The digital transformation of criminal justice systems is reshaping investigations, prosecutions and court proceedings by changing how evidence is generated, preserved, verified and evaluated. This structured review examines the admissibility of digital evidence and the prospects for integrating blockchain technologies into law enforcement practice through a methodologically transparent synthesis of legal, forensic, governance, and computer-science literature. The analysis covers electronic case management, digital evidence lifecycle controls, blockchain-enabled chain-of-custody systems, smart-contract-assisted workflows, privacy-preserving architectures and cross-border evidentiary recognition. The review develops a blockchain-enabled evidentiary governance framework that links digital evidence generation, chain-of-custody management, blockchain verification, legal admissibility, and judicial trust outcomes. It also distinguishes established findings, such as the operational value of electronic case management and cryptographic verification, from emerging pilot evidence and future hypotheses concerning automated enforcement, cross-jurisdictional ledgers and autonomous justice systems. The synthesis shows that blockchain can strengthen evidentiary integrity when deployed as a governed verification layer combining permissioned architecture, off-chain evidence storage, on-chain metadata, validated consensus rules and auditable institutional oversight. However, its implementation remains constrained by governance failures, smart contract vulnerabilities, oracle and data-quality risks, scalability limits, privacy conflicts, legal uncertainty, institutional resistance and cost-benefit trade-offs. The review concludes that criminal justice digitalisation requires socio-technical governance rather than technological substitution, with legal reform, professional capacity, interoperability standards and rights-preserving design forming the foundation for trustworthy digital proceedings.
Cybercrime investigation in India has entered a new legal phase following the commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA). These enactments operate alongside the Information Technology Act 2000, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (DPDP Act), sectoral regulation and specialised cybercrime institutions. This article argues that the principal weakness of the present framework is not a lack of offences, but fragmentation across legal classification, investigative procedure, digital-evidence rules, forensic practice, privacy governance and institutional coordination. Using doctrinal legal research supplemented by official policy and institutional material, the article develops an investigation-chain framework linking complaint triage, offence classification, preservation, lawful acquisition, forensic examination, attribution, financial tracing, cross-border evidence, prosecution and adjudication. It evaluates the continuing interaction between general criminal liability under the BNS and technology-specific provisions of the Information Technology Act, while examining the evidentiary significance of electronic records under the BSA. Particular attention is given to cloud evidence, cryptocurrency, ransomware, artificial intelligence and deepfakes. The article contends that technological traceability must not be equated with human attribution and that evidentiary reliability depends on the entire acquisition-to-trial chain. It proposes harmonised investigative protocols, accredited forensic capacity, specialist prosecution and judicial training, auditable access to personal data, improved cross-border preservation mechanisms, and a human-verification requirement for significant AI-assisted investigative outputs. The analysis contributes an India-specific but internationally relevant model for assessing whether contemporary cybercrime law can produce reliable, rights-compliant and trial-ready investigations.
The rapid growth of cybercrime has significantly increased the importance of digital evidence in criminal investigations and judicial proceedings. However, ensuring the admissibility and reliability of electronic evidence remains a complex challenge due to technological advancements, evolving legal standards, cross-border investigations, and concerns regarding evidence integrity. This narrative review examines the legal and forensic dimensions of digital evidence by synthesizing contemporary literature on its sources, characteristics, governing legal frameworks, and the factors influencing its acceptance in court. The review discusses key issues related to authentication, chain of custody, expert testimony, procedural fairness, and evidence validation, while also evaluating the impact of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, blockchain, the Internet of Things, and deepfake detection on digital forensic practice. The findings indicate that reliable digital evidence requires standardized forensic procedures, scientifically validated investigative methods, and harmonized legal frameworks capable of addressing rapidly evolving cyber threats. Strengthening collaboration among forensic practitioners, legal professionals, researchers, and policymakers will be essential for improving evidence integrity, enhancing judicial confidence, and supporting effective cybercrime investigations. The review provides an integrated perspective that contributes to ongoing discussions on developing secure, transparent, and legally robust digital evidence management practices.
