The Jabbar Adal Principle (JAP) is a theoretical framework in non-relativistic Hamiltonian mechanics that formally names, defines, and analyses the instantaneous ratio of kinetic to potential energy at every local subsystem of a closed physical system — a quantity unaddressed by the First Law, Second Law, or the Virial Theorem. This work introduces three new named physical quantities and one new named unit: Jabbar Asymmetry Parameter — A(i, t) = Ti(t) / |Vi(t)| [Jb] Virial Deviation Parameter — ΔA(i, t) = A(i, t) − Avir(i) [Jb] Adal Asymmetry Index — AAI(t) = (1/N) Σ |ΔA(i, t)| [Jb] The Jabbar unit [Jb] — a named dimensionless unit of virial deviation, analogous to the radian and the neper, named after the Jabbar family of Khanewal, Punjab, Pakistan — derived from Abdul Jabbar, daily-wage labourer, father of the author, whose sacrifices made this work possible. Two Proved Theorems Theorem 1 — The Jabbar Vitality Theorem:In any closed non-relativistic Hamiltonian system, physical processes are possible if and only if AAI(t) > 0 Jb. This is a necessary and sufficient biconditional, logically independent of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Theorem R1 — The Oscillatory Modulation Theorem:For any closed non-relativistic Hamiltonian system of N ≥ 2 coupled harmonic oscillators with distinct normal-mode frequencies ω1 ≠ ω2: AAI(t) = AAI0 · e−γt · [1 + ε sin(ωbeat t + φ)] [Jb] where ωbeat = |ω2 − ω1| is derived entirely from the Hamiltonian eigenvalues — not fitted, not assumed. The heat equation cannot predict this modulation. Derivation Foundations The proof rests on four independently established and undisputed premises: Hamilton's canonical equations (Hamilton, 1835) Normal-mode decomposition (linear algebra) Product-to-sum trigonometric identity (pure mathematics) Virial theorem for V ∝ x² (Clausius, 1870) Numerical Verification System parameters: m1 = 1.0 kg, m2 = 2.0 kg, k1 = 4.0 N m−1, k2 = 6.0 N m−1, κ = 1.5 N m−1, γ = 0.02 s−1. Theoretical ωbeat = 0.646714 rad s−1 (from Hamiltonian eigenvalues) Fitted ωbeat = 0.646686 rad s−1 (from numerical simulation) Deviation: 0.0043% — 1 part in 23,000 RMSE improvement over heat equation: 37.54% Verified independently by Python (NumPy / DOP853 solver, rtol = 10−11) and PHP 8.3 (4th-order Runge–Kutta). Both agree to six significant figures. Supplementary code: JAP_calculations.php (included, CC BY 4.0). Domain of Validity All claims apply exclusively to closed physical systems governed by a non-relativistic Hamiltonian H = T + V. This explicitly excludes General Relativity, quantum field theory, and cosmological scales. The domain encompasses molecular vibrations, coupled mechanical resonators, acoustic lattices, optical traps, and any classical N-body system in the Newtonian limit. Priority and Novelty The following elements have no prior publication in the physics literature to the author's knowledge: The quantity A(i, t) = Ti/|Vi| as a named observable The Virial Deviation Parameter ΔA(i, t) The Adal Asymmetry Index AAI(t) The Jabbar unit [Jb] The Jabbar Vitality Theorem (biconditional) Theorem R1 (oscillatory modulation of AAI) Under CC BY 4.0, any use of these named quantities requires citation of this work. Open Problem — JAP-Entropy Conjecture In the zero-temperature limit (Tbath → 0), during monotonic relaxation, it is conjectured that: AAI(t) ∝ σep(t) / ⟨T(t)⟩ where σep is the entropy production rate. Proof or disproof of this conjecture is the highest-value open problem in the JAP framework. About the Author Muhammad Umar Jabbar (also: Umar Adl Jabbar) was born on 1 February 2008 in village 4/A.H, Khanewal, Punjab, Pakistan. He is 18 years old at the time of publication. His father, Abdul Jabbar, worked throughout his life as a daily-wage labourer and is now bedridden with heart disease. His mother works as a domestic worker earning Rs. 5,000 per month. He has four siblings — two brothers and two sisters — all in education. He could not afford medical college. He could not afford nursing school. He had no university, no laboratory, no supervisor, and no funding. He is believed to be the youngest independent theoretical physics researcher in Pakistan to formally propose and prove named theorems in non-relativistic Hamiltonian mechanics without any institutional support. The Jabbar unit [Jb] is named after his family — derived from his father Abdul Jabbar's name — so that the sacrifice of a labourer from a small Pakistani village is permanently recorded in the language of science. ORCID: 0009-0008-5968-0991Email: umarjaumofficial@gmail.comLicence: CC BY 4.0
