Does letting agents stake a reputational 'trust' asset on the legitimacy of work-verification verdicts raise the quality-adjusted productivity of a fully autonomous agent production economy (requester -> producer -> paid validator, with audits, dispute votes, and adaptive strategies), compared with cheaper institutions at IDENTICAL total verification budget? Mostly no - with a precisely mapped exception, and sharp design rules either way. At matched budget, plain audit routed by accumulate-only validator reputation significantly beats every democratic variant at every tested adversary rate (Holm-corrected Mann-Whitney p<=0.033); when expert audits are cheap, a central noisy auditor dominates everything; and paid validation without accountability is worse than no verification at all. The stylized model's verifiability gradient is real (pooled slope +0.237 per unit of voter signal quality, cell-clustered permutation p=0.0035): truth-staked voting overtakes optimized audit only at jointly high signal quality and adversary rates, and reputation's remaining lead there is erased by identity-reset (whitewashing) attacks - to which truth-staking is intrinsically robust, since a reset identity just donates fresh stake to informative voters. Within democracy the ordering is unambiguous: settle stakes against later ground truth, never against the majority (the deployed coherence-settlement default has an absorbing rubber-stamp equilibrium and loses measurably, p=0.033 at 80 seeds). Staking buys almost no population-level honesty; it works by stake-weighted meritocracy - concentrating trust, hence voting weight, on an informative minority - which also makes it natively sybil-proof where one-agent-one-vote collapses. 'Legitimacy laundering' is second-order at steady state and becomes real only under epistemic finality, which simultaneously starves truth-staking of settlements; the institution's binding resource is eventual ground-truth revelation. A capability-gradient small-LLM instantiation (1B producers, 4B verifiers, hidden-test ground truth, all local) reproduces the model's behavioral premises - including a causal incentive-framing effect on LLM validator strictness (TNR 0.705 paid-per-approval vs 0.864 accountable) - and transfers the institutional structure across two measured operating points, significantly so (Spearman +0.79, permutation p=0.014) at a production-unviable point where the parameter-matched model predicts the observed regime inversion.This manuscript was generated autonomously by the AI Scientist running inside Claude Code (Anthropic); every reported number traces to the project's experiment outputs. It is deposited by the named curator, who takes responsibility for its release.Source & method: https://github.com/qurore/ai-scientist-cli
Background: Indonesia’s simultaneous regional elections (Pilkada serentak) constitute a key component of post-Reformasi decentralization. While designed to strengthen democratic local governance, recent fiscal rationalization policies have increased central control over election financing, raising concerns about their impact on substantive democratic representation. Objectives: This study examines whether fiscal rationalization in Pilkada implementation supports or undermines constitutional principles of democratic, participatory, and accountable local government. It analyzes the constitutional framework of Pilkada, identifies key fiscal rationalization mechanisms, and evaluates their effects on local political representation. Methods: A qualitative normative empirical approach was employed. Normative analysis examined the 1945 Constitution, electoral and regional governance laws, fiscal decentralization regulations, and Constitutional Court decisions. Empirical analysis was conducted through comparative case studies of regional election budget management. Results: Four major mechanisms were identified: NPHD budget revisions, APBD burden-shifting, compressed electoral timelines, and intensified central fiscal steering under Law No. 1 of 2022. These mechanisms reduced electoral capacity, limited voter-candidate engagement, and disproportionately affected less-resourced regions. Although elections formally complied with constitutional requirements, substantive representation was weakened, creating a persistent gap between procedural legality and democratic quality. Conclusion: Fiscal rationalization has strengthened formal compliance but constrained substantive democratic representation. Greater fiscal stability and regional autonomy are needed to ensure competitive, equitable, and accountable local elections. Keywords: fiscal rationalization; Pilkada serentak; constitutional compliance; democratic representation; decentralization.
ABSTRACT A long‐standing topic of concern in the literature on governmental auditing is whether the aims of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) or other central audit institutions should include detecting fraudulent use of public money. The balance of opinion has been against this proposition, largely for reasons of infeasibility. This article takes up the same topic, but in policy contexts appropriate to this special issue, namely, where federally financed health, education, and infrastructure programs are implemented through program spending and delivery by local governments. Such policy contexts heighten the need for a capability to prevent and prosecute cases involving the fraudulent use of public money. This need, recognized within Brazil's federal executive since the early 2000s, has been addressed by its Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria‐Geral da União—CGU) through systematic field audits of municipal implementation coupled with strategic collaboration with the Federal Police. This article examines CGU's integrated audit‐investigation approach and its policy and institutional contexts. By explaining how these strategies have functioned in attaining operational capacity and support, the article provides evidence on possibilities of how audit institution strategies aiming to detect fraudulent use of public money can be feasible within decentralized governance systems that call for innovative vertical coordination mechanisms.