The article provides a comprehensive scientific analysis of the procedural status and jurisdictional powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) as the first autonomous supranational body of criminal justice. The long history of the institute’s formation is researched, starting from the 1995 initiatives and the 1997 «Corpus Juris» academic project, which laid the foundation for the codification of EU criminal law, to the publication of the 2001 Green Paper as a key consultative document for stimulating pan-European debates. Particular attention is paid to the role of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which, through the implementation of Article 86 TFEU, created a direct legal basis for the establishment of the body under the enhanced cooperation procedure using «accelerator clauses». The material competence of the EPPO in the field of PIF crimes is determined in accordance with Directive 2017/1371, in particular regarding large-scale VAT fraud, corruption, and money laundering, and doctrinal proposals for expanding the mandate to environmental crimes and terrorism are considered. The study emphasizes the unique nature of the office as a body sui generis with direct enforcement powers that distinguish it from traditional agencies. The organizational structure of the body, which combines central (College, Permanent Chambers) and decentralized (delegated prosecutors) levels, ensuring institutional independence from the governments of Member States, is analyzed. Through the prism of the case law of the EU Court of Justice (Taricco, G. K. and Others, Stan v EPPO cases), the mechanisms of cross-border interaction between the handling and assisting delegated prosecutors are revealed, and the priority of national courts in exercising judicial control over the acts of the prosecutor’s office is confirmed. Systemic risks of implementing the right of evocation caused by shortcomings of Article 25 of Regulation 2017/1939 are outlined, illustrated by conflicts of competence in Spain and Croatia. The dynamics of Ukraine’s integration into the supranational financial security system of the EU are investigated: from the 2022 Working Arrangement and memorandums with NABU and SAPO to the ratification of the Framework Agreement on the Ukraine Facility in 2024. The paper examines the legal implications of the 2024 Agreement which serves as a mandatory legal guarantee for the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests during the reconstruction of Ukraine.
The article provides a comprehensive scientific analysis of the procedural status and jurisdictional powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) as the first autonomous supranational body of criminal justice. The long history of the institute’s formation is researched, starting from the 1995 initiatives and the 1997 «Corpus Juris» academic project, which laid the foundation for the codification of EU criminal law, to the publication of the 2001 Green Paper as a key consultative document for stimulating pan-European debates. Particular attention is paid to the role of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which, through the implementation of Article 86 TFEU, created a direct legal basis for the establishment of the body under the enhanced cooperation procedure using «accelerator clauses». The material competence of the EPPO in the field of PIF crimes is determined in accordance with Directive 2017/1371, in particular regarding large-scale VAT fraud, corruption, and money laundering, and doctrinal proposals for expanding the mandate to environmental crimes and terrorism are considered. The study emphasizes the unique nature of the office as a body sui generis with direct enforcement powers that distinguish it from traditional agencies. The organizational structure of the body, which combines central (College, Permanent Chambers) and decentralized (delegated prosecutors) levels, ensuring institutional independence from the governments of Member States, is analyzed. Through the prism of the case law of the EU Court of Justice (Taricco, G. K. and Others, Stan v EPPO cases), the mechanisms of cross-border interaction between the handling and assisting delegated prosecutors are revealed, and the priority of national courts in exercising judicial control over the acts of the prosecutor’s office is confirmed. Systemic risks of implementing the right of evocation caused by shortcomings of Article 25 of Regulation 2017/1939 are outlined, illustrated by conflicts of competence in Spain and Croatia. The dynamics of Ukraine’s integration into the supranational financial security system of the EU are investigated: from the 2022 Working Arrangement and memorandums with NABU and SAPO to the ratification of the Framework Agreement on the Ukraine Facility in 2024. The paper examines the legal implications of the 2024 Agreement which serves as a mandatory legal guarantee for the effective protection of the Union’s financial interests during the reconstruction of Ukraine.
