Forms of informal cooperation, coordination, and action that embody mutuality without hierarchy are the quotidian experience of most people. Only occasionally do they embody implicit or explicit opposition to state law and institutions. Most villages and neighborhoods function precisely because of the informal, transient networks of coordination that do not require formal organization, let alone hierarchy. In other words, the experience of anarchistic mutuality is ubiquitous. Subsidiarity frustrates. Emerging from Catholic roots to become an explicit part of EU law,1 the principle admits of clear articulation as an ideal (‘vest authority as close as feasible to those most affected’) but then invites conflicting interpretations and elaborations. As a workable principle, subsidiarity founders seemingly when we need it most: when we ask what, precisely, that principle regulates. Andreas Føllesdal has shown that distinct interpretations of subsidiarity have strikingly incongruous political implications, with any “apparent consensus … gained only by obfuscation” (Føllesdal 1998, 190). And as a moral precept, subsidiarity promises a politics sensitive to diverse needs and responsive to local knowledge; yet in practice, any implementation of the ideal pulls us back toward an authoritative center to regulate disputes and coordinate all of this local wisdom. Jenna Bednar describes subsidiarity as “the soul of federalism” (Bednar 2014, 231) and she has in mind two complementary rationales: ensuring that political power is close to the people affected, while also finding efficient ways to satisfy diverse preferences. Of particular interest in Bednar's account is the epistemic role for subsidiarity in bringing a wider range of perspectives to bear on judging new policies than might otherwise be the case in a more centralized system. Here, then, the justification of subsidiarity appeals to efficiency and accountability, not simply for any given snapshot of needs, interests, and associated policies, but also (and more critically) to the constitutional and administrative system as a whole.2 Still, these epistemic hopes for subsidiarity seem to assume, as Jacob Levy puts it, “a fantastic level of competence, knowledge, and disinterestedness on the part of the body that allocates decision-making authority in each case—itself usually one of the contenders for the authority at stake” (Levy 2007, 462). I love subsidiarity for these frustrations and ambiguities. In this respect, it is the perfect moral maxim for the real worlds of political institutions and practices, where most of us, most of the time, muddle through the messy day-to-day complexities of living together, while leaving space for dissent and resistance. Levy argues that subsidiarity “fails as an institutional decision rule,” but he prefaces that indictment with the thought that it “may offer a useful critical language” (Levy 2007, 462). That, I think, is a thought worth pursuing. Perhaps we will be less frustrated with subsidiarity if we see it not primarily as a decision rule or principle of institutional design, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as an essential challenge to the dominant vocabulary of the sovereign territorial state? To be sure, subsidiarity labors under the long shadow of the Westphalian imaginary, a vision of politics anchored in justifying coercion over a bounded territory. Sovereignty and rights are the coins of that realm. If subsidiarity is to be a critical lens, then it will be laboring against that imaginary, and our settled moral and legal vocabularies so firmly entrenched therein. To make my case, then, this is the labor I will undertake here. On a rather cold and unfriendly morning in October 1625, Rudolph Christian, the newly enthroned count of Eastern Frisia, arrived at the city gate of Emden, expecting that the city would welcome him and immediately start with the traditional ceremonies during which it had to pay homage to its new sovereign. But nobody met Rudolph Christian at the gate, and only later in the day a delegation of the city council appeared at the count's residence, telling him to his great surprise, that it had not been possible to meet him at the city gate because it had not been known through which of the several gates he had wished to enter (Hueglin 1979, 9). Centuries later and half a world away, Clifford Geertz (1980) offers the following story to set the puzzle of his remarkable account of politics and ceremony in precolonial Bali. Dutch administrators, seeking to establish clear designations of local authority and ownership, wished to establish the boundary between two hostile princedoms. The princes agreed that the boundaries were, respectively, wherever one could see the sea, facing outward, or the marshlands, facing inward. Perplexed, the administrators asked if there hadn't been past conflicts over such a murky division: didn't they fight over this territory? “Mejheer,” one of the old leaders replied, “we have much better reasons to fight than these shabby hills” (Geertz 1980, 24–25). Ultimately, things end poorly for the Balinese order. Geertz recounts one of the final encounters of that regime with Dutch forces in 1908, at “Klungkung, the nominal ‘capital’ of traditional Bali” where “the king and court again paraded, half entranced, half dazed with opium, out of the palace into the reluctant fire of the by now thoroughly bewildered Dutch troops. It was quite literally the death of