Blockchain Papers

Paul Pajo

No abstract is available for this record.

K. Balaji, P. Seshagiri Rao

No abstract is available for this record.

Minwei Zhang

This paper examines the legal status of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) within Macau's legal framework, with particular emphasis on the potential analogical application of Article 174 of the Commercial Code. Despite the absence of specific provisions addressing these novel blockchain-based entities, this research demonstrates that Macau's existing legal infrastructure possesses sufficient flexibility to accommodate DAOs through interpretive mechanisms. By analyzing the theoretical foundations of legal personhood, the distinctive characteristics of DAOs, and the underlying principles of Macau's commercial law system, this study proposes a viable pathway for recognizing DAOs as legitimate legal entities. The research reveals that while Article 174 was not originally conceived to address blockchain-based organizations, its purposive interpretation and analogical application could provide a provisional legal foundation for DAOs, pending more specific legislative developments. This approach not only addresses immediate practical concerns regarding the legal status of DAOs but also contributes to the broader discourse on legal adaptation to technological innovation in the commercial sphere.

Magnus Strand

The cases reported concern the assignment of claims to third-party litigators, limitation periods, and the consequences of the competition law concept of a ‘single economic unit’ with regard to the jurisdiction of national courts under the Brussels I bis Regulation. For example, in ASG 2, the Court of Justice was asked whether EU law requires that collective redress, in some form, be available in the Member States, but allowed the Member States a rather wide margin of discretion on the matter. Another example was Heureka, in which the Court of Justice ruled that EU law precludes national rules on the limitation of follow-on damages actions if they do not provide for the limitation period to be suspended, at the very least, until one year after the date on which the public enforcement decision finding an infringement has become final. As the case law develops, we gain legal foreseeability in private enforcement of competition law that will, in turn, further increase incentives to seek compensation for harm caused by infringements. This survey reports developments in private enforcement of EU competition law in the years 2024 and 2025, up until 31 May of the latter year. As there have been no news in EU regulation during this period, the report focuses on case law developments. Private enforcement of competition law takes the form of civil litigation. As a consequence, it falls under the jurisdictions of national courts and will only find its way to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through references for a preliminary ruling. For the purposes of this report, this also means there have been many cases before national courts that will be interesting but cannot be covered here. To offer just two examples, the infamous trucks cartel1 and the Booking.com infringement2 have both given rise to an array of damages claims across European jurisdictions.3 The CJEU case law to be reported mainly concerns three core aspects that will each be covered in one of the sections below. First, whether national law can preclude or restrict the possibility for victims of an infringement of competition law to assign their damages claim to a provider of legal services (a ‘third-party litigator’). This is an issue of fundamental importance to the business model of certain providers active in the private enforcement of competition law. Second, several cases referred to the Court of Justice have concerned limitation periods that apply to damages claims, whether or not the rule on limitation periods in the 2014 Competition Damages Directive4 is temporally applicable in the proceedings. A new case on this issue is reported below. Third, issues related to jurisdiction and other procedural the is an that both and and to the victims of the and core issues that have been further I will a for a preliminary which is before the Court of the of on damages the a and will be The and of for a of victims of an infringement of competition law is a business in the The business model on the of victims to assign their to claim damages to a will the claims and a of the damages if The case reported ASG concerned whether a national limitation of this was with EU law. As in in this it is that damages claims for an infringement of competition law and some form of collective and have that victims of the infringement have to The for will be for to with for each be a rather of actions by providers of legal services in for the collective of victims can to the of for and to This preliminary by a the in the of a for damages for harm caused by an infringement of The infringement in a of for by a of during the period to The victims of the in and The was The victims their to damages in of the infringement of competition law to a third-party ASG which in the proceedings. its to the national the the of a it was under law to assign to damages in a of for the purposes of a for this not been for harm caused by an infringement of competition law. the under the by the victims to the be the was also concerned whether an of law was with EU law. The referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary was in whether EU law precludes national law victims of an infringement of competition law to assign their to damages to a provider of legal The Court of Justice that EU law the possibility of actions for the of compensation but not for Member States to a for The Court of Justice to the referred under the EU law of the national its in to that As I will this is a to ASG with some this for the the issues in the case whether law collective that an to a for whether the for an it or to the to The Court that the of claims the and economic in actions for in the Court not in that it was to the of if victims to their claims the Court of Justice ruled that EU law an of national which the of victims of an infringement of competition law their to compensation to a provider of legal that a only if national law not provide for other possibility of the claims of victims that the of to and the of an for damages was or The Court of Justice not been asked whether EU law requires that collective redress, in some form, be available in the Member ASG is an The Court a to the the Member States a rather wide margin of The of only claims to the there no in national law that claims for certain in the that a for the to with First, the Court of Justice very that the national not it to other of EU law the of the Court the to also the to in of the in its it not the of the national the of in its it is that it have been the Court of Justice to that actions for the of damages rather and under and that it they be available in follow-on the of the actions on EU law not be actions under national law. the Court of Justice has actions with a and the be in it rather that the of will for actions for the of damages to be available in actions if they available in follow-on actions for damages by of an infringement of competition law. The of also to the if actions for the of damages available for other actions under that the actions have a and the of the 2014 Competition Damages there have been several cases in which the Court of Justice has been to the of national limitation periods with the rules of the with or and of EU law. several the core issue has been at in the rules in the temporally in other to the EU law before the 2014 Competition Damages to EU law under that This has been an issue in to of the which its rules on limitation of damages issues in the case law have been the a that on which date the applicable national limitation period can to and under limitation periods be or A new to this of the case law. This one of many cases of its in the of is also a by in the of in of The Court of Justice has not its in the latter this the legal issues will be covered in of the cases on limitation periods in competition damages actions is in which the Court of Justice ruled that and the of preclude a limitation period to if the was of the of the not possibility of or that period during before the national competition As we will the and in Heureka, the that its by its services to the of services This by the of to to The before the of the 2014 Competition Damages on and after the of the for the of the rules of the national law on that claim was under the applicable limitation rules of the at with regard to the period to The limitation period was three and to the the or have of the harm and the of the to of the a limitation period of The the asked the Court of Justice whether EU and in of the and the of preclude a national limitation period applicable to actions for damages for an infringement of competition which to the or be to have that it harm and the of the to compensation for the and which is not during public enforcement it was not whether the 2014 Competition Damages be applicable in the the Court of Justice the a issue a of the of and that the Court that the of the to compensation for harm caused by an infringement of competition law be or if the limitation periods applicable to actions to before the infringement to an and the not or not have been to the for its for The Court an two to the by the national The of the was that a limitation period not to before the infringement has to an The Court of Justice that a was in to it for the to its of in to the of an the of and the the the Court and there is an to the of the The Court with in that the that a limitation period not to before the infringement has to an an to their The of the was that limitation periods cannot to before the or be to the for its for The at the Court of Justice of an infringement of competition the of the that harm and that and the of the the Court with the of a decision the infringement at issue in the EU if the decision was under This was a decision has it has not been and can on the decision to their for damages the the Court also it is in some that gain the at an it be for the in the damages to that the the at an in the case that limitation periods in actions for competition damages cannot to until be the of the infringement of competition law and of the for an for damages with the for the a in of the 2014 Competition Damages As a of in Heureka, there is very the and for damages actions by of an infringement of EU competition at damages actions a decision it is that the is not or it is whether it is the Court of Justice is law in a which very the rules in the the Court is the of the rules in the to law This is not but it is The of the is that it and legal the and to be but consequences for the the Court a in not to across the rules and of for rules that by the EU of this the and the case law is also new and very that will apply under the 2014 Competition Damages they have been on a of law. For a rule of on a can be to the of of the that a certain an infringement of competition a decision on the is will have This the Court to the possibility for the to that the at an The case concerns the but in the has been national public enforcement of competition law. in has that the core of the case is at a will have of the which that to an for for the purposes of follow-on the claim the can on a decision that is of legal the of the the a be on the date the national decision has become we that in the decision not to be final. that it the of legal and the of follow-on in the of to for the national decision to be this is to the of the in Heureka, the of the was not whether the decision was but whether it the infringement to the of The legal by the be by rules on the or of limitation periods in damages actions during public enforcement proceedings. This to the legal Heureka, the Court of Justice also whether and the of for the limitation period to be or during this the Court that the or of limitation periods for the of in to to their actions for the Court also it was not to to or limitation periods during an of the the decision by the be by the if it not of the Court provide an example of a to the rule in of the 2014 Competition Damages that the at the one year after the infringement decision has become or is or national infringement under the and the of do not the limitation period to to be until the the decision this I to the of in that national be a for the a As I for the purposes of the I that the by the form a for the national limitation period until the national decision has become final. The of rules in the 2014 Competition Damages on the of its rules or the of its of the not apply that not apply to that have to an before the national rules rules not apply to damages claims which a national was to other the of rules on the