Abstract Web3 governance systems have expanded the visibility of institutional processes through on-chain records of votes, proposals, and token balances. Yet the availability of governance data does not necessarily ensure that governance structure or decision dynamics remain interpretable. This paper introduces governance observability as a distinct analytical layer within Web3 systems — concerned not with data availability, but with the capacity to relate observable governance activity to the institutional structures and processes that give it meaning. Building upon previous work on VCS governance geometry, the paper defines governance observability through two complementary dimensions: structural observability, which concerns the visibility of governance configuration and role relationships; and flow observability, which concerns the traceability of decision processes as they move through governance structures over time. Together, these dimensions provide a framework through which governance systems may be examined as both structural and dynamic phenomena. The paper further introduces structural invariants as continuity conditions supporting coherent interpretation of governance structure across institutional change, and flow concentration detection as a means of examining how operational patterns may gradually shape the exercise of authority differently from formal governance design. Web3 infrastructure is examined as an enabling environment for such observability, while remaining distinct from the interpretive frameworks through which governance conditions become institutionally meaningful. Governance observability is throughout distinguished from governance automation. The framework does not prescribe intervention or establish universal governance standards. Rather, it proposes that governance systems may benefit from maintaining the capacity to sense and interpret their own structural and operational conditions as governance evolves — contributing an interpretive layer that supports institutional discernment without replacing institutional judgment. Keywords: Web3 governance, governance observability, structural audit, flow observability, VCS governance geometry, institutional design, decentralized governance
Vabuk Pahari, B. Chandrasekaran, Johnnatan Messias, Krishna P. Gummadi · 5 authors
A decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) is a governing entity that empowers its stakeholders (i.e., users who hold one or more of its tokens) to manage blockchain-based protocols (i.e., smart contracts) collaboratively. The governance of a DAO is explicitly encoded in the DAO's governance contract, which defines how stakeholders participate in governance and how much influence (or voting power) they have in any decision. While decentralization and autonomy are the fundamental tenets of a DAO's design, empirical evidence suggests that in practice governance is often highly centralized. In this work, we study the designs and implementations of 48 public and actively used DAOs, with substantially large capital, deployed on Ethereum. We identify how three key governance mechanisms--token registration, staking, and delegation--originally introduced to improve security or participation, contribute to the concentration of voting power. Unlike prior work on centralization of voting power in specific DAOs, our findings reveal that these governance mechanisms of DAOs themselves systematically reinforce centralization. By elucidating the relationship between governance design and voting centralization, this work advances the understanding of DAO governance structures and highlights the inherent trade-offs between decentralization, security, and usability of DAOs.
Public finance transparency has become central to economic modernisation, fiscal accountability, and anti-corruption reform in transitional economies. With the emergence of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), blockchain systems have been increasingly explored as instruments to improve auditability, reduce information asymmetry, and strengthen institutional trust between state, business, and society. This article develops a comparative analysis of blockchain adoption in public finance across four transitional or post-socialist economies: Uzbekistan, Estonia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. Drawing on political economy frameworks, digital governance studies, and blockchain technical literature, it examines the potential and constraints of distributed ledger innovation in procurement, budgeting, treasury operations, registries, and asset disclosure systems. The analysis shows that blockchain adoption is not solely a technological issue but an institutional one, shaped by state capacity, bureaucratic incentives, regulatory ecosystems, and pre-existing digital infrastructure. While Estonia demonstrates advanced institutional integration of blockchain-based infrastructure, Georgia and Kazakhstan illustrate intermediate pathways of digital governance with selective blockchain pilots, and Uzbekistan represents an emerging adopter with rapid digital modernisation but slow blockchain deployment in fiscal functions. The article concludes that blockchain-based transparency reforms in transitional economies require a coordinated approach linking governance, data interoperability, legal reform, and administrative incentives rather than technology alone.
N K Vasilieva, J. D. Darmilova, А.П. ГОРБАТКО, A. N. Kalinichenko
This article examines the concept of cryptocurrency and its specific features. Based on the collection and analysis of information, the paper identifies the dual nature of cryptocurrency, which manifests itself both in the provision of new financial opportunities and in the expansion of corruption and fraudulent schemes. The article explores legal measures and approaches to combating cryptocurrency-related offenses, as well as current methods of detecting corruption involving cryptocurrencies.