The increasing use of the internet by children in Azerbaijan to access harmful content demonstrates the weakness and absence of age verification mechanisms. The Law on the Protection of Children from Harmful Information has a comprehensive system of labeling information that is harmful to children on the offline and broadcasted information and has no direct enforcement mechanisms on the labeling of information on online and digital platforms. This research evaluates both the advantages and the missing aspects of the Azerbaijani system, outlines the enforcement mechanisms of the Texas House Bill 1181, and analyzes the constitutional and practical aspects of the enforcement mechanism of mandatory age verification. The Texas model provides a legal framework for age verification and was upheld under intermediate scrutiny in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, raising significant privacy concerns. One of the concerns was disclosing users personal information to private platforms, which creates risks related to data collection, storage and potential misuse. Azerbaijan's digital identification systems, ASAN Imza and SIMA Imza, are implemented and are privacy- preserving, and therefore, the Texas system can be avoided by use of the given digital identification systems with the inclusion of the zero-knowledge proofs. The study focuses on the policy and the legal framework on the system to enhance the privacy aspects of the rights of the children, and in accordance with the data protection system, describes in detail the steps, legal aspects, and proposed changes to the privacy systems.
Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Veronica Root Martinez, Steven L. Schwarcz
Traditional financial systems rely on a dense network of intermediaries—banks, brokers, exchanges, and clearinghouses—that not only facilitate transactions but also serve as compliance gatekeepers. By implementing capital adequacy rules, disclosure regimes, and anti-money laundering and know-your-customer conventions, these entities constrain opportunism, provide reliable recordkeeping, and enable regulators to monitor systemic risk. Decentralized finance (“DeFi”) disrupts this model by replacing intermediaries with smart contracts: self-executing digital agreements that automatically perform transactions on blockchain or other encrypted computer code. While proponents tout DeFi as a more efficient and “purer” form of finance, its disintermediation eliminates the chokepoints that historically enabled oversight and consumer protection. As a result, DeFi magnifies familiar risks that fueled the Great Depression and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, while also introducing novel vulnerabilities tied to computer code, governance, and cross-border anonymity. This Article argues that because DeFi platforms disaggregate traditional intermediary functions, effective regulation must focus on (i) embedding compliance safeguards directly into platform design and (ii) holding accountable the actors who build, operate, and maintain those platforms. These safeguards are essential to preserve market integrity, mitigate systemic risk, and protect investors in the absence of conventional intermediaries. Specifically, regulators should develop reforms that require platforms to incorporate technological and governance tools that replicate the critical compliance and risk-management functions historically supplied by intermediaries. Constructing such a regulatory regime will require substantial multijurisdictional coordination, both in harmonizing regulatory expectations and in building cross-border enforcement capacity. Fortunately, a range of existing international coordination mechanisms can be leveraged to facilitate this global effort.
The GENIUS Act's prudential framework protects against systemic risk that flows in one direction: from stablecoin failure into traditional banking risk. The empirical record of crosstagion, the bidirectional contagion between traditional finance and decentralized finance, demonstrates that the transmission channel runs the other way as well. When traditional financial stress destabilizes payment stablecoin reserves, as occurred when Silicon Valley Bank's failure briefly unpegged USD Coin in March 2023, the cascade into decentralized markets falls into a jurisdictional gap that neither GENIUS nor the CLARITY Act resolves. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency owns the stablecoin issuer; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission owns the derivative markets where the cascade lands; and a depegged stablecoin may simultaneously fall under the Securities and Exchange Commission's jurisdiction as a potential investment contract under the Howey test. No statute allocates liability or mandates coordination among these three agencies when the transmission crosses their respective boundaries, and no mechanism exists for assigning jurisdictional primacy before all three assert competing claims. DAO governance failure compounds the problem by creating a distinct transmission mechanism operating at blockchain speed, with no identifiable counterparty and no circuit breaker. This Article argues that closing the crosstagion gap requires not new prudential requirements but a designated tri-agency coordination mechanism, triggered by observable stress indicators, that assigns jurisdictional primacy and activates a classification standstill before a crisis rather than after.