The relevance of the study is substantiated by the need to reform the penitentiary system of Ukraine and to identify an optimal model for its institutional development in the context of European integration. Based on the synthesis of legislation and practice of the execution of criminal penalties in the EU Member States, the author has developed an original typology of public administration models in the penitentiary sphere. Four basic models are identified: 1) centralized (ministerial), characterized by a rigid vertical hierarchy; 2) the autonomous (executive) agency model, implying the operational independence of a specialized agency; 3) decentralized (federal), where management is exercised at the regional level; and 4) hybrid (asymmetric), which combines a state-wide system with autonomous jurisdictions. The advantages and disadvantages of each model are analyzed. It is established that a common European trend is the separation of policy-making functions (the prerogative of ministries) from operational management functions. The methodological basis of the study is a combination of general scientific and specialized research methods, including comparative-legal, formal-legal, and institutional analyses. The application of these methodological tools allowed for a deeper study of the European experience of penitentiary institutions. It has been shown that, regardless of the chosen organizational structure, the primary criterion for management efficiency is the state’s ability to ensure reliable, dynamic security, strict adherence to human rights standards, and the creation of the most favorable conditions for the successful social reintegration of offenders. Attention is given to the prospects of transforming the domestic penitentiary system. It is noted that the current Ukrainian penitentiary system retains signs of Soviet institutional inertia and excessive centralization. Based on the analysis, the expediency of the institutional transformation of the penitentiary system of Ukraine through the implementation of the autonomous (executive) agency model is substantiated. The study demonstrates that current Ukrainian legislation creates the necessary legal basis for the functioning of the penitentiary service as an autonomous central executive body accountable to the Ministry of Justice.
In the context of the economy digitalization and the information technologies’ active development, cryptocurrency fraud poses an increased social danger and is characterized by a high level of latency, a transnational nature, and difficulties in detection. Purpose: to determine the content and structure of the cryptocurrency fraud’s forensic characteristics of and to identify forensically significant features relevant to the initial stage of investigation. Methods: general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, as well as special forensic methods, including the systems-and-activity approach, formal logical analysis, forensic modeling, and the generalization of investigative and judicial practice. Results: it is substantiated that the forensic characteristics of cryptocurrency fraud have independent practical significance and function as an information-oriented category. Its main elements are highlighted, the specificity of the digital trace pattern is revealed, and the role of digital traces as a primary source of evidential information is also shown. The study concludes that the use of forensic characteristics is advisable when formulating investigative hypotheses, planning investigations, and selecting tactical techniques.
Abstract. The development of technologies for creating combat drones from civilian drones, the expansion of the practice of using these drones in ongoing military conflicts of varying intensity, as well as the development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems and the possibility of various combinations of AI with combat drones, constitute an already occurring, not yet fully understood, global security challenge that is dangerous for any existing country. The paper also examines the problem of an individual customer outsourcing the commission of an act of revenge or a terrorist attack to individual perpetrators, groups of perpetrators, as well as to AI systems that act autonomously using telecommunications networks, such as the Internet, robotics, and that conduct financing using cryptocurrencies. The security threats discussed here, in the context of the emergence of UAVs and other combat-purpose drones in private hands – supplied both from active armies and manufactured independently – represent a dual combination of threats to the established world order and opportunities for society. And it is clear that the security threat is not some ephemeral threat to the security of some ordinary voter, whose life and fate do not, in reality, interest anyone from the ruling stratum at all. The real security threat is the threat to the life, health, capital, and power of the stratum that rules society, as well as the risk that the service personnel of this stratum – in the form of intelligence services, security and judicial bodies, as well as the legislative branch – will be afraid to carry out the orders given to them, both those involving blatant violations of the law and those involving its simulated enforcement, aimed at continuing the exploitation of society under the guise of observing the constitution and other laws, conducting “a dog-and-pony version of democracy.” The other side of the coin manifests itself as “frontier justice” – the ability for an ordinary person to defend their violated rights even when the violator has an overwhelming advantage in the form of administrative, judicial, and financial resources. It should be taken into account that modern technologies – not only the combination of outsourcing with the use of public computer networks (Public Data Networks, PDN) to commit