Blockchain Papers

Dianxiang Sun, Wei Ma, Liming Nie, Yang Liu

Rug pulls pose a grave threat to the cryptocurrency ecosystem, leading to substantial financial loss and undermining trust in decentralized finance (DeFi) projects. With the emergence of new rug pull patterns, research on rug pull is out of state. To fill this gap, we first conducted an extensive analysis of the literature review, encompassing both scholarly and industry sources. By examining existing academic articles and industrial discussions on rug pull projects, we present a taxonomy inclusive of 34 root causes, introducing six new categories inspired by industry sources: burn, hidden owner, ownership transfer, unverified contract, external call, and fake LP lock. Based on the developed taxonomy, we evaluated current rug pull datasets and explored the effectiveness and limitations of existing detection mechanisms. Our evaluation indicates that the existing datasets, which document 2,448 instances, address only 7 of the 34 root causes, amounting to a mere 20% coverage. It indicates that existing open-source datasets need to be improved to study rug pulls. In response, we have constructed a more comprehensive dataset containing 2,360 instances, expanding the coverage to 54% with the best effort. In addition, the examination of 14 detection tools showed that they can identify 25 of the 34 root causes, achieving a coverage of 73.5%. There are nine root causes (Fake LP Lock, Hidden Fee, and Destroy Token, Fake Money Transfer, Ownership Transfer, Liquidity Pool Block, Freeze Account, Wash-Trading, Hedge) that the existing tools cannot cover. Our work indicates that there is a significant gap between current research and detection tools, and the actual situation of rug pulls.

Massimo Bartoletti, F. Fioravanti, Giulia Matricardi, Roberto Pettinau · 5 authors

Formal verification of smart contracts has become a hot topic in academic and industrial research, given the growing value of assets managed by decentralized applications and the consequent incentive for adversaries to tamper with them. Most of the current research on the verification of contracts revolves around Solidity, the main high-level language supported by Ethereum and other leading blockchains. Although bug detection tools for Solidity have been proliferating almost since the inception of Ethereum, only in the last few years we have seen verification tools capable of proving that a contract respects some desirable properties. An open issue is how to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of these tools: indeed, the existing benchmarks for general-purpose programming languages cannot be adapted to Solidity, given substantial differences in the programming model and in the desirable properties. We address this problem by proposing an open benchmark for Solidity verification tools. By exploiting our benchmark, we compare two leading tools, SolCMC and Certora, discussing their completeness, soundness and expressiveness limitations.