the old order. It expired as it had lived: absorbed in a pageant” (12–13). What binds these two accounts? In each, older forms—and animating symbols and rituals—of political order fall before the imperatives of sovereignty and its most central ordering feature: coercion. Violence. Max Weber's (in)famous claim to monopoly over legitimate coercion within a clearly delineated territory (Weber 1919, 78). In the case of the Balinese order, Geertz means to highlight what our Westphalian-inflected conceptions of politics and the state tend to obscure: “the ordering force of display, regard, and drama” (Geertz 1980, 121). If we invoke our favored analytic categories and causal explanations to reduce the semiotic core of Balinese politics to “the worn coin of European ideological debate” we “allow most of what is most interesting about it to escape our view. Whatever intelligence it may have to offer us about the nature of politics, it can hardly be that big fish eat little fish, or that the rags of virtue mask the engines of privilege” (123). When the homage was finally paid two years later, on the 28th of June 1627, the relation between city and sovereign had indeed been radically changed. In the place of the unilateral obligation of the city, there now was a mutual contract: in exchange for the city's oath of loyalty, the count had to guarantee the city's privileges by an equally binding ‘declaration of rights’. Especially the oath-formula itself appeared fundamentally altered. Where the old oath had spoken of obedience according to customary law between vassals and hereditary sovereign, the new text only spoke of faith between count and city according to mutual contract and in consideration of the city's privileges (Hueglin 1979, 9-10). At the dawn of the sovereign territorial state, then, and sharing so much by way of law and culture, Althusius could negotiate favorable terms of Emden's submission with the fading relevance of local sovereigns. Two centuries later, no such space was possible for the Balinese, and for countless other peoples with distinctive ways of ordering their public lives together. History is littered with peoples who had better reasons to fight than their shabby hills, or who might sometimes fight over shabby hills that they only saw and settled on every few years, before moving on. These peoples lost out to others, whose understandings of use, possession, property, territory, and place were grounded in a particular notion of a right: powers and entitlements to exclude, ultimately grounded in the violence of the sovereign territorial state. The imperatives of territorial sovereignty are distinct from mere control: Henrik Spruyt (Spruyt 1994, 34–35) notes the fundamental novelty of what happens in the decades and centuries after the encounter Hueglin describes. Human territoriality is a deep fact of social life, to be sure; and claims of exclusive and absolute authority are familiar throughout history. The latter, however, were typically made by priests, emperors, and kings, and those claims were over people (bodies and souls), resources, and activities. Territorial jurisdiction was incidental to these desirada, and indeed unimportant insofar as the final authority of divine edict—and of the king or emperor sanctioned by the mandate of heaven—was universal and undifferentiated. In the medieval West, the idea of sovereignty, while a part of medieval thought and law at least from Bodin's famous reflections,3 took a long time to become politically important because it was not clearly differentiated in space: there were no borders delimiting God's power. Spruyt puts the point succinctly: “Church and empire were universalist forms of organization” (1994, 35). This is not to say that claims of territorial jurisdiction were uncommon in human history, but most often they were not claims of exclusive and final authority over clearly bounded physical regions. More often, jurisdictional claims were limited to particular times, people, and activities. Territorial control was incidental to, and derivative of, authority over peoples, activities, and resources. So, what is possible for Emden and some other cities fades as territorial jurisdiction becomes wed to the idea of sovereign territorial states. Possibilities for understanding and implementing complex and overlapping configurations of negotiated, provisional sovereignties become foreclosed under the emerging logics of capital (commerce, exchange, exploitation) and coercion (violence, control, domination), a historical dynamic beautifully elaborated by Charles Tilly (1993).4 Against that history, we so often find ourselves chafing at the legacy of the sovereign state system. Scholars wrestle with how regionally concentrated—and often historically oppressed or marginalized—groups can be fairly and within and most or when those might it from sovereign territorial Scholars with the of and the by peoples, in the and the world has with and if sovereign territorial may and more coercion at borders And and that state and perhaps most us to the of state sovereignty and the of how institutions in fact to with these complexities the of and legitimate coordination with to and indeed the and of the idea of and These are all indeed and I if we might do to some of those ways of ordering public that have been or under the that sovereignty has over Perhaps the of from such us to an understanding of subsidiarity at its a of against that as much as a rule of