a crime, or the possibility of direct remote control of a drone, but also the possibility of using a drone with built-in AI deliberately trained to strike a target – are merely the tip of the iceberg that the “Titanic” of the established security system will collide with. Further technological development, in particular decentralized AI using Web 3.0 / Web3, will make it possible to use AI as the executor of a deceased person’s will, while transferring to the AI the necessary financial resources in cryptocurrency (including programming the AI to further criminal acquisition of funds for its activities), combined with the ability to use fab labs or to have the AI itself hire contractors, creates for the targets of an attack aimed by such an AI a situation of the inevitability of retribution. At the same time, these capabilities can be extrapolated to any life situations – for example, those involving deprivation of liberty, such as in connection with the abduction of any person following the example of the abduction of N. Maduro, or situations such as bankruptcy resulting from the bad-faith actions of counterparties. At the same time, the risk of retribution in the process of defending violated rights affects both rank-and-file executors – such as police officers and judges – and the real masters of the country in the form of the public and non-public elite. The latter situation – the threat to the lives of the elite – already appears to be a real problem requiring a solution. After all, it would be extremely painful for the ruling strata of countries that have fought wars and then reconciled – the main beneficiaries of the past war – to answer to the victims for crimes committed both during the war and during mobilization, even if the terms of peace provide for full amnesty. An absolutely unfamiliar sense of danger will also emerge among the ruling strata governing states that ignite wars and create crises, since they now find themselves in a vulnerable position. This situation is further aggravated by the fact that information – both factual and conspiracy theories – is now widely accessible and can serve as grounds for attacks on representatives of well-known families, both by informed individuals and by mentally ill people. Would the issue of depriving Denmark of Greenland even be on the agenda now if, during the 2024 assassination attempts on D. Trump (AP News, 2025; Reuters, 2025), terrorists had used not firearms but a group of fiber-optic drones with centralized AI trained to recognize its target? The third side of the coin will be the need to minimize offenses in society and to introduce mechanisms of genuine democracy and accountability of the authorities for the results of their activities, when the overwhelming majority of the population is involved in decision-making – from ensuring the functioning of a city district to the election of sheriffs, judges, prosecutors, and all the way to voting on draft laws as well as federal elections (see the experience of Switzerland). This system will make it possible to reduce the number of legal violations by representatives of the ruling strata and to hold them accountable for both past and ongoing crimes without the need for extrajudicial reprisals by private individuals. Concluding the enumeration of the main aspects of changes in public life caused by the development of private combat robotics, let us also consider the fourth side of the same coin. All the technologies and capabilities discussed can be implemented by a wide range of individuals with disturbed psyches, for example religious fanatics, as well as by criminal elements, for whom new technologies present the broadest opportunities for blackmail, robberies, and extortion. And it is precisely against such individuals that it will be necessary to create a security system of a new quality – one that does not yet exist – a security system costing hundreds of billions of euros for each country deploying it, ensuring comprehensive protection of society from new types of threats. Of course, it may seem that the development of such a security system is possible without social modernization of relations in society and without the introduction of mechanisms of real democracy. It may seem that the implementation of a police state based on a digital concentration camp is more preferable. Perhaps – but this would require conducting an experiment, for example following the model of Pakistan or the DPRK, where the ruling military or party elite lives isolated from the main part of the population. In doing so, the ruling stratum would have to survive under new conditions of total war with its own population, from whom, for the sake of “security,” absolutely all remaining freedoms would be taken away, following the example of the DPRK. The application of AI that can operate in our world after the death of the person for whom the AI serves as executor proves that the empirical rule “you can’t take your money with you” is gradually losing its meaning: AI or artificial consciousness (AC) makes it possible to practically and almost inevitably implement the will of either the deceased or, say, a person who has been imprisoned or kidnapped, as well as someone who has found themselves in other situations that limit their ability to act. In this regard, the next customer ordering the next kidnapping of N. Maduro will think very hard about whether it is worth dying from retaliatory actions by AI, or from the actions of an actor who has decided that the triggering event for the AI’s predefined action cycle has occurred. At the same time, an actor in the form of decentralized AI cannot be intimidated, bought, or destroyed. In effect, new technologies put at the disposal of private individuals and organizations what previously only states had at their disposal, in particular an analogue of a system like “Perimeter” (RVSN RF index 