Bitcoin, created by Satoshi Nakamoto, came into existence in 2008. Bitcoin is a virtual currency that has gained popularity worldwide, including in South Africa. It can be used as money or a means of payment or can be kept as an asset. For many years, virtual currencies operated free from legal regulations. Its decentralised network offers its users confidentiality because no-one can link any Bitcoin transaction to any user. This research study investigated the South African Taxation treatment of Bitcoin transactions. It also investigated the taxation legislation for Bitcoin transactions of the three countries selected for this study which are Canada, the United States of America and Australia, in order to establish best-practices that can be applied in South Africa. Bitcoin transactions can come into existence from the process of mining; obtained from barter transactions; and when purchased from Bitcoin vendors through the exchange of countries’ fiat money for Bitcoin, thus attracting taxation implications. The first research question was: What are the tax consequences of Bitcoin transactions in South Africa? This study found the following: the South African Revenue Service, cryptocurrencies are considered assets. The amount received or accumulated as per classification of gross income can be calculated using the value of cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrency transactions can generate revenue that is subject to gross income taxation. The recipient taxpayer must include as gross income the value in South African Rands of a cryptocurrency, paid or accrued to him or her as contemplated in the definition of "revenue asset". It may be considered trading stock to receive Bitcoin with the intention of trading it for goods and services. Research Question Two was: What are the regulations governing, and tax treatment of, Bitcoin in selected countries? The findings can be summarised as follows: The United States of America (USA), Australia and Canada are clear that virtual currencies are not a legal currency and therefore cannot be classified as currency. Canada classifies virtual currencies as a commodity for taxation purposes. The USA and Canada have classified Bitcoin as property and intangible property respectively, which is similar to the approach in South Africa. The definition of a currency for all four countries is similar in the sense that there needs to be physical cash for the amount to be included as gross income for taxation purposes. Moreover, if Bitcoins are acquired with the aim of reselling or investment, Capital Gains Tax comes into play. None of the three nations' definitions of currency apply to virtual currencies. Research Question Three was: What is the difference or similarities between South African income tax consequences of Bitcoin and that of the three jurisdictions chosen for this study? The below is a summary of the results: South Africa, USA, Australia, Canada (specific that virtual currencies are not a legal tender and hence cannot be recognized as currency) Canada Taxes Crypto as a Commodity Bitcoin is labelled property by the USA and intangible property by Canada. This classification attracts Capital gains taxation, which is a similar approach to South Africa. All four nations have comparable definitions of currency, meaning that for an amount to be considered gross income for taxes reasons, actual cash must be present. Consequently, none of the four nations' definitions of currency apply to virtual currencies. Last but not least, virtual currencies are categorised as crypto assets since South Africa's asset definition encompasses assets of any kind, whether tangible or intangible. Virtual currencies were also categorised as commodities or property in Canada. The study recommends on how South Africa might enhance its current tax laws pertaining to Bitcoin transactions. The study also suggests future research that can serve as an extension of this study
Our understanding of contracts continues to evolve. Electronic contracts that have typically taken the form of shrink-wrap, click-wrap, web-wrap, scroll-wrap, multi-wrap and sign-in-wrap agreements have undergone further developments with the introduction of automation in electronic contractual engagements and, more recently, the advent of the so-called "smart contract". Different types of smart contracts exist, including smart contracts that operate on blockchain technology. Despite these developments in commercial and contractual activities, the South African legal framework does not officially recognise smart contracts. The use of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 (ECTA) as a mechanism for the regulatory oversight of smart contracts in South Africa is, in its current form, woefully inadequate and limited in its application to smart contracts. Other jurisdictions, like the European Union (EU), have passed draft legislative and regulatory documentation called the Data Act to address smart contracts, whilst the UK Law Commission has provided recommendations to regulate smart contracts. As South Africa currently has no equivalent to the EU's draft Data Act and has not considered the operation of smart contracts in South Africa, the position in the EU and United Kingdom (UK) is considered in this paper to provide guidelines as to the aspects that it would be necessary to regulate in a South African context.
The concern of this paper is to examine the central-local government relations and the extent and the manner in which this relation undermines or promoted the local government autonomy in Tanzania. Nevertheless, the knowledge about the effect of central-local government relation on local government autonomy and education service management is sparse. The central government is responsible for provision of public services such as education and healthcare because the central government cannot perform each function given the wide jurisdiction. This work was guided by the following research objectives: A) to examine the extent in which central-local government relations undermine local government autonomy. B) to explore the power of the local councils to hire and fire staff under central-local relation management. C) to explore the effect of central-local relations on service delivery management in Local Government authorities. The paper used a case study design with a sample of 40 respondents elected using purposive sampling. The method of data collection was interview and documentary review and the data were analyzed using thematic data analysis and descriptive statistics. The findings indicate that the failure of Local Governments Authorities in Tanzania in provision of services depends partly on the central-local relations in terms of central government interference which undermine local government autonomy, the structure of local government revenue is weak, institutional capacity of the Local Government Authorities, and modalities in place for the public services that the central government directly provides at the local level. The paper recommends that local government finance and administrative autonomy should be strengthened by Enshrining Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) in National Constitution.