infringement has and on the national rules the of other rules on and the Court ruled that a and not be with but also that an for damages which is after the of the national it national law the of if the national limitation period not before the of the for of the The consequences of this further in the Court of Justice the national limitation period by that the national the of rules on limitation periods, that have the the national its of the claim by this and that the infringement not on the Court further that it its that the limitation period not have to on that As a consequence, of the 2014 Competition Damages was in temporally applicable to and to be that the Court that it was for the national to the rule in to the Court of case law on the of rules in the of the limitation period, through the of to the of the rule in I to that it is a in to the and of the in Heureka, which the for on the of this has with the on in and will the The private enforcement of competition law in issues of jurisdiction and that can be the case law of the Court of Justice on and several a of a economic has for to their the in The Court has a in its case but in the cases reported they also some to their in a case the Court has not its preliminary is also The issues at in cases to the concept of the the the of of the Brussels I bis in to the competition law concept of a economic to the rule on jurisdiction under of the Brussels I bis in to the concept of a ‘single economic and to to a a economic issues will be covered in For damages claims, of the Brussels I bis jurisdiction to courts for the the or a of or a of trucks the the The was the in the that the the been by the trucks with to the decision in the was the The was the Court of and the legal issue in its concerned The on of the Brussels I bis and it and its a economic its be covered by the concept of the the the of harm by that economic only its in other Member States in to have harm and the not to have The claim on a of the economic its the Court of Justice that in it that of the Brussels I bis jurisdiction to Member States on the of whether the by an infringement of competition law is in that Member that not consequences can be will be and that consequences of harm the by the Court of Justice that there was no in its case law for the of the economic by the The Court further that the of the was at with the of the Brussels I bis an of the of and of the rules and that victims of an infringement of competition law other the Court that the concept of a economic not be to jurisdiction in the by the The that the Court of Justice have been in its of the economic to private enforcement of competition it is not to will be and the by the in this case was a to the claims a of and this can be in but at the of the the rule is that jurisdiction is at the or of the jurisdiction is under the rules of the Brussels I bis and case but jurisdiction is not it be to that is a of the of the latter an is several of the Brussels I bis jurisdiction to courts for the one of is the claims that it is to and to the of This is in damages claim several and the is a of or a of that form a economic the of competition law. the core issue was whether a national its in an for damages a and its and for an infringement of competition by on the of the and in case law. The in the in and its in the The in was a to on the The competition that its on the but not it that been in the infringement or a the decision by the competition an for damages and before a in the jurisdiction to claims its that and and for harm caused to by the infringement by the competition there was in the to whether the courts jurisdiction in of to whether of the Brussels I bis preclude courts on the a or or of the of the that the competition a a the in to their jurisdiction This issue its way to the the Court of the and was referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. For to be applicable it was the Court to whether there was a of a that it was to the actions in to the of The Court further that the whether the of law and with regard to the claims the and that the not been before it with an to the in on case law its in the Court that the of whether the of law and with regard to the claims the be several in a and infringement of competition law that been by the the by the Court that this also the a economic and of the the of competition law and and for the harm the Court of Justice that it was not in to have jurisdiction under of the Brussels I bis for and several to have been in a the whether the in and the for the which was was The was also concerned with the for the of a and that the Court of Justice that the not only in public enforcement but also in private enforcement of competition law and that the concept of an was the in both the Court that to its jurisdiction under of the Brussels I bis a national not a of the or of the but to the for regard to a that in the the Court that the to that a by the its cannot be a in to its The do the Court if the on the of the and an to the to the not or or of the of its or that that be the Court of Justice ruled that of the Brussels I bis not preclude the for the of of a in to its on the that a or or of the of a that has competition it a that that the not of the possibility of that that not or or of the of that or that that be the of this the for jurisdiction under of the Brussels I bis by the Court of Justice in is The of its is that if the the of the the of competition and the has jurisdiction to actions at one of the in there also be a possibility for the to the but this requires this the to this is an in private enforcement in which is to the of both and The of the and with regard to the infringement is a in the of this and the in be the and through EU for actions by across EU jurisdictions also be an is several at a certain which only have jurisdiction to actions one of an to the claims the at that one that the in the The through which jurisdiction is for is referred to the in the that it for the before the at two and of the Court of Justice is to further on of the Brussels I bis and in to the a to the with the is no in the cases but has an on the The in the two a of in several that have been of and both follow-on The case a a in and and related and The case a decision by the competition on a in and covered several European jurisdictions and several at economic the of competition law. both cases only one the of that was in the actions was a has competition cannot an for damages of its to on the and several of a economic have the of that and do have the and legal and there is a the economic of that and the of the infringement by the the to of the Brussels I bis the to the that there several they can be in a national jurisdiction for one of that claims that it is to and to the of that regard it not that the in the infringement in and at but it that they in an infringement that been by the and that the was on their in that The in the that the national not have the the no of The that not be and that there was no jurisdiction under that rule if there that the only the for its the that a not be concerns that the be but only if it or or of to the As to whether the was in this the by the that harm the was not through an on EU that the of by a which or or of the of a not apply in damages and that the in one of the not have a it was only a and the the that the Court of Justice has not been given to rule on if under the to compensation for harm caused by an infringement of EU competition law to harm in but not that the in the be or for a of jurisdiction under of the Brussels I bis the the the of the by to the of the Court of Justice in the in the and of not to on the in a way to offer and the of a to be of the of the a the it that the was a of the which was for the infringement of competition law. The in turn, in that in to a to the the of the the of a the on whether its was in an economic which a to the of the infringement for which its of the been in the of the by the to the of of the Brussels I bis Regulation. whether the claims the and the the of of the Brussels I bis for the national to have jurisdiction of and whether that have in a infringement of the EU of a the claims and of the with which they each form an that of a the economic of the and the of the infringement by the be but that it not for the to have to the the that the of of the Brussels I bis there that the which they of the of law which have an infringement of the of in EU that it cannot be a that the to the that the of foreseeability not be that be to that they be in the jurisdiction of and not preclude this of the that with the that a in the of the can be an but that an to was to be the Court of Justice will the For it the in of the in it to its on the of by a which or or of the of a not apply in damages it is that the Court will not the of the referred the but rather in to a the not to be with the and the Court of Justice was asked to whether a to be to a economic which an of competition law. The in the two trucks the in The to that the been by the trucks with to the decision in the was the The an for damages with the and that the to was to be to the in The national the in with the but the was with a to the of the in The that this was a in and that the the it and its of a economic the of competition law. The issue of whether the be through its its way to the the Court of and to the Court of its the Court of Justice under its case law and in its in a economic a the of and legal that can be for an if by legal the Court an the of has no legal of its an for damages cannot be the but be a legal the Court of Justice the of and of is a under the to in of the EU of fundamental that the Court find no or in EU law for the that a an for damages one legal an and have the to legal the the the Court of Justice the to a by of the the if it been to have and it not be that legal a economic to on each The Court of Justice the of EU on and on the of The Court that related to the of be by the but that EU certain to the and that can be if the is The Court also that it be to to their a of the if the to the related to in Member the Court of Justice ruled that a cannot be with a to a if the two of the economic The of is that under the case law on a economic under competition to a of their a the of which is or the its this not can the the of for the has been that will have consequences for the of and this cannot be through to the concept of a economic The Court that of competition law by of the and the and it that the and of an of the of which cannot be with to the concept of a economic this case was a and the that there to on the concept of a ‘single economic unit’ the Court will is an of an of damages under the 2014 Competition Damages under the case law of the Court of The on by a of national law and EU which the Court is to in the referred This for a preliminary was by the Court of Justice on and no is The before the of and it is damages in to the trucks in which the compensation for to the The concerns the of in the 2014 Competition Damages and in the of on the damages The also concerns to on which date harm has by of an infringement of competition law. the the has been at a of the date for damages was to the under national the claim The that be the date harm the of the will be to on the date which to on the damages in the proceedings. will be interesting to this there is no EU case law on issues in the of competition damages For the purposes of an for damages a Member the Court of Justice has that on an is the date harm was This was in a competition damages which that the Court it in competition of the 2014 Competition damages be the the harm until the compensation is is this is rather and a through be is very to private enforcement in the EU to case law on actions for private enforcement is by there can be concerns this and whether it be issues under in the and Justice and a report and the for third-party in ASG 2, reported the Court of Justice the of the Member States a rather wide margin of discretion on whether or not to claims for competition damages to be to a third-party I have that the of which was not in the to other on the legal in the Member at will be interesting to the further of EU in to third-party law on the of rules in the 2014 Competition Damages also to The case law has on the of certain rules and on to the of rules also and and of EU law. Heureka, and through we a of limitation which is to be after the rather of the Court in and will also be very interesting to the on we a on that in is also very that we on jurisdiction under of the Brussels I bis in of the concept of an in competition in This case law further to their procedural if the Court of Justice is also it in the reported cases and that not but that for the of both be As we to gain legal foreseeability in private enforcement of competition we will also increase incentives to seek in turn, further case law the Court of very for with an in the