15E601, known in journalism as “Dead Hand”) (Stilwell, 2022). Of course, the AI (or AC) systems discussed above – first and foremost decentralized AI, designed so that they cannot be influenced or have their operating order changed either by shutdown or by blackmail involving the risk of shutdown – may also inherently carry socially constructive tasks. Already now, AI systems can function as independent and autonomous executors, even though they still contain certain built-in technological limitations. Even this, however, already makes it possible to use such systems effectively both as operational AI assistants and as systems for auditing human decisions for compliance with specified goals and/or means (Gudkov, 2020; Cowger, 2023; Li, 2024; Bell, 2025; Brennan, 2025; Brown, 2025). Here and throughout, wherever AI is discussed, the possibility of using an IS is also implied – one that differs from AI by the presence of a software equivalent of will. The rate at which AI systems operating in the PDN evolve into IS systems also operating in the PDN is not considered here, nor is the time it takes for laboratory IS systems to enter the PDN. And, as practice shows, innovations are primarily directed toward the sphere of committing crimes – for example, the elimination of undesirable individuals – an activity engaged in both by independent criminals, such as roaming bandits, and by the intelligence services and ministries of defense of stationary bandits – states. In this regard, although the fully robotic technologies discussed above, which do not involve human intervention in their operation from the moment of launch, can also be used for constructive activities, their priority emergence in cri
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Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Legal, Health, Environmental and COVID-19 Challenges
The contemporary world has witnessed a technological revolution in the field of financial technology, which gave rise to cryptocurrencies as a decentralized electronic monetary system.However, this technological development has also entailed serious criminal uses, as criminal organizations have exploited the characteristics of these currencies to facilitate human trafficking crimes.This study addresses the conceptual framework of cryptocurrencies and human trafficking crimes by analyzing their definitions and distinctive features.It then provides a detailed review of the methods of using cryptocurrencies in various stages of human trafficking crimes, starting from financing recruitment and transportation operations, through collecting proceeds from the sexual exploitation and forced labor of victims, to money laundering and concealing criminal proceeds using advanced technologies.The study aims to uncover the technical and financial mechanisms exploited by criminal organizations in using cryptocurrencies to finance human trafficking crimes, analyze the legal and security challenges facing international counter-efforts, and offer practical recommendations to develop legal frameworks, enhance international cooperation, and introduce advanced regulatory technologies to confront this growing phenomenon.
The article examines the assessment of OSINT results in judicial practice through the criteria of relevance, admissibility, and reliability. Attention is drawn to instances where the relevance, admissibility, and reliability of such evidence have been challenged. The approaches of the Criminal Cassation Court to this issue are presented. The effectiveness of such challenges is analysed in detail on the example of the decision of the Criminal Cassation Court in case no. 201/11849/23, in the context of the defence’s arguments and the counter-arguments (regarding the relevance, admissibility, and reliability of factual data). It is concluded that, where OSINT results are recorded in a report under Article 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine with annexes, the report itself constitutes the source of evidence, as a type of document. Accordingly, issues of admissibility may concern exclusively the manner in which the inspection was conducted and recorded, compliance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine as to the competent authority, the time limits of the pre-trial investigation, and other procedural aspects of the collection and recording of the data contained in the report. By contrast, if doubts arise concerning the content of the originally recorded data, their origin in open sources (the author of the content, the person who published it, and the purpose of such publication), their possible creation by artificial intelligence, their creation and dissemination for the purpose of disinformation, the correctness of their technical collection, the immutability of online content of any kind, metadata, or hash values, the issue at stake is the reliability of the evidence. In this situation, initiating a claim for the recognition of such factual data as inadmissible evidence is meaningless. OSINT results may contain factual data that lack the quality of relevance, but this is in no way connected with the analysis of their source – namely, open data – since relevance is determined by the existence (or absence) of a connection with the circumstances subject to proof. Accordingly, initiating a claim for the recognition of evidence as irrelevant on the basis of doubts concerning the content of the originally recorded data or their origin in open sources (the author of the content, the person who published it, and the purpose of such publication) is also meaningless. In judicial decisions, OSINT results must be presented in such a way that an impartial observer can understand why the court considers them reliable. The foundation for this lies in proper recording during the pre-trial investigation, in compliance with the recommendations of the Berkeley Protocol.
