In this paper, we argue that discussion of worker participation in decisionâmaking is very limited in its usefulness unless the analysis looks at the structure of decisionâmaking, particularly in terms of centralization, in the organization concerned. The issues of worker participation are not instructive per se . If there is decentralization, it may assist the effectiveness of participation structures at lower levels, but the problem remains of the degree to which the costs of some decentralization are tradedâoff by the âdominantâcoalitionâ in the corporation against the benefits of centralization of decisionâmaking in the areas of finance and senior personnel.
Linear programming models of specialized financial decision problems such as working capital management [21], short-term financing [22], or capital bug-geting [24] are deficient in that they may lead to decisions which are suboptimal with respect to the firm as a whole. Each model attacks a single decision problem and neglects its interaction with the other activities of the firm. On the other hand, a model which reflects these interdependences and interactions by including the various financing, investment, and operating decisions in a single model tends to become excessively large and inefficient to use. What is needed is a model that incorporates the efficiencies inherent in smaller, more specialized models which can be utilized on a decentralized basis and which can simultaneously lead to decisions that are optimal for the firm as a whole.