У статті розглянуто особливості фінансової децентралізації в Україні. Досліджено повноваження отримані органами місцевого самоврядування для надання якісних та доступних суспільних послуг громадянам. Також, охарактеризовано відповідальність органів місцевого самоврядування перед виборцями – за ефективність своєї роботи, а перед державою – за її законність. Крім того, досліджено основні джерела ресурсів об’єднаних територіальних громад та проведено групування за критеріями їх сутності та ролі у формуванні конкурентних переваг. Проаналізовано фінансову спроможність громад. Визначено, інші інструменти забезпечення економічного розвитку громади, зокрема, здійснення зовнішніх запозичень, самостійне обрання установ з обслуговування коштів місцевих бюджетів відносно розвитку та власних надходжень бюджетних установ, сформовано теоретико-методологічні положення, які можуть бути покладені в основу сучасної системи управління ресурсоефективністю територіальних громад. Доведено, що добровільно об’єднані територіальні громади мають усі можливості й ресурси для повноцінного функціонування та розвитку. Сьогодні органи місцевої влади беруть на себе цілковиту відповідальність за всі сфери життя на власних територіях, що і є показником успішної й доцільної діяльності ОТГ. Визначено, що за умови добросовісного виконання зобов’язань, підвищується ефективність використання бюджетних коштів, а це – прямий і правильний шлях до стабілізації соціально-економічної ситуації в усій країні. Визначено проблеми з якими стикаються місцеві органи влади на шляху до децентралізації. Проведено аналіз видаткових повноважень органів місцевого самоврядування у сучасних реаліях.
ENGLISH SUMMARY : Procurement has been designed to redress some of the imbalances of the past; however, this policy instrument is being abused in some institutions around the country. This abuse has caught the eye of the Minister of Finance who, a few years ago, appointed a Chief Procurement Officer (CPO). This office of the CPO is within the National Treasury and it is tasked with ensuring that procurement, currently known as supply chain management (SCM), is properly managed. One of the causes of deficiency within the SCM environment is decentralisation. This is a method used by various institutions, including Parliament. Decentralisation means that every office is able to procure its own goods and services. This may result in procedures not being followed properly because the people who are trained in procurement or SCM reside in the SCM office. When procedures are not followed properly, this may result in awards of bids being made incorrectly, leading to irregular expenditure and possibly qualified audit opinions. The National Treasury has established a central database for all suppliers. This may curb some of the inconsistencies currently experienced; however, each institution still procures its own goods and services. In the case of Parliament, the database is not being used yet and with programmes in place that take Parliament to the rural areas, the central database may not be efficient. This study aims to give recommendations to ensure the SCM Section is able to support Parliament in meeting its strategic objectives. The study takes into consideration the unique status of Parliament as a People's Parliament and as such it needs to put people at the centre of its operations. This study also wishes to show that as much as the SCM environment is decentralised in Parliament with the necessary controls in place, there has been an improvement in ensuring that the SCM unit is able to play its strategic support role without compromise.
Early 1990s governments across the South have embarked on democratic decentralization reforms aimed at introducing and strengthening local governance because of its assumed potential to improve the delivery of public services and alleviate poverty. To comply with that international practice, in early 2000 Tanzania government decide embarked on an ambitious Local Government Reform Program that addressed Political decentralization. Political decentralization signaled the government’s commitment to enhance the decision making authority of local government councils on matters affecting local development including determining priorities for local development, land use, finance, service delivery and human resource management. This paper sought to find out whether the selected local government council led by councilors enjoys the development planning, and service delivery authority as established in the local government law. The findings have confirmed that the case study council enjoyed modest decision making authority in the areas of local development planning, selecting local development strategy, and enjoyed even greater authority over service delivery powers.
Can the parties to a conctract agree that the consideration should be paid in bitcoins? Or will this obligation be qualified as the delivery of 'objects'?