The article examines the assessment of OSINT results in judicial practice through the criteria of relevance, admissibility, and reliability. Attention is drawn to instances where the relevance, admissibility, and reliability of such evidence have been challenged. The approaches of the Criminal Cassation Court to this issue are presented. The effectiveness of such challenges is analysed in detail on the example of the decision of the Criminal Cassation Court in case no. 201/11849/23, in the context of the defence’s arguments and the counter-arguments (regarding the relevance, admissibility, and reliability of factual data). It is concluded that, where OSINT results are recorded in a report under Article 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine with annexes, the report itself constitutes the source of evidence, as a type of document. Accordingly, issues of admissibility may concern exclusively the manner in which the inspection was conducted and recorded, compliance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine as to the competent authority, the time limits of the pre-trial investigation, and other procedural aspects of the collection and recording of the data contained in the report. By contrast, if doubts arise concerning the content of the originally recorded data, their origin in open sources (the author of the content, the person who published it, and the purpose of such publication), their possible creation by artificial intelligence, their creation and dissemination for the purpose of disinformation, the correctness of their technical collection, the immutability of online content of any kind, metadata, or hash values, the issue at stake is the reliability of the evidence. In this situation, initiating a claim for the recognition of such factual data as inadmissible evidence is meaningless. OSINT results may contain factual data that lack the quality of relevance, but this is in no way connected with the analysis of their source – namely, open data – since relevance is determined by the existence (or absence) of a connection with the circumstances subject to proof. Accordingly, initiating a claim for the recognition of evidence as irrelevant on the basis of doubts concerning the content of the originally recorded data or their origin in open sources (the author of the content, the person who published it, and the purpose of such publication) is also meaningless. In judicial decisions, OSINT results must be presented in such a way that an impartial observer can understand why the court considers them reliable. The foundation for this lies in proper recording during the pre-trial investigation, in compliance with the recommendations of the Berkeley Protocol.
The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional and legal aspects of digital intellectual property in the context of the development of the information society and Ukraine's accelerated digital transformation under wartime conditions.It examines the impact of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and non-fungible tokens (NFTs), on the transformation of traditional concepts of authorship, ownership, and creative freedom.Special attention is paid to the need for reinterpreting constitutional guarantees enshrined in Articles 41 and 54 of the Constitution of Ukraine through the lens of technological neutrality and contemporary digital realities.The study focuses on the challenges of identifying authorship in works generated with the use of artificial intelligence, as well as on the legal nature of ownership rights to digital assets, including NFTs.It also analyzes the role of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in shaping the doctrine of digital rights and adapting constitutional interpretation to the challenges of the digital era.Particular emphasis is placed on the importance of digital intellectual property for Ukraine's post-war recovery, especially in the context of developing a national Digital IP Strategy aligned with European approaches and initiatives.The article substantiates the conclusion that the constitutional modernization of intellectual property law is necessary to ensure a balance between human rights, technological innovation, open access to knowledge, and national resilience.Such an approach will contribute to the harmonization of Ukraine's legal system with European and international standards while preserving the human-centered nature of legal regulation in the field of creative activity in the digital age.
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Legal, Health, Environmental and COVID-19 Challenges
The article is devoted to studying the problems of recording electronic evidence in criminal proceedings regarding crimes committed in Ukraine using cryptocurrencies, which is relevant in view of the significant spread and use of cryptocurrencies and crimes committed through their use. During the study, the methods of system analysis and technical-legal analysis were employed, alongside the formal-logical method. The shortcomings in the legal regulation of the investigation of crimes committed using cryptocurrencies were highlighted. Practical recommendations have been developed for involving experts in the fields of computer technologies, programming, and information security in the recording of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings concerning crimes committed with the use of cryptocurrencies. The requirements for recording electronic evidence while investigating crimes committed using cryptocurrencies (virtual assets) are formulated. In particular, the need to copy, archive and hash files is specified. The use of appropriate software is suggested. The practical significance of the study is that the obtained results can be used by operatives, investigators, prosecutors and detectives during the investigation of crimes of the studied category, as well as during further scientific research on the specified topic.
