Automated matching engines execute millions of orders per session, yet systematic asymmetries in latency, order size, and market access compound into persistent execution disparities that erode participant trust. We formulate provably fair order matching as a Constrained Markov Decision Process and propose CPO-FOAM (Constrained Policy Optimization with Feedback-Optimized Adaptive Margins). An inner loop computes an analytic trust-region step on the Fisher information manifold; a PID-controlled outer loop dynamically tightens safety margins, suppressing the sawtooth oscillations endemic to Lagrangian methods under non-stationary dynamics. Group fairness (demographic parity, equalized odds) enters the CMDP cost vector while individual Lipschitz fairness is enforced deterministically via spectral normalization. We prove BIBO stability and that the integral term drives steady-state violations to zero. On LOBSTER NASDAQ data across six market regimes, CPO-FOAM recovers 95.9% of unconstrained throughput at 2.5% constraint violation frequency; on crypto-asset LOB data under MEV injection it captures 98.4% of the reward envelope at 3.2% CVF. The method scales sub-linearly to M=8 constraints, settles on-chain within one Ethereum block, and yields a 2.1X reward improvement on Safety-Gymnasium, confirming domain-agnostic generalization.
Liquidation of collateral are the primary safeguard for solvency of lending protocols in decentralized finance. However, the mechanics of liquidations expose these protocols to predatory price manipulations and other forms of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). In this paper, we characterize the optimal liquidation strategy, via a dynamic program, from the perspective of a profit-maximizing liquidator when the spot oracle is given by a Constant Product Market Maker (CPMM). We explicitly model Oracle Extractable Value (OEV) where liquidators manipulate the CPMM with sandwich attacks to trigger profitable liquidation events. We derive closed-form liquidation bounds and prove that CPMM transaction fees act as a critical security parameter. Crucially, we demonstrate that fees do not merely reduce attacker profits, but can make such manipulations unprofitable for an attacker. Our findings suggest that CPMM transaction fees serve a dual purpose: compensating liquidity providers and endogenously hardening CPMM oracles against manipulation without the latency of time-weighted averages or medianization.
Financial markets exhibit temporal organization that is not fully captured by volatility measures or linear correlation structure. We study a null-validated topological approach for quantifying financial market complexity using Bitcoin daily log returns and the S&P 500 index as examples of cryptocurrency and broad U.S. equity market dynamics. The analysis uses the $L^1$ norm of the persistence landscapes computed from sliding-window delay embeddings. This quantity co-moves strongly with stochastic volatility during periods of market stress, but the strength and form of this relationship vary over time and differ between the two markets. Surrogate-based null models provide statistical validation of these observations. Rejection of shuffle surrogates rules out explanations based on marginal distributions alone, while departures from phase randomized surrogates indicate sensitivity to nonlinear and phase-dependent temporal organization beyond linear correlations. These results demonstrate that persistence landscape norms provide complementary information about market dynamics across market conditions.
Carlo Brunetta, Amit Chaudhary, Stefano Galatolo, Massimiliano Sala
Dynamically distributed inflation is a common mechanism used to guide a blockchain's staking rate towards a desired equilibrium between network security and token liquidity. However, the high sensitivity of the annual percentage yield to changes in the staking rate, coupled with the inherent feedback delays in staker responses, can induce undesirable oscillations around this equilibrium. This paper investigates this instability phenomenon. We analyze the dynamics of inflation-based reward systems and propose a novel distribution model designed to stabilize the staking rate. Our solution effectively dampens oscillations, stabilizing the yield within a target staking range.
This paper proposes a model that enables permissionless and decentralized networks for complex computations. We explore the integration and optimize load balancing in an open, decentralized computational network. Our model leverages economic incentives and reputation-based mechanisms to dynamically allocate tasks between operators and coprocessors. This approach eliminates the need for specialized hardware or software, thereby reducing operational costs and complexities. We present a mathematical model that enhances restaking processes in blockchain systems by enabling operators to delegate complex tasks to coprocessors. The model's effectiveness is demonstrated through experimental simulations, showcasing its ability to optimize reward distribution, enhance security, and improve operational efficiency. Our approach facilitates a more flexible and scalable network through the use of economic commitments, adaptable dynamic rating models, and a coprocessor load incentivization system. Supported by experimental simulations, the model demonstrates its capability to optimize resource allocation, enhance system resilience, and reduce operational risks. This ensures significant improvements in both security and cost-efficiency for the blockchain ecosystem.
