The Jabbar Adal Principle (JAP) is a theoretical framework in non-relativistic Hamiltonian mechanics that formally names, defines, and analyses the instantaneous ratio of kinetic to potential energy at every local subsystem of a closed physical system — a quantity unaddressed by the First Law, Second Law, or the Virial Theorem. This work introduces three new named physical quantities and one new named unit: Jabbar Asymmetry Parameter — A(i, t) = Ti(t) / |Vi(t)| [Jb] Virial Deviation Parameter — ΔA(i, t) = A(i, t) − Avir(i) [Jb] Adal Asymmetry Index — AAI(t) = (1/N) Σ |ΔA(i, t)| [Jb] The Jabbar unit [Jb] — a named dimensionless unit of virial deviation, analogous to the radian and the neper, named after the Jabbar family of Khanewal, Punjab, Pakistan — derived from Abdul Jabbar, daily-wage labourer, father of the author, whose sacrifices made this work possible. Two Proved Theorems Theorem 1 — The Jabbar Vitality Theorem:In any closed non-relativistic Hamiltonian system, physical processes are possible if and only if AAI(t) > 0 Jb. This is a necessary and sufficient biconditional, logically independent of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Theorem R1 — The Oscillatory Modulation Theorem:For any closed non-relativistic Hamiltonian system of N ≥ 2 coupled harmonic oscillators with distinct normal-mode frequencies ω1 ≠ ω2: AAI(t) = AAI0 · e−γt · [1 + ε sin(ωbeat t + φ)] [Jb] where ωbeat = |ω2 − ω1| is derived entirely from the Hamiltonian eigenvalues — not fitted, not assumed. The heat equation cannot predict this modulation. Derivation Foundations The proof rests on four independently established and undisputed premises: Hamilton's canonical equations (Hamilton, 1835) Normal-mode decomposition (linear algebra) Product-to-sum trigonometric identity (pure mathematics) Virial theorem for V ∝ x² (Clausius, 1870) Numerical Verification System parameters: m1 = 1.0 kg, m2 = 2.0 kg, k1 = 4.0 N m−1, k2 = 6.0 N m−1, κ = 1.5 N m−1, γ = 0.02 s−1. Theoretical ωbeat = 0.646714 rad s−1 (from Hamiltonian eigenvalues) Fitted ωbeat = 0.646686 rad s−1 (from numerical simulation) Deviation: 0.0043% — 1 part in 23,000 RMSE improvement over heat equation: 37.54% Verified independently by Python (NumPy / DOP853 solver, rtol = 10−11) and PHP 8.3 (4th-order Runge–Kutta). Both agree to six significant figures. Supplementary code: JAP_calculations.php (included, CC BY 4.0). Domain of Validity All claims apply exclusively to closed physical systems governed by a non-relativistic Hamiltonian H = T + V. This explicitly excludes General Relativity, quantum field theory, and cosmological scales. The domain encompasses molecular vibrations, coupled mechanical resonators, acoustic lattices, optical traps, and any classical N-body system in the Newtonian limit. Priority and Novelty The following elements have no prior publication in the physics literature to the author's knowledge: The quantity A(i, t) = Ti/|Vi| as a named observable The Virial Deviation Parameter ΔA(i, t) The Adal Asymmetry Index AAI(t) The Jabbar unit [Jb] The Jabbar Vitality Theorem (biconditional) Theorem R1 (oscillatory modulation of AAI) Under CC BY 4.0, any use of these named quantities requires citation of this work. Open Problem — JAP-Entropy Conjecture In the zero-temperature limit (Tbath → 0), during monotonic relaxation, it is conjectured that: AAI(t) ∝ σep(t) / ⟨T(t)⟩ where σep is the entropy production rate. Proof or disproof of this conjecture is the highest-value open problem in the JAP framework. About the Author Muhammad Umar Jabbar (also: Umar Adl Jabbar) was born on 1 February 2008 in village 4/A.H, Khanewal, Punjab, Pakistan. He is 18 years old at the time of publication. His father, Abdul Jabbar, worked throughout his life as a daily-wage labourer and is now bedridden with heart disease. His mother works as a domestic worker earning Rs. 5,000 per month. He has four siblings — two brothers and two sisters — all in education. He could not afford medical college. He could not afford nursing school. He had no university, no laboratory, no supervisor, and no funding. He is believed to be the youngest independent theoretical physics researcher in Pakistan to formally propose and prove named theorems in non-relativistic Hamiltonian mechanics without any institutional support. The Jabbar unit [Jb] is named after his family — derived from his father Abdul Jabbar's name — so that the sacrifice of a labourer from a small Pakistani village is permanently recorded in the language of science. ORCID: 0009-0008-5968-0991Email: umarjaumofficial@gmail.comLicence: CC BY 4.0