Or Brook, Katalin Cseres

The paper analyses how the substantive and procedural aspects of priority setting could implement considerations of gender equality and guarantee women’s equal market participation. Despite the EU’s robust constitutional framework and its horizontal clauses, gender equality remains an invisible issue in EU competition law. Notwithstanding the potential of priority setting rules and practices as a tool to combat inequality, currently they do not explicitly implement considerations of gender equality in the EU. Gender-sensitive indicators could be embedded across the priority setting rules and practice cycle. Four aspects of priority setting are particularly suitable for the consideration of gender equality: agenda setting, the substantive criteria guiding prioritization, conducting ex-post impact assessment of priority setting decisions, and the procedure in which prioritization decisions are being taken. The paper proposes to draft a new Recommendation on priority setting within the framework of the European Competition Network (ECN), nudging competition authorities to base their priority setting rules and practices on criteria based on sustainable, inclusive growth with a strong focus on gender equality. Women make major contributions to the economy, and their economic participation and unrestrained access to markets contribute vastly to inclusive growth and sustainable development.1 However, modern economies are characterized by gender divisions of labour, gender inequalities in income and wealth, gender hierarchies in industrial enterprises, gender differences in rights of ownership, and conditions of employment.2 While women represent remarkable spending power and economic influence, controlling the dominant share of global consumer expenditure, they are overrepresented among economically vulnerable groups of population with little to no economic independence.3 Women are known to have less income, wealth, and capital on average than men.4 Moreover, women are not only economically more vulnerable than men, but also have unequal access and unequal opportunities to participate in the economy. This is due to the fact that gender and gender relations, in interaction with other structures of social hierarchy, such as class, ethnicity, race, and age, shape economic relationships, preferences, choices, and decisions by businesses and consumers.5 Accordingly, gender differences influence the allocation of resources in the economy, and while the specific nature of gender relations varies among societies, the general pattern is that women have less economic autonomy, fewer resources at their disposal, and limited influence over decision-making processes.6 Women’s lack of equal participation in the economy and gender inequalities in markets have many causes including discriminatory laws, policies, and social norms coupled with shifts in the global economy and demographics, technological advances, and protracted crises.7 Part of this assemblage of barriers are the laws, policies, norms, and institutions that structure markets, which operate with a gender divide mirroring the broader organization of society along gender lines.8 Competition law is a fundamental area of the law to safeguard open and competitive markets, and to ensure that competition functions as an effective accountability mechanism against arbitrary use of private economic power at national and supranational (EU) levels.9 While debates on the optimal welfare standard guiding competition law enforcement have been long ongoing, and a large number of competition authorities adopt a consumer welfare standard globally, competition rules are generally aimed at protecting citizens from the negative impact of the undue acquisition and exercise of market power, whether private or public.10 Through preventing anticompetitive practices resulting from restrictive agreements between firms, abuses of dominant position, mergers which lead to excessive market power, and state aid that provides economic advantages to selected firms, EU competition law influences who has access and under what conditions to goods and services, and who can participate in markets. This raises the question of whether and how competition law and policy can address gender inequalities in markets and facilitate a more equal economy for women. Which tools and mechanisms EU competition law has to address the barriers to women’s access and participation in markets as consumers of goods and services, or as entrepreneurs? More concretely, this paper focuses on the question of how competition authorities in the EU can implement a gender lens in their priority setting rules and practices. Priority setting is the way competition authorities select which cases they pursue and which they disregard.11 Setting priorities entails administrative discretion on the side of the competition authorities and provides them with the freedom to choose their course of action and to make choices that best fulfil the public interest that the law protects. At the same time, competition authorities’ priority setting has vast socioeconomic consequences for economies and citizens’ welfare, and impacts wealth distribution across various groups of society, including women. The paper analyses how the substantive and procedural aspects of priority setting could implement considerations of gender equality, protect women as vulnerable citizens, and facilitate their equal market participation. It investigates this question against the EU’s legal and constitutional order and its underlying integration mechanisms that support the integration of gender equality as a constitutionally embedded fundamental right under EU law. By relying on the authors’ empirical research on priority setting rules and practices in the EU and its Member States, and the UK12 as well as the theoretical framework they developed,13 the paper offers a theoretical and a practical framework for embedding gender within competition law enforcement. In the European Union’s legal order, gender equality and competition law are both constitutional values.14 First, undistorted competition is a fundamental constitutional value in the EU legal order.15 EU competition rules are to control economic power, safeguard undertakings’ freedom of economic activity and consumers’ choice, and guarantee equal opportunities for all EU citizens to participate in the internal market. When competition is effective in markets, citizens benefit from lower prices, better products and services, and innovation. While the central concern of EU competition law is to target firm behaviour that can harm the competitive process and ultimately the economic interests of consumers,16 is also a central of the integration and as a fundamental of the EU’s internal equality is also a value of the on which the is and under is to the Member and a fundamental right in the of equality to a state in which access to rights or opportunities is not by Accordingly, can be as and women equal access and use of equal participation in and and from The of gender equality the of equal to substantive equality is to opportunities they are equality in the EU as a tool of economic and by the of the However, over the a fundamental value and of EU by the of horizontal clauses, the European of and the of the the EU various aspects of gender equality, and the a of a gender in all EU policies, while also specific to or gender the EU is as a global in gender equality, robust equal and and the gender policy and to address Competition law is not action as gender equality its at controlling excessive economic power to the for the and of competition has been the of consumer welfare the of economic in the of this standard is that not the welfare of all groups It to consumers within the market under and their economic while specific and of By on the of consumer welfare, competition law and policy do not the of such as age, race, and social income, or the potential of anticompetitive practices or the competition law that vulnerable consumers and citizens are by negative market consumers than known as the and are at a of negative impact on their the consumer welfare standard has due to its focus on and while to of broader social such as social and economic the rights of or the distribution of economic power within of that competition can and contribute to more equal distribution of wealth and that competition on other than such as or products and services, can contribute to and to this competition law the competitive process and economic power that the of a Despite on and little has been to gender inequalities and their with market mechanisms and excessive market While gender equality has been as a of economic growth and social and women’s economic and are as for and sustainable has been little consideration of how economic law and could address economic and implement gender EU competition and have not the question of how the enforcement of EU competition norms, institutions and decision-making impact women. This is as EU competition law is embedded in a constitutional gender equality has been a value of the EU legal order the of equal for of the of the the EU has not only a of equal and but has also a framework its for gender all of its policies, gender By use of the by social to and social from the of women’s this paper an based on the in EU competition law. The is a that to whether and enforcement tools women’s and the gender of rules and practices that or It the gender of a legal or social have women been of for whether the competition rules with their of consumer welfare standard of women’s in the of preferences, choices, and they markets and market power and and on an exercise is in its the and of women’s of social and power Women’s social are by of at the of race, social position, and Accordingly, can contribute to the that in with other an in markets and market The of the competitive process is a value of the EU’s legal and economic order, and as such an of of the on the European which among the EU of equality, of and for When the they to the EU’s economic and legal order, which as a explicitly the of undistorted by the competition law a in EU Member States, due to market the process of EU and strong supranational enforcement mechanisms of the European Moreover, the EU is the enforcement of the EU competition rules on anticompetitive agreements and of with the Member Competition authorities the based on their national procedural and within their and constitutional In this the of administrative and setting for the effective enforcement of the EU competition a fundamental of the EU legal order, competition law and by all Member States, and the of competitive markets is a value for all Member is also a of the EU legal order, as by equality between the Member and on equal between women and is also an of the EU as in that the EU is on of and that equality between women and equality is also a fundamental which is in of the of the EU equality rules an economic to of competition between within the the EU’s to equality law has and the of gender equality and the the EU’s gender equality have a policy from a preventing competitive within the for with to the of equal and to to the of and to a legal and framework with of the of the of in the EU constitutionally the to gender equality gender all policy and by gender equality and guiding legal of the EU. the of substantive equality the new various of and including an By a new on the social policy of the European integration the to the constitutional framework of including competition law and gender equality, a framework the economic and social of the legal By a competitive social market as an of the the on European the that social and economic interests be Accordingly, to a market economy with social by including both economic and social under the of market The of the horizontal also a of such have an to the EU’s to ensure between as not to the of policy and which be in all of EU By social and such as the of gender equality, they a constitutional to all of EU law and While all of the way integration has to remains the horizontal clauses, explicitly that the EU to gender inequalities and gender equality. Accordingly, the EU has to inequalities and gender equality all its and in its of Despite this robust constitutional and while the has that the of the be as and gender equality remains an invisible issue in the area of competition law. in their and on the of EU competition and no cases to gender equality in the practice of the or the a and in EU the horizontal have been as tools by the but their has been more in policy than in the of the Accordingly, their has been to a to the of and of equality within the EU legal The EU’s by that the gender by including a gender in all of policy in all EU policy internal and equality and competition law could be as of social and economic This also with the economic nature of the European integration and the constitutional between economic and social at EU However, social has in the EU’s constitutional framework and a inclusive internal market economic and social are at the EU is not a new equality considerations with the of a competitive market. of and wealth for many a central in the competitive markets in competition that that by economic power and equality of competition to economic The of equality of also central to the of competition which the and enforcement of EU competition While the in EU competition law from the a economic the of equality of competition law excessive state with the on the between the of competition law and has in the The of and of economic power in the of a large are as a of economic and social market power has been as to of Accordingly, both the