González, Agustín Muñoz, Juan I. Sequeira, Rafael Orive Illera
In this work, we present an application of the probabilistic weak formulation of mean field games (MFG) for modeling liquidity pools in a constant product automated market maker (AMM) protocol in the context of decentralized finance. Our work extends one of the most conventional applications of MFG, which is the price impact model in an order book, by incorporating an AMM instead of a traditional order book. The key structural difference is that in the AMM setting, the price is determined by the pool's reserves through a nonlinear mechanism, replacing the linear price-impact function used in classical models. Through our approach, we establish the existence of solutions to the Mean Field Game and, additionally, the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player game. We complement the theoretical results with a comprehensive numerical study that validates the equilibrium structure: stability under perturbations, the $\varepsilon$-Nash property via unilateral deviations, finite-player convergence at propagation-of-chaos rates, and sensitivity to cost parameters and incentive targets. These results offer a new game-theoretic perspective for representing strategic behavior in AMM-based liquidity pools and open promising opportunities for future research in this emerging field.
Research on Bitcoin (BTC) transactions is a matter of interest for both economic and network science fields. Although this cryptocurrency is based on a decentralized system, making transaction details freely accessible, making raw blockchain data analyzable is not straightforward due to the Bitcoin protocol specificity and data richness. To address the need for an accessible dataset, we present ORBITAAL, the first comprehensive dataset based on temporal graph formalism. The dataset covers all Bitcoin transactions from January 2009 to January 2021. ORBITAAL provides temporal graph representations of entity-entity transaction networks, snapshots and stream graph. Each transaction value is given in Bitcoin and US dollar regarding daily-based conversion rate. This dataset also provides details on entities such as their global BTC balance and associated public addresses.
Pedro Braga, Georgios Chionas, Piotr Krysta, Stefanos Leonardos · 6 authors
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol design space. Our aim is to leverage this parameter to maintain a healthy balance between block producers (who need to be compensated) and users (who need to feel encouraged to transact). We follow the approach introduced by EIP-1559 and design a similar mechanism to dynamically update the MEV extraction rate with the goal of stabilizing it at a target value. We study the properties of this dynamic mechanism and show that, while convergence to the target can be guaranteed for certain parameters, instability, and even chaos, can occur in other cases. Despite these complexities, under general conditions, the system concentrates in a neighborhood of the target equilibrium implying high long-term performance. Our work establishes, the first to our knowledge, dynamic framework for the integral problem of MEV sharing between extractors and users.
Blockchain and other decentralized databases, known as distributed ledgers, are designed to store information online where all trusted network members can update the data with transparency. The dynamics of ledger's development can be mathematically represented by a directed acyclic graph (DAG). One essential property of a properly functioning shared ledger is that all network members holding a copy of the ledger agree on a sequence of information added to the ledger, which is referred to as consensus and is known to be related to a structural property of DAG called one-endedness. In this paper, we consider a model of distributed ledger with sequential stochastic arrivals that mimic attachment rules from the IOTA cryptocurrency. We first prove that the number of leaves in the random DAG is bounded by a constant infinitely often through the identification of a suitable martingale, and then prove that a sequence of specific events happens infinitely often. Combining those results we establish that, as time goes to infinity, the IOTA DAG is almost surely one-ended.
Samuel W. Akingbade, Marian Gidea, Matteo Manzi, Vahid Nateghi
We present a heuristic argument for the propensity of Topological Data Analysis (TDA) to detect early warning signals of critical transitions in financial time series. Our argument is based on the Log-Periodic Power Law Singularity (LPPLS) model, which characterizes financial bubbles as super-exponential growth (or decay) of an asset price superimposed with oscillations increasing in frequency and decreasing in amplitude when approaching a critical transition (tipping point). We show that whenever the LPPLS model is fitting with the data, TDA generates early warning signals. As an application, we illustrate this approach on a sample of positive and negative bubbles in the Bitcoin historical price.
