Does letting agents stake a reputational 'trust' asset on the legitimacy of work-verification verdicts raise the quality-adjusted productivity of a fully autonomous agent production economy (requester -> producer -> paid validator, with audits, dispute votes, and adaptive strategies), compared with cheaper institutions at IDENTICAL total verification budget? Mostly no - with a precisely mapped exception, and sharp design rules either way. At matched budget, plain audit routed by accumulate-only validator reputation significantly beats every democratic variant at every tested adversary rate (Holm-corrected Mann-Whitney p<=0.033); when expert audits are cheap, a central noisy auditor dominates everything; and paid validation without accountability is worse than no verification at all. The stylized model's verifiability gradient is real (pooled slope +0.237 per unit of voter signal quality, cell-clustered permutation p=0.0035): truth-staked voting overtakes optimized audit only at jointly high signal quality and adversary rates, and reputation's remaining lead there is erased by identity-reset (whitewashing) attacks - to which truth-staking is intrinsically robust, since a reset identity just donates fresh stake to informative voters. Within democracy the ordering is unambiguous: settle stakes against later ground truth, never against the majority (the deployed coherence-settlement default has an absorbing rubber-stamp equilibrium and loses measurably, p=0.033 at 80 seeds). Staking buys almost no population-level honesty; it works by stake-weighted meritocracy - concentrating trust, hence voting weight, on an informative minority - which also makes it natively sybil-proof where one-agent-one-vote collapses. 'Legitimacy laundering' is second-order at steady state and becomes real only under epistemic finality, which simultaneously starves truth-staking of settlements; the institution's binding resource is eventual ground-truth revelation. A capability-gradient small-LLM instantiation (1B producers, 4B verifiers, hidden-test ground truth, all local) reproduces the model's behavioral premises - including a causal incentive-framing effect on LLM validator strictness (TNR 0.705 paid-per-approval vs 0.864 accountable) - and transfers the institutional structure across two measured operating points, significantly so (Spearman +0.79, permutation p=0.014) at a production-unviable point where the parameter-matched model predicts the observed regime inversion.This manuscript was generated autonomously by the AI Scientist running inside Claude Code (Anthropic); every reported number traces to the project's experiment outputs. It is deposited by the named curator, who takes responsibility for its release.Source & method: https://github.com/qurore/ai-scientist-cli
Abstract Decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms have gained in popularity over the last few years, as they offer a wide range of accessible, innovative, and complex financial services. Because they evolve quickly under limited regulation, it is easy for malicious parties to target them for profit when they notice a vulnerability in these emergent protocols. Existing work has focused on understanding typical attack flows and securing the technology to alleviate crime. However, little is known about what other attributes, beyond technical vulnerabilities, may put DeFi actors at risk. Drawing on Cook’s (Crime Justice 7:1–27, 1986) crime opportunity framework of target attractiveness, this study investigates which attributes are associated with an increase or a decrease in the likelihood of DeFi victimization. We compare actors victimized in 2022 with those that were not across several target dimensions: propinquity, vulnerability, potential payoff, main area of operation, and self-protection activities. Results show that being listed on a popular centralized exchange, operating on a layer-2 blockchain, offering lending services, and having high trading volumes are associated with an increased likelihood of victimization, while operating a dApp and having experienced past victimization are associated with a decrease. By contrast, self-protection measures such as publicly disclosed audits, and bug bounty programs show no measurable effect, likely reflecting variation in their quality and implementation or the fact that undisclosed audits could not be observed. By integrating criminological theory into DeFi security research, this study provides a holistic framework for understanding crime opportunities in this novel ecosystem, while informing potential prevention strategies to reduce associated harms.
Abstract Central banks are increasingly experimenting with frontier technologies, such as Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) platforms, alongside advancements in traditional systems like the SWIFT network. While prior research has largely examined technology readiness and regulatory frameworks in isolation, their interactive effects on remittance costs remain underexplored. This study investigates how the Frontier Technology Readiness Index (FTRI) moderates the relationship between remittance costs and the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Index. The lack of integration of these dimensions is a critical research gap that is addressed to help achieve Sustainable Development Goal 10c (SDG-10c) and G20 targets. Panel data regression, followed by fixed and random effects to test robustness, was employed using datasets for remittance-sending and remittance-receiving countries derived from Worldwide Remittance Price data. In remittance-sending countries, enhanced technological readiness combined with a less stringent AML framework is associated with lower remittance costs. On the contrary, despite high technological readiness, in remittance-receiving countries, higher AML stringency tends to increase costs. Technology and AML measures in receiving countries and the amount of remittance paid in sending countries, in isolation, don’t have a significant influence on the cost of remittances. The analysis focuses solely on remittance cost efficiency and proposes incorporating transfer speed and transparency in future studies. Findings imply that the prevalence of informal channels like hawala and current pricing models does not encourage and reward higher remittance volume. Remittance cost reduction policies should focus on anti-money laundering measures and technology readiness in conjunction rather than in isolation. Incorporating national indexes provides a clear direction for improving the defined set of variables that are measurable and thus actionable to policymakers.