constitutional framework and the of competition law in that EU competition law with the of competitive markets economic power is and economic opportunities are the EU’s constitutional framework is based on a competitive social market as well as the constitutional mechanisms in the horizontal clauses, both an to the of gender equality and competition law. This with the of gender equality as substantive equality in of women’s consumers and equal access to markets, and services, and their equal opportunities to participate in their of a The to the question of which EU competition law can in gender and how to and the integration of gender equality in competition law. In the framework of competition law and gender can a at various of the and enforcement. can by embedding the gender lens in the substantive of the competition law that the of the consumer and its with market power has been as a of but has not been what women’s preferences, choices, and consumer behaviour fulfil in the and market power and competitive in competition power and gender for that and access to services, or Accordingly, that for women can women gender equality and of equality in the of the competition law not First, raises value in and legal the of the power to of wealth in society to competition a that is to Competition as not have the to make value While they are who have the to they lack the to economic and the of the substantive competition law for between economic and This in legal the of a or the to be as competition law enforcement this to the that competition law and policy are not the tools to or other of the nature of the competition rules in the the substantive of the competition rules the of interests in to with legal as to the of that an from the competition in the many of can be by embedding gender equality considerations in the competition authorities’ as to the substantive competition law While competition authorities’ enforcement against anticompetitive practices can vast for society, competition authorities’ resources are limited and can target only a limited number of the of which potential they pursue and which they is of fundamental for all Setting priorities influences the of and impacts wealth distribution across various groups of competition authorities’ priority setting has vast socioeconomic consequences for economies and citizens’ welfare, including women. Accordingly, the power to the enforcement priorities provides an to gender within competition the substantive competition law Competition authorities for focus on markets or practices that women. priority setting provides for and public participation priority setting are law such as or policy law tools the competition authorities to the nature of social debates over and norms and which not be to them the substantive of the law. Competition authorities can interest groups and the general public on their priority setting and them to Despite the potential of priority setting rules and practices as a tool to combat inequality, currently competition authorities do not explicitly implement considerations of gender equality in the EU. a the allocation of enforcement and the and they are not among the of society and not who them markets have been to the of a consumer to their social position, economic or vulnerable citizens, for can be by anticompetitive practices in markets such as and Competition authorities do not or the impact of the on from demographics, social race, and Moreover, they limited for the of such vulnerable groups of society in their a groups are at a of anticompetitive priority setting the freedom and the power to choose which cases to pursue and which to and resources to the such power authorities the to focus on of economic and can be by the the or the competition as can contribute to enforcement Despite the of prioritization choices, research that is a large of priority setting and practices across national legal in the the question of what of competition law the European and the Member national competition authorities and how such decisions have not been in The and procedure for setting enforcement priorities have not been by the EU of the an on the Member to their competition authorities to their enforcement and to that they do not to be an enforcement However, this legal has not been by or EU law to Member or in setting the enforcement Moreover, competition authorities have and invisible priority setting practices. are by no or rules on how and they their enforcement and are not to or their prioritization In many competition authorities their enforcement priorities in a of their enforcement are to to by consumers or to and than conducting their prioritization are to focus the enforcement on a of anticompetitive behaviour in the interests of than of The EU’s of for that while the European priority to cases which have the potential impact on the internal market and on criteria to be in to ensure the of cases with the to competition or consumer welfare in the internal market and across all economic By relying on the authors’ this analyses how priority setting could implement considerations of gender equality and address practices that gender inequalities to First, gender equality can be in priority setting rules and practices by on the of markets, on anticompetitive practices in markets that to gender for spending of consumers’ such as services, and priority could be to markets and the of In the women are overrepresented in such as and priority setting could also focus on access to markets, anticompetitive behaviour that market access of and by vulnerable groups such as businesses that in access to and on anticompetitive practices that market access by women access to and Gender-sensitive indicators could be embedded across the priority setting rules and practice cycle. In empirical various aspects of the priority setting to their and in the and Four aspects of priority setting are particularly suitable for the consideration of gender equality: agenda setting, the substantive criteria guiding prioritization, conducting ex-post impact assessment of priority setting decisions, and the procedure in which prioritization decisions are being taken. First, gender equality considerations could a competition that a of enforcement that or practices are a an agenda than only to or of their impact on markets and It in whether to open an or to a and what enforcement tools to use in agenda could focus on and practices women a of their they are in the economy, they are for in social and with such as and In in of and social and of in are The substantive criteria for priority setting to or internal criteria guiding competition authorities’ decisions on whether to pursue or a agenda setting, this not to a specific or but to Setting substantive criteria structures the exercise of the competition authorities’ use of focuses enforcement on and the It both enforcement in cases of or and practices only a limited impact on consumers and It also functions as an accountability substantive criteria accountability and and of the of prioritization to broader While EU law not substantive criteria for Member States, such of the are by substantive by the national or as by only internal substantive by as internal control and by both internal and substantive and are not by or internal criteria at research has that or the competition authorities have competition law prioritization such have on practical of the for legal the of an the resources of the competition the legal the competition is well to an the potential of the and on economic growth indicators or of the the impact of the on the of the economy or the or on consumer In that prioritization decisions of the European and the of the EU Member are by economic growth on consumer welfare as the of their substantive prioritization Setting competition law enforcement priorities based on the consumer welfare standard or other growth indicators not who the of the are and the impact the competition law enforcement have on their priorities by the consumer welfare standard do not between the products or to an for between competitive harm in products markets and an competition authorities could their priorities with to broader growth the have that such as do not a of the conditions that Accordingly, is a for for not and economic growth but also in the of and such not only at the of the economic but also at the and conditions of of and have been from economic growth to inclusive and sustainable a and and to wealth across society and opportunities for In of gender and women’s have been The and the for are both and in the to The and In the the is a tool to the of gender equality. by the European for its in has and by a of gender equality, to the EU’s policy It both and and more effective to opportunities for The have been and in over the in substantive prioritization criteria that their competition law enforcement more with new of inclusive and sustainable The and competition authorities have both the economic that influence and ultimately better for all of The and a more inclusive and sustainable growth to of This is from the on broader and the of competition the with The prioritization the to the which explicitly that harm can be markets do not with in vulnerable in at of and the to markets well for vulnerable the for and its prioritization The of the of the make markets well for and and in the the competition is an economic process that the of It is a to a economy and in a and to contribute to in a that and businesses from the of markets. the assessment of is not limited to or in markets. The social interest in the of the including not only market markets, optimal of legal or and consumer but also public interests such as economic of and The also an enforcement of the large impact its have on a such as and in vulnerable or and impact prioritization choices, for by who can participate as in the participation and various functions in administrative that the of and administrative decision-making in modern not only and administrative authorities in the of markets, but their participation an of and accountability that the of the and the participation of is an mechanism the administrative use of and functions as a to are the to the of the competition or that could ultimately lead to the of the However, such a is of participation rights and no on the competition authorities to address them by a enforcement and is for and for technological in but is only of the considerations for modern public and a between procedural and be This could for between of participation and by to of who are in the public Women as in the public interest of gender equality, could be procedure to the could be which society to a anticompetitive which the competition to the of the by a in a that administrative are not only in the and equality of This women’s to participate in decision-making by being and access to by the participation rules in legal It the of the of law that by the of administrative decision-making be effective participation and of their legal competition authorities can gender equality considerations within impact ex-post assessment of prioritization assessment of competition law is limited in general and to prioritization are no for the of a competition in general and the allocation of enforcement priorities in the lack of such and the in and the impact of the enforcement the limited ex-post of competition law enforcement to focus on the number of in a or on growth indicators such as consumers’ the in resulting from the competition policy enforcement in the market by the of the Competition authorities little on the impact of their of cases and enforcement is little on the impact of the enforcement on the of or the of products or This by the EU of for the European for on than on and the of its enforcement for gender equality considerations within impact prioritization in with the EU policy on gender impact the European a of in its to gender the policy from policy to and While the not gender impact as a has the consideration of gender within its general impact assessment equality is not a of social but also a fundamental of sustainable and inclusive By equal opportunities in markets, can facilitate women’s potential as to and a competitive markets are to and in a including the interests and of women. While the of EU competition as a area of the EU legal and economic order, has been to protect competitive markets and goods and for a broader constitutional value that a social order well and of specific The and the constitutional of EU competition law are with the of equal which is a of gender equality as a constitutional and fundamental right in EU law. Despite this strong constitutional of the between competition law and gender equality, and mechanisms of gender the horizontal clauses, their invisible both in the EU and in national competition law This paper offers a but enforcement tool to gender equality in the enforcement of competition law. It how gender equality considerations could be in the priority setting rules and practices of competition authorities to how such could be in the substantive of the competition law While being of the administrative and constitutional across the EU Member States, but also the central and the in EU competition law policy across the the this paper is a of the Recommendation on the power to priorities in the framework of the the to priorities the could within the framework of the a that on the way prioritization criteria are the EU has its growth which is based on the of and inclusive growth and competitive the the on the of the its legal and economic order for a of the consumer and for the based on sustainable, inclusive growth and also social of The have no of interest to