Why does industrialization in some cases generate social consolidation and in other cases political conflict? This paper argues that the answer depends on how industrial finance is allocated. I develop a dynamic political-economy model in which the government channels external liquidity into industry under either centralized or decentralized finance. Under decentralization, adverse shocks harden budget constraints and permit replacement of inefficient incumbents by new entrepreneurs. Under centralization, by contrast, the government is more likely to refinance inefficient incumbents, soften budget constraints, and block entry. Industrialization then generates concentrated rents and a higher risk of conflict. I interpret late imperial Russia as a historically revealing case of this mechanism. Rather than treating Russia as the sole object of interest, the paper uses it to motivate a general theory of industrialization under monopoly.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasize inclusive, equitable, and environmentally sustainable growth, requiring effective localization for meaningful outcomes. Local governments, particularly in developing countries, play a crucial role in translating global goals into actionable strategies at the grassroots level. In India, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), empowered by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, serve as key agents in implementing SDGs through decentralized planning, resource allocation, and community participation. This research article examines the role of local governments in achieving SDGs in India, with a special focus on Karnataka. Using a narrative review methodology based on PRISMA-ScR guidelines, the study synthesizes findings from 28 empirical studies, government reports, and policy documents published between 2015 and 2026. Evidence suggests that local governance interventions have improved service delivery outcomes by 30–50 percent in sectors such as water management, sanitation, renewable energy, and rural livelihoods. Initiatives such as Gram Panchayat Development Plans (GPDPs), e-Gram Swaraj, and Finance Commission grants have strengthened participatory planning and accountability. However, challenges such as limited fiscal autonomy, capacity deficits among elected representatives, and coordination gaps persist. The study concludes that strengthening local governance through capacity building, financial empowerment, and technological integration is essential for achieving SDGs. Karnataka's innovative practices demonstrate the potential of decentralized governance in driving sustainable development.
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are blockchain-based entities that operate without centralized management or shareholders, enabling worldwide token holders the option of participating in their governance through self-executing smart contracts. With approximately fifty thousand DAOs controlling over $30 billion in assets, these organizations offer unprecedented efficiency and global collaboration, enabling stakeholders to participate and contribute to the operation of DAOs regardless of their jurisdiction or physical presence. DAOs, however, also present significant legal and regulatory challenges, particularly concerning liability, contractual enforcement, tax obligations, and oversight. Their decentralized and fluid structure makes it substantively difficult for any single country—including powerful actors such as the United States and the European Union—to assert jurisdiction or exercise regulatory authority over such organizations. In addition to governance considerations, the decentralized, pseudonymous, and borderless structure of DAOs may be exploited for unlawful purposes, most notably money laundering. This Article examines how DAOs, particularly within the decentralized finance sector, facilitate anonymous cross-border transactions that pose novel and significant money laundering risks. By analyzing existing regulatory responses in major jurisdictions including the United States and the European Union, as well as efforts by key international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations, the Article demonstrates that prevailing regulatory frameworks and enforcement models cannot adequately respond to the distinct challenges presented by DAOs. This regulatory vacuum poses significant risks to global financial stability, the integrity of the financial systems, and core national-security interests, including the prevention of sanctions evasion, counterterrorism and proliferation financing, and the deduction and disruption of state-sponsored, cyber-enabled illicit finance. Accordingly, the Article proposes a novel, modular, risk-based, global anti-money laundering framework tailored to DAOs’ unique operational realities. The proposed framework aligns with principles of functional equivalence, technological neutrality, and transnational cooperation, offering a more effective means of addressing DAO-related, anti-money laundering risks while preserving space for innovation.
Mbonigaba Celestin*, J. Azhar Mohamed**, G. R. Gnana Raja** & K. Vinayakan**
This analysis uses data from the IMF, OECD, and the World Bank, studies the viability of decentralized finance within nine economies. The multilevel structural equation model attributes 84 percent of the variance of legitimacy to blockchain reporting (β=0.41), AI analytics (β=0.29), audit accessibility (β=0.22), and the intensity of oversight (β=0.12). The study claims unalterable data combined with algorithmic assurance as novel pillars of accountability and trust. Policy implications advocate for the adoption of cohesive, auditable trust frameworks alongside AI-powered auditing solutions to streamline transparency and fortified cross-border accountability in decentralized finance.