Decentralization is the allocation of power between central and lower levels structures of the government. The dimensions and the extent to which powers are transferred from one level to another vary across countries depending on the goal a country wishes to achieve. But one of the common aspects included in the transfer of powers to the lower level structures is financial decentralization. The reason is clear. It makes no sense to transfer power to the lower level structures without finance to execute own decisions. Transfer of financial powers to lower level structures and creating an alignment that support efficient and effective operation of each structure, has often been one of the major challenges in the implementation of decentralization model of government. Tanzania has been one of the victims in this situation. In view of various government reports, since independent in 1961, the several attempt tried by the government to transfer powers to the lower level structures led to either little or no success. The adoption of Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) in 2000 could be considered as the government attempt to correct the existed bottlenecks that led to the failure in the previous initiatives to decentralise. This paper attempts to answer the question: ‘is financial decentralisation realised under the DbyD, and what are the factors that contribute or hamper the financial decentralisation? The paper is based on the research findings presented in Mbogela (2009). The report consisted of descriptive presentation on financial matters from four case councils namely: Mbozi District council, Mbeya City council, Mbeya District council and Morogoro Municipal council. The findings from the four cases are presented, examined and compared. Keywords: Decentralisation by devolution, financial management, Local government authorities.
Bernard Bashaasha, Margaret Najjingo Mangheni, Ephraim Nkonya
Uganda introduced the decentralization policy in 1997 under the Local Government Act of 1997 that has since undergone four amendments. The policy inherently decentralized service delivery institutions and their governance in order to improve access to services for the rural poor. Based on an analysis of available literature, the paper documents the state of knowledge regarding rural service provision in Uganda under decentralization and identifies knowledge gaps for further investigation. Its focus is on education, health, and agricultural advisory services, as well as the management of natural resources in Uganda. Although enlightening, a review of the broader decentralization literature is beyond the scope of this work. The analysis revealed that results in terms of attaining the objectives of decentralization are mixed. While as anticipated generally decentralization resulted in greater participation and control over service delivery and governance by local communities, local governments are still grappling with a range of challenges, namely, inadequate local financial resources and over-reliance on conditional central government grants; inability to attract and retain sufficient trained and experienced staff; corruption, nepotism, and elite capture. With regard to the specific services, while universal primary education (UPE) policy under the decentralization framework is credited with a dramatic increase in primary school enrollment, public primary education services are still dogged by concerns over financing, equity, quality, and the need for curriculum reform. Some studies show that there has been no improvement in health services with many health status indicators either stagnating or worsening. In general, decentralization of education and health services has not resulted in greater participation of the ordinary people and accountability of service providers to the community. Regarding agricultural extension and advisory services, except for areas serviced by NGOs, the majority of the country does not readily access extension services, because districts have been unable to prioritize the operational expenses. However, there is some evidence that the devolution of responsibility for natural resource management (NRM) has contributed to greater compliance with some NRM requirements in some areas while in other areas forest conditions have declined following decentralization. Generally, evidence on whether decentralization has improved service delivery in Uganda is still inconclusive, and more research is needed.
A hallmark of post-apartheid South Africa has been the introduction of bold and innovative policy in areas ranging from the national Constitution to resource management policy. In line with this approach, there has been a clear commitment to principles of decentralization and participatory development, with Local Economic Development (LED) featuring prominently in national, provincial and local government pronouncements and planning. Despite considerable policy and funding support for LED, results at best can be described as only modest. This paper critically reflects on the importance attached to LED in South Africa, what has been attempted over the last decade, and the various reasons that might explain the limitations experienced with applied LED, including those that are inherent in the nature of LED and those that can be attributed to local factors. The paper draws upon field-based research undertaken over more than a decade and the findings of a major study undertaken by an international development finance organization. The paper raises challenging questions about the nature, focus and potential of LED as an appropriate development intervention.