Milan Mitić

Artificial intelligence (AI) and distributed ledger (DLT), although technically diametrically opposed technologies, have many common features in international trade relations (MTO). The mentioned technologies are at the same time emerging technologies and disruptive technologies. On the other hand, MTO consists not only of entities, but also concrete business relationships, ie business operations. In this sense, AI and DLT are the subject of both international economic law and international trade law. Both technologies are viewed in the light of the digitalization of trade (economy) with the aim of automating it as much as possible. Automation is one of the key features that AI and DLT have in common. Preoccupied with AI and DLT, UNCITRAL, UNESCO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have made significant contributions to the regulation of these technologies, among which the EU has gone the farthest with the adoption of the ,,Artificial intelligence Act'' (P9_TA(2024)0138). Within the framework of their powers, the aforementioned entities offered areas of application of AI and DLT, but also provided specific normative solutions either in the form of "technology in trade" or in the form of "technology for trade". Therefore, these technologies are found in sources of international trade law of different hierarchies, but also in legal documents that will be the basis for creating new normative solutions in the future. This paper will focus on the international trade aspects of these technologies by analyzing the work of UNCITRAL, UNESCO, WTO and EU in order to show the basics but also the trends in the international trade relations of AI and DLT.

Barrie Sander

In his new monograph, Informed Publics, Media, and International Law, Daniel Joyce sets out to explore the role of the media both as an object of international legal regulation and as an influence on international law’s development and structure.1 Given the obvious connections between the media and international law, one might have expected the topic to have already garnered extensive interest within the existing literature. Yet, as Joyce observes at the outset, ‘[f]or all its ubiquity and power, the media has to date been the subject of surprisingly limited attention within international legal scholarship’.2 In this context, the publication of Joyce’s text may be viewed as part of a recent wave of literature that signals growing interest in the subject amongst international legal scholars, whether due to rising concerns over the use of international law in public debates,3 or as a result of the exponential growth of new channels of communication, most notably digital media platforms.4 In tackling the multi-dimensional relationship between the media and international law, Joyce’s approach is historical and critical, illustrating both ‘the resilience of existing international law frameworks, but also their significant silences’.5 The historical perspective is particularly valuable in surfacing interesting continuities between present-day controversies and earlier eras. For example, Joyce reveals how contemporary concerns about the relationship between international law, populism, and social media,6 find echoes in a range of formative debates about the relationship between international law, public opinion, and the press in the early twentieth century.7 The drawing of historical parallels is particularly important given the fast pace of developments in the sphere of communication in the digital age. In particular, as the notion of Web 3.0 (or Web3)—the much-hyped third generation of the Internet premised on ‘decentralised’ technologies, touted to follow static webpages (Web 1.0) and social media and user-generated content (Web 2.0)—begins to enter the public consciousness, adopting a historical perspective may help nurture what Elizabeth Renieris recently termed an outlook of ‘informed skepticism’.8 As Renieris explains, similar to its predecessors, ‘Web3 is imagined as being apolitical, open, decentralized and inclusive’, seemingly oblivious to the fact that ‘[t]his ethos—characterised by free speech absolutism and free market ideals—has enabled all manner of online harms, including rampant mis- and disinformation, racism, discrimination, hate speech and harassment, concentrations of power, toxic business models and limited accountability’.9 In this context, Joyce’s text is particularly useful in situating the shifting contemporary communication sphere along a broader historical trajectory, tracing the neoliberalisation of public communication across different time-periods and settings, and shining a spotlight on the role performed by international law in the process. Beyond its critical and historical orientation, at the centre of Joyce’s text is the concept of ‘informed publics’, characterised as ‘a more inclusive and messier picture of the social and connective tissue of international law’ than the notion of ‘international community’.10 If claims made in the name of the latter are often merely ‘attempts to translate the particular into a language of self-serving universalism’,11 Joyce advances the notion of ‘informed publics’ as ‘a model of international civil society which allows for greater variety of forms of association’, both by ‘contest[ing] the state-centrism of international law and better reflect[ing] a system which involves not a single participatory democracy but a range of regional, domestic and local polities’.12 For Joyce, ‘international law depends on informed global publics to function and to address the complex global problems which we face’.13 In this way, the concept of ‘informed publics’ emerges as a ‘normative goal’ for international law, one which ‘remains critical to any future conception and realisation of a multilateral system of global governance’.14 It is the concept of ‘informed publics’ that draws into view the dual inquiry at the centre of Joyce’s research:15 first, the role of international law in regulating the media, including new forms of digital media; and second, the reliance of international law on the media in communicating its objectives and norms as well as in its functioning as a system. In reflecting on Joyce’s work, this review follows the book’s structure, with a particular focus on the text’s discussion of the relationship between digital media and international law. In the first half of the book, Joyce examines a range of international law frameworks applicable to the media which adhere to different regulatory models—each recognising and foregrounding certain values and interests to the marginalisation and exclusion of others. In Chapter 2, Joyce examines the regulatory vision of free publics, encompassing the ways in which human rights law (particularly freedom of expression) has sought to protect media freedom from State intervention, as well as how international trade law has sought to ensure free markets for the global media economy.16 Both areas of law emphasise media freedom—with human rights law focused on protecting the media’s societal watchdog function, and trade law focused on deregulation and market access.17 Yet, as Joyce explains, this emphasis comes at the expense of addressing ‘the power of the media itself and its own connections with violence and the abuse of rights’.18 In Chapter 3, Joyce turns to the regulatory model of endangered publics, encompassing the ways in which human rights law (concerning incitement, hate speech, and propaganda), international criminal law (concerning atrocity speech), and international humanitarian law (concerning media activities in armed conflict) address the connections between the media and violence.19 While these areas of law counter the reductively positive image of the media that underpins the regulatory vision of free publics, Joyce observes that they nonetheless ‘configure the dangers of media power as being exceptional rather than structural’ and thereby contribute to ‘a failure to connect media violence with its economic and political power’.20 Finally, in Chapter 4, Joyce discusses the regulatory model of digital publics, encompassing forms of Internet, data, and platform governance, which are characterised by ‘an absence of international law’ and an investment of faith in the promise of ‘self-regulation, market-driven innovation and techno-libertarianism’.21 Joyce suggests that while international law and the media are often depicted as being ‘existentially threatened by technological disruption’, at least part of this ‘crisis’ concerns ‘the ongoing failure of international legal frameworks to address the rise of information capitalism in the form of digital media monopoly’.22 Across these chapters, Joyce offers a compelling analysis of the international regulatory landscape applicable to the media, traversing a diversity of contexts to critically surface both the blind spots and biases identifiable within a range of fields of international law. In an era of specialisation, where scholarship is becoming increasingly siloed, Joyce’s ability to bring diverse fields of international law into conversation with one another is particularly valuable. At the same time, by adopting such a broad perspective some level of detail and nuance is inevitably sacrificed. In exploring the relationship between international law and new forms of digital media in particular, Joyce’s text unveils many of the challenges that have arisen in attempting to reign in the power of today’s leading digital media companies. However, to some extent, I would argue, Joyce understates the significance of both the state and the law in both enabling the neoliberalisation of the contemporary digital communication sphere and in continuing to legitimate various repressive practices undertaken within it. Whilst acknowledging that the Internet ‘evolved in collaborations between governments, the military and academic institutions’,23 the role of both the state and legal frameworks in the Internet’s historical trajectory remains somewhat marginalised in Joyce’s account. The influence of the state on the shape of the contemporary online environment is well documented. Monika Zalnieriute, for example, discusses the dominance of the ‘US Information-Industrial-Complex’, which ‘catalysed the rapid growth of information and communication technologies within the global economy, while firmly embedding US strategic interests and companies at the heart of the current neoliberal regime’.24 Support from the US government took at least two forms. First, the US government provided significant amounts of funding and awarded a range of procurement contracts to US technology companies—a fact that not only undercuts the neoliberal myth that private wealth accumulates because free markets are kept distinct from public expenditure, but also provides important context for the Edward Snowden disclosures which revealed close ties between the US National Security Agency and a number of US technology giants.25 Second, the US government also supported its largest US technology companies by promoting an ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda abroad, premised on ‘globally “normalised” strong legal protections for intellectual property rights, advertising-based consumerism and the commodification of information and personal data’.26 And it is here that both domestic and international law become part of the story of the neoliberalisation of the contemporary online environment. As the works of Julie Cohen and Amy Kapczynski, amongst others, have demonstrated, ‘rising platform power, monopoly power, and the power that technology can give capital over workers and governments over the governed … are mediated at every moment by law’.27 At the domestic level, fields such as contract, trade-secrecy, intermediary immunities, privacy, and the First Amendment helped anchor the rising power of online platforms, while at the international level, trade agreements have prohibited the restriction of cross-border online information flows and forbidden data localization rules.28 As Kapczynski argues, ‘a wave has rippled through our law … [which], intertwined with the architecture of digital networks, has enabled the creation of the vast new firms that wield new forms of surveillance and algorithmic power, … [and] delivered us a form of neoliberal capitalism that is inclined toward monopoly, concentrated power, and inequality’.29 By placing emphasis on the absence of international law in the digital domain,30 Joyce’s account understates some of the ways in which both domestic and international law have helped shape the neoliberal communication sphere that characterises the contemporary online environment. Beyond shaping today’s online environment, international law also performs a role in legitimating certain repressive practices within it. Joyce’s account is alive to law’s legitimation function, particularly in the context of discussing the co-option of the vocabulary of human rights law by social media companies ‘not as binding legal norms, but as available ingredients to enable corporate self-regulation and marketing’, as well as ‘to minimise the damage to their reputations’.31 Yet, the legitimation function of international law extends beyond this corporate context. Consider, for example, the recent majority judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the bulk surveillance case of Big Brother Watch and Others v UK.32 The judgment endorsed the legality of bulk surveillance operations as in principle ‘valuable’ and of ‘vital importance’ for states seeking to identify threats to their national security,33 provided such programmes contain sufficient ‘guarantees against abuse’ and are subject to a set of ‘end-to-end safeguards’.34 By adopting this approach, the majority judgment adhered to a form of ‘procedural fetishism’,35 which has been characterised as nothing less than ‘a grand, definitive normalization of mass surveillance[,] by a virtually unanimous Grand Chamber[,] for decades to come’.36 In his concluding remarks, Joyce suggests that ‘it is important to reconsider the value and resilience of existing international media law frameworks including, most significantly, the human rights model, but also to be realistic about the failures and problems associated with that system’.37 Yet, while Joyce acknowledges the limits of the vocabulary of human rights law in general terms—including how the human rights system ‘struggles with controlling private power, individuates and simplifies collective and highly complex issues, and often underplays their structural dimension’38—a more detailed exploration of the ways in which human rights law has legitimated and struggled to reign in particular forms of private and state power in the digital domain would have helped prepare the ground for assessing the extent to which it is equipped to address the accountability deficits associated with the contemporary online environment.39 In the second half of the book, Joyce turns to examine how the media is coming to shape various dimensions of international law. In Chapter 5, Joyce explores publicity as a technique utilised by international courts and actors to claim legitimacy and signal their authority. Joyce focuses in particular on the fields of international criminal law and human rights law, observing how ‘mediatized trials have public relations benefits, but also present the now familiar dangers of media spectacle’, whilst ‘human rights witnessing promises connection but can also deliver commodification and simplification’.40 Reflecting on these tensions, Joyce concludes that while adopting media forms and engaging in public relations may be understood as ‘the international legal system … responding to demands for greater transparency, accountability and participation’, ultimately ‘publicity cannot act as a substitute for informed publics who are so often kept at a distance from the levers of institutional power and influence’.41 In Chapter 6, Joyce considers the broader critique of the communicative capitalism that underpins international law’s reliance on the media and its increasingly digitalised form. To this end, Joyce examines ‘not only the media’s role in bringing issues to public consciousness, but also its implication in the preservation of silences and the maintenance of obsessions and anxieties’,42 and reveals the ways in which the growing reliance of international actors on digital media platforms ‘further entangles the field with neoliberal ideologies embedded within the infrastructure of Silicon Valley’.43 The result, Joyce concludes, is that ‘publicity promises participation, but delivers digital media monopoly, corporate “values” as structuring norms and increasing private power on the international plane’.44 Joyce’s analysis in these chapters is again impressive, drawing on a diversity of disciplinary perspectives ranging from political theory to communications studies to reveal how the turn by international actors to mediated techniques of publicity has produced ‘effects of both visibility (for one or a group of victims or a theme) and invisibility (for other forgotten victims, contextual analysis and different or competing claims and causes)’,45 whilst masking and facilitating ‘the broader privatisation of the public sphere’.46 Where the text might have delved deeper, however, is in surfacing the ways in which the contemporary online environment enables the reproduction of inequalities, for example along gender and racial lines. In discussing mass atrocities in Myanmar, for example, Joyce points to the failure of Facebook to prevent its platform being used as a tool to incite violence against the Rohingya community.47 However, what is omitted from Joyce’s account is any exploration of the reasons behind Facebook’s passivity in this context.48 Reflecting on the contrast between Facebook’s de-platforming of Donald Trump following the US Capitol riots and its general passivity in Myanmar, Rebecca Hamilton has reflected upon ‘the role that economic and political power—coupled with cultural affinity, and distributed unevenly across and within States—plays in the decisions of major [social media companies] about what content stays on their platforms’.49 According to Hamilton, global inequities behind how content is moderated on digital platforms are partially a reflection of capitalism, calculated in the advertiser revenue that a platform derives from an American user compared to a user in Myanmar, and partially a reflection of unevenly distributed political power, with ‘years of local activism, coupled with international reporting and a United Nations Commission of Inquiry [being required] to finally get Facebook to take the kind of de-platforming action [in Myanmar that] it did in the United States’.50 But another part of the story concerns systemic racial bias. As Hamilton notes, major social media companies ‘continue to default to the cultural assumptions and political and economic incentives held by their predominantly white American male founders’.51 This ongoing ‘diversity crisis’ in the digital technology sector is significant since, as UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, E Tendayi Achiume, recently observed, ‘technology … that disproportionately excludes women, racial, ethnic and other minorities is likely to reproduce these inequalities when it is deployed’.52 Joyce also critically discusses ‘platform humanitarianism’, encompassing the turn within the human rights movement towards ‘commodified forms of advocacy, fundraising and competition for attention and power between NGOs’, initially drawing on the emergence of global media, but today increasingly reliant on digital media platforms ‘to communicate its messages, seek publicity and engage in digital witnessing in the attempt to capture audiences motivated by humanitarian concerns’.53 One example that Joyce explores in this context is the notorious Kony 2012 campaign, in which an organisation called Invisible Children distributed a video across various digital media platforms calling for the capture and arrest of the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, by the end of 2012.54 As Joyce notes, the aim of the video was ‘to engage the American people to place on their government to the of military in to the in its to capture In this way, the video sought to a by the International Court into a in to his Joyce the Kony 2012 for the of the political in and to its whilst also to the broader that the focus of such may attention from social in the Yet, as the of has recently a to this story is how the a example of by as ‘the of social and economic value from the racial of another only is the Kony 2012 video with racial but by the US of the may also be within a broader historical in which international law has performed a role in the of value from the in international such as the or and military as For the of this form of global is the of and the of form of between the wealth and the of While Joyce acknowledges the that media may audiences and publics from for the of the racial dimensions of digital are at but not In Informed Publics, Daniel Joyce has made a valuable towards the complex and diverse connections between international law and the the end of the book, Joyce observes its ‘the media is not given the significance or in international legal which it has in other such as international political and social It is that with the publication of Joyce’s book, this to at a when international actors are to on the future regulation and use of digital media platforms, they would well to on the critical and historical in this The is to the and in the of International discussion on Daniel Joyce’s Informed Publics, and International Law, as well as the for their are the