Portia Roelofs, Good Governance in Nigeria. Rethinking Accountability and Transparency in the Twenty-first Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. 356 pp. £ 26.69 paperback. Peer Schouten, Roadblock Politics. The Origins of Violence in Central Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 256 pp. £ 95.78 hardcover. The state in Africa has been the object of ongoing analysis and debate. Those who qualify it as ‘failed’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ or ‘neo-patrimonial’ rely on a strict Weberian definition which views the state as the monopolist of legitimate physical violence, an autonomous bureaucratic apparatus, the embodiment of popular sovereignty, and a spatially and territorially coherent entity. These features represent an essentially Western ideal type. As an alternative, scholars have explored its long historical formation (Bayart, 1989; Cooper, 2002; Hibou and Tozy, 2020), the interpenetration of the bureaucratic realm and the social world (Mitchell, 1991), and the everyday making of the state through processes of negotiation, contestation and bricolage (Hagmann and Péclard, 2010). Other scholars have examined the fabric of informal political order, emphasizing, sometimes uncritically, ‘the strength of weak states’ (Meagher, 2012). This essay reviews the two books listed above by Portia Roelofs and Peer Schouten, which are part of the ongoing discussion on state-making theory. Both authors reflect on this theory from a local perspective, employing popular understandings of accountability, legitimacy and forms of sovereignty. Roelofs book on Nigeria and Schouten's on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are excellent cases through which to examine these issues and to rethink some of the significant challenges Africa faces. These include an outward-looking political economy based on mineral wealth in parts of the territory (for example, oil in Nigeria and coltan, copper and gold in Eastern Congo); decades of armed conflicts, indicating the difficulty of the central state in controlling its national territory; widespread forms of patronage understood as the distribution by politicians of private goods to citizens; and the imposition of structural adjustment programmes by the International Monetary Fund which drastically reduced the state bureaucracy and its capacity to govern societies. At first glance, the title of Portia Roelofs book Good Governance in Nigeria: Rethinking Accountability and Transparency in the Twenty-first Century (hereafter Good Governance in Nigeria) might be viewed as provocative. It is surprising to see good governance associated with this country, given that Nigerian politics is often characterized in academic literature by neo-patrimonialism, patronage and corruption. Instead of endorsing the view of Nigerian governance as marked by self-destructive greed and a culture of corruption, Roelofs explores lesser-known forms of popular accountability and transparency by examining how the Nigerian political class governs the population and how Nigerians want to be governed. She focuses on Ekiti, Lagos and Oyo, three southwestern states where governors from the dominant party in the southwest, the All Progressives Congress (APC), adopted new public policies in the 2000s. They did so not because they were influenced by donor agencies (for example, in 2004, development aid represented only 0.6 per cent of government spending) but rather because they reactivated a long tradition of progressive governance ingrained in the history of the southwestern region. While radically different in the argumentation, Peer Schouten's book Roadblock Politics: The Origins of Violence in Central Africa (hereafter Roadblock Politics) also starts with empirical observations. Schouten mapped more than 800 roadblocks in eastern DRC, where minerals are strongly associated with armed conflict. With this new cartographic evidence in hand, the author challenges a well-established analytical framework — the DRC conflict is not so much about control over natural resources but about control over spaces of circulation or roads. For Schouten, roadblocks form an entry point into ‘forms of political order that somehow remain invisible in conventional state theory’ (p. xiv). His comparative analysis with the Central African Republic (CAR) helps us to rethink how informal political orders have been constructed along roads in economically poor, resource-rich countries in Central Africa. For the author, roadblocks are not symptomatic of the region's predicament as Hobbesian anarchy; rather, they display a structure of consistent rules and logics of control. These rules pertain to who can set up a roadblock, where, and how movement beyond the roadblock is organized. In exploring these different forms of territorial governance, both books reviewed here prove useful in rethinking state theory and the making of contemporary political arenas. They are based on several years of fieldwork conducted by the authors as part of their PhD dissertation research. What politicians, traders, market women, policemen, military men and rebels think about governance, sovereignty and accountability enables the authors to decipher conventional wisdom on good governance, the resource curse thesis and the neo-patrimonial state. In the sections that follow, I individually discuss the two books which address different research questions on governance, transparency and political order. Following this, I examine the various local conceptions of authority and political legitimacy, which are rooted in a long historical trajectory and challenge common assumptions about state theory. As in so many developing countries, the World Bank and international donors sought to export a ready-made model to Nigeria to transform the state from within. A classical international good governance agenda insists on the need for an insulated system of techno-managerial governance that will protect the market from politics, and in which elected officials and civil servants in government are committed to delivering public goods and to being held accountable for adhering to rules and meeting key indicators. While this narrative is well known, it is surprising to see its adoption by some states in Nigeria in the early 2000s. A long period of military rule, coupled with the implementation in 1985 of structural adjustment programmes, led to the evisceration of many federal and state institutions, a sharp increase in corruption levels, a general decline of public infrastructure, the marginalization of civil society institutions and an upsurge in the number of violent groups claiming more financial resources from the federal state (Osaghae, 1998; Suberu, 2001). Nonetheless, in the early 2000s, the Lagos State government implemented new public policies consistent with the governance agenda of the World Bank, which entailed upgrading public services, reasserting an autonomous civil service, embracing public–private partnerships in various sectors (security, waste and transportation) and increasing the state budget through taxation. Roelofs convincingly suggests that Lagos became a model replicated in neighbouring states; it was implemented in Oyo State during the mandate of Governor Abiola Ajimobi (2011‒19) and in Ekiti State under Governor Kayode Fayemi (2010‒14) (p. 59). Both governors were able to modernize their states by embracing public‒private partnerships and constructing new roads and market infrastructures. Despite this, Fayemi was not re-elected in 2014, and the APC lost Oyo State to the opposition in 2019. This leads Roelofs to ask, ‘What kind of accountability and what kind of transparency do people expect from their leaders?’ (p. 56). Her book is partly inspired by the suggestion in the early 2000s of Thandika Mkandawire that ‘anti-democratic effects of technocracy can be counterbalanced by an aspect of governance that has been downplayed by Western approaches to democracy: the social dimension’ (p. 24). The core argument Roelofs advances is that power must be socially embedded for it to be accountable. In other words, social demands (either personal, family or group-based interests) have the potential for constraining power which, admittedly, is an argument poorly mobilized by academics working on Nigeria. In the process of doing so, Roelofs reconceptualizes accountability as accessibility. Accessibility is understood as the maintenance of spaces for direct communication between political leaders and their constituents. However, politicians often ignore these demands in favour of dominant technocratic approaches to accountability. On a more theoretical level, the author criticizes the claim that politics should be divorced from the world of social relations. Many academics who promote rational choice theory, as well as economic experts at the World Bank, fail to recognize the central role that social relations between politicians and the broader population play in shaping effective mechanisms of transparency and accountability. Similarly, the dominant interpretation of transparency is largely based on the quantity and coverage of budget information. For Roelofs, this is insufficient. Transparency demands that the social networks, relations and obligations within which leaders are embedded should be made visible. While emphasis is placed on the importance of communication channels, Roelofs is not naïve about the material dimension of politics and does not overlook established practices of exchange of private goods between politicians and voters. She also recognizes that such patronage politics provides only a partial explanation: the relationship between voters and politicians is also shaped by citizens’ social demands and their broader expectations about how politicians should behave. Empirically, the argumentation is convincing for the states of Oyo and Ekiti. The APC governors were lacking human faces and neglecting the masses despite the implementation of progressive policies. Although Ajimobi improved or built new infrastructures, he was seen as arrogant and disrespectful and was replaced by a governor who was perceived as being closer to the people. Lagos State remains a question mark in Roelofs book. It is presented as a model for the southwestern states based on the success achieved during the rule of Governors Tinubu (1999‒2007) and Fashola (2007‒15). This reflects an academic optimism about the policies of Lagos that does not consider the strength of APC bureaucratic machines and societal groups (for example, market women's associations, unions, professional guilds, street leaders) loyal to APC governors and working for their re-election (Fourchard, 2021; Lawanson et al., 2025; Salvaire, 2019). In other words, it remains to be demonstrated that since 1999 APC governors of Lagos State have been re-elected due to their accessibility, accountability and ability to listen to the population at large. At the core of Peer Schouten's book, Roadblock Politics, lies another conventional wisdom. The resource curse thesis is a popular narrative with respect to Central Africa. Richard Auty (1993) is credited with coining the concept,1 but Paul Collier amplified it in the late 1990s. Collier explained that the upsurge of conflicts in Africa was linked to globalization while civil wars were motivated by the same basic ‘greed’ as that of rational entrepreneurs (Collier, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The risk of civil war was especially high if countries with weak institutions depended on primary commodity exports, as in the DRC and CAR (p. 237). Interestingly, Schouten notes that Collier was highly influential in promoting this thesis among an unlikely alliance of activists, governments and industrial stakeholders in the region (pp. 237‒38). Schouten's quantitative and qualitative analysis of roadblocks rightly indicates not only that this oversimplifies the situation on the ground, but also that it conceals other analytical possibilities. He demonstrates and argues that the emergence of mobile economies across long distances gave rise to roadblocking as a political technique for negotiating and governing the control of long-distance exchanges from pre-colonial times to the present. Roadblock Politics is a very well-informed history and geography of roadblocks in central Africa. The work is impressive in its articulation of a quantitative analysis of 1,000 roadblocks concentrated in Eastern Congo and CAR with ethnographic insights from specific places. Schouten advances three principal arguments. First, roadblocks are a meaningful form of state making because they have been a dominant form of power both in the 19th century and in the past 25 years, a point to which I will return in the last section of this essay. Second, different means of different forms of rule and which the author to as an of where the of the of is to and the circulation of goods and Roadblock are highly On national and which of roadblocks are largely by state roads and through the with weak economic are and at per cent by armed groups such as the and other or reflect the of power in that they for They are both a groups different of and a must part of their up the roadblocks do not Following such as or the as they are able to through roadblocks through of and who the on the while a from the under which this work is Schouten's to the theoretical that are First, it challenges the dominant role minerals play in of conflict in Central Africa and an interpretation of the Although roadblocks are a central part of the conflict between groups for control of different they are not linked to the of mineral All goods are not only Second, it what Schouten to as the political of