This is a derivative of the German version that you can find here. Many modifications and improvements have been made in this version. The Gaia Economy â The VisionThis new economic and monetary system is a project for structural balance. It addresses the feelings and incentives of the wealthy, the middle class, and the poor alike. Critically, this new economic and monetary system makes it significantly easier to establish genuine social-democratic systems. Instead of allowing inequality to develop unchecked â which must then be corrected by taxing the rich â the Gaia Economy preventatively stops the accumulation and hoarding of wealth from the start. A central mechanism is demurrage (a circulation-maintenance fee): money does not need to be ârecapturedâ through taxes; instead, a continuous stream of funds is created by the natural decay of idle balances. Technically, this means: Treasury Accrual: Idle balances pay a small fee (e.g., 0.5% per month) into a transparent Treasury. Operations & Impact: This Treasury funds system operations (security, audits) and the Impact Layer. Separation: The Impact Layer decides allocations based on transparent, verifiable criteria, but it never gates or controls the Payment Layer. Status & ImplementationThis manuscript represents the first half of the complete work; further chapters detailing advanced implementations and global scaling are forthcoming. However, we are not waiting for the text to be finished to act. The Payment Layer and Impact Layer have already been programmed. They are fully functional and ready to use as an application. This app will be released officially alongside the implementation of the first pilot project. The Gaia Economy is conceived as a learning system â errors are data that can be changed through a rigorous governance process. We invite you to build, test, and improve with us. Collaboration requests, constructive criticism, and questions are highly welcome. Contact: info@dzydent.com Abstract: The Gaia Economy (U.S. Edition) The DiagnosisThe current monetary system contains a structural flaw: positive interest and compound interest automatically shift wealth upward, generating permanent pressure for growth and rationalization. This "invisible vacuum cleaner" siphons purchasing power from the real economy into financial asset hoards. The Solution: Two Separated Modules The Gaia Economy introduces a new economic infrastructure consisting of two deliberately separated layers: Payment Layer (Gaia Coin): A neutral, non-speculative payment rail. It anchors a light circulation pressure (demurrage) in code. This ensures money keeps flowing, making hoarding unattractive. It serves as a medium of exchange, not a wealth storage vehicle. It is non-custodial and privacy-preserving (no on-chain PII), utilizing zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to validate transactions without disclosing personal details. Impact Layer (Voluntary Incentives): An optional layer that rewards verifiable contributions to the common good (e.g., ecological repair, care work, education). It operates on a cash-basis: rewards (Vouchers) are paid out of realized Treasury inflows, ensuring the system never creates debt or inflation. It evaluates entities, not individuals, preventing "social credit" surveillance. Governance & SafeguardsTo prevent capture, the Gaia Economy utilizes common-good councils and a multi-quorum governance system. Changes to core parameters require a supermajority and a mandatory timelock (delay), ensuring no rule changes happen overnight. Implementation StrategyIntroduction proceeds via closed-loop pilots (municipalities, universities, merchant associations) that run in parallel with the U.S. Dollar. The Gaia Economy is positioned as complementary infrastructure â compatible across political camps â secured through clear legal frameworks (e.g., 501(c)(3) stewardship, licensed partners for fiat ramps). Executive Summary (For Decision-Makers) Starting Point & GoalThe Gaia Economy responds to structural mis-incentives in the existing monetary system (hoarding, wealth concentration, growth pressure) with a practical, legally grounded alternative that runs voluntarily in parallel to the USD. Core Solution Gaia Coin (Payment Layer): A digital cash replacement with embedded demurrage to stimulate local circulation. Architecture: Energy-efficient consensus, pseudonymous wallets, open-source code. Neutrality: Payments are never gated by behavior or AI. Impact Layer (Incentives): A voluntary layer that rewards verifiable outcomes. Mechanism: Impact Vouchers are minted for verified actions and redeemed for Gaia Coin. Pacing: Payouts are strictly paced by the Budget_k (realized treasury inflow) to ensure solvency. Verification: Relies on off-chain evidence and Human-in-the-Loop review; AI is assistive only. Governance & Compliance (U.S. Context) Immutable Core: The separation of Payment/Impact and the prohibition of positive interest are unchangeable. Parameter Registry: Adjustable parameters (e.g., demurrage rate) require Supermajority + Timelock. Compliance: Pilots start as non-custodial closed loops. Any custody or fiat interaction is handled exclusively by licensed partners (banks/MTLs), ensuring compliance with U.S. regulations without burdening the protocol. Introduction & Scaling Phase 1 (Pilot): Private, closed-loop implementation with anchor merchants and a local nonprofit. Phase 2 (Regional): Integration with municipal services and licensed on/off-ramps. Phase 3 (Network): Inter-regional connection. Benefits Short term: Faster local circulation (Velocity), reduced merchant transaction costs, transparent funding for local projects. Mid term: Measurable strengthening of care, education, and environmental protection through the Impact Layer. Long term: A socially stable, ecologically compatible economy that relies on incentives rather than coercion. Immediate Next Steps The software and the blockchain currency are ready. The path forward is execution: Sign non-controlling MOUs with pilot partners (City/University). Define the Impact Catalog v1 (verifiable metrics for local needs). Deploy the Protocol v1.0 App (Wallet + POS + Treasury Dashboard). Establish Governance (GIP process, Council selection). Deploy Monitoring (Public Dashboards for Treasury and Impact KPIs). Keywords: Gaia Economy, Demurrage, Dual-Module Economic Architecture, Cash-Basis Budgeting, Impact Vouchers, Non-Custodial, DAO Governance, Social Democracy, Justice, Fair, Anti-Hoarding, Common Good, Sustainable Development.Work to be done next:Part X â Technical Blueprint & Pilot-to-Scale Roadmap (expanded, detailed, integration-ready) Part XI â The Mathematics of GAIA (Balance Equations) (10-point micro-structure per subsection) Part XII â Environment, Animals, Public Health (Special Topics) (10-point micro-structure per subsection) Part XIII â Practice: U.S. Case Studies (10-point micro-structure per subsection)
The article reveals the role and importance of investments in the socio-economic development of the country. The role and main aspects of investments in the modernization and development of the economy in the context of modern globalization and technological changes are described. The volumes and growth rates of investments in fixed assets for 2020-2024 are analyzed. The share of investments in fixed assets from centralized and decentralized sources of financing in 2020-2024 is studied. The main problems that hinder the attraction and effective use of investments in the economy are identified. The impact of investments in fixed assets on the volume of gross domestic product was determined using correlation methods. Based on the results of the study, important proposals and recommendations were developed to increase the attractiveness of the investment environment in Uzbekistan and actively attract investments.