Lisa Toohey

The topic of ‘trade and technology’ usually gives rise to discussions of the ways in which new technologies might be traded, and the limitation of current trade rules in adapting to rapidly changing innovations. In contrast, this chapter asks a fundamentally different question – what opportunities will technology present to change the modes and methods by which trade regulation is achieved? Specifically, the chapter considers how the World Trade Organization (WTO), or a future trade organisation, might itself take advantage of technology to restructure how it manages trade and fulfils its mandate. That mandate includes serving as a facilitator of trade agreements and market access negotiations, a forum for resolution of trade disputes, and a watchdog for national trade policies. It argues that technologies such as artificial intelligence, distributed ledger technologies, and the Internet of Things can be used in order to streamline and improve a range of WTO processes, particularly dispute settlement, negotiations, notifications, and monitoring.

Gregory Shaffer, Henry Gao

<table><tr>\n <td><p>China\n is incrementally developing a new, decentralized model of trade governance\n through a web of finance, trade, and investment initiatives involving\n memorandum of understanding, contracts, and trade and investment treaties,\n supported by an indigenous innovation policy that is transnational in its\n reach. In this way, China could create a vast, Sino-centric, legal order in\n which the Chinese state plays the nodal role. It is a hub and spokes model,\n with China at the hub. In this article, we first examine China’s export of an\n infrastructure-based development model, implemented through Chinese\n state-owned and private enterprise investments and commercial contracts (Part\n B), before turning to China’s development of a complementary web of free trade\n and investment agreements (Part C), and an indigenous innovation policy (Part\n D). The paper theorizes and empirically traces how these Chinese initiatives\n shape the evolving ecology of the transnational legal order for trade.<br></p></td></tr></table>

Rolf H. Weber

No abstract is available for this record.

Panagiotis Delimatsis

No abstract is available for this record.

William E. Kovacic, Hugh Hollman

In its first decade, the International Competition Network has prospered, contributed to the development of widely accepted international policy norms, and come to exemplify the form of voluntary multinational collaboration that commentators have identified as a promising way to facilitate international ordering amid the global decentralization and diversification of economic regulations. This article takes stock of ICN’s achievements, considers why it has succeeded in many of its aims, and asks a number of questions regarding what comes next. It seeks to inform the ICN’s future by offering a way to think of its institutional characteristics to assess its relative advantages.The ICN’s paramount goal is to facilitate convergence - the broad acceptance of standards concerning the substantive doctrine and analytical methods of competition law, the procedures for applying substantive commands, and the methods for administering a competition agency - on superior approaches concerning the substance, procedure, and administration of competition law with the expectation that if competition systems around the world opt in to superior techniques, they will achieve greater progress toward dismantling competitive restraints. The article begins by examining the convergence methods, specifically the four elements of ICN’s convergence strategy. It then discusses the context of the ICN within the major international competition networks that have played important roles in the development of international competition policy standards - OECD, UNCTAD, and the WTO. Finally, it looks at the ICC’s interaction with other multinational networks and considers how much the ICN’s convergence-related initiatives will reduce conflicts among jurisdictions with respect to the treatment of specific matters and whether ICN inspired convergence will suffice to eliminate transnational conflicts.The authors see three major focal points for the ICN in the coming decade. The first is to build on its past successes and continue to pursue the identification and adoption of best practices with respect to substantive standards, procedures and the administration of competitive agencies. The second is for future ICN efforts to identify and make use of complementarities with the OECD and UNCTAD to provide a basis for the networks to identify areas in which collaboration will improve their collective effectiveness. The third is to examine and refine the ICN’s operational framework and determine whether its structure and operational forms are adequate to supports its current and future programs. Finally, the authors see major and administrative challenges ahead with problems of resources, financing, and management that must be resolved for the ICC to have a successful second decade.