In 2022, an image of a “bored ape” accessible through a non-fungible token (NFT) was stolen from actor Seth Green. The thief then sold the bored ape to a good faith purchaser. Had this been a physical painting, the outcome would have been clear: a thief cannot convey title they do not have, and the purchaser would acquire nothing. Yet the ensuing debate proceeded as though the NFT's technical features had altered this settled principle, as though blockchain records could bestow property rights on the new purchaser. They cannot. Ownership rights in digital assets stem from law, not from the software systems that create and maintain them. When Lawrence Lessig famously proclaimed “code is law,” he meant that code functions as behavioral regulation by imposing technical limitations on users, not that it generates enforceable rights. His insight was descriptive: code shapes what people can do within digital environments, just as physical architecture channels movement through physical space. Yet the advent of blockchain networks, cryptocurrencies, and smart contracts has morphed this observation into the flawed conviction that what code makes possible, the law must recognize as legally enforceable. While legal scholarship has noted this misconception, it has yet to offer a rigorous framework to resolve it. This Article fills this gap by applying H.L.A. Hart’s legal theory to demonstrate that code acquires legal force only to the extent that positive law grants such power. This investiture occurs through two pathways: public empowerment through legislation, and private empowerment through contracts, trusts, and other ordering instruments. Absent such formal investiture, code remains "soft law," a structural constraint lacking normative force. The relevance of our analysis extends beyond the conceptual malaise affecting the blockchain ecosystem, addressing a foundational conflict poised to reappear with every wave of new technology, from large language models to autonomous robots.
This Article proposes a novel legal framework, the Coin-to-Company ("C2C") model, that reconciles the structural and governance innovations of blockchain-based organizations with the substantive requirements of U.S. securities law through categorical separation and complementary use of established regulatory exemptions. The model addresses a fundamental tension in digital asset regulation, which is how to enable broad-based community participation and decentralized governance through token distribution without triggering securities law compliance obligations, while simultaneously creating compliant pathways for value realization through traditional corporate equity structures. Rather than attempting to resolve this tension through novel legal theories such as relying on indefinite concepts of “sufficient decentralization” or temporal transformation of securities, the C2C model maintains clear categorical distinction between tokens distributed as utility or community instruments (the “coins”) and equity securities issued through established exemptions by a traditional operating company. Tokens never represent investment contracts; equity never dilutes token utility. The model achieves this through: (1) a dual-organization structure familiar in crypto comprising: (a) a US LLC with C Corporation tax election (“LabsCo” or “DevCo”) for business operations and equity issuance; and (b) a decentralized autonomous organization (a “DAO”) that is strictly used for token holder community organization, related IP assignment, and token owner advocacy for project participation and guidance, which may optionally be organized around a legal entity such as an association or foundation: (2) a permissionless token locking mechanism offered by DevCo that functions as technical identity infrastructure and eligibility credential that grants no corporate rights explicitly per the DevCo’s operating agreement; (3) documented pathways for locked token holders to petition the company for equity under a company administered plan and approved pathway such as: (a) Regulation D pathways for equity sales to accredited investors; (b) Reg S; (c) Reg CF/A for crowd-sales; or (d) Rule 701 pathways for compensatory equity grants to advisory contributors, intellectual property providers, and employees; and (4) DevCo shareholders use locked tokens to perform corporate functions such as voting on major corporate matters. Locked token holders may also participate in voting, but only identified shareholders’ locked token votes are binding for purposes of DevCo actions. The model is particularly timely given regulatory developments signaling acceptance of token-security distinctions. The proposed Responsible Financial Innovation Act recognizes decentralized governance systems and “ancillary assets” while creating clear commodity jurisdiction for digital assets. The current SEC Chairman Paul Atkins’ Project Crypto framework, as being coordinated with the CFTC, proposes distinguishing digital commodities, digital tools, and digital collectibles from securities based on functional characteristics rather than form. This Article demonstrates that the C2C model, by carefully operationalizing these distinctions through documented legal structures, provides a defensible, immediately implementable framework for projects seeking to build token-based communities while maintaining regulatory compliance and enabling institutional capital participation.