Xing-Shuo Song, Quan-Lin Li, Yan-Xia Chang, Chi Zhang
Note that the serial structure of blockchain has many essential pitfalls, thus a data network structure and its DAG-based blockchain are introduced to resolve the blockchain pitfalls. From such a network perspective, analysis of the DAG-based blockchain systems becomes interesting and challenging. So, the simulation models are adopted widely. In this paper, we first describe a simple Markov model for the DAG-based blockchain with IOTA Tangle by means of two layers of tips and internal tips' impatient connection behavior. Then we set up a continuous-time Markov process to analyze the DAG-based blockchain system and show that this Markov process is a level-dependent quasi-birth-and-death (QBD) process. Based on this, we prove that the QBD process must be irreducible and positive recurrent. Furthermore, once the stationary probability vector of the QBD process is given, we provide performance analysis of the DAG-based blockchain system. Next, we propose a new effective method for computing the average confirmation time of any arriving internal tip at this system by means of the first passage times and the PH distributions. Finally, we use numerical examples to check the validity of our theoretical results and indicate how some key system parameters influence the performance measures of this system. Therefore, we hope that the methodology and results developed in this paper can be applicable to deal with more general DAG-based blockchain systems such that a series of promising research can be developed potentially.
Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 1559 was recently implemented to transform Ethereum's transaction fee market. EIP-1559 utilizes an algorithmic update rule with a constant learning rate to estimate a base fee. The base fee reflects prevailing network conditions and hence provides a more reliable oracle for current gas prices. Using on-chain data from the period after its launch, we evaluate the impact of EIP-1559 on the user experience and market performance. Our empirical findings suggest that although EIP-1559 achieves its goals on average, short-term behavior is marked by intense, chaotic oscillations in block sizes (as predicted by our recent theoretical dynamical system analysis [1]) and slow adjustments during periods of demand bursts (e.g., NFT drops). Both phenomena lead to unwanted inter-block variability in mining rewards. To address this issue, we propose an alternative base fee adjustment rule in which the learning rate varies according to an additive increase, multiplicative decrease (AIMD) update scheme. Our simulations show that the latter robustly outperforms the EIP-1559 protocol under various demand scenarios. These results provide evidence that variable learning rate mechanisms may constitute a promising alternative to the default EIP-1559-based format and contribute to the ongoing discussion on the design of more efficient transaction fee markets.
We study a game-theoretic model of blockchain mining economies and show that griefing, a practice according to which participants harm other participants at some lesser cost to themselves, is a prevalent threat at its Nash equilibria. The proof relies on a generalization of evolutionary stability to non-homogeneous populations via griefing factors (ratios that measure network losses relative to deviator's own losses) which leads to a formal theoretical argument for the dissipation of resources, consolidation of power and high entry barriers that are currently observed in practice. A critical assumption in this type of analysis is that miners' decisions have significant influence in aggregate network outcomes (such as network hashrate). However, as networks grow larger, the miner's interaction more closely resembles a distributed production economy or Fisher market and its stability properties change. In this case, we derive a proportional response (PR) update protocol which converges to market equilibria at which griefing is irrelevant. Convergence holds for a wide range of miners risk profiles and various degrees of resource mobility between blockchains with different mining technologies. Our empirical findings in a case study with four mineable cryptocurrencies suggest that risk diversification, restricted mobility of resources (as enforced by different mining technologies) and network growth, all are contributing factors to the stability of the inherently volatile blockchain ecosystem.
We study learning dynamics in distributed production economies such as blockchain mining, peer-to-peer file sharing and crowdsourcing. These economies can be modelled as multi-product Cournot competitions or all-pay auctions (Tullock contests) when individual firms have market power, or as Fisher markets with quasi-linear utilities when every firm has negligible influence on market outcomes. In the former case, we provide a formal proof that Gradient Ascent (GA) can be Li-Yorke chaotic for a step size as small as $Θ(1/n)$, where $n$ is the number of firms. In stark contrast, for the Fisher market case, we derive a Proportional Response (PR) protocol that converges to market equilibrium. The positive results on the convergence of the PR dynamics are obtained in full generality, in the sense that they hold for Fisher markets with \emph{any} quasi-linear utility functions. Conversely, the chaos results for the GA dynamics are established even in the simplest possible setting of two firms and one good, and they hold for a wide range of price functions with different demand elasticities. Our findings suggest that by considering multi-agent interactions from a market rather than a game-theoretic perspective, we can formally derive natural learning protocols which are stable and converge to effective outcomes rather than being chaotic.
Participation in permissionless blockchains results in competition over system resources, which needs to be controlled with fees. Ethereum's current fee mechanism is implemented via a first-price auction that results in unpredictable fees as well as other inefficiencies. EIP-1559 is a recent, improved proposal that introduces a number of innovative features such as a dynamically adaptive base fee that is burned, instead of being paid to the miners. Despite intense interest in understanding its properties, several basic questions such as whether and under what conditions does this protocol self-stabilize have remained elusive thus far. We perform a thorough analysis of the resulting fee market dynamic mechanism via a combination of tools from game theory and dynamical systems. We start by providing bounds on the step-size of the base fee update rule that suffice for global convergence to equilibrium via Lyapunov arguments. In the negative direction, we show that for larger step-sizes instability and even formally chaotic behavior are possible under a wide range of settings. We complement these qualitative results with quantitative bounds on the resulting range of base fees. We conclude our analysis with a thorough experimental case study that corroborates our theoretical findings.