IntroductionResearch on government decentralization is well established both globally and domestically. However, a notable gap persists in the literature: few studies have systematically examined the relationship between decentralization and sustainable development. This gap is especially pronounced in the Iranian context, whereâdespite some early efforts (e.g., Obedeh & Mousavi, 2009)âempirical investigations linking decentralization to sustainability remain scarce. Moreover, much of the existing sustainability discourse has narrowly focused on environmental, economic, and social pillars, often overlooking the critical role of governance structures, particularly decentralization, in enabling sustainable outcomes. Addressing this lacuna, the present study aims to identify and prioritize key dimensions of government decentralization that contribute to sustainable development. MethodologyThis study adopts an applied, non-experimental descriptive design. The research population comprises 25 experts in public administration, including 16 university faculty members and 9 senior officials from government organizations. Participants were selected through purposive sampling using the snowball technique. Data were collected via a structured expert questionnaire grounded in a nine-dimensional conceptual framework. Reliability was assessed using the inconsistency index, while validity was evaluated through the Lausche coefficient. Factor prioritization was conducted using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a multi-criteria decision-making method widely employed in policy and governance research. FindingsBased on the results, it is clear that the index of monitoring local conditions with a weight of 0.192 is the first priority. The index of attracting local funds with a weight of 0.084 is in the second priority. The index of financing by the government with a weight of 0.075 is in the third priority. The index of determining goals based on the principles of sustainability with a weight of 0.075 is in the fourth priority. The index of alignment of sustainability goals with the needs of the local community with a weight of 0.073 is in the fifth priority. The index of trust in local managers with a weight of 0.065 is in the sixth priority. The budgeting index based on sustainability goals with a weight of 0.063 is ranked seventh. The index of commitment to accountability with a weight of 0.054 is in the eighth priority. The index of increasing the authority of local institutions with a weight of 0.049 is in the ninth priority. The education index of local managers with a weight of 0.049 is in the tenth priority. Discussion and ConclusionThe criterion of contextual targetingâdefined as aligning policies and governance decisions with local conditionsâemerged as the highest priority, with a normalized weight of 0.339. This underscores a fundamental principle of effective decentralization: one-size-fits-all mandates are ill-suited to diverse regional contexts. Leading decentralized systems worldwide calibrate the scope of authority and resource allocation to subnational governments (e.g., provinces, municipalities) based on continuous monitoring of local socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional conditions. This finding resonates with Ishrodoost (2021), who identifies the absence of region-specific targeting as a key barrier to decentralization in Iran, and with Fuaâs (2022) analysis of Russiaâs decentralization reforms, which emphasizes the necessity of tailoring governance structures to regional realities.The second-highest priority was financial considerations (weight: 0.222). Globally, the fiscal relationship between central and local governments constitutes a critical determinant of local autonomy and service delivery capacity. In Iran, where local authorities suffer from chronic revenue shortages and limited fiscal autonomy, strengthening intergovernmental financial mechanisms is essential. Embedding decentralization within a good governance frameworkâcharacterized by fiscal transparency, equitable resource distribution, and performance-based budgetingâcan help address systemic challenges such as bureaucratic inefficiency, rising administrative costs, and the central governmentâs limited responsiveness to local needs. Only through such reforms can municipalities establish sustainable economic foundations and stable revenue streams. These insights align with prior studies by Zarkhani et al. (2018) and Mohammadi (2008).Third in priority is local sustainability capacity building (weight: 0.207). This entails a systematic, multi-level approach to strengthening the capabilities of local institutions, communities, and leaders to plan, implement, and sustain development initiatives. Effective capacity building integrates leadership development, community engagement, organizational learning, and institutional adaptation to foster resilience and well-being at the local level. As DeCorby et al. (2018) argue, local capacity is a prerequisite for meaningful devolution of power; without it, decentralization risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive. Similarly, Choi et al. (2019) highlight the centrality of local capacity in UN-supported decentralization efforts in developing countries.Transparency and reporting ranked fourth (weight: 0.134). Robust accountability mechanismsâincluding systematic data collection, performance monitoring, and public reportingâare vital for ensuring that decentralized authorities remain aligned with policy objectives, learn from implementation outcomes, and adapt decision-making accordingly. This finding is consistent with Zuidervik et al. (2021) and Lin et al. (2018), who emphasize transparency as a cornerstone of effective local governance.Finally, human resource performance received the lowest weight (0.097), though it remains strategically significant. Skilled, motivated, and ethically grounded personnel are essential for translating decentralization policies into practice. Human capital constitutes a core organizational asset, particularly in public institutions, where competent staff can drive innovation and sustainable performance. Chigbo (2021) identifies human resource competencies as a key enabler of decentralization, a view echoed by Rashidi et al. (2021) in their analysis of administrative decentralization in Iran.