The design of the decentralized co-operative governance system, conditioned and \nregulated by the South African constitution is of critical importance for policy design and \nimplementation. The division of powers falls within a unitary form of government. This \nstudy, which is about the processes, mechanisms and modalities of public policies \ndesign and implementation uses the public finance and health sectors, as a case study \nor lens through which policy design and implementation is examined within a \ndecentralized cooperative governance system. The study is per se not about the public \nhealth system, but rather a review and an analysis about how the decentralization and \ncooperative governance nature, practice and dynamic of government system, influences \nand condition the policy processes and practice on finance and health, separately and \ncollectively within the public health system. \nIn its attempt to unbundle the health function, but also reform the public health system, \ncentral and provincial governments have introduced a number of reforms. These reforms \nwere ostensibly driven by different policies and programmes originating either from the \npublic finance or public health sectors with significant consequences for the provinces. \nMoreover, these different policies also outlined structural and functional responsibilities \nand authority among the central and provincial government departments. The \nimplementation of these policies was at times based on different interpretations of policy \ndesign and implementation responsibilities and authority between the central and \nprovincial governments within co-operative governance system. \nThe argument of this study is that despite intentions implicit to public policy, co-operative \ngovernance system is contested at a central government level within the public health \nsystem, as well as between levels of government and the public health and finance \nsectors. This dissertation explores the nature of the relationship between the central and \nprovincial governments by exploring co-operative governance in the health sector on \npolicy and financing processes and mechanisms. The central question is how does \ndecentralized co-operative governance really work in the public health system? \nA case study method was used to conduct this research. Data was collected over a four \nand half year period using a variety of data collection methods, including semi-structured \nin-depth interviews; documents and reports analyses; policy content review and \nanalyses; and revenue and expenditure reviews and analyses. \nThe study’s findings are: \na) the functional and structural decentralization of policy-making and implementation \nwithin the co-operative governance system contributes to undermining the cooperative \ngovernance relationship between the public finance and health sector and \ncentral and provincial governments; \nb) the central government is using its overriding powers to “impose co-ordinated \nsolutions” to problems within the co-operative governance system, leading to \nsituations where ‘imposed co-ordination’ is considered as ‘co-operative governance’; \nc) the theory provides a classical distinction between state control, supervision and \ninterference models. This dissertation shows that, depending on the policy context \nand circumstances, the uniqueness of South Africa’s co-operative governance \nsystem allows the central government to mobilize any of these models to achieve its \npolicy intentions, whether written or unwritten; and \nd) the classical arguments of decentralization, particularly within a devolved system of \nco-operative governance where greater autonomy and authority are given to subnational \ngovernments, are found wanting within the South African governance \nsystem, given both the policy-making and fiscal resource strength of the central \ngovernment relative to the provinces. \nThis dissertation leads me to conclude that the South African practice of co-operative \ngovernance in the health system is actually imposed co-ordination and that provinces \nare de facto administration outposts of central government policies, programmes and \nservice delivery responsibilities. Therefore in reality there is no autonomy and \nindependence of the provinces from the central government as envisaged in the \nConstitution of the Republic of South Africa. In fact, provinces only exist, in terms of their \nconstitutional competencies as far the central government allows it to exist given its \nplenipotentiary powers over both micro and macro matters affecting institutions, fiscus \nand social policies.
ConclusionsIn Spring, negligence again presents itself as the avenue through which judges reform private law.The emphasis throughout was on negligence, although the speeches of Lords Woolf and Slynn demonstrate that contract could have provided a remedy.It is somewhat surprising that the contractual analysis did not dominate the speeches, especially since Scally indicates that the contractual analysis should be preferred in cases involving harm arising from e m p l ~y m e n t .~~ Yet only Lord Woolf held that the 'primary source of any liability is contractual rather than tortious,' since the relationship with the defendants arose from the previous engagement;55 the other Law Lords did not address the point.We might also ask what would have happened if the plaintiff had brought the action in defamation.Would their Lordships have found a remedy by reforming the law of defamation?For example, would they have held that qualified privilege should not be available to employers or, if available, it should be rebuttable by proof of carelessness rather than malice?Certainly, Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspaperss6 suggests that the House of Lords is willing to take a fresh look at the rules of defamation where political values are at stake; would it do so where more personal or commercial values are at stake?It seems doubtfuls7; perhaps the employer's qualified privilege has stood too long in a tort 'beyond the redemption of the courts'58 for the judiciary to re-examine it.59And perhaps the return of a more liberal view of negligence makes it unnecessary. Agitating for Part-Time Workers' Rights Charlotte Villiers and Fidelma White"In 1994, progress was made for part-timers in the pursuit of their rights at work.In Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Employment,' the House of Lords, having recognised the standing of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), granted a declaration that provisions of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (EPCA) indirectly discriminate against women and therefore are incompatible with European Community law.This involved reversing the decisions of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal.This case is significant for a number of reasons.First, while the case recognises the need to protect part-time workers, the EOC was successful because it was held ~ 54 supra n 48, at pp 302-304 (per Lord Bridge).55 supra n 1, at p 390. Cf South Pacific Manufacturing Co Lid v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd, supra n 18, at p 297 (per Cooke P). 56 [1993] AC 534.57 But see Lord Woolf, supra n 1, at p 400: 'it by no means follows that so far as references are concerned the same view should be taken of public policy as was taken when Whiteley v A d a m was decided.' 58 Slim v Daily Telegraph Lid [1968] 2 QB 157 (per Diplock LJ).59 cf White v Jones, supra n 3, at p 216 (per Lord Mustill), and Hedley, 'Recovering Lost Legacies: White v Jones in the Lords' [1995] 1 Web JCLI: 'if we are truly convinced that the will admitted to probate does not reflect [the testator's] wishes at the time of his death, why admit it to probate at all?'