The pending High Court appeal in Poulton v Conrad raises one of the most significant questions yet considered by an Australian court concerning digital assets: whether Bitcoin constitutes property at common law and, if so, whether traditional proprietary remedies such as detinue and conversion are available. The appeal has attracted competing approaches. The appellant characterises Bitcoin as information recorded on a distributed ledger and argues against proprietary recognition. The respondent emphasises Bitcoin's practical functionality and the control exercised through private keys. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation approaches the issue through established principles of property law and the long-standing taxation treatment of Bitcoin as property. These competing arguments illustrate the continuing difficulty of applying legal concepts developed for physical assets and bilateral legal relationships to decentralised digital assets. This article examines the competing submissions and argues that the debate is often framed too narrowly. The more fundamental question is not whether Bitcoin is property in the abstract, but how the law should characterise exclusive control over a digitally scarce economic resource. In doing so, the article considers Bitcoin's monetary characteristics, its practical operation through cryptographic authentication, and the distinction between legal title and practical control. The article further explores the implications of the appeal beyond cryptocurrency, including secured lending, insolvency, taxation, estate administration and the operation of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth). It argues that the long-term significance of the appeal may lie less in the classification of Bitcoin as property and more in whether Australian law begins to recognise cryptographic control as a legally significant form of control in its own right. The article concludes that the future development of digital asset law is likely to depend upon legal frameworks that better align proprietary rights with practical control, particularly where control is exercised through private keys rather than physical possession or contractual rights.
The terminology around blockchain technology is notoriously confusing, with disputes over whether a blockchain is the same as a distributed ledger, or whether an appcoin is the same as a protocol token. In this article, I examine the difficulties the rapidly shifting, contested vocabulary poses for regulators seeking to understand, govern, and potentially use blockchain technology, and offer suggestions for how to fight through the haze of unclear language.
In Part I, I provide examples of the fluctuating, contested language in the blockchain technology space, and describe the forces at play in shaping the language. In Part II, I lay out the problems the language raises for regulators, including challenges in identifying the facts about the technology, distinguishing among the many variations of the technology, and communicating clearly about the technology, as well as increasing the chances of regulatory capture, inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions and subject domains, and “perverse innovation.”
In Part III, I closely analyze the use of the term “immutable” in blockchain discourse, to illuminate the confusion a single term can cause for regulators (and the public at large). I argue that the widespread use of the term “immutable” as a defining feature of blockchain technology is misleading, given that (i) real world events have demonstrated that the unchangeable nature of a blockchain record is always limited by the decisions of its human governors to change it, and (ii) the source of a blockchain record’s “immutability” is disputed, meaning that it is unclear whether any particular variation of the technology may be fairly described as creating an “immutable” record. This is problematic as regulators have already begun to craft legislation describing the records created by blockchain technology as immutable, and are making decisions to use the technology in large part because of its “immutability.”
In Part IV, I suggest ways regulators can become better educated about blockchain technology, as is essential for them to responsibly govern or use the technology. I also recommend that regulators take a highly critical approach that (i) seeks to separate hype from reality; (ii) is sensitive to how incentives may shape the way blockchain technology is portrayed by industry and those sponsored by industry, and how misleading terminology appears in publications of the highest prestige levels; (iii) includes diverse perspectives from proponents and critics of the technology, multiple disciplines, and from across the gender, race, geographic, and economic development spectrums; (iv) takes nothing, including descriptions of the technology itself, at face value, but deeply interrogates and scrutinizes the technology and its stated capabilities; and (v) asks regulators to think for themselves about the technology and its benefits rather than succumbing to herd behavior.