for What it to subsidiarity not primarily as a principle and an authoritative as a moral principle and but as a of against the dominant vocabulary of territorial sovereignty, and rights of jurisdiction and is as a and not a to and of the old order. after much to in the world we find ourselves have a and moral vocabulary that we can and and that admits of important and But how we the between peoples, and without some idea of And if we that to be a then we can with for the sovereign territorial state as and those This is also to however, that by the between peoples and as a of who has a to territory, we are these in a a and legal that to the idea of a over or and of and are institutional means to those and within a This is the of much by and who has a to what territory and its who as a distinct When and are these claims and what do those rights by way of resources, within a territory, and borders against to These are important and in a and with and our need for and on these is Still, these and labor firmly within the and vocabularies of the Westphalian sovereign state, and a dominant of that realm. are a and we can as engines for and we can territorial of claims of legitimate and of terms of rights ownership, and These are not the only such however, and we perhaps as the principle of to our and not force and political on other other ways of the between and peoples, territory and To this a might what could our to resources, and people other than one of This after the world we find ourselves have a and moral vocabulary from the past can and that and we offer important and to these in of the and of those past But on ways of understanding these if we were to in that what would be the as political those to and the most of ideal do not we long in the of at do not there and claim the of with we not only to our practices, but also to be in and in a world where where such to and where territorial the only feasible way to those rights through and I claim that she is such a but in on territorial sovereignty, an of the historical to the sovereign territorial these historical to the territorial system not because they real for us for the most they social and that no and they In on to that these historical complexities make clear it may be at the territorial system is not a or an political Still, so other in this of a given that we do in fact in a world of sovereign territorial (and associated is she moral justification for our world as a of jurisdictional we see this of political as a firmly historical are there that might or legitimate I not a I with and that state political authority can indeed be least given some of the by I to the on offer by such as and others, claims of for peoples to be on particular but also that the familiar state system is and in critical and that state claims of sovereign control over peoples and claims to in to moral and of that however, I that of I have more of the I what by the fact and our categories and the of authority so often toward the world in a particular and to that world according to their administrative logics and of and I also not a but in this I those have the can about and of political or that state but at the end of the if of a state and then it is a that its and at or use, this is what their their core their most I by as (and the vocabulary of rights when about the of politics, we may be that moral about coercion what so a that state is the or limited to Westphalian and or it to of or it is and its and according to the imperatives of analytic and of not they useful in understanding how our world and in I the territorial rights ultimately in the Westphalian imaginary, this these and and where it is Still, it is how our of, territorial rights in and in or ultimately to so much in moral vocabulary of and territorial jurisdiction a particular that those entitlements to regulate of and in so other not as a deep point of but as a yet historical fact about our and I not for of a territorial state system by the privileges of state and then by that those need be “the we are familiar with in authoritative of public but she that decision-making by and would count as on this would local that typically on a much than famous local for resources, such as local or to the But the of how those and local would be is the of the of territorial sovereignty are to politics, and I we escape that simply by some or the messy but local and that so in of and and the of occasionally in of a centralized To see the more in these of be to a that for their peoples and would this the the other in our world on terms that they would have historically for In that at the they can be our are in and a or ways that their understandings and would have without the of European to our understanding of and legitimate not us to And this the old that we simply their their conceptions of and to Of we and they But for all of our of and and we to in ways that make those the in through the complexities of use, and territorial on and the that are now I think, the only in these to only to while and this not the that is the The one other in in when the of rights is with of how to and place are I between and two this is more than the any other way of life, have in political and These and foreclosed for and the quotidian of and social life, on the that have to the hopes and of and and yet that sovereign have in and in the ways The of these I and and moral and then perhaps of our and ask if our favored ownership, use, jurisdictional