Pascal Lamy

I am particularly honoured by your invitation to this Second Biennial Conference of the European Society of International Law. Indeed, I am both honoured and pleased, not only because I am in Paris, but above all because I support the ESIL project, one of the objectives of which is to develop a deeper understanding of trade law and to promote closer cooperation among all those working in the field of international law. Admittedly, I have only distant memories of the Hague Academy of International Law where I once worked on estoppel, but the general theme of this conference – International Law: Do We Need It? – convinced me that there was room, this evening, for a non-specialist. It is in that capacity that I will be speaking to you, in the hope that I can contribute the views of a practitioner on the role and place of WTO law within the international legal order. In doing so, I am seeking to establish a constructive dialogue between doctrine and practice with the aim of improving normative and institutional coherence within the international legal order. Trade is to be found at the origin of entire segments of public international law, and it accounts for one of its main sources: the treaty. Indeed, one of the first international legal instruments to leave a trace in history was the commercial treaty between Amenophis IV and the King of Alasia (Cyprus) in the 14th century BC. This treaty exempted Cypriot traders from customs duty in exchange for the importation of a certain quantity of copper and wood. Nothing has fundamentally changed since then: at the beginning of the 21st century we still have bilateral trade agreements. But they now have to be reported to the WTO, so that they may be checked for consistency with international trade rules. The international legal order, on the other hand, has evolved dramatically. The great empires have disappeared into the annals of history. Philippe le Bel and Jean Bodin’s jurists progressively conceptualized the notion of sovereignty; the treaties of Westphalia ushered in a society defined by the pre-eminence of sovereign states, the 1815 Congress of Vienna laid the foundations of multilateralism, and the 19th century saw the first international organizations come to light. With the creation of the League of Nations, followed by the United Nations system and, finally, with the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc, the 20th century witnessed the evolution from traditional international law between states towards a contemporary and universal international law open to new players, including international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Thus, the international legal order has experienced a number of upheavals. But its evolution has been neither linear nor homogeneous – which is why international society still bears the marks of several historical stages in the process. As a metaphorical illustration, let us take the three physical states of matter: gas, liquids and, finally, solids. Today’s international legal order is simultaneously composed of these three states. Gas is the coexistence of particles devoid of any hierarchical differentiation: the Westphalian order made up of sovereign states organized according to an essentially ‘horizontal’ logic with a decentralized responsibility mechanism. The solid state is reflected in the European Union, the perfect example of an international integration organization which produces rules that it interprets ‘autonomously’ and whose primacy and direct applicability is guaranteed through a system of judicial remedy. The judicialization of responsibility of Member States for violations of Community law is a cornerstone of this integrated legal order. Between the gaseous state and the solid state, there remains the liquid state. It is to this category that the World Trade Organization belongs. Neither entirely vertical nor entirely horizontal in essence, resembling an organization for intergovernmental cooperation in certain respects while being closer to an international integration organization in others, the WTO represents a unique legal order or system of law. At the risk of oversimplification, in fact, I will draw no distinction between a system of law, a legal system and a legal order. The reason why the international legal order exists in several physical states is that it is evolving; and the WTO is both a product and a vehicle of that evolution. Indeed, the WTO is an international organization that brings together two concepts of international law. Leaving aside one or two specificities, it is a permanent negotiating forum between sovereign states and is therefore a cooperation organization akin to international conferences traditional international law. But it a which it an integration in contemporary international law. In the it a the WTO a legal order. we take up Jean of rules of law a system and a society or we that there within the international legal order, a WTO legal order. The WTO system has two rules and But the that it is not that it is or the two that I will be in an to this legal system into the international legal order and, it in with the other legal us with the first and the WTO a unique legal system within the international legal order. The WTO is an international This may and it to that This to a legal has its The which was by the WTO in was a that into in and was to with the treaty the International Trade Organization that treaty into the for a a an in in not for any institutional Thus, the not have but a which the of the an international organization in the of the and therefore a international legal the only through its and, for its with the support of the for the International Trade Organization a for the Thus, it was with the that a international organization was according to the by the International Law in its on the responsibility of international organization by a treaty or other by international law and its international legal In order to any the the WTO states in that the Organization have legal The of this The states that the WTO and for the of its Thus, its legal an international which it to at the international and an which it to for the of its and, among other to its permanent As with all international the of the WTO by the of But its which is for in its the WTO has Thus, the main of this of international organization is that it the WTO to have its which is in a within the by its and to with other international As a international the WTO now an integrated and legal it produces a of legal rules up a system and a of legal first of The WTO is a treaty of by of of of practice and – is the – have been into the new WTO treaty. WTO rules it is that the WTO and the WTO not have any general to the WTO to that to and in that they a of The system is no on the of a certain which the to the of that reflected the of the states The WTO not in the to the by public international law – it produces legal rules an integrated Indeed, the WTO integrated in a which an that is to be number of this fact, in which states that the trade of the the WTO and on all This is why they to the the In the – the which in the first that there was a between the of the WTO treaty since they of of or whose place in several the that with all of the WTO which be and and Thus, the WTO treaty is in a which has an legal WTO law a its In United States – the the of a legal order and to that this order was by its on by an place in a treaty the of which in on the of the may be a since the of have an on the of The of no only of WTO law, but is still Leaving that I that the WTO rules above all the of its since to is in the of the In other they a new legal order defined this integrated legal system is not there is a of in international law and the rules of its treaties therefore be in with the of international law. Thus, the WTO legal order the sovereign of states, international and the to not to the rules of of which the for The WTO respects general international law, while at the it to the of international In the international legal order, the WTO has its unique system of law. Leaving aside the on the of international law, it is that WTO law is a of international law in I this with two two of general international law which the WTO has to in its and on which it has a the sovereign of states and the to The sovereign of states between states of and This is at the international organizations have a the WTO is in that the of its a of law, in all of its – from the which at once two to the which the not to of the and of the according to the and by it is that this of is for a certain in the it all states, in international to views and to on an The of is reflected in the rules of the in the of the of it can be found in the and the It the of which is at the of the negotiating mechanism. Indeed, by the the in is a At the international all States – and and – a of which can be that will a trade to from the law of the to of States have an of and But these rules be – which is why the WTO and to establish can only between it to of the certain trade and to to by the can in and This from the for the was made in with the to the of and states that not for made by in trade to or and other to the trade of there is the which for the of a system of that the to to the an to the to among in no with the sovereign of states – on the in the of where is an to of and this of rules to the of states is a of will the of The WTO, on the of sovereign of states. But this not that it is of the of that the of trade in the of traditional international law. me with to the of states, in only sovereign states This is in the traditional international organizations made up of states It is that the WTO remains an once it has been to to the evolution of international society and the of new may be so that has been to the WTO, and has been to an Member its to the of the European Community a WTO Member is In the the in for the European Community to a With the creation of the WTO, this practice was The treaty that the number of of the European and Member States in no the number of Member is new is above all the of the Community its Member in this is the of – a which the WTO interprets in a of the the WTO that may for and cooperation with non-governmental organizations with to those of the has been no to but the in the and of between the WTO and the new rules have the for a of towards the This not that they into the negotiating the WTO remains an negotiating the to the they have been a role in the through since the of the in United States – It is in to the of the WTO while an open to the that This to that the WTO in the general in is in the state, while the – – that the WTO, in the role of is to within the international legal order. Thus, the WTO has a vehicle in the evolution of international law towards its contemporary and is a in the of international society into an international us to example of the WTO general international law while it to the of its legal the of the to by This is a that at the of general international law and is in the United Nations the the on the of which that international by in a that international and and not Thus, they the international the states that was to through and of international the In this the creation of a system was a of both through law and through The of the of the to by with to that is a of international the main of in traditional international law, is It has now been that states for any of but the of responsibility and, above its to the and of any legal of the is its I to it of an integration of the of the International Law on of States for which an to the WTO is a or the can general international law on the to WTO law – that its legal system in the of an of international still by its in the of it was of a the WTO system a new which the of and At the the to the of It is a that is to it according to the for is made by and is to of the where a has been the or a of which only of law. This the essentially legal of the WTO is for all WTO Member may the of a by In other that Member to WTO law. to may in other international for example the International of all WTO by the and of the for all to the WTO agreements. In order to of the that the the to the of the system the Thus, the of all to WTO rules has been the of a institutional the and is to a of rules and in the In other it is an integrated and in of this system is the of legal and in which the of a of WTO Member can WTO law or not it has a direct and – in the so to of the of states This which to the was by the in – it that the United States to the European in the not In other any state may on the of a that Member is not with its WTO law. is to that the it is is followed by the by the and the of WTO to and to up on the by the of the of the the not the that so may in the of trade can we from all of these of they the of a certain that is at the WTO, with an of international The is essentially to for the a of the of a society into a It is no the of the that but the Indeed, of the law that to the is in an of the of all of the Member states, which all to that they have been In other responsibility is by an it is the of the may But is the of international responsibility by the is that sovereign states a certain the of the of it to the of a we to law in its traditional since the in the state that has the to its to The by the state which is within the of the treaty and to to on the product of international law in its traditional the of state to take the law into its Thus, there is a of or a between the decentralized responsibility of traditional international law and the of the of The WTO is one of the to have in by the states by on the of In the I the of to all and the WTO is a since the that the is to remains The the to a the remains to the Thus, WTO law is a of legal rules up a system and a As the WTO an integrated and legal order. together traditional international law, which it and contemporary international law, which it is to the WTO has a of the international legal order a legal But WTO law to the legal of other international organizations within the international legal This me to the of which will the between the legal system of the WTO and the legal of other international organizations. The and of the WTO on it to of other legal and on the and of its with other international organizations. In order to the place and the role of the legal system in the international legal order, I will the and other legal including by other international organizations. I will first this from a normative of and from an institutional I will that the WTO, from being it is to its and the of other international organizations. In this the WTO in the of international coherence and the international legal order. The WTO, its treaty and the of any between WTO and those in other WTO not or other international In fact, the and now the WTO, that trade is not the only that can The WTO to objectives other the responsibility of other international organizations. has to these so to with the to they that in me a of system with and in other and will why I that the WTO has been in of international The WTO is of a it that trade and trade The of the WTO is that trade and to of and at the the and now the WTO, of to these The – but still in – of that a Member from aside a Member that other those of trade This can for a Member has made in other on an an may to The by WTO was to a new of the WTO that the place of trade in the of and the that to be between all is this within the WTO legal and the WTO treaty was and a In the first WTO an – the that the a of treaty in the Vienna on the Law of I am this to international legal The first that this general on treaty the of a of or general international law. It was to so may neither the nor the have the Vienna on the made its first now on the of the between the WTO and the international legal is not to be in from public international that to of the Vienna of treaties to be in and in the of the and the that the to take of the for of the This to a that in the and a in of In on the and of the Vienna the have since to the of the WTO treaty and to I have been that no other international system is so to the Vienna In this on the of the Vienna is a that the WTO to being integrated into the international legal order The between the WTO and other of international was the that in the WTO, – to and so – not to be be according to the of the of In this has that be and so that they have no or The the of WTO in the In the WTO, to we a a of a a is for any a new and is to be an will have to the by a – and the this the it will be to the the of the will the entire the of the to a – is it a or on it a it a and, finally, the trade of the a a or is there is an to the is in a to the of the has that a with a between WTO and a to other trade be has that the by the of of is in an of the general or an of the the I the of and the essentially the one of and a of between the of a Member to an and the of the other The of the of is not and the the and the of the at and the up But not or with between and the to of other legal the has a of or between of or between of and I hope it is now that WTO trade to will be to WTO so they not In other the WTO the of and other legal and to the of of its coherence within the international legal order. of the WTO is that can at the they and in the between and the European the importation of the that was to its since it was on and in other and no risk by the of the WTO that its integration into the international legal order, is the legal and it to international and in other the and states that on in the International of and the International to be with the while and not by any in the or the that they have a certain in a of WTO international The for states to or international the WTO to in other international which they will in the of the I but let me to the of the the WTO to that of the to an of the it is not has into a general of law, the to an that the of the WTO in of the and of a of and international In the – this was to that be in the and that it I and to the and of WTO It made to the to WTO – and the – in an into the of the of the WTO at the of the at the of in This the to contemporary treaties that and to that these be in the WTO so to international coherence with to I therefore with a of that in general of public international law in its of the WTO the has that the WTO is within the of the international legal order. The WTO take into other of international law. a WTO on will WTO on In so it coherence between of or legal order. I that in with the to the WTO the and of other international organizations. In the WTO is of the of other of and of the that it is not in the international between the WTO and other international organizations of coherence within the international legal order. that the WTO is an international organization with legal it has up an of and with other on the international The the coherence within the international legal order, the the international us at the between the WTO and other international organizations. for WTO on coherence with an to the exists a of cooperation on and with several international organizations. the of is to on we a new which brings together several organizations and to in the of trade We have cooperation with other international organizations. in the of we now have a – the and Trade – the WTO, World and Organization World Organization and the World Organization for international organizations have or in WTO The WTO an in international organizations. the of cooperation and coherence between the of the WTO and that of other international organizations to in a The WTO working with international organizations in from to As I in I am a of international I not to that is a general of international But I that international cooperation is one of the United in of the I that towards international coherence the only to the evolution of international and of international legal But international coherence is to the of the WTO and the of trade rules. The in of trade a role in and but it is not a for all the of neither is it to nor in can it be it is in a and and a Trade can only be and it is by which at the capacity or the of of the by the for a for public and so This is international legal of these with the other treaty of WTO international coherence will only in the of the WTO not or to any other states to all of these in a I that the WTO and But this is not and the I to I in the for I am a This brings me to States with – – of international treaties so the for with the and mechanism. me one example and will the in the coherence of international legal order. The – was with the In by and the of through the of new the of its for and to and that The those being to its WTO that the and for its on the in with the United Nations on the Law of the to the WTO by the of and the to the International on the Law of the The the WTO the of to from the of of on the of to The have or not was to and to of a In a it is that both have or and the with an that a WTO in its to or not may from the of the on the It that the two may on the or on the of the law. in that the an to both and the But in the of a the WTO have that of of any between the and in the of any international to these two may In of the of the and WTO it is that a WTO because – and – has been for a or both at the it is that the WTO any other process. This is where of the of international legal order the WTO, through its can that it take into the of other legal still the that it will be for the WTO to the the of between trade and of other legal Indeed, at a has an on the can be to the WTO system and The WTO will have to the trade can in the of the In the of WTO the WTO may in be on the hierarchical between two of Indeed, a WTO Member the to a trade to a in it is the WTO will and the to with an can a WTO for trade in support of its of the WTO for public a Member to an International Organization a state for of it is the WTO will on the legal and of an on international trade and its to trade rules. But I there is no reason to the WTO with the to the coherence between from legal The of coherence of international legal system is by the of the WTO and in its mechanism. This the between the and the traditional decentralized system of still in several legal I not that the in of the WTO to be but I that the WTO system The to the I have to I in the of other legal so to the of the WTO in the international legal order. This not all because we with several legal for which still be We to the of international law and the of international legal legal and legal will to and coherence will on on the and of the have been including a to the International of in of for order has been made by the the of and international law. The International Law has in that me now Today’s international legal order will be to only to the that the legal through is no to this and the WTO is of its The WTO has evolved from the States to the to the of the international system and it with a international the This international organization is now up and it produces of law The legal and of those by WTO for but the WTO normative including a forum for permanent and its but open the of its legal order. In the WTO of its international legal and is now with other international organizations. But there is In up a system in other to be the WTO not only to other legal but it in other and the coherence of legal order. In this the WTO is an a the international legal order. This in the place and role of the WTO and its legal order in the international legal a for international towards international coherence and for which I is we the we in to be that or