In a time of growing environmental issues and climate change, the drive toward sustainability is more important than ever. Startups and small businesses are expected to be more instrumental in forming a sustainable future as world economies move toward greener paradigms. For many of these businesses, though, the financial load related to sustainable infrastructure, eco-innovation, and clean technology still be a major obstacle. For sustainable businesses trying to bring environmentally friendly ideas to market without sacrificing financial viability, green financing options including grants, subsidies, and green loans provide essential lifelines. Emphasizing the need of access to specific funding resources that support environmentally friendly practices, this abstract investigates the several green financing options open to startups. Examining both public and private sector projects emphasizes how green finance closes the innovation gap with implementation, especially for early-stage businesses trying to scale their green solutions. Grants and subsidies represent among the most well-known sources of green money. Usually governments, international organizations, and environmental NGOs supply these financial support to inspire creativity in fields including waste management, green manufacturing, sustainable agriculture, and renewable energy. Grants are a great choice for startups with limited cash flow since they unlike loans do not demand repayment. Many environmental grantinitiatives to support clean tech development have been started in areas including the European Union, North America, and portions of Asia. As part of the EU's larger goal to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, the European Green Deal, for instance, provides billions in support to sustainable businesses. To lower the initial costs of green investments, numerous local and national governments also provide direct subsidies and tax breaks. These could include financing for research and development of low-carbon technologies, subsidies for fleets of electric vehicles, or rebates for solar panel installations. In addition to fostering the growth of green startups, these policies hasten the market uptake of sustainable goods and services. Green loans have become a powerful instrument for sustainable finance in addition to grants. These are loans specifically designated for environmentally beneficial projects, and they frequently have favorable conditions like reduced interest rates, extended payback periods, or repayment plans that are based on performance. To assist with climate-resilient projects, organizations such as the World Bank, the Green Climate Fund, and several green investment banks provide specialized green loan programs. In order to specifically serve small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) with environmental missions, some commercial banks have also entered this market by introducing green loan portfolios. Accessing green loans or grants for startups in need of these funds necessitates both a strong business plan and an unambiguous proof of environmental impact. The majority of funding organizations assess applications using standards like energy efficiency, circularity, social sustainability, and carbon footprint reduction. Thus, it is essential to have solid environmental metrics and data to support assertions. Furthermore, obtaining certifications such as B-Corp status or compliance with ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) standards can boost one's credibility and chances of getting funding. Additionally, startups now have more opportunities to interact with mission-driven investors who value sustainability in addition to financial returns thanks to the growth of impact investing. Green-minded venture capital firms and angel investors frequently offer seed money to eco-innovative companies, seeking high-growth prospects in line with long-term environmental objectives. Additionally, by reaching out to eco-aware communities, crowdfunding websites such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo are being used to fund green startups. Notwithstanding these encouraging advancements, obstacles still exist. Many startups are not equipped with the knowledge, skills, or resources necessary to successfully negotiate the intricate world of green finance. Grant and loan application procedures may be extremely competitive and cumbersome. Additionally, global scalability is hampered by the uneven distribution of green funding across various regions. Governments, financial institutions, and the private sector must work together more closely to close these gaps in addition to implementing policy changes and raising entrepreneur financial literacy. To address these challenges, startup incubators, accelerators, and advisory organizations are increasingly offering green finance consulting services, helping early-stage companies identify suitable funding options, prepare compelling applications, and build investor-ready sustainability strategies. Digital tools and platforms are also emerging to match green startups with appropriate funding sources, thereby streamlining the connection between innovative ideas and capital. In conclusion, green financing is not merely a niche category of economic support; it is an essential enabler of the global transition toward a more sustainable economy. By making green finance more accessible, equitable, and aligned with the realities of early-stage startups, stakeholders can unlock a wave of innovation that tackles some of the worldâ s most pressing environmental issues. Whether through grants, subsidies, green loans, or impact investing, the opportunities for sustainable entrepreneurship have never been more abundant, but seizing them requires a well-informed, strategic, and purpose-driven approach.
The United Nations (UN) plays a pivotal role in addressing climate and economic governance through initiatives like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Paris Agreement under COP conferences.While the UN promotes international cooperation and sustainable development, challenges persist regarding the alignment of its strategies with the socioeconomic realities of underdeveloped nations.This article critically examines the role of the UN in climate and economic governance, emphasizing its impacts on national sovereignty, transparency in climate financing, and the practical implementation of global initiatives in the Global South.Key issues such as outdated agricultural methods, pollution from heavy metals and microplastics, and limited infrastructure in underdeveloped regions are analyzed.Solutions proposed by environmental advocates like Dr. Robert O. Young and political leaders such as Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Donald J. Trump are explored, including detoxification strategies, decentralized approaches to environmental governance, and flexible emission reduction policies.The paper advocates for a balanced, region-specific approach to climate governance that prioritizes local empowerment, tangible solutions to pollution, and transparency in climate financing while respecting national autonomy.