I am hopeful that these recommendations, coupled with awareness that blockchain vocabulary is treacherous, can help regulators to discover the facts about blockchain technology and respond to them appropriately.
Feroz Ahmad Ahmad, Prashant Kumar, Gulshan Shrivastava, Med Salim Bouhlel
ON 12 JANUARY 2009 a pseudonymous entity signed a transaction that instructed a distributed network to transfer a small amount of digital currency to Hal Finney, one ofthe key figures of the cypherpunk movement. After a few minutes, the transaction was recorded on a distributed public ledger, permanently updating the balance ofbothparties. This transaction— the first Bitcoin transaction—marked the beginning of a new era of decentralized payment systems, ushering in a variety of financial Services that do not depend on any centralized clearinghouse or other financial middleman. Bitcoin is regarded by many as a powerful technological innovation that could disrupt many sectors, in the realm of finance and beyond. But the underlying technology on which the network operates, the Bitcoin blockchain can do much more than that. Just as the internet did in the early-1990s, blockchain technology carries with it a whole new range of promises concerning how decentralization can support and promote individual freedoms and autonomy. Blockchain proponents believe that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency platforms will revolutionize mechanisms of value exchange in the same way that the internet transformed information sharing, by providing a platform for people to exchange digital resources, in a secure and decentralized manner without the need to rely on any intermediary or trusted authority. But this revolutionary potential also carries with it serious implications for censorship, intellectual property, and the regulated flow of information. A blockchain is a decentralized database of transactions maintained by a distributed network of computers, which all contribute to the verification and the validation of transactions. Once accepted, these transactions are recorded inside a “block” of transactions, which incorporates a reference to previous blocks. This creates a long chain of blocks—a “blockchain”—that stores the history of all transactions in a chronological order. Every block contains information about a particular set of transactions, a reference to the preceding block in the blockchain, and the answer to a complex mathematical puzzle that is used to validate the data associated with that block. A copy of the blockchain is stored on every computer in the network, making it virtually impossible for anyone unilaterally to modify the data stored on this decentralized database: if anyone tries to modify any transaction the fraud will be immediately detected by all other network participants.
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On 4 June 2009, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its judgment in a reference for a preliminary ruling made by a Dutch administrative court (College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven). The Dutch court had referred questions to the ECJ in an appeal from the Rotterdam District Court, which had quashed a decision of the Dutch Competition Authority imposing fines on five mobile network operators for infringing Article 6 of the Dutch Competition Act and Article 81 EC. In its original decision, the Dutch Competition Authority imposed fines of €50 million on the five operators, Telfort, Orange, KPN, T-Mobile, and Vodafone, finding that they had exchanged confidential information at a meeting of 13 June 2001 regarding the reduction of standard dealer remunerations for postpaid subscriptions and allegedly agreed that the reduction would take effect on or about 1 September 2001. On appeal, the Rotterdam District Court annulled the decision in question and ordered the Dutch Competition Authority to adopt a new decision. In an appeal brought by T-Mobile, KPN, Orange, and the Dutch Competition Authority, the Dutch administrative court referred three questions to the ECJ regarding: (i) the criteria to be applied when assessing whether a concerted practice has an anticompetitive object; (ii) the evidence of a causal link between concerted practice and effect that must be adduced; and (iii) whether there is always a presumption of a causal link between the concerted practice and the market conduct when applying Article 81, even where the concerted practice was a single meeting. The ECJ responded stating that a concerted practice is prohibited by Article 81(1) where it is clear that its object or its effect is to prevent, restrict, or distort competition. Further, the ECJ found that there is no need to take the actual effects of the concerted practice into account once its anticompetitive object has been established. The ECJ also stated that the intention of the parties is not an essential factor in determining whether a concerted practice is restrictive, but it is a factor which can be taken into account. The ECJ held that a concerted practice of the kind at issue in the appeal proceedings before the Dutch court could be considered to have an anti-competitive object where the exchange of information removed uncertainties about the intended market conduct of the undertakings involved. With regard to the evidence of the causal link that must be adduced, the ECJ stated that its jurisprudence had established a rebuttable presumption that undertakings would take account of information exchanged with their competitors. The ECJ also considered that the presumption of this causal connection still applies where only one single meeting has been held, although the presumption is more compelling where undertakings have exchanged information on a number of occasions. to the the issue at is not the number of held but whether the information exchanged at the in question the undertakings the to anticompetitive market On the that