Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are designed to disperse control, yet recent evidence shows that effective governance is often concentrated in a small number of participants. This note studies one simple mechanism behind that pattern. Because decentralized governance is monitor-intensive, rising proposal flow may eventually outpace the capacity of broad-based participation. Using a DAO--quarter panel, I estimate a fixed-effects kink model with DAO and quarter fixed effects and find a statistically significant decline in the marginal responsiveness of active voters once proposal activity crosses an interior threshold. I then study realized voting concentration using kink specifications with data-driven cutoffs. Across specifications, decentralization gains do not persist indefinitely once governance workload becomes sufficiently high, and load-based measures show especially clear evidence of a transition toward more concentrated realized control. The results provide reduced-form evidence consistent with a ``too big to monitor'' mechanism in DAO governance: when proposal flow grows faster than broad participation can keep up, effective control may drift toward a smaller set of highly active participants.
Existing typologies of think tanks classify institutions by ideology, thematic focus, or organizational affiliation-but none addresses how think tanks interact with their principals. This note introduces T-Notation, a functional classification system modelled on the B2B/B2C framework, categorizing think tanks by interaction mode: T2G (government), T2B (business), T2I (international organizations), T2M (media), and T2T (think tank-to-think tank). The framework is applied to the SCO think tank ecosystem, where it reveals a structural deficit and suggests a protocol-based alternative-the Think Tank Distributed Ledger (TTDL)-to the secretariat model currently under deliberation.
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) were supposed to prevent oligarchy. On the evidence, they haven't. Voting power is concentrated, delegation keeps producing superrepresentatives, and proposal turnout hovers below ten percent (Han et al. 2024; Fabrega et al. 2025). The empirical literature has measured this pattern many times over, but it has not had a theoretical frame equal to what it measures. This paper offers one. Drawing on Milovan Djilas's The New Class (1957) and Robert Michels's Political Parties (1911), I argue that DAO governance reproduces-not metaphorically, but structurally-the features of the communist nomenklatura: a self-perpetuating stratum that rules through control of the administrative apparatus rather than through ownership, that selects its members by cooptation rather than election, and that accrues privileges attached to position. I operationalize this through the Nomenklatura Index (ONI), a seven-dimension composite derived directly from Djilas's categories and piloted on three DAOs-Compound, MakerDAO/Sky, and Gitcoin-chosen to span the range of oligarchic formation I expected to see. The pilot does what it is supposed to do: ONI discriminates across the three cases in the predicted order and with meaningful spread. I close with design and regulatory implications. The governance-design ones (rotation mandates, supermajorities on self-dealing, deliberation minima) target the Djilasian mechanisms directly rather than working around them; the regulatory ones supply courts and agencies with a diagnostic vocabulary for the liability questions opened by CFTC v. Ooki DAO and unlikely to close anytime soon.
This paper studies governance participation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) to evaluate whether participation insights from corporate governance extend to token-weighted, decentralized voting systems. Using proposal-level data from 1,959 governance proposals across five major DAOs between July 2022 and December 2024, we examine two distinct dimensions of participation: voting-power mobilization and participation breadth. We test whether marginal procedural design featuresâspecifically voting-window durationâaffect participation once institutional identity is controlled for. Across linear and count-data specifications, voting-window duration has no statistically or economically meaningful association with either participation measure. In contrast, persistent DAO-level differences explain the vast majority of participation variation, indicating that persistent DAO-level heterogeneity accounts for substantially more variation in participation than marginal differences in voting-window duration. We further document dynamic participation patterns: later proposals mobilize greater voting power without expanding the participating electorate. By exploiting the transparency and proposal-level granularity of DAO governance (Yermack, 2017), this study directly observes participation patterns that are typically inferred in shareholder voting. The findings reinforce a central insight of corporate governance theory: participation is more closely associated with institutional identity than with marginal differences in voting window duration.