This final chapter will show that we have no option but to master sustainability by deploying technology and finance effectively. The shift from physical to digital is on its way, and technology is accelerating manufacturing from global to local, dematerialisation, and sharing towards a circular economy. Digital is a prerequisite to green electrification, but we still have a long way to go. Finance powers innovation, but this also transforms finance. Financial technologies are used to automate investments, insurance, trading, banking services, and risk management. Finance is going digital, and distributed ledger technologies will transform financial markets. Greenwashing is likely to diminish due to increased transparency (supported by technology) and mandatory ESG reporting, although geopolitical ESG risk showed its ugly face in the war against Ukraine. It is time to rethink how markets integrate ESG towards a healthy planet and a prosocial society that makes our children proud.
UNDP, Human Development Report 2020. The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2020. 412 pp. Available for download at: https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf The last years have seen bombshell reports dropped from international institutions with mounting frequency, including reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2018, 2019, 2021) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2019). These reports appeared at the same time as highly visible Euro-Atlantic proposals to deal with the climate crisis, for example, Ocasio-Cortez's âGreen New Dealâ resolution,1 the 2021 âBiden Planâ2 and the European Commission's 2019 âGreen New Dealâ.3 Against a background hum of mounting popular unease with structural inequalities and polarization, such reports share at least two notable traits: first, these documents now acknowledge that âbusiness as usualâ, in every sense of the phrase, blocks the shifts they demand. The 2018 IPCC report, for example, calls for ârapid and unprecedented societal transformationâ (IPCC, 2018: 77). Second, these reports register unease about the degree of social polarization and how it and poverty heighten exposure to climate disasters. Accordingly, these reports sometimes discuss or at least refer to capitalism as having produced income inequality, and even ecological crisis. Furthermore, in response to rising anti-racist (Ransby, 2018) and anti-colonial mobilization (Estes, 2019) within the imperial core, such rhetoric is scattered throughout these reports. Yet, if they at times discuss colonialism and capitalism, the reports never explicitly theorize them (although they do have a theory for them).4 Sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, these documents suggest modern capitalism has gone awry â prices are âwrongâ, finance is running rampant (see, for example, UNCTAD, 2019: 27) and democratic institutions and social movements need to re-tame capitalism so that it does not fatally undermine its natural-ecological substrate. However, the reports do not take aim at capitalism: the production of commodities through private monopoly control of the means of production towards the ceaseless and globally polarized accumulation of surplus value. They avoid analysing capitalism as based on exploitation, and in doing so, they write warrants for a new, tamed, ecologically sensitive capitalism that enfolds the natural world into its accounting matrices. Thus, by failing to see it and remedy it, the reports make exploitation inevitable. They do the same for SouthâNorth resource transfers and the degraded participation of Southern states in the international system (Mundy, 2021) â the varied patterns of oppression and exploitation marked by such flows and full or partial denudation of sovereignty, which have been identified historically and in the present as colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Such false assumptions are cumulative. Erasures beget erasures: if one can see the past only in its grossest detail, one is unlikely to take account of the demands of those whose pasts shape their particular paths to the social-ecological horizons these reports often outline. This is the background against which we can interpret the Human Development Report 2020. The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene (hereafter, HDR 2020 or the Report), which distils, represents and crystallizes such contradictions.5 In what follows, I first provide a framework for interpreting a wide array of calls for change coming from the global North and South.6 I then summarize the Report's key interventions and critically assess them, focusing on the deployment of categories such as Indigenous, colonialism, capitalism and nature-based solutions. I use the framework of accumulation on a world scale and the national question, the bundle of political issues related to self-determination, imperialism, sovereignty and national liberation, to interpret the Report and to compare it with kindred and more radical calls for worldwide green transformation. Calls for change, both local and global, can be grouped into four general âtypesâ of transformation, blurring and blending into one another at the margins (Ajl, 2021a). Each type is partially distinguished from the others on a series of axes, including ambitions for domestic social and technological change; ambitions and responsibilities vis-Ă -vis international social and technological change; the presence or absence of agriculture/agricultural land bases and resources in any transition; and â touching on one of the preoccupations of the HDR 2020 â which social and political agents, conceived not as abstract structural elements or ideal-typical elements of a class society but as historical and contemporary forces, have agency and legitimacy within the world system. A final central element is how each approach tends to analyse the world social-ecological system, and whether they consider the colonial legacy and neocolonial present, a point I reserve for the following section. Proponents of one such type of proposal, âtransformation from aboveâ, defend current distributions of property, in some cases evincing disinterest in suppressing carbon dioxide emissions at all. Accordingly, these calls converge on the following point of unity: there is no mention of climate debt/reparations. Furthermore, the Climate Finance Leadership Initiative (CFLI), an online consortium which includes Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs and HSBC, calls for greening the US military and envisions agriculture as a new frontier for financialization (CFLI, 2019). Then there are calls for mobilizing public investment in the North and South to âcrowd inâ capital currently sitting in the bond sector and push it towards Southern state-guaranteed low-risk loans (see, for example, Gabor, 2020). Spratt and Dunlop (2018) focus extensively on control of population movements, while organizations such as the Energy and Resources Institute (2020) calls for biofuels in lieu of current hydrocarbon deployment in sectors difficult to decarbonize like maritime and aerial transport and steel. Others, such as Dutkiewicz et al. (2020) and Willett et al. (2019), call for extensive intervention in diets and pastoral or small-farmer production. Agriculture is mentioned only as the object of climate-smart interventions and possible land-sparing intensification (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015; Rifkin, 2019). Additionally, the CFLI has warned that fossil fuel assets may be forcibly retired and may not receive public compensation (CFLI, 2019: 276), and uses the language of âjust transitionâ for dealing with the consequences for workers in the energy sector. This model does not mention coreâperiphery or NorthâSouth