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Ukrainian Legal and Forensic Studies
Legal, Health, Environmental and COVID-19 Challenges
This article explores the metaverse in depth, from the literature to the latest technology trends. Key concepts such as Web3, blockchain, AI, VR, AR, haptic technology and the IoT are examined, framing the metaverse as a new space for human and digital interaction in an immersive 3D environment. It highlights how technological development has fostered debate on the prospects of the metaverse, which represents a new virtual frontier where human and digital interaction merge in an immersive environment. This sensory medium raises questions about human rights, especially in relation to privacy, property and digital identity, consequently, the following problem is formulated: To what extent is the protection of Human Rights appropriate within the metaverse?. Thus, the research was carried out using a qualitative methodology, which included an exhaustive analysis of the existing literature on human rights and emerging technologies, as well as case studies on virtual environments. Finally, it concludes by emphasizing the need for a multidisciplinary approach to address the challenges of the metaverse, highlighting the importance of protecting human rights in this new digital environment.
The article is devoted to the investigation of the confiscation of cryptocurrency (virtual assets) during the execution of court decisions in criminal proceedings. The topic of the research is relevant because the cryptocurrency industry is currently more developed than the legal regulation of this area. Equally impressive is the number and methods of committing crimes of illegal possession of cryptocurrency. However, until now there are no studies in Ukraine that would determine at the doctrinal level how to execute a court decision on the confiscation of cryptocurrency. In the process of research, the formal-logical method, as well as the methods of systemic and technical-legal analysis were applied, which made it possible to formulate approaches to the execution of punishment in the form of confiscation of cryptocurrency and the rules of such confiscation. The need to provide at the legislative level for the grounds, procedure and rules for the confiscation of cryptocurrency, as well as its special confiscation, is indicated. The experience of confiscation of cryptocurrency in other jurisdictions is presented and the optimal algorithm and procedure for carrying out such activities is proposed. Cases that may occur in the context of confiscation of cryptocurrency are identified and rules and approaches to such confiscation are formulated.
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War, Law, and Justice
Legal, Health, Environmental and COVID-19 Challenges
The article is devoted to the scientific and theoretical substantiation of the position on the formation of international municipal law as a field of modern international public law. In domestic jurisprudence, the topic is being studied for the first time. The authors connect the emergence of international municipal law with the processes of constitutionalization of international public law and the internationalization of the constitutional legal order of states. These processes were accompanied by the growth of international recognition of the institution of local self-government. First of all, through its international legal regulation and contextualization of topical aspects of the activities of local governments, taking into account their international activities. In particular, through the development and adoption of a number of international multilateral treaties and the preparation at the United Nations level of the draft World Charter of Local Self-Government. In the context of the internationalization of the constitutional legal order of countries in the field of urban law, significant processes of borrowing international legal standards of local selfgovernment by state constitutional law are indicated. Based on the analysis of international practice, a conclusion is made about the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with international standards. At the same time, recommendations are given for its improvement, in particular, for financing local governments, budgetary decentralization, limiting the competence of local state administrations, etc. The formation and development of the architecture of modern public international law, its institutional and structural system is usually associated with its sectoral construction, which is based on the definition of the subject of legal regulation and method of legal regulation. The emergence of a new subject of legal regulation in public international law, as an independent and autonomous legal system, is based on the actualization, emergence, activation, contextualization of cooperation in a new field of interstate cooperation, which in practice is determined by the emergence of a new object of international law. In this case, the methods of international legal regulation in public international law remain constant – either imperative or dispositive. However, today in the formation of new branches of public international law plays an important role trend that emerged during the formation of a new form of globalization – legal, which has such a nomenclature – the constitutionalization of public international law and the internationalization of constitutional order. In general, the national legislation of Ukraine meets world standards, but some legislative norms should be improved. First of all, this concerns the financing of the local state administrations, limiting the competence of local state administrations to the level of control functions and mediation between the local governments, the executive branch and the President. In addition, it makes sense to provide a mechanism for the implementation of the international legal standards for the subjects of Ukrainian local self-government.