it had imposed fines on and its and on for their in a that in the and between and in of Article 81 EC. The found that and of had agreed not to the in when they in to this to into and The found that the their even the European to in found to have on a at to have the of the in the and to have The imposed fines of million on and for their in the the the into account the of the the anticompetitive of the the in the and the the The was with in at the of in and On 2009, the ECJ an appeal brought by a judgment of the Court of of September a the million that the had imposed on in 2001 for its in a on the market was to In its the ECJ that when the of the account of the that had allegedly the of in the The a of a has on the of the the a of a a from its the even where the which would it to a the on the of in a an the to the of the In to a of the the decision referred to of evidence in which had been to the of the not to the that the on a for a of the In the this not to with the evidence that the had at its to in its decision a of the the ECJ found that had been from its of The judgment of the was it to the of its of the administrative the ECJ held had not been a of the the could in have the of the the judgment of the on the ECJ considered that the of the proceedings it to judgment on the In this the Court held that the not evidence of a of the The ECJ that the was not to a to on account of the from the Court to On 1 2009, the in its an by the European decision in the had the by the in of its decision to the a judgment of the ECJ that annulled the original decision of In its to the decision, a number of In it that the had no to its decision on the of the European and the in and that the to only 81 and and not the of the also that the ECJ has that it be held for the of in the that the is and that the its of to the and the to a The held that the was to that there had been an of Article of the and to a the of the to the the decision was on the in and the that the had not that the had its to for the of Article of that The only for the was that was in at the the new decision was The also that the decision not the of the of by or in one not be for the that the had the for the of the with and that the finding of was made the the that the was in of of in to the of or the to the On 2009, the European a decision imposing fines million on for their in a and the of and and in the of in the of a in to the the market for is million The was by an made by which brought the of the to the On the of its the found that between and the had a the to which they had the and agreed on for and number of also in to their in the of a for the that brought the to the from from the of million that would have been imposed on The of was by the had been for a in the On September 2009, the ECJ in its an appeal brought by and of its a judgment of the of In the the a decision of which and imposed a of million on the five for the in a on the market for the that the had in for the to not have its in the The that by that where a of the in a that Article 81 there is a rebuttable presumption that the its The found that this presumption had not been in the at and the imposed by the to the In its appeal, that the had not applied the of the of Article 81 and Article of In this the judgment for the of on the on ECJ and to that it is not for the to that a is by its in to to the must at the of the of that the in a its In the at in the of the intention to and with its was on the that had a in its in the decision, the also made reference to that the had a of the of on the which also its of in of 2009, the taken by the and that the ECJ the In its the ECJ has to the appeal, and that a be held for the anticompetitive of its even it not in The ECJ made it clear that where a has a in a that has the the can a the conduct of the and there is a rebuttable presumption that the in a the conduct of its with no to this The ECJ found that there was no in the for the of the presumption to the of to the actual of by the The ECJ that the not have to in its of or in its decision, evidence that to the of the in the also the judgment for held that the evidence to the and between the and its in to the of the and to the presumption of to the that the is to its to the of the in the that is to its conduct on the which is to the of and that the on to in a and at a that the of the conduct of the on the market in the would to a which is to the of by the of the The ECJ also in its The ECJ found that the conduct of the on the market be the only factor which the of the to be established. to the in to whether a its conduct on the market account must be taken not only of to the of the the of the and but also of the to the and that the to the The ECJ that the to be taken into account from to and be in an In the this not to the of a In this the ECJ that the is of the that has the the is and with the that for the and even where the not in the it the In that the ECJ that the of the be The appeal was from this judgment that it be in practice for a to the presumption that it the conduct of its the that the is of On September 2009, the ECJ in its an appeal by a judgment of in which the a decision of June that a of million for their in a of in the The which was the the of and of and by a number of in The by the brought an before the for of the decision or a reduction of the In its the the decision regarding its of the and but one of the fines The the it found that the had its on and had this market and that had been a of made a appeal to the of the decision or a reduction of their In their appeal to the the that the had in its of the Article 81 to the effect of anticompetitive conduct on between and of the of the In the that the had in in (i) that there is a presumption that a practice of applied the of a is to and (ii) that the three of the of the of an in the the of the its actual on the and the of the not the and that the of the the in determining its The also that