polarization. Southern actors have no role outside of the concern that they might nationalize newly installed clean energy infrastructure. A second type of transformation maintains large portions of the first and is notable in having no clear constituency. It is essentially a green Keynesian industrial growth policy, one that seeks to increase social wealth, avoid hard internal redistribution and renew the core industrial base. Proponents of this type of proposal, such as the US Government's âGreen New Dealâ,7 call for massive investments in renewable energy, often but not always targeting a zero-carbon energy system in the US by 2030 through full renewables replacement (Jacobson et al., 2015; see also Trainer, 2018). This type of transformation proposal incorporates the following some to but through the of like or more to clean but as a new frontier of and the US as a of the the and with an sense of whether such technological transfers be in the of industrial the or control and capital the Furthermore, this type of transformation on and inequalities and some to colonialism and even more to an â as we an element of the HDR 2020. it is on and climate and often but not always on Southern the and are A type of transformation is the not to and the of or demands which the social to push them Proponents of this such as US and âGreen New call for of wealth, always sometimes on a world scale or some of climate also et al., 2019). This type of transformation investments to the use to core and social towards social and like and It calls for a massive renewables sometimes with a of carbon emissions by sometimes targeting while climate as and 2020). 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Agriculture is leaving a profound footprint on the Earth. With field surveys and modeling techniques, researchers are exploring how to make agricultural landscapes less threatening to biodiversity. In Bokito, Cameroon, a forest transitions to farmland. Photograph: Mokhamad Edliadi/CIFOR. In Andhra Pradesh, India, Iris Berger removes her shoes before wading into a rice paddy. As water sloshes around her knees, she keeps a wary eye out for the occasional cobra. But mostly, Berger's eyes and ears are fixed on other creatures: birds. Andhra Pradesh, a state in the country's southeast, is in the middle of a major agricultural shift to using locally sourced inputs rather than chemical pesticides and fertilizers. The hope is that the practice, known as zero budget natural farming (ZBNF), will be easier on the farmers' budgets and also on the region's natural resources and wildlife. Berger, a conservation scientist working on her PhD at the University of Cambridge, is surveying birds on farms and natural areas to learn whether ZBNF could prove one solution to a problem researchers and farmers are contending with the world over: how to increase food production without losing biodiversity. The Earth's biodiversity is in steep decline. Between 1970 and 2016, populations of bird, reptile, mammal, fish, and amphibian species fell an average of 68%, according to the World Wildlife Fund's Living Planet Report 2020. The biggest driver threatening endangered species is often habitat loss, says Christopher Crawford, a PhD candidate in the Science, Technology, and Environmental Policy Program in Princeton University's School of Public and International Affairs. âUsually, the biggest driver of habitat loss is land-use change. And usually, that is coming from agriculture.â But the need for food grows. Accounting for changes in climate, global food demand could increase between 30% and 62% from 2010 to 2050, according to a meta-analysis by Michiel van Dijk, of Wageningen Economic Research in the Netherlands, and colleagues in a July 2021 Nature Food issue. Faced with this challenge, Crawford, Berger, and others are using on-the-ground surveys and sophisticated models to strategize about where it is best to farm and where it is best to let nature be. The work points to ways forwardâ for example, focusing on which uncultivated regions are species poor but could yield good crops and which crops, with improved farming strategies, could produce enough on existing farms. But the work also raises questions, from how to engage policymakers to what the definition of biodiversity really is. Agriculture has left a profound imprint. Around 38% of the Earth's land surface is now covered by cropland or livestock grazing areas, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). In Brazil, a smallholder farmer harvests oil palm. Photograph: Miguel Pinheiro/CIFOR. In a May 2021 study in Nature Communications, Karina Winkler, of Wageningen University and Research in the Netherlands, and colleagues estimated that the global agricultural land area increased by around 2 million square kilometers between 1960 and 2019 alone. A January 2022 study in Nature Food by the University of Maryland's Peter Potapov and others found that the annual rate of global cropland expansion has nearly doubled over the past two decades. As farms expand, wilderness retreats. Nearly 90% of global deforestation between 2000 and 2018 occurred because of the expansion of cropland and livestock grazing areas, according to the FAO. In a December 2020 report in Nature Sustainability, David Williams, of the University of Leeds, in the United Kingdom, and colleagues identified 1280 vertebrate species projected to lose a quarter or more of their habitat to agricultural expansion by the year 2050 if policy changes fail to make food production less costly to biodiversity. This biodiversity loss presents an issue, not only for the environment but for farming, because many crops depend on ecosystem services that require biodiversity. Agricultural intensification reduces the abundance and diversity of pollinators and the natural enemies of agricultural pests, explains ecologist Matteo Dainese, of Eurac Research's Institute for Alpine Environment, in Italy. In 2019, Dainese, then at the University of WuÌrzburg in Germany, and colleagues published a study in Science Advances that compiled data on pollinator and pest control species, as well as evidence of pollination and pest control services, from 89 previously published studies covering 1475 agricultural fields across the globe. They found that, as agricultural area around a particular field increased, species richnessâ the numbers of species providing pollination and pest control services to the fieldâ declined. Successful pollination and pest control depended not only on a species's overall abundance but also on this species's richness. In fact, greater agricultural expansion around a field indirectly resulted in lower yields because of the decrease in the number of species. âIt is important to maintain biodiversity,â says Dainese. To protect biodiversity, it helps to know which land is likely to be cleared nextâ and for what cause. Maybe a new soybean field is an isolated development. Or maybe it is the start of a farming trend that could sweep into neighboring forests. âWe wanted to look at the specific crops to identify those crops that pose the most threat in which regions,â says conservation economist Roman Carrasco, of the National University of Singapore. Carrasco and colleagues developed a model based on the von ThuÌnen model, which predicts that land will be allocated to whatever use generates the highest net revenue. The team compiled published data related to potential earnings across the globe for 17 important crops, including wheat, soybean, and coffee. They entered that data into the model to predict which crops were likely to spread where by 2050. âWe divide the world into cells,â explains Carrasco. âAnd then we say, in this cell, what is the potential for production for each crop? What are the [crop] prices? How far away from the cities [is the cell], and how much would it cost to bring [the harvest] to the city?