In this paper, we provide a new theoretical framework of pyramid Markov processes to solve some open and fundamental problems of blockchain selfish mining under a rigorous mathematical setting. We first describe a more general model of blockchain selfish mining with both a two-block leading competitive criterion and a new economic incentive mechanism. Then we establish a pyramid Markov process and show that it is irreducible and positive recurrent, and its stationary probability vector is matrix-geometric with an explicitly representable rate matrix. Also, we use the stationary probability vector to study the influence of many orphan blocks on the waste of computing resource. Next, we set up a pyramid Markov reward process to investigate the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. As a by-product, we build three approximative Markov processes and provide some new interesting interpretation on the Markov chain and the revenue analysis reported in the seminal work by Eyal and Sirer (2014). Note that the pyramid Markov (reward) processes can open up a new avenue in the study of blockchain selfish mining. Thus we hope that the methodology and results developed in this paper shed light on the blockchain selfish mining such that a series of promising research can be developed potentially.
This paper introduces new methods for analysing the extreme and erratic behaviour of time series to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 on cryptocurrency market dynamics. Across 51 cryptocurrencies, we examine extreme behaviour through a study of distribution extremities, and erratic behaviour through structural breaks. First, we analyse the structure of the market as a whole and observe a reduction in self-similarity as a result of COVID-19, particularly with respect to structural breaks in variance. Second, we compare and contrast these two behaviours, and identify individual anomalous cryptocurrencies. Tether (USDT) and TrueUSD (TUSD) are consistent outliers with respect to their returns, while Holo (HOT), NEXO (NEXO), Maker (MKR) and NEM (XEM) are frequently observed as anomalous with respect to both behaviours and time. Even among a market known as consistently volatile, this identifies individual cryptocurrencies that behave most irregularly in their extreme and erratic behaviour and shows these were more affected during the COVID-19 market crisis.
Nick James, Max Menzies, Lamiae Azizi, Jennifer Chan
This paper proposes a new method for determining similarity and anomalies between time series, most practically effective in large collections of (likely related) time series, by measuring distances between structural breaks within such a collection. We introduce a class of \emph{semi-metric} distance measures, which we term \emph{MJ distances}. These semi-metrics provide an advantage over existing options such as the Hausdorff and Wasserstein metrics. We prove they have desirable properties, including better sensitivity to outliers, while experiments on simulated data demonstrate that they uncover similarity within collections of time series more effectively. Semi-metrics carry a potential disadvantage: without the triangle inequality, they may not satisfy a "transitivity property of closeness." We analyse this failure with proof and introduce an computational method to investigate, in which we demonstrate that our semi-metrics violate transitivity infrequently and mildly. Finally, we apply our methods to cryptocurrency and measles data, introducing a judicious application of eigenvalue analysis.
Recently, the notion of cryptocurrencies has come to the fore of public interest. These assets that exist only in electronic form, with no underlying value, offer the owners some protection from tracking or seizure by government or creditors. We model these assets from the perspective of asset flow equations developed by Caginalp and Balenovich, and investigate their stability under various parameters, as classical finance methodology is inapplicable. By utilizing the concept of liquidity price and analyzing stability of the resulting system of ordinary differential equations, we obtain conditions under which the system is linearly stable. We find that trend-based motivations and additional liquidity arising from an uptrend are destabilizing forces, while anchoring through value assumed to be fairly recent price history tends to be stabilizing.
Marian Gidea, Daniel Goldsmith, Yuri Katz, Pablo Roldan · 5 authors
We analyze the time series of four major cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple) before the digital market crash at the end of 2017 - beginning 2018. We introduce a methodology that combines topological data analysis with a machine learning technique -- $k$-means clustering -- in order to automatically recognize the emerging chaotic regime in a complex system approaching a critical transition. We first test our methodology on the complex system dynamics of a Lorenz-type attractor, and then we apply it to the four major cryptocurrencies. We find early warning signals for critical transitions in the cryptocurrency markets, even though the relevant time series exhibit a highly erratic behavior.