the had in in the to from that the had an on the the of the the the judgment for held in to the the had not to the and for the the conduct of the by to the market of In in 2009, the regarding the of the market the and the to the of the market of in the the of the market the the that is to a of with regard to the when it that a has had an on the market for the of assessing the of the and the of the The that the ECJ the judgment and the fines imposed on the In its the ECJ a and the The ECJ that there is a presumption that a practice of that is applied the of a single is to and that that presumption can only be an of the of the and its the In the at the ECJ found that the presumption had not been In the ECJ that the not only the in but also a of and The ECJ that the had been to that the had the effect of and was to The ECJ also that the could the of the a by reference to the of the that not in the and in the of this the of the a in the of an The ECJ considered that the had not from the of the that the had had an on the the ECJ stated that the to the of the market of in the not of the conduct of to the In this the ECJ that by to the the market of in their the to that the of the fines imposed on the the of their that in this the essential by the their of information and of the the The ECJ also that in to the of the account must be taken of the of the to distort and the and the on of their to the it was to take into account the between the and the in the of the of the to could be that by their In the ECJ considered that the fines not have a effect the market of the not taken into account. The appeal was in its On September 2009, the ECJ the judgment and annulled the decision in the In the undertakings a of million for their in a of and concerted in the in of Article 81 EC. was million for this brought before the In its judgment of the the for of the decision and the fines for only of and and to the of the judgment and the decision or a reduction in their In of 2009, that the ECJ the judgment and the decision and the brought by and In its the ECJ has the of its and the from and which that the had evidence their in the or the of this and that the had the of and in the criteria by the for the In to the ECJ found that the had to from its finding that of had been to a between the of and the decision. 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that the had been in that there was no of the to in the of the of the market and of the of the In its the ECJ agreed with the of that the was by an of in that the the of the of the market by the to the of a to market and the of the the ECJ that when assessing the of and the the has reference to one of which is the of the In this the ECJ found that the was to that to to operators could be established by of to their market also that the had not applied the it the of the by to the of the and the of an a which could not be also considered that the had the of by to the of the infringing an The ECJ of finding that the had not the the ECJ appeal in its On June 2009, the that it has a in connection with proceedings brought by the European that has been its by for to a of in but also in a of which need to and have been by an standard of the The its into on when it that it had a of to the to the a by not its of to the and that to the to had to a from or its this the that was its by for the of 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the of the by and (ii) the of the by to the was not its its into a with which that the be to The ECJ also that there was a for to for the of its the that it was to a of to the the held that be that the of the to whether of the or have a even it the actual of the and be to be to in for the of the the by the parties the ECJ that the decision the judgment stated that was to a or from an parties for of its the decision only imposed on with to its in and that the of the proceedings before the and of its with a The ECJ agreed that the was but found that the only for a was an for and had the of the On September 2009, the in its a decision of June that found that and its referred had its on the market for and to The decision considered that in (i) to and to for more and (ii) applying to between and The not a for but ordered to from in the brought the before the the decision the of the market and the of an of a and for a to be is the that that the and the have agreed on an and that the is to the in is the of the and between the and the the of the account three of of and (i) which in their and in to in in their and also in to and where the of of is in (ii) which and of or of in and have to the of and (iii) which their with to and the only in the European is the only in a to in In the decision appeal, the made a between and and to the decision, and by the that the in and by On the of this the the market the of and to to and that there is a single market in and at one in which the parties to the The only to it a the the that the the and by not the parties to the but and The that the only between (i) and the and (ii) the and its of which is to the to the by on of parties to the the on an of The that the not a by between and and in its of the With regard to the of an that it not to the that had for there was no the of to (i) only on (ii) was not to between and and (iii) in the on the of that of the of the and between the and and for to the in of had been by in there was no of had not an anticompetitive and the to that a that the applied to not In its the that and only to a of this it found that a by to the in the that there was no evidence of a for information in the before it that the between and could to that it was not to a and in that the could the a this the found that was not to between and With to that had to the that the that an is in a it of its to its when they the in undertakings in a be of the to adopt a of conduct or take not in and which would even be or taken by to this the that could not the of