territorial be in ways that are not so to the idea of and more to the legacy of that that that our understandings of and and that so for politics and and resources. can the and of the Westphalian on a bounded sovereign authority over territory, and then with our and their or we can that and its at least to some useful we can do the by and and are and in through who has rights to territory, when and and how we about and and But they are much within the Westphalian a little against the and historical of that we do when we ask about the of ways of within these and we find ourselves and often So, we need and moral within the and political we have but we also at those where the and and need not and It may be that we the ways that other other can us the and of at its can be such a a principle of through in ways that against rule by others, while the that we are often with those I of the to the at of this when they to their with the messy of politics as it is in and and villages and neighborhoods and and overlapping that quotidian against a of subsidiarity for and other within sovereign states. In other has as that sovereign territorial can be yet also then consideration (and to the of how a principle of subsidiarity might an institutional “a of by their to of a world but where subsidiarity more coordination at the level is with more local argues for a of control over when that control is to in but those can be by the more fundamental of When claims on and of which subsidiarity is an In a that and the justification of borders against the of than and and the notion that political order and peoples who claim sovereignty over a particular to through sovereignty on a on complex and of deep people, such as and which she terms In through how these of and but also and in of territorial rights and state sovereignty, appeals to an account of I the of account of territorial and on point us to about and in terms that the vocabulary of the sovereign territorial state. The of of what and where and as by and and typically the of of resources. of this is perhaps the story to of complex that few have the and on the by and the Emerging from a between two sovereign the has into a but of and that and that state, and policies to that at least people one and of two sovereign If there is one that what the day-to-day and formal the and and the to of would have to be decision is made that not make to those the of and most importantly, of is to local and and and The in some ways a point about of subsidiarity that are typically as a that any workable implementation of subsidiarity under of social and will require coordination and at of organization, and that the (and on such will be To the that any principle of subsidiarity of to that mandate will require a coordination of diverse of which require that are by as and which authority back toward a one of subsidiarity in the European at of that while subsidiarity has been by as a challenge to more with to it has to be an which some political not least the have to more and 2014, with that might be thought to that in of is not and that “the on are not however, on to that perhaps is better as a for with less on the in of On my favored of subsidiarity as a for critical these simply are not of subsidiarity as a moral and critical do a close between subsidiarity and of the between the epistemic and of subsidiarity within And I this to territorial anchored in what she a of most clearly by of the through with the of and authority in I do however, we need to these in of and overlapping jurisdictional and rights within a sovereign territorial state? If the is that politics is about and our then perhaps subsidiarity can be the core moral rather than sovereignty and rights of jurisdiction and perhaps more as the critical been subsidiarity is a that sovereignty, and control rights from and of the and in which so much of our most What of the at the by Andreas Føllesdal and several others, that interpretations of subsidiarity authoritative of the principle to to be a not with subsidiarity and not with subsidiarity as a critical lens, but with constitutional that the of their frustrations of by of human and the of politics as the of particular sovereign territorial states. to consensus on interpretations of political we claim to In such an however, constitutional and may not be a but a subsidiarity is as much about through in as it is a to challenge sovereign imperatives and their dominant In a world that has the of Westphalian territorial sovereignty, the imperatives of and which to toward the of with a critical have a that is perhaps If a on subsidiarity can us then it is The is to and for their on these and for their two on and subsidiarity at the of This from with and with at the Subsidiarity from two with this and in particular from by and Andreas Føllesdal on the of On the for to the dominant vocabulary of state sovereignty, I have much over the years from Hueglin and the The no conflicts of