⢠âIncentive-regulatoryâ policy synergy promotes energy transition but falls short of â1 + 1 > 2â expectations. ⢠policy synergyâs marginal effect is lower than standalone incentive policy due to institutional conflicts. ⢠Transmission mechanisms (industrial/financial/cognitive) exhibit significant attenuation under policy synergy. ⢠policy synergy effectiveness hinges on city attributes: stronger in high-capacity, non-resource-dependent cities. ⢠Top-down institutional integration is critical to resolve âinstrumental tensionâ in multi-policy governance. Accelerating the energy transition (ET) is essential for achieving climate goals, yet the effectiveness of combining multiple policy instruments remains uncertain. This study investigates the synergistic effects of Chinaâs New Energy Demonstration Cities (incentive policy) and Key Air Pollution Control Zones (regulatory policy) on urban ET from 2011 to 2021. A multidimensional ET index is constructed under the âenergy trilemmaâ framework, and a double machine learning approach is employed to identify causal impacts and mediating mechanisms. The results show that: (1) policy synergy significantly promotes ET, but its marginal effect is lower than that of the incentive policy alone, failing to achieve the expected â1 + 1 > 2â outcome; (2) Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the synergy effect is more pronounced in cities with stronger economic foundations, higher fiscal decentralization, non-resource dependency, and non-old industrial base status, highlighting the role of local institutional carrying capacity; (3) Mechanism analysis further indicates that synergy promotes ET mainly through industrial upgrading, green finance, and public environmental awareness, but all pathways suffer from transmission attenuation. These findings underscore the challenges of fragmented governance in multi-policy environments and suggest that effective energy transition requires stronger institutional integration, clearer policy signals, and enhanced local implementation capacity.
Leonardo Henrique Lima de Pilla, Alketa Peci, Rodrigo de Oliveira Leite
ABSTRACT Corporatization in the public sector entails decentralizing the provision of public goods and services to more autonomous entities, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Research indicates that the decision to corporatize is driven, among other factors, by the pursuit of financial sustainability in public organizations. A continuing debate revolves around whether the political ideology of incumbents is linked to the creation of SOEs. However, limited attention has been given to understanding if incumbentsâ ideology shapes SOEsâ financial performance and, hence, financial sustainability. This is concerning because SOEs operate beyond political cycles, facing pressures from ideologically different governments over time. Herein, we investigate whether the incumbentsâ ideologies shape SOEsâ financial performance. We hypothesize that the more right leaning the incumbent, the greater the SOEsâ financial performance. However, given that incumbentsâ decisions are influenced by their political partiesâ behaviors, the effects of ideology may be contingent on these factors. Thus, we investigate whether the association of incumbentsâ ideology with SOEsâ financial performance is weaker when incumbentsâ political parties display non-policy behaviors (e.g., by prioritizing electoral outcomes or office occupation). We analyze a 2019â2022 panel of 317 SOEs controlled by 27 subnational governments in Brazil with both FGLS and instrumental variable regression approaches. The data comprising 1,116 SOE-year observations confirm our hypotheses. Our research contributes to scholarship on the drivers of public organizationsâ financial performance and sheds light on the role of political contingencies, such as incumbentsâ ideology and party predominant behaviors regarding SOEsâ financial performanceâa commonly overlooked gap in current research.
Abstract This chapter argues that, although political finance rules should be normatively assessed in tandem with the party system, in order to develop more precise recommendations for political finance design and reform, tailored to specific political systems, we need to consider a number of contextual factors. These include electoral institutions, institutions of decentralization, form of government, and party organization. Some of these factors may directly impact on a countryâs party system. But even when they do not, they should still be considered in the analysis at this stage as they can help to qualify the evaluation of party system/political finance combinations and thereby formulate more nuanced judgements that are well suited to the design of rules in a practical setting.
This systematic literature review compares two leading selective-disclosure primitives for decentralised identity-BBS+ signatures and Selective-Disclosure JSON Web Tokens (SD-JWT)-to clarify their suitability for privacypreserving credentials. Following Kitchenham's protocol, 226 records from 2017-2025 were screened across IEEE, ACM, SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, IETF and W3C repositories, yielding 31 primary studies with empirical data. Quantitative synthesis shows that BBS+ derived proofs remain constant-size at roughly 140 bytes and verify in about 12 ms on consumer hardware, whereas SD-JWT presentations grow with the number of revealed claims but still verify in under 10 ms for typical twoclaim use cases. Qualitative analysis confirms BBS+ provides strong unlinkability, predicate proofs and zero-knowledge disclosure, while SD-JWT offers seamless integration with existing JOSE/OAuth infrastructures yet carries correlation risk due to stable salted digests. Standardisation progress is comparable: the BBS+ cryptosuite reached W3C Candidate Recommendation in April 2025, and SD-JWT is in late-stage IETF review. The review concludes that privacy-critical scenarios such as age-gated services favour BBS+, whereas high-throughput web applications benefit from SD-JWT; consequently, hybrid wallet support for both formats is recommended. Future research should tackle scalable revocation, post-quantum migration and multi-credential aggregation to sustain long-term trust and interoperability.