Se presentó el desarrollo de una plataforma de ciberseguridad para vehículos aéreos no tripulados (UAV, por sus siglas en inglés) o drones según la tecnología cyber-deception. Esta tecnología tiene como fundamento la creación deliberada de señuelos (honeypots) de fácil acceso y detección para detectar potenciales intrusos en el perímetro de una infraestructura crítica. Se explicó el modelo conceptual de la solución propuesta y la descripción detallada de cada uno de los procedimientos desarrollados, se implementó una metodología de desarrollo tecnológico, se llevaron a cabo procedimientos para la creación de señuelos en redes inalámbricas wifi y en bandas de radiofrecuencia (RF), y se incluyó la aproximación al desarrollo de un procedimiento de GPS Spoofing. Este último fue explorado usando un equipo de radio definido por software (SDR, por sus siglas en inglés) para la suplantación de señales GPS que permite la implementación de estrategias de defensa contra drones atacantes. Finalmente, se describe la plataforma web para monitorear los señuelos activos y para registrar los intentos de penetración. Estos registros de intento de penetración se almacenan en una blockchain desarrollada según la tecnología Ethereum. Se encontró que las redes inalámbricas wifi y de RF poseen vulnerabilidades que pueden ser explotadas por potenciales atacantes. También que el procedimiento GPS Spoofing es mucho más complejo que los procedimientos por redes inalámbricas, pero que permitiría tomar acción sobre drones atacantes.
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Conflict, Peace, and Violence in Colombia
War, Law, and Justice
European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
Віктор Євстафійович Загородній, В. Є. Загородній, Виктор Евстафьевич Загородний, Viktor Ye. Zahorodnii · 15 authors
Zahorodnii V. E. The establishment of cryptocurrency / V. E. Zahorodnii, V. V. Tishchenko, V. A. Dyntu // ECHR’s Jurisprudence in Digital Era : proceedings of the Int. sci. conf. (Odesa, May 31 – June 1, 2019) / MES of Ukraine, Nat. Univ. “Odes. Acad. of Law”, SRC NALSU ; exec. eds. H. A. Ulianova, V. A. Tuliakov. – Odesa : Publishing house “Helvetika”, 2019. – P. 114-117.
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The article provides an analysis of the standard of proof «reasonable suspicion» in practice of the European Court of Human Rights (further referred to as ECtHR), which is recognized as a source of law in Ukraine next to the European Convention of Human Rights (further referred to as ECHR). It is argued that a concept of standards of proof is relatively new in Ukrainian legislation, where no legal definition of particular standards is provided. National courts face complexities in application of the «reasonable suspicion» standard that leads to systemic violations of fundamental rights and numerous cases before the ECtHR versus Ukraine. Based on systemic analysis of academic literature and practice of the ECtHR regarding «reasonable suspicion» standard, that is applicable while a breach of Article 5 of the ECHR is at stake, the authors have elaborated criteria of the reasonableness of the suspicion in criminal proceedings that can serve a guidance for the national courts. Reasonable suspicion of committing an offence can be defined as an aggregation of facts and information capable to persuade an objective observer that the person may have committed an offence. Despite evidence to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard shall not be of the same level as required for justification of the criminal charge or the conviction, reasonable suspicion cannot be of purely subjective nature, it shall not be described in abstract terms either. Finally, the standard of proof «reasonable suspicion» is of dynamic nature. The longer the period of fundamental rights limitation is the stronger justifications for such interventions are required. Even while rendering the first decision ordering the detention on remand, national courts shall substantiate not only the persistence of reasonable suspicion, but justify with evidence an existence of «relevant» and «sufficient» reasons for the detention. In this article existence of evidence at the pre-trial stage is consistently demonstrated, that is supported by numerous cases of the ECtHR regarding «reasonable suspicion» standard.