â The team also included data on the distance to the nearest farm growing the same crop. âIt's hard to have a completely new crop in a new place,â explains Carrasco, because there is not the know-how for growing it. The model predicted that 260 million hectares of land has high potential to be converted into cropland by 2050. Roughly 80% of this land is forested. In Borneo, natural habitat is being logged to make way for oil palm. Photographs: L. Roman Carrasco/National University of Singapore. By incorporating political stability and governing style into the model, the team also learned that conflict within countries appears to be a major factor limiting agriculture's advance into some of the planet's most biodiverse habitats. Coconut, for example, is poised to expand in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Carrasco and colleagues posit that the main factor holding this and other crops back there is political conflict, which discourages foreign investment. The same is true for other countries facing political instability, such as Venezuela and Angola. Some growers in Andhra Pradesh, India, use conventional farming techniques to raise maize but with patches of natural habitat throughout. Photograph: Iris Berger/University of Cambridge. âWhat we think is that, when that political instability is resolved, these areas will be under big threat of conversion from crops,â says Carrasco. He hopes that, by identifying this risk now, conservation organizations can engage with governments in these regions to develop careful plans for where to expand agriculture and where to protect wildlife. The study also showed that, if growers could reach the greatest possible yields for their regions, the need for additional farmland by 2050 would drop by 27%. Closing this yield gap, Carrasco estimates, would prevent 20% of species extinctions for birds and 6% for mammals. Encouraging farming practices that raise the productivity of three crops in particularâ rice, soybean, and wheatâ would be especially impactful, says Carrasco. âThe demand is massive for those three, and they are in areas that have a lot of biodiversity.â This potential to save natural landscapes by increasing production on existing farmland is at the heart of many debates about reconciling food demand and biodiversity. Since the early 2000s, conservation scientist Andrew Balmford, of the University of Cambridge, in the United Kingdom, has explored the effects of what he calls land sharing versus land sparing. Land sharing makes agricultural land more hospitable to wildlife through practices such as incorporating hedgerows and ponds and limiting the use of chemicals. But land sharing can produce lower yields, requiring more farmland, explains Balmford. âYou make the farm friendlier for wildlife; that's great. But you're reducing your production, and that simply means the problem is going to leak somewhere else.â Alternatively, land sparing aims to increase yield even at a cost to biodiversity within agricultural areas, which can free up space for natural habitats elsewhere. Balmford's team first explored the impact of these two approaches using data on the population densities of bird and tree species sampled across Ghana and India. The sampling sites spanned high-producing monoculture to more low-yielding fields of diverse crops interspersed with forest. For each species in each country, the researchers studied the relationship between the abundance of individual species and crop yield. They then used those relationships to project whether each species would be better off if food demands were met through land sparing, land sharing, or some intermediate. The research, reported in Science in 2011, suggests that most bird and tree species are negatively affected by agriculture, and the majority of these species are sensitive to even low-yield farming. Land sparing, then, would allow for greater population sizes for most bird and tree species across the landscape as a whole. Balmford and colleagues continued this research in other regions with additional species, looking to see if the findings held. âWe had people looking at grasses and sedges and daisies and dung beetles, and we were still getting the same broad pattern,â says Balmford, noting that the pattern held for the majority of species in each taxon and in every location. In a 2021 review in the Journal of Zoology, which includes work from his own group and others, Balmford reports that, of over 2500 species studied, over three-quarters survive better without agriculture, and of those, the large majority maintain greater population sizes under land sparing. Balmford says that his findings have been criticized by those who equate higher yields under land sparing with unsustainable farming inputs, including chemical fertilizers and pesticides. âWe don't think it needs to be that at all,â says Balmford, noting that the yield could also increase through additional labor or farming knowledge and under certain traditional farming practices. Berger was struck by Balmford's findings and wondered whetherâ if land sparing really is better for biodiversityâ there could be ways to ramp up the yield sustainably. âThere's no use in increasing the yield, and then, in 10 years' time, the soil is degraded,â says Berger. She wondered whether the ZBNF movement gaining momentum in Andhra Pradesh could be part of the answer. ZBNF began taking hold in Andhra Pradesh as early as 2016, says agricultural scientist Zakir Hussain, who leads science and research for the Farmer Empowerment Organisation (RySS), the government-supported non profit responsible for helping farmers in Andhra Pradesh transition to ZBNF. In 2018, the government of Andhra Pradesh announced a push to transition all of the state's farms to ZBNF in a bid to improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers and to restore the region's biodiversity and ecosystem services. Growers began eschewing synthetic pesticides and fertilizers in favor of more cost-effective and sustainable options, such as managing pests with botanical extracts or creating perches for insect-eating birds. Today, Hussain says that about 800,000 farmers in Andhra Pradesh practice ZBNF, which the government now refers to as community managed natural farming. Anecdotal evidence that ZBNF can match or even surpass conventional farm yields is mounting, and the practice is spreading quickly. ZBNF farmers become âambassadors,â says Hussain. âThey spread natural farming practices to other farmers.â Scientific research exploring ZBNF practices is just beginning to emerge. In a February 2022 issue of the journal Sustainability, Hussain and colleagues described a field experiment at study sites across Andhra Pradesh in which they found no difference in yield between plots managed with conventional and those managed with ZBNF practices for a variety of crops. Berger wants to know how ZBNF affects birds. She wonders whether the practice may make farms more habitable for birds while also increasing yields so that more wild habitats can be spared. She surveys the density and diversity of avian species on ZBNF and conventional farms, as well as in forests untouched by agriculture. She also records the proportions of natural habitat nested within the farmland. Ultimately, Berger, who counts Balmford as one of her dissertation advisors, will enter this data into a mathematical model that will optimize the agricultural landscape to meet food production goals while maximizing the density for each bird species. She will learn the ideal amount of spared habitat versus farmed land, the optimum proportion of ZBNF versus conventional farms, and the most effective proportion