Ignacy Nieweglowski, Aviv Yaish, Fahad Saleh, Fan Zhang
Cryptoassets launched by political figures, e.g., political finance (PoliFi) tokens, have recently attracted attention. Chief among them are the eponymous tokens backed by the 47th president and first lady of the United States, TRUMPandMELANIA. We empirically analyze both, and study their impact on the broad decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. Via a comparative longitudinal study, we uncover a "Trump Effect": the behavior of these tokens correlates positively with presidential approval ratings, whereas the same tight coupling does not extend to other cryptoassets and administrations. We additionally quantify the ecosystemic impact, finding that the fervor surrounding the two assets was accompanied by capital flows towards associated platforms like the Solana blockchain, which also enjoyed record volumes and fee expenditure.
Abstract Although extensive research has examined the credit risk of real estate enterprises, the relationship between the political connection of real estate enterprises and these enterprisesâ credit risk has not been formally studied. Using the panel data of 123 real estate listed companies in the Chinese stock market from 2008 to 2021, this paper finds a significant positive correlation between the political connection of private real estate listed companies and their credit risk. This phenomenon is attributed to the excessive debt that benefits from political connections since it may raise the credit risk of any real estate firm. Interestingly, considering that 2013 is the first year of Chinaâs Internet finance era, we find that the popularity of Internet finance and other decentralized lending financing channels may enhance the impact of political connections on real estate credit risk. Our findings provide new micro evidence for the influencing factors and mechanism of credit risk of real estate enterprises during the recent âcredit crisisâ in the real estate market in China.
Ăngel SazâCarranza, Martino Maggetti, Kutsal Yesilkagit, David Coen
Abstract Several recent studies have pointed to the increasing relevance of relatively informal, non-treaty-based global governance bodies (GGBs). Yet, a systematic fine-grained assessment of these bodies and their implications for global governance are still pending. To what extent, do non-treaty-based GGBs constitute a truly novel type of governance body, distinct from traditional treaty-based international organizations (IOs)? How do the distinctive features of GGBs affect their role in global governance? To what extent are GGBâs patterns of emergence and development specific to policy sectors? This article tackles these questions, drawing on an original dataset on GGBs in five distinct policy areas (banking and finance, energy, global health, Internet, and migration policy). We combine a micro-organizational perspective with a meso-level network approach to unpack the main features of non-treaty-based GGBs vis-Ă -vis, traditional IOs. Our results provide support to the general expectation that non-treaty-based GGBs offer distinctive opportunities for global governance with respect to traditional IOs. However, importantly, this relationship is not dichotomous. We find that GGBs exist on a continuum of fit-to-purpose designs ranging from hard, formal, and intergovernmental models to a soft, informal, and multistakeholder-based form of governance. Lastly, we also find notable variations across policy areas, where global health stands out given its decentralized network structure.
During each election cycle, the city of Seattle distributes four $25 vouchers to every registered voter, which may be donated to and redeemed by campaigns for city office. Through a difference-in-differences research design, we study the causal effect of Seattle's program on various outcomes in city council elections in the first two cycles after implementation, with comparison cities drawn from large cities in Washington and California. We find a 53% increase in total contributions and a 350% increase in number of unique donors; these effects are largely explained by large increases in small donations, defined as contributions less than $200. We find statistically insignificant evidence of decreases in private donations, although our point estimates suggest moderate-to-substantial crowd-out ratios. We further estimate a highly significant 86% increase in number of candidates coupled with substantial decreases in incumbent electoral success. These results provide some of the first causal evidence of the effect of decentralized public campaign finance schemes, while speaking to the impacts of campaign regulation more generally on donation activity, candidate entry, and incumbency advantage.
This article presents a survey of broad-based stakeholder-ownership models for journalism. The models considered are forms of ownership by employees, associations, audiences, and blends of these. Some of the examples are so new that they have not been, and cannot yet be, comprehensively studied. Yet they bear unique promise for addressing the dual challenges of economic sustainability and perceived accountability that bedevil news media today. Such promise, however, does not guarantee success. While broad-based stakeholder ownership in the news business shows capacity for public accountability, as well as some promise for business sustainability, it is ill-equipped to compete in markets organized to favor investor-owners with far greater capital access. Such ownership models, therefore, will likely require additional policy support to gain and maintain significant market share.
Abstract. This paper examines the process of mass democracy as the fundamental cause of transfer seeking and the centralization of governance, using Austrian-school theory and methodology such as decentralized knowledge, disaggregated phenomena, and the structure of capital goods. The alternative of decentralized, small-group gov-ernance reduces the demand for campaign financing and makes more effective use of decentralized knowledge. In addition, when public revenues originate in the local districts and are passed on to higher levels of governance, it provides incentives for revenue sources which do not have an excess burden on production. The governance struc-ture of cellular, bottom-up, multi-level voting, with public revenue flowing up from the lower to the upper levels, provides a contrast for a comparative systems analysis that can yield insight into the transfer seeking endemic in mass democracy.