The literature on finance and innovation treats the relationship as monotone: more capital directed at innovative firms should raise long-run productivity growth. This paper shows why that need not hold. A Schumpeterian growth model is developed in which financiers screen heterogeneous candidate innovations before funding them, subject to a genuine cost-speed tradeoff: stricter screening raises the average quality of funded projects but slows the rate at which capital reaches the innovation frontier. The balanced-growth rate is a strictly concave, single-peaked function of screening intensity — an Allocation Frontier — with a technologically determined peak and a decentralized equilibrium that always falls strictly short of it, by an amount governed by the cost of screening relative to the value of getting it right. A calibration combining OECD productivity data, the markup literature, and an illustrative target for screening intensity finds this shortfall costs the calibrated economy roughly four percent of its attainable growth rate. Comparative statics further show that “more innovation finance” is not one thing: cheaper screening and greater entrant heterogeneity both raise growth by moving the economy toward its own frontier peak, while a larger raw flow of candidates raises growth by moving it away from an unchanging one.
Entrepreneurs typically seek financing in decentralized markets, where they approach investors sequentially. We develop a model of sequential capital markets with privately informed investors. The sequential market creates a dynamic adverse selection externality that leads to overinvestment and excessive rents to intermediaries, even as the number of competing investors becomes arbitrary large. The resulting rents lead to excessive entry of investors and insufficient entry of entrepreneurs. Moving to a centralized market structure or reducing transparency restores competitiveness but may harm efficiency. The model also explains how even a small skill advantage for an investor can lead to preferential deal flow and outsized returns.
This study explores how national institutional environments shape entrepreneurial activity in the context of decentralized finance. Focusing on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), we use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) on data from 2,709 ICOs across 42 countries to identify institutional configurations associated with high and low ICO activity. Drawing on institutional theory and heuristic-driven decision-making, we find that entrepreneurs and investors navigate uncertainty through diverse, context-specific institutional combinations. The findings contribute to entrepreneurship research by uncovering multiple pathways through which macro-level regulatory, cultural, financial, and technological conditions enable or constrain token-based fundraising across national ecosystems.
The present contribution explores – for the first time in economic literature – the monetary experiment called Lugano’s Plan ₿ and conducted by the City of Lugano (Switzerland) since March 2022 consisting of a public-private partnership with a global player in the stablecoin market such as Tether. In addition to stimulating a vivacious public debate about payment methods and fostering educational initiatives, the City of Lugano has created LVGA, a local payment token based on blockchain technology, which represents de facto a stablecoin pegged to the Swiss franc. The present case study provides further insights into the local experience of Lugano and might represent an example of “best practices” to be further explored by the economic literature in the future.
This paper investigates the speed of price discovery when information becomes publicly available but requires costly processing to become common knowledge. We exploit the unique institutional setting of hacks on decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. Public blockchain data provides the precise time a hack’s transactions are recorded—becoming public information—while subsequent social media disclosures mark the transition to common knowledge. This empirical design allows us to isolate the price impact occurring during the interval characterized by information asymmetry driven purely by differential processing capabilities. Our central empirical finding is that substantial price discovery precedes common knowledge: approximately 36 percent of the total 24-hour price decline (∼27 percent) materializes before the public announcement. This evidence suggests sophisticated traders rapidly exploit their ability to process complex, publicly available on-chain data, capturing informational rents. We develop a theoretical model of informed trading under processing costs which predicts strategic, slow information revelation, consistent with our empirical findings. Our results quantify the limits imposed by information processing costs on market efficiency, demonstrating that transparency alone does not guarantee immediate information incorporation into prices.
A.V. Bogucharskov, I.E. Pokamestov, Karine Adamova, Zh. N. Tropina
The complexity of trade finance instruments associated with need for many accompanying documents, constant coordination are problems of this process.Successful development of trade finance instruments depend on improvement of software and implement blockchain solutions that enable companies to unite and through partnerships and process automation to accelerate cash flow and documentation throughout supply chain.The paper aims to examine areas and ways of blockchain application in trade finance and to identify key aspects of improving transactions process.We present possible interaction of participants with digital letters of credit and factoring with blockchain application and display its effect on key trade finance instruments.Moreover, we identifies a number of problems, implementation solutions of which will lead to further more efficient application of technology in supply chain finance.The achieving these goals will lead to further more effective application of blockchain in financing of supply chain.Blockchain with a high level of functionality and security in trade finance processes reduces processing time for documents, transaction costs, expanding number of participants and increases level of transparency.