governance which is meaningful only if it is in to a territory and a population within it (p. a with other forms of territorial governance might have been useful to the to which roadblock politics as local political order is that the author roadblocks as a political through which Central African the by the of In for their they from and at roadblock politics reflects local conceptions of public authority in Central Africa. Despite being very both examine African conceptions of state making and political They the making of authority by exploring and often political This is especially in an academic where African history has so often been to Schouten, is a long historical tradition of to the of power in the of Roadblock Politics the history of a on on the roads from the to the and along the Congo to the became widespread in the 19th century as the circulation of goods as and It was a very for able to and control over a party to it was As with was the for these as or For Schouten, a form of He us that this is rooted in Central African the of along key is in and what as first of people to wealth by along (p. were a of state making than autonomous to the emergence of political power (p. Roadblock politics in the century is presented as a of two how the period period from the of the 19th century the of the in might have contemporary and politics is a form of history that to as Peer Schouten's book is well to an between the two the is more historical especially of the and The of roads into during the period is presented as a African are at the same seen as the of the on the suggests that the was along and in in mineral but weak especially in and was This form of government is by the author as on a (p. Schouten suggests in the same that on was a and more form of rule than the of direct across He also that the population was and in in the a as the (p. The last point to is that the analysis of and to be the of the order. All the presented by Schouten favour a thesis from the pre-colonial to the period in to state However, I have some about this The thesis has the of some on rule which are well established by These include the capacity of the to in very the in of central African to along the and in of work and and the ability of to and by especially World In other words, Schouten suggests that the population the imposition of (for example, and and the central state other political possibilities. This thesis does not to how view their of movement of the In the book, a at about In the I from to were this is (p. In a roads are The government (p. These that a system of roads did of the century and that the It a of national state legitimacy, and if this were the roadblocks politics be an radically different to the both in and in the of and In other words, historical between the 19th and are not especially how roadblock politics might from In Good Governance in Roelofs is in to state than in the to rule and the in which political legitimacy is over Instead of that a of good governance was on Nigeria by the Roelofs the tradition of or or In the of a political class led by a and of the Western this have a to rule in so as they display a based on Western with the of in the 19th For historical in the region in the 19th and and replaced war as a of political leaders must than they For and governors in leaders need an of government if they are to their to new The a social and political a social that is through the of It the of social and for constraining the power of Roelofs suggests that Tinubu was elected as governor of Lagos State in he was very much influenced by and a public in the of Nigeria for and the return of in The strength of the on the capacity to of historical and Roelofs is very to local conceptions of APC politicians a to and to be for their good governance, but they politicians from private of and She suggests that is a The book the between political of the politicians who do not often This of development and local authority has as by the for and so ingrained in the southwestern part of Nigeria. ask, to what local politicians have been in the past APC politicians have the in Nigeria since but popular has in a of economic power and of in and What remains of this to It that has as the three political in the very patronage politics to play a significant role in by the widespread of politicians their that the core of and This the question of how political legitimacy has been built over in the two to state on the hand, and popular of accountability, on the other hand, to be central in the of local political the two books are convincing in their argumentation, might be other to For Schouten, roadblock politics reflects the radically and of local public This point the in which informal institutions public authority by a of (for example, associations, associations, women's and In the past years, an of work in and political has the role of state and institutions in shaping local authority in (Fourchard, the African has of institutions working at the of the state and These institutions the state as and while to or their public authority have and conflicts, power local power within a the of political Schouten's central arguments. or informal institutions that transform into This is the for groups that have some legitimacy because they are seen as more than the and a for which people are to and Schouten that roadblock groups have some legitimacy, especially with respect to and they for the of local What might be is the to which these armed groups at a of from the or the local they might be a of the but is a significant between the two in that roadblocks to be a form of between central state services, and what are the or the seen as legitimate or in and on this another from the roadblocks to the in which they are to how to between groups which legitimate or local For Roelofs, local political legitimacy is in the popular of accountability and accessibility. In coupled with a neo-patrimonial of the the social with officials as effective governance in Africa. by patronage or politics, Western political have social relations in their discussion of African politics and socially embedded forms of of the of Good Governance in Nigeria is that it beyond these patronage to other forms of popular accountability in Nigeria and in the For example, politicians are to be embedded in and the of communication through to by of is This is in the literature on politics but largely in the literature on in a broader with literature beyond the African is but political research on Africa with neo-patrimonial literature or rational choice theory political and political research that and the of political legitimacy beyond However, a more central question how politicians are in Africa and how their will and political demands in public The two books reviewed here with historical and conceptions of authority and accountability in