Abstract This study examines the economic and geopolitical determinants of Indonesia’s defense expenditure from 1984 to 2022 using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model to capture both short-term and long-term dynamics. Recognizing the contextual relevance of Indonesia’s Total People’s Defense and Security System (SISHANKAMRATA), the analysis relies on conventional military expenditure data (% of GDP) due to the absence of consolidated multi-ministerial records. The results show that in the short run, defense spending is highly sensitive to macroeconomic shocks: inflation, exchange rate volatility, and foreign direct investment exert negative effects, while debt, trade openness, and regional military expenditure strengthen budgetary allocations. In the long run, macroeconomic fundamentals (debt, growth, inflation, and foreign investment) together with neighboring countries’ military spending drive defense expenditure, whereas regional average spending has a negative effect and U.S. military expenditure does not show a structural impact. These findings underscore the dual pressures of fiscal fragility and regional security competition in shaping Indonesia’s defense budget. Policy implications highlight the importance of inflation-adjusted and exchange rate–resilient budgeting, sustainable financing mechanisms such as defense bonds or a Defense Sovereign Wealth Fund (D-SWF), and deeper ASEAN defense cooperation to balance security needs with fiscal discipline. This study contributes a macro-level perspective on defense economics under conditions of institutional fragmentation, offering a framework for future comparative and panel-based research across decentralized security systems.
Jan 1, 2025·SOCRATES Rīgas Stradiņa universitātes Juridiskās fakultātes elektroniskais juridisko zinātnisko rakstu žurnāls / SOCRATES Rīga Stradiņš University Faculty of Law Electronic Scientific Journal of Law
Head of Administrative Division of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia, VSIA “Latvijas Vēstnesis” Journal “Jurista Vārds”, Riga, Latvia, Paula Lipe
This article examines the application of the Rome I Regulation to contracts for the cross-border sale of non-fungible tokens (NFTs), a novel category of digital assets. While NFT transfers are increasingly common in digital commerce, the legal framework for determining applicable law in such transactions remains unsettled. The research adopts a doctrinal legal analytical research method grounded in the systematic interpretation of European Union (EU) legislation, case law, academic commentary and comparative soft law instruments. It focuses on how Articles 3 and 4 of Rome I operate in decentralised, pseudonymous environments where conventional connecting factors such as habitual residence and contract typologies are difficult to apply. The findings demonstrate that although Rome I remains formally applicable, its conceptual foundations—especially the reliance on territorial connecting factors and analogue contract classifications—are tested by emerging realities in NFT sales. The article concludes by identifying areas where interpretative guidance or targeted legislative reform may be necessary to ensure legal certainty and coherence in NFTrelated transactions. Keywords: applicable law; NFT sales; Rome I.
The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) has emerged as a popular governance solution for decentralized applications (dApps), enabling them to manage their members across the world. This structure ensures that no single entity can arbitrarily control the dApp without approval from the majority of members. However, despite its advantages, DAOs face several challenges within their governance processes that can compromise their integrity and potentially lead to the loss of dApp assets. In this paper, we first provided an overview of the DAO governance process within the blockchain. Next, we identified issues within 3 key components of the governance process: the Governance Contract, Documentation, and Proposal. Regarding the Governance Contract, malicious developers could embed backdoors or malicious code to manipulate the governance process. In terms of Documentation, inadequate or unclear documentation from developers may prevent members from effectively participating, increasing the risk of undetected governance attacks or enabling a small group of members to dominate the process. Lastly, with Proposals, members could submit malicious proposals with embedded malicious code in an attempt to gain control of the DAO. To address these issues, we developed automated methods to detect such vulnerabilities. To investigate the prevalence of these issues within the current DAO ecosystem, we constructed a state-of-the-art dataset that includes 3,348 DAOs, 144 documentation, and 65,436 proposals across 9 different blockchains. Our analysis reveals that many DAO developers and members have not given sufficient attention to these issues. For the Governance Contract, 176 DAOs allow external entities to control their governance contracts, while one DAO permits developers to arbitrarily change the contract's logic. In terms of Documentation, only 71 DAOs provide adequate guidance for their members on governance processes. As for Proposals, over 90% of the examined proposals (32,500) fail to provide consistent descriptions and code for their members, highlighting a significant gap in transparency within the DAO governance process. For a better DAO governance ecosystem, DAO developers and members can utilize the methods to identify and address issues within the governance process.
Due primarily to increases in individuals fleeing violence and turmoil in Central America, over 40% of noncitizens arriving in the United States are put on a fast-track removal process and subsequently claim fear of returning to their home countries. A decade ago, the number was only 5%. This influx of asylum-seekers at the border has led to tension between those who wish to protect them and those who view such migrants as “invaders.” In 2019 and 2020, the Trump Administration proffered sweeping regulatory changes with the aim to substantively and procedurally restrict noncitizens’ access to protection from persecution and torture in their home countries. Although not all of these proposals may ultimately go into effect, it is vital to explore the legality of such provisions lest they reappear in subsequent administrations. Pursuant to domestic and international law, the United States is subject to the non-refoulement obligation, which prohibits forcibly returning a refugee to a country that threatens their life or freedom. All humans have the fundamental right to not be returned to a country where they will be persecuted or tortured, regardless of their legal status in the country where they seek protection. In the United States, noncitizens facing qualifying persecution or torture upon return to their home countries are entitled to protection in the form of statutory withholding of removal (“withholding”) or withholding or deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT protection”). This Comment argues that noncitizens vindicating their non-refoulement rights by seeking withholding or CAT protection must receive stronger procedural protections because of the fundamental interests at stake. Specifically, two issues are addressed. First, the use of the “reasonable possibility” standard of proof at the fear screening stage, a practice expanded in recent years, is inappropriate and a violation of the non-refoulement obligation. This standard is suited for final determinations on the merits, not threshold screenings. Because of the well-documented problems with fear screenings, even absent an increased standard of proof, this practice would result in an impermissible risk that individuals with valid claims would be returned to face persecution, torture, or even death without ever being fairly heard. Second, the unique position of these noncitizens, from legal and humanitarian perspectives, should entitle them to Constitutional Due Process Clause protections. Because their right to non-refoulement is not subject to the discretion of the Executive, the denial of due process cannot be justified by the “entry fiction,” the legal doctrine that gives certain noncitizens inside the United States limited constitutional protections because the law considers them to be detained at the border.
<table><tr>\n <td><p>China\n is incrementally developing a new, decentralized model of trade governance\n through a web of finance, trade, and investment initiatives involving\n memorandum of understanding, contracts, and trade and investment treaties,\n supported by an indigenous innovation policy that is transnational in its\n reach. In this way, China could create a vast, Sino-centric, legal order in\n which the Chinese state plays the nodal role. It is a hub and spokes model,\n with China at the hub. In this article, we first examine China’s export of an\n infrastructure-based development model, implemented through Chinese\n state-owned and private enterprise investments and commercial contracts (Part\n B), before turning to China’s development of a complementary web of free trade\n and investment agreements (Part C), and an indigenous innovation policy (Part\n D). The paper theorizes and empirically traces how these Chinese initiatives\n shape the evolving ecology of the transnational legal order for trade.<br></p></td></tr></table>