U. Irmer

Self-reliance and the new ACP-EEC Convention Or again, to distinguish between a self-reliant development strategy and previous development strategies: 'The current development policy debate on improving the terms of trade, stab1Lizing export earnings, the new world economic order and so forth, does not go to the heart of the development problem.The primary obstacle to development is not mono-cultures, high export dependence, the high proportion of raw materials in exports, or fluctuating export revenue, but the~ in which such exports are produced, the~ export revenue is used and the internal structures which such activities produce.From the foregoing historical analysis it may be assumed that every effort to improve the external economic position of Third World countries merely through the use of external economic mechanisms will remain fruitless if that effort is not backed up by promotion of development through a far.reachingtransformation of the domestic, social and political systems of such countries'.<Dieter Senghas, Autocentric Development on the European Model, paper to the German Society for Peace and Conflict Research, No 37 p.18).A more eloquent expression than these definitions, couched in the language of political science, may be found in descriptions of what self-reliance means in practice, contained in important documents produced by the regional conferences or organizations to which the ACP countries belong.For instance: 'b~1-~~-Q~il9 QQ_~b~!-~~-b!~~ and let development plans do likewise' <Prime Minister Mara of Fiji to the Pacific Islands Conference: Development the Pacific Way, Honolulu, March 1980, Conference Papers p.74).At this conference of leading politician~mainly from the Pacific Island State~ attention focused on strategies designed, as the final communique puts it, to achieve self-sufficienty meeting basic human needs allow for control of our destinies speak with a united voice in international forums promote national development, and enhance regional cooperation, in order to 'achieve a quality of life based on what exists in each Island society, and through the "Pacific Way".Regional cooperation, cult1~ral identity ('If you don't know whence you have sailed, how can you know where you are going?',T~lese~proverb.)and decentralized problem-solving as close as possible to the individual citizen have an essential role to play in this.-7 -PE 85.143/fin. -In the Lagos Plan of Action for the economic developmen\ of Africa 1980-2000 of the OAU (quoted here in the edition of the International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva 1981, and referred to hereinafter as the Lagos Plan> the preamble states inter alia:'Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance.This is not to say that the country should totally cut itself off from outside contributions.However, these outside contributions should only supplement our own effort And:'As a consequence of the need for increased self-reliance Africa must mobilize her entire hu~an and material resources for her development'.At the same time, the importance is stressed of ensuring that 'our development policies reflect adequately our socio-cultural values in order to reinforce our cultural identity', and repeated reference is made to such terms as autonomous capacity, self-sufficiency internally Located development, and indigenous abilities.Here again, then, emphasis is laid on mobilizing the country's own resources, both human and material, there is a desire for the country to rely to a greater extent on itself, and for the basic needs of the local population to be respected in the context of its own cultural identity -all this goes hand in hand with a substantial reappraisal of the regional approach to the ultimate objective of an African common market.This objective has already taken contractual form for the Caribbean countries in the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community (Caricom) of 1973.It is PE 85.143/fin.Sources of Lagging Growth Ccontd.>The internal "structural" problems and the external factors 'impeding African economic growth have been exacerbated by domestic policy inadequacies, of which three are critical.First, trade and exchange-rate policies have overprotected industry, held back agriculture, and absorbed much administrative capacity.Second, too Little attention has been paid to administrative constraints in mobilizing and managing resources for development; given the widespread weakness of.planning,decisionmaking, and management capacities, public sectors frequently become overextended.Third, there has been a consistent bias against agriculture in price, tax and exchange-rate policies.' From'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa' World Bank 1981, p.4.The Tongalese Prime Minister: 'There is confusion caused by the Pacific Communities being constantly confronted by an industrial model.There is heavy stress on economic development at the expense of social and appropriate cultural pgorammes.Colonial domination has exposed Pacific peoples to the standar-ds derived from living in other countries.These standards are being used as a yardstick in measuring development.Since most Western countries are industrialized, there is the risk that standards for cultural development in the Pacific may be based on these western values', Pacific Conference papers, p.39. Industrialization programme for Africa, p.28, point 7: 'Industrial activities initiated by foreign investors have failed to meet the basic needs of the population: they have not made for an integrated economy nor have they contributed to the modernization of African society.The legacy of Colonialism has perpetuated at best an economic structure featuring a comparatively small modern sector and a large backward agricultural sector ', and 'The capital-intensive manufacture of sophisticated products has heightened the regions' dependence on foreign manpower, capital and technology'.-14 -PE 85.143/fin.'---'into account by the Co11munity and the ACP between th"is meeting dr.d 1 September''.Let us hope that the European Parliament's own-init1at1ve report will contribute to that end.-36 -PE 85.143/fin.