Mønika Ambrus
Notwithstanding the general acknowledgment of its importance, there are still uncertainties and ambiguities as to the precise meaning and actual application of the precautionary principle in international environmental law. In the context of decision making at the interâState level, it has been explained that one of the interpretations of this principle means a âshiftâ in the allocation of the burden of proof. Unsurprisingly, a similar effect of the principle can be, and has been, claimed in dispute settlement. Given these claims, the general aim of this article is twofold: first, to define what a âshiftâ in the allocation of the burden of proof actually means; and second, to explore and assess whether this theoretical/conceptual understanding of the âshiftâ is applied when the precautionary principle is at stake, and whether there are good reasons to apply it in dispute settlement and decisionâmaking processes.