchains verify one signature per transaction on the critical path, which creates O(N) verification cost, high hardware pressure, and difficult post quantum migration. This paper presents ACE Runtime, a ZKP native execution layer built on identity authorization separation. We replace per transaction signature checks with lightweight HMAC attestations in the hot path, then generate one aggregated zero knowledge finality certificate per block in an asynchronous prove stage. The system is organized as an Attest Execute Prove pipeline with two tier finality: soft finality from BFT voting and hard finality from proof verification. Under standard cryptographic assumptions, we provide formal arguments for attestation unforgeability and hard finality irreversibility. We also define a two phase timeout and backup proving path with witness availability gossip for liveness under builder failure. Quantitative results combine analytical modeling with reference implementation measurements. The prototype shows low CPU orchestration overhead, while model driven analysis projects constant per block verification cost, lower validator hardware requirements for non builders, and better bandwidth efficiency than per transaction signature designs. These results indicate that identity authorization separation is a practical architecture for sub second cryptographic finality with a clear path toward stronger post quantum components.
Smart contracts are fundamental components of blockchain ecosystems; however, their security remains a critical concern due to inherent vulnerabilities. While existing detection methodologies are predominantly syntax-oriented, targeting reentrancy and arithmetic errors, they often overlook logical flaws arising from defective business logic. This paper introduces SmartGraphical, a novel security framework specifically engineered to identify logical attack surfaces. By synthesizing automated static analysis with an interactive graphical representation of contract architectures, SmartGraphical facilitates a comprehensive inspection of a contract's functional control flow. To mitigate the context-dependent nature of logical bugs, the tool adopts a human-in-the-loop approach, empowering developers to interpret heuristic warnings within a visualized structural context. The efficacy of SmartGraphical was validated through a rigorous empirical evaluation involving a large dataset of real-world contracts and a large-scale user study with 100 developers of varying expertise. Furthermore, the framework's performance was demonstrated through case studies on high-profile exploits, such as the SYFI rebase failure and farming protocol flash swap attacks, proving that SmartGraphical identifies intricate vulnerabilities that elude state-of-the-art automated detectors. Our findings indicate that this hybrid methodology significantly enhances the interpretability and detection rate of non-trivial logical security threats in smart contracts.
Mahmoud Hafez, Eman Ouda, Mohammed A. Mohammed Eltoum, Khaled Salah · 5 authors
Aircraft engine blade maintenance relies on inspection records shared across manufacturers, airlines, maintenance organizations, and regulators. Yet current systems are fragmented, difficult to audit, and vulnerable to tampering. This paper presents BladeChain, a blockchain-based system providing immutable traceability for blade inspections throughout the component life cycle. BladeChain is the first system to integrate multi-stakeholder endorsement, automated inspection scheduling, AI model provenance, and cryptographic evidence binding, delivering auditable maintenance traceability for aerospace deployments. Built on a four-stakeholder Hyperledger Fabric network (OEM, Airline, MRO, Regulator), BladeChain captures every life-cycle event in a tamper-evident ledger. A chaincode-enforced state machine governs blade status transitions and automatically triggers inspections when configurable flight hour, cycle, or calendar thresholds are exceeded, eliminating manual scheduling errors. Inspection artifacts are stored off-chain in IPFS and linked to on-chain records via SHA-256 hashes, with each inspection record capturing the AI model name and version used for defect detection. This enables regulators to audit both what defects were found and how they were found. The detection module is pluggable, allowing organizations to adopt or upgrade inspection models without modifying the ledger or workflows. We built a prototype and evaluated it on workloads of up to 100 blades, demonstrating 100% life cycle completion with consistent throughput of 26 operations per minute. A centralized SQL baseline quantifies the consensus overhead and highlights the security trade-off. Security validation confirms tamper detection within 17~ms through hash verification.
This paper tackles the discovery of tMEV, that is, the Maximal Extractable Value on blockchains that arises from Token smart contracts. This scope differs from the existing MEV-discovery research, which analyzes application-layer contracts or attacker contracts, but ignores the wide and diverse range of token contracts. This paper presents a pipeline of techniques for tMEV discovery, including tSCAN, a static analysis tool for identifying non-standard supply-control functions in token contracts, and tSEARCH, a searcher that uncovers profitable tMEV opportunities by generating, refining, and solving token-specific constraints. By replaying real-world transactions, this paper demonstrates both the profitability of tMEV strategies and existing searchers' unawareness of them: the proposed tSEARCH extracts $10\times$ more profit than observed MEV activity on Ethereum. The practicality of tMEV searching is demonstrated through a prototype built on Slither, showing high effectiveness with low performance overhead.
In post-quantum blockchain settings, objects that require validity proofs (e.g., blob roots, execution-layer or consensus-layer signature aggregates) must be broadcast through mempool and relay networks. Recursive STARKs have been proposed to aggregate such proofs so that each node forwards one proof per tick plus objects without proofs, capping per-node proof bandwidth at roughly 128 KB degree per tick. We observe that propagation does not inherently require validity proofs on the path-only a lightweight assurance that an object is eligible for relay. We present AR-ACE (ACE-GF-based Attestation Relay for PQC), in which relay nodes forward objects plus compact attestations (e.g., identity-bound signatures or commitments) and do not generate, hold, or forward any full validity proof. Only the builder (or final verifier) performs a single aggregated validity proof over the set of objects it includes. This proof-off-path design removes proof overhead from the propagation path entirely, yielding an order-of-magnitude reduction in proof-related relay bandwidth relative to proof-carrying propagation. When instantiated with ACE-GF-derived attestation keys, AR-ACE preserves a unified identity story with on-chain authorization and is PQC-ready. We specify a protocol model, state design goals and security considerations, define security games, and provide a structural bandwidth comparison with recursive-STARK-based propagation.