With the appointment of John Squires, former Intellectual Property Counsel of Goldman Sachs, as Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), the agency stands at a pivotal moment in the ongoing struggle over the scope of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Squires-together with USPTO leadership figures such as Howard Lutnick, an inventor on hundreds of business method patents-enters office at a time when innovation in fields such as artificial intelligence, financial technology, blockchain, Web3, and algorithmically mediated medical diagnostics is increasingly constrained by the uncertain and often inconsistently applied jurisprudence stemming from Alice, Mayo, and their progeny. Early administrative signals during Director Squires's tenure indicate an institutional willingness to reconsider entrenched approaches to § 101 examination. This Article proposes the most significant institutional reform to § 101 examination in decades: the creation of a dedicated, legally trained § 101 Examination Unit-composed of attorneys, former administrative patent judges ("APJs"), or examiners with substantial legal education-to assume responsibility for subject-matter eligibility determinations after traditional art-unit examination concludes. Operating as a quasi-intermediate appellate body and building on historical "Super Examiner" roles, this unit would absorb § 101 examination from the technologically oriented art units, enhance patent quality, reduce PTAB appeals, and provide a consistent, legally grounded framework aligned with administrative-law principles, precedent, and the realities of modern innovation. An alternative approach is to simply assign all 35 U.S.C. 101 rejections to the PTAB, due to APJs having the ideal legal background to handle and analyze all 101 rejections.
Probate stands as a bastion of legal formalism, seemingly resistant to the transformative currents of digital innovation that have swept through other domains of American law. While financial transactions, real property conveyances, and contract execution have increasingly begun exploring the use of Web3 technologies such as blockchain and smart contracts, estate and probate law remain tethered to paper-based procedures and rigid execution requirements. Nevada was the first state to provide legal support for Web3 technology, amending its Uniform Electronic Transactions Act statutes in 2017 to recognize blockchain-based transactions as valid and judicially enforceable. Yet despite this progressive legislative framework, the state’s estate and probate laws remain unchanged. What reforms are required to extend this legal recognition of blockchain to testamentary instruments and probate administration? To explore this, I begin in Part I by examining Nevada’s existing statutory framework for traditional paper wills, electronic wills, and probate administration, identifying where these laws diverge from the state’s more progressive legislation governing blockchain-based transactions. In Part II, I introduce the concept of a blockchain will, explain its technical functionality, and discuss how such instruments can be amended, revoked, or rendered obsolete. I then propose specific legislative reforms that could allow blockchain wills to serve as legally recognized alternatives to traditional paper wills, including the creation of a state-managed blockchain will registry that would provide the procedural infrastructure for securely filing, validating, and preserving blockchain wills. To illustrate how these proposals might operate in practice, hypothetical examples modeling blockchain-based testamentary execution and probate are included. Finally, I analyze the policy considerations both for and against reform, examining the legal barriers that must be addressed and the potential benefits this technology could bring to probate courts.
On August 15, 2025, Gemini Space Station, Inc. filed a registration statement on Form S-1 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contemplating the offering of up to 16,666,667 shares of Common Stock. After receiving comments from the Commission and the additional filing of amendments to the prospectus, the offering of about 15.2 million shares was priced before market opening on September 12, 2025, at $28 per share. Gemini’s “shares opened at $37.01 . . . at which it raised $425 million,” valuing the Company at $4.4 billion. Gemini’s disclosure documents provide an excellent description of the many new blockchain-enabled Decentralized Finance [DeFi] technological and operational challenges facing participants. These valuable disclosures benefit investors and all those who seek to understand important developments impacting the future stability of global crypto, financial and currency markets. Many readers may find Gemini entities to be of particular interest due to the involvement of executive officers Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss of Facebook/Meta start-up fame. It is Gemini’s actual disclosure language that is the focus of this Article.
