This book is about why and how central and local governments clash over important national policy decisions. Its empirical focus is on the local politics of Japan which has significantly shaped, and been shaped by, larger developments in national politics. The book argues that since the 1990s, changes in the national political arena, fiscal and administrative decentralization, as well as broader socio-economic developments have led to a decoupling of once closely integrated national and local party systems in Japan. Such decoupling has led to a breakdown of symbiotic relations between the centre and regions. In its place are increasing strains between national and local governments leading to greater intra-party conflict, inter-governmental conflicts, and more chief executives with agendas and resources increasingly autonomous of the national ruling party. Although being a book primarily focused on the Japanese case, the study seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of how local partisans shape national policy-making. The book theorizes and investigates how the degree of state centralization, vertical integration for party organizations, and partisan congruence in different levels of government affect inter-governmental relations. Japan’s experience is compared with Germany, Canada, and the UK to explore sources of multi-level policy conflict.
This study proceeds from the obvious assumption that without revenue powers and expendi-ture autonomy any devolution of functions on local governments remains hollow. Without resources local self-government is an exercise without much scope for decision-making. But even if local governments do have adequate revenue powers, their fiscal autonomy may be curtailed by utterly restrictive and, often Byzantine, administrative regulations of the central state, erratic interventions by the central government and – for fear of being not returned to office in future elections - a lack of will among local leaders to utilize the revenue powers vested in local authorities. <br>\tAlthough there is a plethora of literature on decentralization in the Philippines, the literature reflects what Linn,48 Smoke,49 and Smoke, Martinez-Vasquez and Peterson 50 have deplored elsewhere in relation to fiscal decentralization in more general terms: there is not much systematic research on how the Local Government Code of 1991 affected the fiscal capabilities of local governments. Most of the decentralization literature stands in the tradi-tion of the old institutionalism 51 and thus strongly centers on legal-institutional aspects and the historical evolution of decentralization in the Philippines. The few serious studies are by now dated 52 or are difficult to access because they are studies commissioned by bilateral and multilateral donor organizations.53 <br>\tThe main objective of this study is thus to explore as to what extent in the Philip-pines the devolution of functions has been accompanied by an adequate allocation of re-sources to local governments. Local fiscal capacities are thus considered as the litmus test for the success of decentralization reforms in the Philippines. <br>This dissertation is organized into five parts. Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical foun-dation of decentralization as well as the study’s significance, scope and limitations, and methodology. In particular, the theoretical foundation lays down the debate between centrali-zation and decentralization as well as the differing contexts – political and economic - of de-centralization. The research question and the study’s possible contribution were also ex-plained in this chapter. <br>Chapter 2 describes the Philippines’ political-legal structure and its local government system. It also briefly outlines the major changes brought about by the Local Government Code of 1991, the most extensive reform legislation on local governments in the country’s history. <br>Chapter 3 presents the overall or macro-view of decentralization in the Philippines. First, decentralization and local autonomy were explained using the Local Government Code of 1991 wherein the new Code became a catalyst to personnel, functional and fiscal decen-tralization. Second, the local financing structure was described by presenting the trends and dynamics between the central and local governments in obtaining the consolidated LGU in-come and expenditures from 1985 (pre-LGC of 1991) until 2001 (after the passage of the LGC of 1991). Third, the Local Government Code and the LGU Performance were evaluated using the results of the Local Productivity and Performance Measurement System (LPPMS) as a self-assessment tool. <br>Chapter 4 presents the case studies in Bataan and Pampanga on fund sourcing as well as the performance of the Central Luzon Region in local fiscal administration. The case studies will show the experiences of the provinces, cities and municipalities in resource mobilization under the regime of decentralization. This Chapter will also show the impact of inflation or increase in prices in the increase in income on whether the inflation to increase in income leads to real growth in a particular locality. <br>Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the results and observations of the study.