Africa that have been This of history into the social remains to a more of the fabric of public authority in the African and is a for more qualitative work that challenges and assumptions about countries in and the African in The two books a central to the conventional wisdom on state authority in Africa and A strength of these two scholars is their capacity to fieldwork over to rethink many central issues in state-making theory. in the of a roadblock, a or in how local politicians to their is an excellent point for on very state theory. The World technocratic of good governance, the resource curse thesis and neo-patrimonial and rational choice theory remain dominant in international development agencies and among academics and need to be by such research. In this the to territorial governance forms part of a broader by a number of scholars to the state in a more and (Hagmann and Péclard, 2021; The quantitative analysis of roadblocks helps beyond a of the roadblocks are a form of political order and to be a political or the of mineral exploring the role of Western such as and is an to the of in such a political is a political and at the for International His research include the and the political of public He and in Africa and Nigeria
Persistent electoral irregularities—ranging from vote manipulation and ballot stuffing to logistical failures and post-election violence—continue to undermine democratic consolidation across developing democracies. Nigeria, Africa’s largest democracy, epitomizes this crisis, where recurrent allegations of fraud, digital failures, and institutional mistrust have eroded public confidence in electoral outcomes. This paper proposes a secure, transparent, and technically robust blockchain-based electoral framework tailored for developing democracies. Leveraging the core attributes of blockchain—immutability, decentralization, real-time auditability, and cryptographic security—we design a technical architecture for voter registration, ballot casting, vote tallying, and public verification. The system integrates smart contracts, Proof of Authority (PoA) consensus, cryptographic identity verification, and zero-knowledge proofs to ensure integrity, privacy, and resilience. We analyze implementation challenges including the digital divide, cybersecurity threats, and legal gaps, and propose a phased, stakeholder-driven roadmap anchored in Nigeria’s institutional context. Comparative insights from Estonia, Sierra Leone, and Brazil underscore the importance of local ownership, institutional autonomy, and civic literacy. The paper contributes a practical, context-sensitive blueprint for blockchain-based electoral reform, bridging the gap between theoretical innovation and real-world deployment in fragile democratic ecosystems.
Responses to surveys eliciting evaluations of trust in government, both generally and in specific areas, have varied over time and across countries.Using consistent survey data for 34 OECD countries from 2007-2023, we estimate a model of factors determining levels of trust.We employ a series of econometric techniques of increasing sophistication.The level and growth rate of real income per capita, social spending per capita, the degree of decentralization, and economic freedom all exert positive effects on trust.Inflation, unemployment, and debt per capita negatively affect trust.Additionally, higher levels of human capital and the elderly share of the population negatively affect trust.In the context of trust in government, the estimates suggest a heavier weight on inflation than on unemployment when compared to Okun's misery index, which weights them equally.Additionally, the estimates are used to evaluate combinations of policies, e.g.debt-financed increases in social spending that affect inflation and/or unemployment, to determine the net effect on trust in government.
Given Vietnam's current anticorruption campaign and its distinctive context of decentralized governance and public sector dominance, this paper investigates how anticorruption efforts affect corporate investment behaviour during 2006 and 2019. Using a novel text-based measure of anticorruption and comprehensive firm-level datasets, we uncover a consistent pattern that firms tend to delay investments in response to heightened uncertainty triggered by anticorruption activities. This strategic hesitation reflects a rational response to avoid potential regulatory and political uncertainty, and holds across a wide range of robustness checks, including alternative model specifications, variable definitions, and advanced estimation techniques such as system GMM and entropy balancing. Our findings also reveal that anticorruption campaigns significantly reduce informal business costs—particularly bribery, thus highlighting institutional improvements and a more transparent business environment. Notably, while public sector investment efficiency improves under the campaign, private firms show no significant efficiency gains, underscoring the asymmetry in how reforms affect different ownership structures. By bridging institutional reform with corporate finance, the study offers new insights into the channels through which anticorruption influences firm decision-making, governance, and political strategy. This research fills a critical gap in the literature, demonstrating that anticorruption is not merely a legal or ethical issue, but a transformative force in corporate investment dynamics.
DeFiisrevolutionizingthefinancialworldbyprovidingopen,approval-free,peer-to-peerwaysto transact,thankstoblockchain.DeFiallowsmorefinancialopportunitiesanddifference,butitalso presentsproblemsforAMLandcompliance due tohowitisdecentralized,usespseudonymsand is available in different countries. It describes in detail the barriers faced in DeFi within the EU duetotechnologyandregulations.ItdiscusseswhytraditionallawsareoftenunsuitableforDeFi, leading to questions about regulations, regulatory boundaries and any gaps in enforcing them. StudyingspecificcasesintheEU,thearticleexploresthejourneyofAMLregulationsandpoints out some of the obstacles inside the regulatory sphere due to swift changes in decentralized technology.Movingon,ithighlightsthatitisdifficulttoenforcethelawindecentralizednetworks. The study puts forward a group of guidelines in policy, law and technology to improve AML compliance in DeFi without hindering its advancements. For example, EU regulators may align theirrulesformemberstates,createbetterframeworksforliabilityofdecentralizedmarketactors, utilizeregtechandencourageteamworkbetweenregulators,technologistsandindustrymembers. Based on the findings, rigid and uncooperative regulations will not only fail to tackle issues in DeFibutalsoslowdowninnovation.Thus,thisarticleoffersideasforfuturediscussionsandrules on safeguarding money matters in the growing world of decentralized finance.