Maria Ambrosanio, Paolo Balduzzi, Massimo Bordignon
For almost two decades, starting from the early ‘90s, Italy experienced the strongest wave of decentralization reforms in its post II World War history. The causes were both economic and political. Yet, in recent years, again economic and political causes seem to call for opposite reforms. Along with a second wave of scandals, this time interesting local politicians, the crisis that has hit our country since 2008 is having relevant effects on the relationships between central and local governments. The aim of this paper is to assess dimension and direction of these effects. We first review the situation of "fiscal federalism" in Italy before the crisis, summarizing the decentralization process in the ‘90s, its consequences in terms of financing and functions for local governments, the constitutional reform of 2001 and the implementation problems this created. We then look at the numbers of the crisis; the "double dip" of the economic cycle in the period 2007- 2013, the policies implemented to contrast the financial market confidence crisis and the distribution of the burden of the fiscal consolidation across levels of government. We also discuss the institutional features of the implemented policies, in particular referring to number of local governments and to the financial relationships between level of governments, including taxes, transfers, fiscal rules and bankruptcy procedurals. Finally, we look at the future: what consequences will the new European rules, as enshrined in the new art. 81, have on the financial relationships between levels of government? And how is the balance of power between the center and the periphery going to change in lieu of the new proposed Constitutional reform?
Feroz Ahmad Ahmad, Prashant Kumar, Gulshan Shrivastava, Med Salim Bouhlel
ON 12 JANUARY 2009 a pseudonymous entity signed a transaction that instructed a distributed network to transfer a small amount of digital currency to Hal Finney, one ofthe key figures of the cypherpunk movement. After a few minutes, the transaction was recorded on a distributed public ledger, permanently updating the balance ofbothparties. This transaction— the first Bitcoin transaction—marked the beginning of a new era of decentralized payment systems, ushering in a variety of financial Services that do not depend on any centralized clearinghouse or other financial middleman. Bitcoin is regarded by many as a powerful technological innovation that could disrupt many sectors, in the realm of finance and beyond. But the underlying technology on which the network operates, the Bitcoin blockchain can do much more than that. Just as the internet did in the early-1990s, blockchain technology carries with it a whole new range of promises concerning how decentralization can support and promote individual freedoms and autonomy. Blockchain proponents believe that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency platforms will revolutionize mechanisms of value exchange in the same way that the internet transformed information sharing, by providing a platform for people to exchange digital resources, in a secure and decentralized manner without the need to rely on any intermediary or trusted authority. But this revolutionary potential also carries with it serious implications for censorship, intellectual property, and the regulated flow of information. A blockchain is a decentralized database of transactions maintained by a distributed network of computers, which all contribute to the verification and the validation of transactions. Once accepted, these transactions are recorded inside a “block” of transactions, which incorporates a reference to previous blocks. This creates a long chain of blocks—a “blockchain”—that stores the history of all transactions in a chronological order. Every block contains information about a particular set of transactions, a reference to the preceding block in the blockchain, and the answer to a complex mathematical puzzle that is used to validate the data associated with that block. A copy of the blockchain is stored on every computer in the network, making it virtually impossible for anyone unilaterally to modify the data stored on this decentralized database: if anyone tries to modify any transaction the fraud will be immediately detected by all other network participants.
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Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Numerous studies have been made of regional differences in income and level of development in Italy, and these studies basically differ in the responses they give to the question of whether the said differences were already of a substantial nature prior to Unification, or whether in fact they have widened since then. The present essay is going to examine this problem by focusing on the local administrative system adopted after Italian Unification, in order to ascertain the existence of a different approach to public intervention at the local level, and thus to the existence of disparities in local public spending. The paper offers an analysis of the actual working of the post-Unification administrative system in Italy, in terms both of the powers attributed to Italy’s municipalities and provinces, and of the degree of autonomy they had in deciding on funding methods. This analysis aims to ascertain whether the chosen strategy could have been maintained in a state characterized by strong regional differences, and to establish the kind of impact such a strategy had on the regional differences themselves. The main conclusion is that in absence of any sort of automatic transfer from the more industrialized regions to the poor ones, the adoption of a decentralized tax system for the financing of local public expenditure contributed to the deepening of regional divide. As a consequence at the beginning of the 19th century the central government started to subsidize the poorest regions and little by little move towards a more centralized fiscal system.
The present study describes and explains the changing role of the state in the Italian healthcare system since the beginning of the 1970s, with a particular focus on developments following 1978 when the healthcare system was transformed from a social insurance system into a national health service. In order to address these changes in a systematic way, we track healthcare system development along three dimensions: regulation, financing, and service provision. With regard to regulation, we observe a relative retreat of the state due to decentralization processes and internal market mechanisms. Quantitative measures for the financing and service provision dimension also indicate a modest relative retreat of the state. Taking regional data into account, we identify a clear North-South-divide in the public/private mix of financing and service provision. Although the focus of the paper is to describe the changing role of the state in the Italian healthcare system, we also offer preliminary explanations. We seek to identify the role of exogenous shocks such as economic crises versus endogenous stressors specific to the healthcare system itself (i.e. inherent inefficiencies) on healthcare system change. Therefore, the paper aims to provide a tentative, yet dynamic account of healthcare system change that is both descriptive and explanatory.