for to in of the to its this would its not to its conduct to on the to the that the conduct of an in a be an even in the of In the that it not an anticompetitive was to the of the the found that conduct was to to on the market even could In this the that had a with regard to the of and on the market and that could not the it had the that an its and on a European with regard to a the that by to the was to and In this the the judgment for the that it is not in to an of Article that on the market would be by a to but is that the at issue is or is on the The also found that the and for by to and in the in to Article by a to to On September 2009, in which the appeal of a judgment that annulled a decision to by Article of In that the Court of Justice the judgment and a ruling in the that the decision to the In its of appeal, the that the and the of The the from the that there of that had a on the of the of by the that be made the of Article the must be to the by the a of the The that undertakings need to that the a of the but that they for this by and by an decision with a The of by the a on the of their was the to the of parties by that the not was The that this not that the must to the to but that the must to it to in an and finding is the that the is of more by the which the in in the at by and that their to Article 81 In it that the that the is more of when the that to where the that be to be more The also a number of about the of that the considered could have the by the In the that they the issue of whether the the of an issue that was on In its the had that the of whether the by not from a of the was not on a The found this that the was to a when assessing the effects the would have on market and whether the to the would be is the on that one of was that must be to the need for a of the the would to the of the of to of even when the not on a of the the that the Court of Justice judgment in the the to the in with the by Article of the of the Court of In the that the Court of Justice the decision and on On September 2009, the the of the decision of 13 2009, and a of the decision was also in the of September The that the has (i) of or to on the that they or of their from from and to to at one on the that it only practice is referred to and (ii) to to or the of and to the to practice is referred to with to the the decision that the at issue the of the for finding an and an to that the had the of an which is to be of whether was to the In that the is for finding an Article the to the of its on in of the more of the Court in of appeal the decision have been in the of September that the in by to that its had an actual to and by to whether its in the of the European had and effects the European also that the to the standard of by to that its or of their from that the in applying its to whether of and to take account of of In that the essential which its of and the of the On June 2009, the European imposed a of million on the for the In in that held by made of this it to the the considered that its was to the of the be that to a the they in a of or the only be the the a although even a can be to for where the of the In into with the on whether or not the had in to in the of in more the had been On the the that there was only a between the parties and that there in in its decision, the the issue of the on which of The a into this which in its decision of June In this decision, the held that had in with of by the and at it a at was the of and had taken the held by in the of the and the of of by to of its with in 2001. to the this The that had the the by the In the at the into account the of a of the the of the the of the of the of the between and the and the that had with and have been of its to the In of the the considered the that the not to and that the to the the would have been had the on the decision is of the of the imposed on the that the would have been the had In the which was in by the fines for of the only a of the million imposed on in the for of a in it for three to a In the of Competition the decision a clear that the not of this of the the On June 2009, the European a to the on the of the of the the of the in with the of the and the for in the to the the in the have in between the and the the that there still a number of that not the and need to be in more one by the and have effects on competition. The that this that there is for a of at The also the to this that the the of the parties more of its one and the has been to the was to in the of a of the The that the has between that have effects and that the that there have been a number of with effects that have the a of the the for in the the on for to from the to the European and the in Article of the to this which was in parties can of to their from the to the European the not meeting the three or more of the is intended to the on parties by the to only one to the European to to the have the and of in the have the of between the and the the that have with regard to the and of the is the is and it the parties to an to the the to object to a the is the actual to the European that the is not an in parties no but to The not to the the that it to to the the with regard to the of the to the On June 2009, the European the of by a The found that the would have the a on from to and and that it would also to on between and and and In to the to that new to on of the where the also or and the in On June 2009, the an appeal the European decision the between the of and is the in has been a and The has an finding that appeal the decision was referred to the by the is of is the September decision to of a judgment by the the of the would no be of to The Court held by the appeal would have been would have been from the market for in the in September of could not be to to the market in to the to the decision. The considered in it was not to on appeal the decision. In the the of the an of the decision before the which annulled the