Off-Chain transactions allow for the immediate transfer of Cryptocurrency between two parties, without delays or unavoidable transaction fees. Such capabilities are critical for mainstream Cryptocurrency adaption. They allow for the "Coffee-Coin Criteria"; under which a customer orders a coffee and pays for that coffee in bitcoins. This is not possible with On-Chain transactions today. Unfortunately, all existing Off-Chain transaction protocols are notoriously unreliable The current generation of third-party facilitators are vulnerable to hacker-based attacks. As Mt. Gox tragically demonstrated, centralized-transaction institutions are easy targets for Cryptocurrency thieves. The slightest security flaw in a third-party system will pounced on by hackers, who will proceed to devour it like ants devouring a crab. Under such circumstances, it no wonder that the Public treats most Cryptocurrency services with a constant shadow of suspicion. For Bitcoin to flourish, its anti-hierarchy principles must be applied to safe Off-Chain transactions. First and foremost, we need a new hacker-proof protocol that can easily be executed by any experienced developer. Preferably, the protocol will be open-sourced for full reliability and transparency. This paper presents one such procedure, which allows for he safe transmission of Bitcoin private key control by way of Cryptocubic transactions.
We study decentralized cryptocurrency protocols in which the participants do not deplete physical scarce resources. Such protocols commonly rely on Proof of Stake, i.e., on mechanisms that extend voting power to the stakeholders of the system. We offer analysis of existing protocols that have a substantial amount of popularity. We then present our novel pure Proof of Stake protocols, and argue that they help in mitigating problems that the existing protocols exhibit.
On February 2014, $650.000.000 worth of Bitcoins disappeared. Currently it is unclear whether hackers or MtGox, the largest Bitcoin exchange, are to be blamed. In either case, the anonymous and unregulated nature of the Bitcoin system makes it practically impossible for innocent victims to get their money back. We have investigated the technical possibilities, solutions and implications of introducing a regulatory framework based on redlisting Bitcoin accounts. Despite numerous proposals, the Bitcoin community has voiced a strong opinion against any form of regulation. However, most of the discussions were based on speculations rather than facts. We strive to contribute a scientific foundation to these discussions and illuminate the path to crypto-justice.
Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivan Pustogarov
Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase transaction unlinkability. We present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user pseudonyms to the IP addresses where the transactions are generated. Our techniques work for the most common and the most challenging scenario when users are behind NATs or firewalls of their ISPs. They allow to link transactions of a user behind a NAT and to distinguish connections and transactions of different users behind the same NAT. We also show that a natural countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the bitcoin network. Our attacks require only a few machines and have been experimentally verified. We propose several countermeasures to mitigate these new attacks.
Open access
4 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Abstract Mix network plays a key role in electronic voting to preserve anonymity and lots of mixnet schemes have been proposed so far. However, they requires complex and costly zero-knowledge proofs to provide their correct mixing operations. In 2010, Sebe et al. proposed an efficient and lightweight mixnet scheme based on a cryptographic secure hash function instead of zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper, we present a more efficient and faster mixnet scheme than Sebe et al.'s scheme under the same assumption. Also, our scheme is secure. Key Words : Zero-knowledge proof, e-Voting, Anonimity, Mixnet, hash function â . Introduction Mixes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem, as published by D.Chaum in 1981 [1] . A mix-network or mixnet accepts as input a collection of ciphertexts, and outputs associated plaintexts(or ciphertexts) in a randomly permuted order. A well constructed mixnet makes it infeasible for an adversary to determine which plaintext output corresponds to which ciphertext input more efficiently than by guessing at random. Proposed by D.Chaum in 1981 as a technique for anonymous e-mail and e-voting, mixnet can be categorized into decryption mix-nets and re-encryption mix-nets
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Cryptography and Data Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
We calculate the probability of success of block-hiding mining strategies in Bitcoin-like networks. These strategies involve building a secret branch of the block-tree and publishing it opportunistically, aiming to replace the top of the main branch and rip the reward associated with the secretly mined blocks. We identify two types of block-hiding strategies and chart the parameter space where those are more beneficial than the standard mining strategy described in Nakamoto's paper. Our analysis suggests a generalization of the notion of the relative hashing power as a measure for a miner's influence on the network. Block-hiding strategies are beneficial only when this measure of influence exceeds a certain threshold.
Open access
2 source records
cs.CR
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
In this short note we show that the Bitcoin network can allow remote parties to gamble with their bitcoins by tossing a fair or biased coin, with no need for a trusted party, and without the possibility of extortion by dishonest parties who try to abort. The superfluousness of having a trusted party implies that there is no house edge, as is the case with centralized services that are supposed to generate a profit.