Sean Foley, Bart Frijns, Alexandre Garel, Tai‐Yong Roh
We examine the relationship between national culture and a country's Bitcoin activity. Given that Bitcoin is a high-risk currency/investment that is frequently used for illegal purposes and whose market is relatively opaque, we focus on the cultural dimension of individualism, which has been related to financial market participation, risk-taking behavior, and overconfidence. Using unique data that includes the originating country for Bitcoin transactions, we examine the relationship between individualism and a country's Bitcoin activity for a sample of 80 countries between 2009 and 2020. We find a significant and positive relationship between a country's individualism and its use of Bitcoin consistent with cultural values affecting the demand for such high-risk currency/investments.
Web3 and DeFi are widely advocated as innovations for greater financial inclusion and democratization. We assemble the most comprehensive dataset to date on the largest Web3 ecosystem and use large-scale computing to investigate the claim. We discuss Ethereum's network structure, time trends, and distributions of transactions, mining, and ownership. Mining income and Ether ownership are concentrated in a few nodes, even after excluding exchange and mining pool wallets, with inequalities more exacerbated than observed in the real economy. Network activities are dominated by large transactions, shifting from peer-to-peer to user-DApps/DeFi interactions, and from Ether-based to ERC-20-token-based. High percentage transaction fees, congestion-induced gas-price fluctuation, suboptimal reserve setting, and large return volatility of tokens disproportionally harm small, unsophisticated, and new nodes, with high failure rates hurting all users. Finally, we present causal evidence that base-fee burning mechanisms (e.g., EIP-1559) and airdrop programs (e.g., OmiseGo Airdrop) promote inclusion and equality through monetary redistribution.
Although societies are becoming increasingly secularized, religion continues to play an important role worldwide. However, few studies have focused on how religion affects the entrepreneurial emergence novel markets. To address this gap, I examine the impact of Islam, as a decentralized belief system, on entrepreneurship in the context of developing Islamic investment fund markets across countries. I focus on religious diversity within Islam as an instance of intrainstitutional complexity and analyze a country-level panel dataset of Islamic investment funds in addition to complementary qualitative data. Intriguingly, I find that religious diversity within Islam plays a paradoxical role: it promotes the entrepreneurial supply of Islamic investment funds in a country, but it also reduces the investor demand for these funds. This complex effect is moderated by interinstitutional forces: the market logic positively moderates the effect on supply dynamics, whereas the state logic negatively moderates the effect on supply and positively that on demand. This study contributes to the research on religion and market emergence, institutional complexity, and Islamic finance.
Vertical decentralization, either at the deconcentration, delegation or, more rarely, the devolution level, has been instituted in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. It usually has the effect of increasing the quantity as well as the quality, in terms of health and education, of public goods. More neglected in the literature is the issue of horizontal decentralization, shifting the decision-making power from the central ministry of finance to the ministries of education and health, as well as strengthening the legislative and judicial branches of government. We examine the relationship between horizontal decentralization with its important ethnic dimension and vertical decentralization. Local governments are accountable to the center under vertical and to democratic forces and civil society under horizontal decentralization. Smaller local units are more likely to be more homogeneous ethnically, leading to a larger quantity and higher quality of public goods.
This article explains (1) the origins of central banking and (2) variations in the spread and durability of central banks across nations. Early central banks helped bind governments to honor their debts and thereby furthered governments' capacities to efficiently finance military expenditures. The origins of central banking are problematic because government credit-worthiness and efficient wartime fiscal policy are public goods, subject to the free-rider problem. Applying a variant of the joint-products model, I argue that governments offered private benefits (monopoly privileges) to select creditors to induce participation in central banks. To explain cross-national differences, I argue that the level of domestic political decentralization negatively affected the incidence and durability of central banking. Countries with decentralized political systems faced regulatory competition from strong local authorities as licensers of banking monopolies, making it difficult to adopt or sustain central banking. Qualitative and statistical evidence from Europe and the United States to about 1850 support the arguments.