The article provides theoretical-game model of voting in decentralized autonomous organization, where honest participants and evil agents meaning harm to the system strategically interact. To restrain harmful behavior mechanism of reputation tokens, i.e. intangible assets accumulated for conforming voting and lost in case of inactivity or confronting decision. The access to voting is given only when the minimum reputation threshold is exceeded. The model shows the introduction of reputation can transform one-step dilemma of participation into dynamic game. The key result is identification of two principle types of balance: mixing one, when evil agents behave like honest for a certain period of time in order to accumulate influence for the future attack and separating one, when they reveal their type quickly and are expelled from the system. Analysis shows that mechanism effectiveness depends drastically on its parameters (amount of rewards and fines) and informational structure: complete information of agents about proposal value can raise effectiveness of goal-oriented attacks. On the basis of this analysis recommendations were provided for designing sustainable systems, including the necessity to combine reputation with other mechanisms (quorum, delegation) and adjust parameters with regard to the share of evil agents.
Open access
Advanced Research in Systems and Signal Processing
One of the factors negatively affecting management effectiveness in decentralized autonomous organizations is implicit centralization of decision-making within a certain group of participants. Such centralization can be caused by both economic reasons related to uneven distribution of voting power and information and social ones related to participants’ status and control over information. The decision-making process in decentralized autonomous organizations has been analyzed in a situation when participants face information asymmetry, strategic behavior, and lack of centralized control. The principal–agent model has been considered as a formal basis, in which tokens’ holders act as the principal and project initiator, who forms an offer of a certain quality, as the agent. The conditions under which it is possible to form an equilibrium that ensures high-quality projects choice have been investigated. Incentive mechanisms have been proposed to ensure the interest in the principal’s participation in managing organization. Two directions have been considered: changing the agent’s remuneration structure based on payments differentiation and participation costs compensation for the principal. It has been demonstrated that minimal institutional changes can significantly improve organization’s management effectiveness, while maintaining decentralized nature of decision-making.
Open access
Advanced Research in Systems and Signal Processing
Urban-rural dichotomy is a poaching challenge to inclusive economic growth and sustainable development across the world. Such imbalance is commonly defined by unequal access to infrastructure, economic opportunities and good public services. This paper discusses how digital technologies, such as broadband, mobile applications, e-commerce, and precision farming tools, are transformative solutions that can be important tools in bridging this gap, economic opportunities, and sustainable livelihoods in rural society. The main hypothesis is that the traditional "urban bias" can be reversed by using specific digital interventions to reduce the transaction costs, widen the market reach, and decentralize the access to knowledge and finance.
Delo obravnava pojav tehnološko inovativnih organizacij, ki zaradi razvoja tehnologije veriženja blokov v povezavi s pametnimi pogodbami avtonomno delujejo v decentraliziranem medmrežju, z multinacionalnim obsegom in dostopom do trga in tako predstavljajo idejno zasnovo za razvoj optimalnejših poslovnih modelov in struktur. S predstavitvijo prednosti v povezavi z dodatnimi vzroki za regulacijo decentraliziranih avtonomnih organizacij predpostavimo in zaključimo, da ni primerno, da tovrstne inovativne organizacije delujejo neregulirano. Hkrati v delu izpostavljamo problematiko vzpostavitve optimalnega regulativnega okvira z željo preprečiti prekomerno centralizacijo tehnoloških sistemov, katerih idejna zasnova temelji prav na decentraliziranem delovanju, ter z željo zasnovati regulativni okvir, ki bo v največji meri skladen z obstoječimi tehnološkimi strukturami, ter bo kot tak omogočil tudi nadaljnji (regulirani) razvoj inovacij. V delu za ta namen primerjalnopravno predstavimo vzroke in napotke za sprejetje tovrstnega regulativnega okvira, ter ponazorimo možnost analogne uporabe tradicionalnega prava (tudi v slovenskem pravnem redu).
We study a two-level system having N local systems in the lower level subordinate to a central system in the higher one, such that both central and local systems have decision-making units. The central system is a coordinating agency and the local ones are semi-autonomous operating devisions. The basic principle of planning for this organization is that the central system allocates resources so as to optimize its own objective, while the local ones optimize their own objectives using the given resources. A local objective function, fn, is a function of the lower level decision variable vector x=(x1,・・・, xN) and the higher level one a=(a1,・・・, aN), where an is a resource vector allocated to the local system n. Since the functions ■ are mutually independent, the lower level composes a multi-objective system, in which the lower level decision-makers minimize a vector objective function f =(f1,・・・,fN) with respect to x in cooperation with each other. Thus, the lower level generates a set of noninferior (i.e. Pareto optimal) solutions ■(a) being parametric with respect to a. The central decision-maker, then, chooses the optimal resource allocation a⁰ and the best noninferior solution ■⁰ corresponding to a⁰ from among a set of ■(a). The above problem becomes a decentralized two-level optimization, when the local system contains only its own variables (xn, an). Several theorems and iterative algorithms for the formulated problems are obtained by use of mathematical programming techniques.