In May 1991, an editor of the official magazine of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints reflected on a tumultuous quarter-century of liberalization within her church. She did so with a feature article previewed on the magazine's cover with the lines, “Framers remember formation of World Church Objectives,” and a picture of four of these framers. Those pictured were all elderly white American men. Ostensibly about a series of church objectives adopted in 1966, the article itself detailed the movement of the RLDS Church toward peace and justice theology, the inclusion of women in the priesthood, and a reframing of the very notion of mission in the church. In doing so, the article's writer included quotes from people involved in these changes. The individuals quoted had once held offices in the Council of Twelve Apostles or the church's First Presidency, the highest-ranking leadership groups in the church. The quotes were all from white American men.1In the 1970s, priesthood in the RLDS Church ranged from local priesthood who preached and presided over weekly meetings to denominational leaders who set church-wide policies. Until the mid-1980s, men filled all priesthood offices. Additionally, the RLDS Church, numbering 220,000 at its sesquicentennial in 1980, was overwhelmingly an American church, peopled by a white supermajority, even though it had a small presence in twenty-nine nations and an even smaller number of Black, Asian, Pacific Islander, Latino, and Indigenous Americans.2 Most senior church leaders in the 1960s and ‘70s were also white American men. These were the individuals who gave new revelations to the church, articulated church policies, and shaped things as mundane as hiring practices. Given this, the small cadre of historians who have investigated the RLDS Church's late twentieth-century liberalization have focused, perhaps understandably, on white American church leaders with graduate seminary degrees. These influential RLDS leaders participated in ecumenicism, taught peace and justice theology, and had transformative, global encounters as they spread the RLDS Church to Asia and Africa in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s.3This paper refocuses our attention on a different set of people who also shaped the church's rapid liberalization. These people included Barbara Howard, who wrote the article featured in my introduction. A longtime Saints Herald editor, Howard was also a founding member of a grassroots RLDS feminist consciousness-raising group. As I will argue, RLDS reformers like Howard allied with people across lines of identity, nationality, faith, and privilege, creating networks that helped make the church's liberalization plausible in the first place. Furthermore, the RLDS individuals and organizations that I will highlight in this essay gesture towards a broader story about how the New Left, forged in the fires of the 1960s, found religious denominations, like the RLDS Church, as fertile incubators for the extension of its projects across the global 1970s and 1980s. These were decades in which most scholars saw both liberal religion and the New Left in full decline, if not collapse.4 During these trying decades, the New Left emphasized the importance of grounding massive change in local organizations—in the small and the particular.In mid-twentieth century America, “small was big,” notes historian Daniel Immerwahr. This was particularly true of the New Left, that largely Western social movement advocating for identity-based rights in the 1960s. “Whereas the older leftism centered on trade unions and mass parties,” Immerwahr argues, “the new generation, enamored with ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘the beloved community,’ questioned the very basis for such organizations.”5 The New Left instead reveled in the democratic possibilities of small groups to create revolutionary change. For instance, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse told a New York audience in 1968 that the New Left was “diffused, concentrated in small groups and around local activities, small groups which are highly flexible and autonomous,” forming a “political guerilla force in peace.”6 For activists like Marcuse and his allies in the paradigmatic New Left student group, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), smallness seemed an antidote to all social ills.By the early 1970s, influential sages, such as the Gandhian economist E. F. Schumacher, the author of the best-selling 1973 book Small Is Beautiful, promoted the virtues of smallness.7 Politicians joined this chorus, too. Ronald Reagan, hardly a paragon of the New Left, declared in 1975, “It is activity on a small, human scale that creates the fabric of community.”8 The valorization of smallness also had a creative global reach across the 1970s. For example, Filipino community organizers created small, networked student groups to resist Ferdinand Marcos's dictatorship, and feminists across the United States and the globe met in small groups they called “consciousness-raising” groups for education, sharing, and political advocacy.I did not choose the latter examples randomly; the community organizing movement and radical feminism had distinct manifestations within the RLDS Church in the 1970s and 1980s. In what follows, I will highlight two individuals who exemplify these movements in the RLDS Church: the RLDS feminist theologian turned Unitarian, Sharon Welch, and the radical Catholic, community organizer, and RLDS NGO employee, Toto Delfin. As I will show, their social movements helped transform the RLDS Church, asking leadership to reimagine hierarchy and cultivate a more participatory understanding of the church. The RLDS Church, in turn, partially embraced these visions, redefining itself as a “Community of Christ” and proclaiming itself a “prophetic people,” not a “people with a prophet.”The RLDS Church's decision to do so asks us to reflect on the sources