Blockchain Papers

Prayote Songklin

No abstract is available for this record.

Mentre, Gilles

The dissertation aims to demonstrate that direct democracy is the new stage of democracy. Direct democracy has never been taken seriously. Most authors deem it unrealistic given space and time constraints and stress the risk that the ignorance of the masses could pose. Since democracy is the search for a legitimate and efficient system producing increased equality and respecting individual and minority rights, direct democracy seems, to many, a dead-end. In section 1, I analyze how direct democracy, theoretically, can answer these objections. Legitimacy is grounded in intersubjective and institutional trust. Distrust is not only targeted against the government but also toward others, fueled by and fueling polarization. Direct political participation in deliberating and voting is not only a solid human desire and condition of fulfillment but also a vector of renewed institutional trust, echoing a broader movement for more horizontal power. The efficiency of direct democracy is more debated. An increasing number of voters prefer decisions driven by experts over the crowd. Direct democracy must only prove that it is at least as efficient as experts or that experts are fallible. Given the epistemological value of non-experts, the private character of expertise, and the dynamic and inclusive aspect of pluralistic intelligence, this minimal test is passed. Direct democracy is, therefore, a powerful tool to solve the compromise/consensus conundrum. While consensus has turned into that of a particular elite, compromise is impracticable in a polarized context. Direct democracy creates new majorities based on projects rather than programs. The condition is that minority rights stay off-limits and that individual rights are treated through qualified majoritarianism. In section 2, I empirically test direct democracy's adaptability and margin of uncertainty. Direct democracy, in the 24 American States that allow it, leads to results closer to the majority opinion than legislatures. Initiatives present no constant political trend in their results and prove resistant to polarization. In recent popular votes on abortion, voters did not align with their parties on critical issues. In Taiwan, direct democracy helps re-unite on specific topics a divided nation, powered by online debate and decentralized fact-checking tools. In Estonia, citizens have had the possibility to vote via the Internet since 2005, a system that has increased turnout and overhauled the generational digital divide. The Swiss used internet voting for twenty years until it was halted in 2020. Security issues around e-voting still need to be solved regarding identification, devices, and verifiability. Nevertheless, both examples prove that, once these difficulties are solved or in contexts with higher trust or lower stakes, e-voting fosters participation, flexibility, and security. It enables direct democracy to self-institutionalize itself. In section 3, I make concrete propositions for a "digital direct democracy". The referendum is subject to criticism. Renewed fact-checking and tracking are needed, although fake news is no excuse for inaction. Citizens' assemblies can be helpful to deliberative and controlling tools if their recommendations are submitted for a referendum. Referendums always risk becoming plebiscites unless they are citizen-led. Multiple-choice voting, multi-stage referendums, or open questions need to be experimented with through e-voting. What does the future hold? Efficiency needs to be reconsidered with AI, potentially leading to "datatorship". Reversely, the development of e-voting has the potential to allow for a fully direct democracy. This model of "pancracy" could be powered by communities in a society with multiple individual affiliations. Decentralized autonomous organizations already provide an experimental framework. "Datatorship" and "Pancracy" are processual utopias. They allow us to understand the conditions of a true democracy.

Xiaobo Lü

Elites often use social policies to garner political support and ensure regime survival, but social policies are not a silver bullet. Using two waves of Chinese national surveys, I find that a recent policy of abolishing school fees has significantly increased citizens’ demand for greater government responsibility in financing compulsory education. I argue that policy awareness, rather than policy benefits, drives citizens’ demand. Finally, I show that policy awareness has enhanced citizens’ trust in China's central government, but not in local governments. This asymmetry in regime support has two sources—the decentralization of education provision and biased media reporting—which induce citizens to credit the central government for good policy outcomes. Given that citizens’ responses are primarily influenced by policy awareness that is promoted by the state media, this study casts doubt on the use of social policies to sustain long-term political support.