of natural habitat patches within farmland. The results, she says, could suggest a combination of different approaches in different areas. Maybe in some places, for example, ZBNF produces lower yields, so some proportion of conventional farms are required to spare the natural habitat that specific bird species require. But perhaps these conventional farms need to include some optimum number of habitat patches to maintain pollinators and other ecosystem services critical for their yield. âIt's very complex and probably very case specific,â says Berger. Researchers are also using models to pinpoint where, in an ideal world, farming could expand at the least cost to biodiversity. But the work hinges on estimating one variable that is especially difficult to pin down: biodiversity itself. Biodiversity is the variety of life on Earth. This variety exists at different scales, such as whole ecosystems, species, or genes within species. Researchers recording biodiversity simply cannot count everything. So they make choices. Some may tally all vertebrate or plant species or give higher weight to endangered species or use only birds or another representative group. Many combine several of these measures into a single biodiversity index. When Crawford began reading land prioritization studies, he recognized that researchers often measure biodiversity in different ways. âAll valid and defensible methods,â he says. But he wanted to understand how seemingly small differences between methods ultimately influence land-planning recommendations. Crawford began with a land-use model called agroEcoTradeoff, previously developed by colleagues at Princeton and elsewhere. He used this model to project where to convert land to farmland in Zambia to minimize biodiversity loss while meeting crop production needs in this country with a rapidly growing population and economy. Lilac-breasted roller (Coracias caudatus) at South Luangwa National Park, Zambia (l). Researchers are using models to determine where in Zambia the land could be farmed with minimal biodiversity loss. Photograph: Hans Hillewaert, CC BY-SA 4.0. Two male Phyllomedusa rohdei frogs in the Atlantic Forest in Bahia, Brazil. Some 85% of this forest has been cleared for agriculture, pasture, timber plantations, and cities. It remains home to 2200 species of fauna and 20,000 species of plants. Photograph: Renato Augusto Martins, CC BY-SA 4.0. Crawford ran the model with four previously published biodiversity indices and, each time, received different recommendations for where to expand agriculture. An index focused on vertebrate species richness with additional consideration given to species' range sizes, for example, suggested that agricultural expansion would be best placed in the southwestern portion of the country. Meanwhile, an index focused on how rare, intact, and well-protected different vegetation types are instead suggested that farmland should expand along the eastern portion of the country. Indeed, when comparing recommendations for where to expand agriculture between pairs of indices, the average overlap was only around 2%. The team then developed a series of their own indices so that they could systematically vary different components to understand what exactly causes biodiversity indices to return such divergent recommendations. They found that focusing on different groups of animals could change the recommendations dramatically. Bird diversity in for example, was least by agriculture in the would be better off if agriculture into the and affected the recommendations such as the of the data included and how much weight was given to range when species richness. the of whether to combine different biodiversity measures by taking the versus the could the recommendations in ways. for these of prioritization to be in about land-use and land-use researchers need to be very careful and about how they are biodiversity and about the that they are says As researchers for the best possible between farmland and biodiversity they also the of this ideal landscape into yields the space that farmland says Balmford. âIt will to if look at global over for most in most But it The as Balmford explains in his 2021 Journal of is that a in yield could lower and so requiring more yields could also increase which that into more land Land sparing, then, best when increased yields are by policy measures at biodiversity, such as land-use and to the area covered by agriculture. such as this field in biodiversity, including the biodiversity of species to farming. Photograph: Some growers use such as this one on a to and increase biodiversity. Photograph: of Agriculture But these policy changes require to the of biodiversity and the of potential issue is that the research in this field is focused on biodiversity across the but the researchers are often based in and are for research to be by people who the these says this research to have an says Carrasco, should be from the So when are your research, should with the of the country and to understand the they to also need measures of biodiversity and between biodiversity and of the World in Cambridge, in the United Kingdom, and colleagues in a 2021 in Nature that countries need a biodiversity index the is a measure of and colleagues say, the would be a measure of a biodiversity The would be using a that of biodiversity, as well as that biodiversity to from to the of including and The is still in a says scientist and landscape ecologist of the National for and of Biodiversity in a on the is an for while researchers in South and develop their has been biodiversity data to government and organizations for over two now, says But as a single the of biodiversity in the country, it is really difficult to because have to use all of these of says The hope is that an will a for biodiversity over that a policy change will work also âWe need evidence for the governments to and bring policy says Hussain. And the same for livelihoods depend on these had farmers that growing crops out of the year could increase production and also protect the So the says Hussain, farmers are the Balmford spreading how to meet needs at least cost to Journal of Crawford of in biodiversity indices used for land-use A global for crop Science Advances Carrasco of conversion risk from crop
Open access
Sustainable Development and Environmental Policy
Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
Royal University of Bhutan was established in 2003 through Royal Charter. RUB is a decentralized university with eight colleges distributed across the country. In the year 2011, RUB became fully autonomous university. After two years of successful autonomy, the RUB was beginning to sense the gradual decline in government funding. This has put to test the future sustainability of the university. Colleges under RUB have saved the funds that was granted by the royal government of Bhutan (RGoB) to sustain in the future as there began gradual decline in grants during the coming years (Rigyal, 2013). This study is aimed to find the present investment policy of the colleges under RUB and recommend investment products for them to generate future sustainable income for the colleges & university. In order to assess the knowledge of the investment, expected return & risk and the preference of the colleges under RUB a set of questionnaire was administered. A total of 20 respondents, including President, finance personal and administrative officer, from 5 colleges (representing more than 60% of colleges) under RUB were taken for the study. Responses reveal the general investment policy of the colleges, present investment avenues adopted and return on them. All these facts were analyzed to propose portfolio for the colleges, which can help them to generate sustainable incomes.
Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Carlos A. Roncisvalle
The objective of this study is to examine the evolution and characteristics of the financing for the nvironment in Brazil, in order to identify the advances and retreats after the Rio 92 Conference. Brazil has a very decentralized administration, composed of three independent levels of public administration: the federal government, 27 state governments, and more than 5000 municipios, " or municipalities; all of them with specific environmental institutions. However, at the time of the completion of this report, there were no indicators that aggregate information from these different institutional levels for the 1992-2001 period.(1) Thus, this study was a first effort to generate this kind of figures. Given the very short time for its completion, the main priority was to identify the resource flows from the federal government and some selected states. Efforts to estimate spending on pollution control and other environmental activities by the private sector were also made. In addition, the issue of funding sources is also discussed. Despite many methodological problems involved in the elaboration of these indicators, it was possible to identify trends and conclusions for environmental spending. At the federal government level, it was estimated that environmental expenditures were between 0.4% and 1% of the federal spending. Another important finding was that, although there was an official commitment to increase efforts in this area after the Rio 92 Conference, the overall federal government expenditures in environmental issues did not increase during the 1993-2000 period. Moreover, a matter of concern was the declining quality of this spending, with fewer resources directed to end-activities and more money diverted to means-expenditures. An important cause of this was the increasing share of debt related expenditures (interests and amortization) in the total budget. On the other hand, investments suffered cutbacks, particularly in the more recent period, and the expenditures in personnel fell systematically by 25% in constant prices during the second half of the nineties. Environmental projects are the most important single element in international cooperation agreements. However, the flow of foreign resources presented a declining trend since 1994, oscillating between 6% and 17% of total expenditures. Most of these resources come from external credit operations (loans), which means that in the long term, they represent an extra pressure of financial expenses in the budget. The proportion of international donations/total expenditures in 2000 fell to the lowest level in the series (2.0%), clearly indicating the decline of international support for environmental projects in Brazil. Results for the 1996-98 period show that, if sanitation costs are included (an overestimate since it also considers water supply), environmental expenditures are relatively more important for local governments: around 9% of the total public spending in the sample of municipios considered. State governments are in the second position, spending around 1.5% of their budget on environmental issues, in contrast to the less than 1% of the federal government. For this reason, there remains a clear need to generate better aggregate figures for the states and municipios for the whole period. The methodologies used for public budgeting and expenditure control vary widely, making it very hard to supply compatible aggregate numbers. In the three states where longer time series were estimated (SĂŁo Paulo, ParanĂĄ and Rio Grande do Sul), there was no consistent trend of increasing expenditures on environmental objectives. Another gap that needs to be fulfilled refers to the private sector environmental spending. There were positive signals which indicated that the private sector is getting more concerned with the environmental issues, particularly those agents that have interests/responsibilities at the international level. It was calculated that the environmental spending of the industry sector was around R$ 160 million per year, slightly less than 1% of its value added. Although it is expected that this number will increase in the future, it is considerably lower than the public sector spending on environmental issues. It is very difficult to aggregate all these figures, but assuming for the year 2000 that the public spending on environmental issues was of 1.5% of the total, the public environmental spending would be of 0.33% of GDP, and an annual expenditure per capita of R$ 22.9 per capita (US$ 9.2 per capita). If the estimated industrial environmental spending (R$ 160 million) is added, the total spending becomes R$ 4.1 billion (0.34% of GDP), or R$ 23.9 per capita (US$ 9.6 per capita). Most of the funding for environmental projects comes from the government (mainly federal, through BNDES), international development agencies, or from companies' own resources. The private financial sector has a minor role on the financing of environmental expenditures but, gain, there are signals of positive changes, with the creation of innovative private funds specialized in environmentally friendly projects that combine financial and "green" interests as an example. The consolidation of economic instruments in international environmental agreements, particularly the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases emissions, may accelerate this new financial market. Another potential source of funding for environmental projects is connected to the implementation of economic instruments in the environmental management system. Command-andcontrol procedures, such as licensing and emission standards, largely dominate the environmental regulation in Brazil. However, some interesting experiences, such as the "green" tax rebound (ICMS verde) and the recent changes in the water resources policy adopting the user/polluter-pays principle, indicate that the role of economic instruments will increase and, consequently, that there is potential for developing self-sustained financial mechanisms to sponsor environmental expenditures. (1) After the completion of this research, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) published estimates of public spending for the 1996-98 period (IBGE 2001). Whenever relevant, these figures were also added to the analysis, but with an alert that they were obtained using different methodological procedures."