for rapid change within late-twentieth-century American-based churches. Put another way, did change come from above, below, or beside? More provocatively, the RLDS Church's evolution should also give us pause to ask what we mean by thinking about some religious groups as being successful in late-twentieth-century America. For instance, historians often talk about the success of evangelicals and Pentecostals in the late twentieth century. At the same time, they invoke words like “decline” when they write about liberal or ecumenical Protestants and liberal Jews from the same era. While it may seem less polite to do so with Restoration traditions, many everyday members of these churches point to the success of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the decline of the RLDS Church (Community of Christ). “Success” in these formulations, of course, is based upon the relative number of adherents that either one or the other group has, as well as the size of their endowments.I would like us to consider a slightly different question of and metric for success in this essay. In short, I would like us to think about how particular groups within a denomination can change their group internally. That is, how well do interest groups within their denomination change policies and orientations and exert wider cultural influence? As I will argue, New Left-aligned groups within the RLDS Church in the 1970s and 1980s might have influenced a numerically declining church, but they were astoundingly successful in giving their parent church a new set of orientations and policies. To make this case, I will first turn to Sharon Welch's story and detail the influence of small feminist groups upon the 1970s RLDS Church.In April 1977, twenty-five-year-old Sharon Patton Welch delivered a paper at a conference sponsored by an RLDS feminist consciousness-raising group called AWARE or Awake, Worship, Action, Renewal, and Education. The conference, held in Independence, Missouri, focused on women and the priesthood. Its keynote address featured a feminist theologian from Vanderbilt, where Sharon Patton Welch was a graduate student. For the April conference, Welch boldly proffered a constructive critique of the very idea of priesthood in her church.Welch began by methodically showing her audience problems with the notions of hierarchy in the Melchisedec and Aaronic Priesthoods and clerical Christianity. She argued that it was not just that the RLDS priesthood excluded women; the priesthood itself was based upon a hierarchical worldview, elevating some humans and lowering others. In an act of feminist resourcement, Welch offered a pragmatic intervention that drew upon particular RLDS traditions to counter this hierarchy. “If authority is defined as the ability to evoke skills and creative initiative in others,” she argued, “rather than the right to govern and lead, it seems appropriate that we think of it as emerging out of the social acceptance of one's effort to facilitate the growth of others.”9 This was what made priesthood a possibly transformative, liberating experience. Welch opined that such a system would enable the RLDS Church “to expand its ministry as it is open to the variety within each person, and is no longer restricted by fixed, limited definitions of the talents peculiar to each sex. This type of system discards the safety of defined patterns of service and hierarchical patterns of control. It is an acceptance of the challenge to develop a community characterized by collegiality and trust.”10 While somewhat vague, Welch envisioned a system of authority within the church that could be characterized as an interconnected web of consciousness-raising groups.Radical feminists created consciousness-raising groups in the late 1960s as a means for education, agitation, and, ultimately, they hoped, revolution. Many individuals who identified as radical feminists had felt shut out of New Left and Civil Rights advocacy groups where feminist issues might be marginalized or even ridiculed. In response, radical feminists advocated for forming small, cell-like groups where individuals could come together for face-to-face interactions, listen and validate each other's experiences, and be educated on feminist pedagogy and issues—and thus have their consciousnesses raised. These groups stressed egalitarian processes, too, where no one person was to dominate discussions, and group tasks would be rotated among participants, obviating the need for the specialization of roles or hierarchical leaders. In the 1970s, feminist consciousness-raising groups became places for radical political advocacy, personal growth, and group therapy.11In some ways, 1970s feminist consciousness-raising groups mirrored the best of what Welch had experienced in her church. Born and raised in the tiny farming town of Dimmitt, Texas, Welch attended a small RLDS branch (congregation) mostly composed of her family. In later reminiscences, she emphasized how it affirmed her, giving her great confidence in herself. Her voice was taken seriously, and she grew to believe that her calling in life was to be a scholar and earn a PhD, a degree that no one in her social sphere possessed.12 Welch also reflected that RLDS summer family camps, called by RLDS folks “reunions,” were really “socialist experiments.” “People paid what they could pay and donated their labor,” she noted. The RLDS folks who attended these camps were “farmers, janitors, and truck drivers,” and