Beyond that, we likewise considered the payment time and also handling charges. Most Ethereum casino sites in this write-up will certainly have your crypto withdrawal processed within a couple of mins, with others taking a maximum of 1 day. It may sound like an attractive basic VIP program, however the cashback is really one of the very best among all online Ethereum casino sites.
Part I briefly considers the taxation of bitcoin transactions to give the reader some sense of the constitutional Pandora’s box that was opened by South Dakota v. Wayfair. Part II then delves into one aspect of the Wayfair decision that has broad implications for the future. Specifically, when does technological change justify a departure from the Court's previous Commerce Clause decisions? Part III sketches a possible solution to the problem of horizontal precedent: the application of voting to questions of horizontal precedent, or Bayesian Stare Decisis. Part IV summarizes this proposal and concludes.
A little orange plastic dog just ran into my ear and the little bugger won't come out.I even offered him some beef jerky but he says he only eats mosquito paste so I've been sittin' around smashing up mosquitoes to coax this dog out of my ear and when I've finally got enough of this mosquito-mush mixed up the dog says he changed his mind about it and now he just wants some smack.I don't have any l tell him and he starts biting the inside of my ear and I'm afraid the little bastard's gonna make me go deaf 'cause he's barking too, so -I don't like to do it -but I go in after him with a Q-tip.He comes out looking like a little ball of earwax, but I can still make out the tail.When I was young I had a dog that died and I never got to bury him so I take the Q-tip and wipe the little orange ball with a tail off onto a Kleenex and put the Kleenex in a shoebox and bury the shoebox in the backyard .Then I stand over the burial mound and play "Taps" on my grandfather's old accordion.Then some motherfucker animal rights activist who is very well known for her hunger strikes to stop the extermination of cockroaches, and who was acquitted when she went on trial for killing a Terminex man with a flamethrower, gets wind of my method of little plastic dog removal and calls the ASPCA and PETA which both promptly send agents out to my apartment to flush me out using mustard gas.I don't know where they got the mustard gas -it was explicitly banned after WWI-but they had it and they used it and next thing I know I'm on my way to the PETA Animal Rights Violators' Concentration Camp where, if I don't cough up my lungs in big chunks from the mustard gas, I am slated to be hanged and then burned at the stake when they're through drawing and quartering me.Fortunately enough, I wasn't exposed to the gas long enough for it to be fatal, but I do have some pretty severe respiratory problems as I write this.And since the gas didn't kill me, the animal-friendlies sure wanted to.They had exhumed the little ball of plastic orange with a tail from my backyard grave as proof that I was a barbaric torturer of beings unable to defend themselves.They also got a testimony from the neighbors that I had played "Taps" on an accordion, a blatant mockery of the seriousness of the plastic dog's death.They were gonna string me up at high noon, cut me to pieces and start the fire by five after.Well, I ruined their little plans and here's how: My detainment quarters were swarming with ants.I just took a couple of real big ones with me to my execution.You have no idea what sort of negotiating tool a big ant between
This Article explores, and ultimately embraces, a new exception to the complete diversity rule in removal cases: the doctrine of procedural misjoinder. We argue that the doctrine offers federal courts a vital tool with which to police joinder gamesmanship. Absent this power, plaintiffs may preclude defendant access to federal courts by the relatively simple expedient of joining in state court largely unrelated claims against or on behalf of non-diverse parties. The resulting lawsuit thus fails the complete diversity test, rendering such cases removal-proof. Like fraudulent joinder, the long-standing practice of ignoring non-diverse parties against whom no valid claim may be asserted, the doctrine of procedural misjoinder would permit federal courts to disregard any diversity-destroying parties who have been improperly added to the state lawsuit. Because access to federal courts is at stake, we believe federal courts should adopt this new doctrine, applying federal joinder standards to test the legitimacy of plaintiffs’ party alignments before denying removal jurisdiction.