A scheme for anonymous tag based anonymous credentials is enhanced. Different from existing zero knowledge proof based anonymous credential schemes that require numbers of challenges and responses between verifiers and credential holders, the anonymous tag based scheme requires only small number of challenges and responses between verifiers and credential holders. This is because the scheme in this paper can be easily made sound even in environments where verifiers also may behave dishonestly. However, the original scheme has probabilistic features, i.e. verifiers must generate dummy fake challenges; therefore overheads for managing anonymous systems cannot be reduced to the minimum. The enhanced anonymous tag based scheme excludes these probabilistic features from interactions between verifiers and credential holders. The scheme also corrects several design errors included in the original scheme.
Public key infrastructures (PKIs) enable users to look up and verify one anotherâs public keys based on identities. Current approaches to PKIs are vulnerable because they do not offer sufficiently strong guarantees of identity retention; that is, they do not effectively prevent one user from registering a public key under anotherâs already-registered identity. In this paper, we leverage the consistency guarantees provided by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Namecoin to build a PKI that ensures identity retention. Our system, called Certcoin, has no central authority and thus requires the use of secure distributed dictionary data structures to provide efficient support for key lookup. 1
In anonymous reputation systems, where after an interaction between anonymous users, one of the users evaluates the peer by giving a rating. Ratings for a user are accumulated, which becomes the reputation of the user. By using the reputation, we can know the reliability of an anonymous user. Previously, anonymous reputation systems have been proposed, using an anonymous e-cash scheme. However, in the e-cash-based systems, the bank grasps the accumulated reputations for all users, and the fluctuation of reputations. These are private information for users. Furthermore, the timing attack using the deposit times is possible, which makes the anonymity weak. In this paper, we propose an anonymous reputation system, where the reputations of users are secret for even the reputation manager such as the bank. Our approach is to adopt an anonymous credential certifying the accumulated reputation of a user. Initially a user registers with the reputation manager, and is issued an initial certificate. After each interaction with a rater, the user as the ratee obtains an updated certificate certifying the previous reputation summed up by the current rating. The update protocol is based on the zero-knowledge proofs, and thus the reputations are secret for the reputation manager. On the other hand, due to the certificate, the user cannot maliciously alter his reputation.
Bitcoin is a digital currency which is based on P2P network and open source software. It is avirtual currency without any control by any centralized organization. New Bitcoins are issuedby lots of specified algorithms. The whole Bitcoin network utilizes the distributed database toverify and record all the transactions through the nodes in the P2P network in which thedouble spending is prevented. No person or organization is able to control Bitcoin based on adecentralized P2P network and algorithm. The cryptographic functions of Bitcoin are designedto allow only the real Bitcoin owner to pay and transfer, and ensure the anonymity andmarketability.The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the security architecture and services for the Bitcoin system and describe of all the features and infrastructures of the whole Bitcoin network. A whole establishment demo including wallet client, mining server with GUI and mining client is implemented. Further improvement will be suggested and recommended for the system
Bitcoin supports complex transactions where the recipient of a transaction can be programmatically determined. Using these transactions, multi-party computation protocols that aim to ensure fairness among partici-pants have been designed. We present a Denial of Service attack against these protocols that results in a net loss for some or all of the honest parties involved, violating those fairness goals. 1
In the last few years the efficiency of secure multi-party computation (MPC) increased in several orders of magnitudes. However, this alone might not be enough if we want MPC protocols to be used in practice. A crucial property that is needed in many applications is that everyone can check that a given (secure) computation was performed correctly â even in the extreme case where all the parties involved in the computation are corrupted, and even if the party who wants to verify the result was not participating. This is especially relevant in the clients-servers setting, where many clients provide input to a secure computation performed by a few servers. An obvious example of this is electronic voting, but also in many types of auctions one may want independent verification of the result. Traditionally, this is achieved by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs during the computation. A recent trend in MPC protocols is to have a more expensive preprocessing phase followed by a very efficient online phase, e.g., the recent so-called SPDZ protocol by Damgard et al. Applications such as voting and some auctions are perfect use-case for these protocols, as the parties usually know well in advance when the computation will take place, and using those protocols allows us to use only cheap information-theoretic primitives in the actual computation. Unfortunately no protocol of the SPDZ type supports an audit phase. In this paper, we show how to achieve efficient MPC with a public audit. We formalize the concept of publicly auditable secure computation and provide an enhanced version of the SPDZ protocol where, even if all the servers are corrupted, anyone with access to the transcript of the protocol can check that the output is indeed correct. Most importantly, we do so without significantly compromising the performance of SPDZ i.e. our online phase has complexity approximately twice that of SPDZ.
Iddo Bentov, Charles Lee, Alex Mizrahi, Meni Rosenfeld
We propose a new protocol for a cryptocurrency, that builds upon the Bitcoin protocol by combining its Proof of Work component with a Proof of Stake type of system. Our Proof of Activity (PoA) protocol offers good security against possibly practical future attacks on Bitcoin, and has a relatively low penalty in terms of network communication and storage space. We explore various attack scenarios and suggest remedies to potential vulnerabilities of the PoA protocol, as well as evaluate the performance of its core subroutine. 1