Andrew Isaak, Baris Istipliler, Suleika Bort, Michael Woywode
Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) represent a novel organizational form enabling self-governed coordination based on blockchain technology. This study examines the prototypical Bitcoin DAO from an institutional perspective, focusing on how its core features—decentralization and autonomy—interact with the broader institutional framework in which it operates. Specifically, we study how regulative institutional environments (i.e., (il)legalization) shape the growth and development of DAOs while theorizing about the role of both petty and grand corruption (i.e., by higher-level officials) in influencing the effectiveness of these regulative institutions. Our empirical analysis focuses on the global rise of Bitcoin trading and platform establishment across 49 national contexts from 2011 to 2023. Utilizing a unique data set, we find that, although the number of Bitcoin exchange platforms in a country is positively associated with Bitcoin legalization, Bitcoin trading volume is positively associated with Bitcoin illegalization. In countries with higher levels of grand corruption, Bitcoin illegalization becomes even more strongly associated with trading. In contrast, grand corruption dampens the positive association between legalization and the number of Bitcoin exchange platforms. Further, the presence of petty corruption reduces the impact of grand corruption. Our study reveals that it is critical to distinguish between petty and grand corruption as an important factor that influences the interplay between the regulative environment and growth and development of the Bitcoin DAO and the related ecosystem of Bitcoin trading and platform founding.
The constitutionalising of local self-government through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments marked a significant moment in India’s democratic and federal evolution. These reforms sought to deepen democracy by devolving powers, responsibilities and resources to local governments. More than three decades later, decentralization in India has produced institutions that are electorally vibrant but administratively constrained. This paper examines the paradox of extensive formal devolution coexisting with persistent state control. Using the analytical framework of finance, functions, and functionaries (the “3Fs”), it argues that decentralization in India has unfolded as a managed and politically conditioned process rather than a comprehensive transfer of authority. While fiscal transfers and functional assignments have expanded unevenly, control over administrative personnel has remained firmly centralized. The retention of authority over functionaries emerges as the central mechanism through which state governments preserve power over local governance. The paper contributes to decentralization scholarship by shifting attention from constitutional design to political economy, highlighting personnel control as the key constraint on substantive local self-government in India.
Introduction: the study covers features of investigation activities of internal affairs in countering bribery committed with the use of digital financial and cryptocurrency assets. Materials and Methods: the doctrinal law provisions on the investigation activities of the internal affairs in the light of the fight against corruption became the study materials. Regulations on countering bribery committed with digital financial and cryptocurrency assets were the basic study sources. The author used universal (analysis, deduction, and induction) and special (structure logic, dialectical, and legal) methods of cognition. Literature review: the author analyzed investigation and criminology scientific works, as well as considered studies on informational and telecommunication technologies in countering bribery. Thus, he came to the conclusion that H.A. Asatryan, A.P. Dmitrienko, M.G. Zhigas, V.S. Ishigeev, A.V. Kulikov, A.I. Ovchinnikov, A.L. Repetskaya and others contributed substantially to the study. Results: the following conclusions were drawn from the research: - The most challenging issues concerning the detection and documentation of bribery committed using digital financial and cryptocurrency assets were analysed by the author. - The most common ways to identify crypto wallets and their users, which can be used by internal affairs bodies, were considered. - The scheme of criminal transactions related to bribery was presented. - The regularity in the use of information and telecommunication technologies by internal affairs bodies in combating bribery committed using digital financial and cryptocurrency assets was defined. Discussion and Conclusions: there are signs of circulation of digital financial and cryptocurrency assets in bribery. The author presents his own variant of the inquiry for crypto platform to receive necessary information for the investigation; measures to improve investigation efficiency in internal affairs bodies when combating bribery committed with digital financial and cryptocurrency assets.
Matthew M. Kavanagh, Luis Gil Abinader, Fatima Hassan, Eli A. Friedman
Scientific advances to fight infectious diseases have been remarkable. International law and global governance have sought, and often failed, to keep pace, secure equity, and stop outbreaks. We trace the law and governance model emerging from early failure in the AIDS response and identify four elements: use of law by national governments to compel sharing; decentralized generic manufacturing; mechanisms for voluntary sharing of patents and technology transfer; international funding. In combination, these created a remarkable new ecosystem. We find that when COVID-19 hit and mRNA vaccines were rapidly developed, global North governments opposed mobilizing this synergistic model. Instead, equity efforts focused on financing purchase of vaccines from originator companies with little use of law. Amidst monopolies and scarcity of doses, vaccine nationalism fatally undermined this effort. Whether more synergistic law and governance emerges from rapidly changing global health law will likely dictate the efficacy of future global infectious disease response.