the vast majority lacked a college education. “The most uneducated worker,” she noted, “might have the insight in a class or prayer meeting that changed people's lives. There was no elitism.” As a child and teen, “it just seemed so natural for me to see people living in cooperative ways”—a stark contrast to the outside world.13Welch was a gifted high school student and left West Texas for Michigan State in a she to the RLDS Church's liberal she in but she did not That when she with RLDS her the and they and it an of feminist possibilities in Welch later that was I of the cultural of religion so in also her with RLDS feminists who became her and like Barbara Howard her to a small, RLDS where all in of priesthood Additionally, Welch was to do that no RLDS women had at the a graduate to she to in but not she and Barbara Howard attended the meeting of an RLDS feminist consciousness-raising group in in group was not the first RLDS feminist consciousness-raising group. A small group of and at had the in and it out to in some of its of these and and the group that would Welch to their meeting at the of in Independence, RLDS women and a to the RLDS Church's the leadership group in the church, composed of the First Presidency, the Council of Twelve and the of The began by This is on of all the women in the church by of their have from full within the church not to ask that another or be filled by one of the many women church but that a true in so that no one who is as and to tasks be for a this time, women of the in the RLDS Church, they held very with of authority within the church's and local Most of these priesthood and an RLDS conference women from in the priesthood. the that did not priesthood were largely filled by men. In the RLDS World a to and more women for but was no hiring 1973 and Given this the of the feminist the RLDS World AWARE women RLDS women from across the church to their At one such conference in AWARE women RLDS if they could their meeting in official conference as other interest like or their In response, AWARE member a longtime and the RLDS Church's a to the group. AWARE women their meeting on paper and in This act AWARE of new and a group of within the 1970s RLDS AWARE feminists to their and each other even if AWARE members had to be more when in official church AWARE met in the of its members in the Its meetings were a with and within the a it held in with many other 1970s feminist consciousness-raising In this way, AWARE women to the church they would be embraced more its two decades of AWARE became a for and AWARE women feminist also local women for the first for of in their advocated for more in church and helped a advocating for women in the RLDS priesthood. AWARE also the conference at which student Sharon Welch the Welch delivered her address in 1977, she was to called to a different As she later the RLDS Church in graduate At that women were not being and it was a the women who were but who were not and who movement being taken on She that “the for me was that more people of Jesus and the of in liberal not Welch to in her became as she began to other religious In Welch became a and taught as an of at the first person with in Restoration to at was not in her another RLDS left the RLDS Church in the early 1980s and was in the United Church of Welch, she a feminist at a in her case, of at AWARE and from in the RLDS Church, the became a college and and the latter a feminist in she that inclusion was not even for the majority in the 1970s RLDS This mirrored among as historian argues, the decline of churches in the 1970s can be to number of but one was that these liberal traditions were not liberal to many New Left activists in the Welch and some of her feminist who left the RLDS church a with it in Welch that was not so a the RLDS but a of what it taught For a time, Welch to to RLDS and feminist In she a to a on RLDS by Herald the official RLDS The official RLDS the in turn, a of Welch's first of and A of Welch even to in to an AWARE where she with the women with she first experienced a consciousness-raising life a of radical within the RLDS Church in the 1970s. While Welch left the RLDS Church, she and her feminist helped create an in which could be in the first place. She also a of RLDS that in which the priesthood itself became more egalitarian and even women to be to the RLDS priesthood in was not the one by the possibilities of grassroots In this the RLDS embraced a global in which community organizing could radical social in the and Welch's in on the of an RLDS NGO that did just to community organizing in the RLDS Church, we turn from the to the where radical who an RLDS NGO a new understanding of in the 1970s and a in the of in that time, as his called had for and its parent for more than in a for an with me that the and a told a I raised my a senior and a Filipino A This of a that from of in community that began a the first of Filipino and some of the Filipino Ferdinand Marcos's During these called the as it in the first of the called out the and The with and even student many joined the Filipino and its the New organizations to create social such as the Council for or in This latter group and from the community organizing movement in the United States by and from American the 1970s, community organizing like the as student activists to as places to create radical democratic from its not or could their and create change. A community could facilitate change but could not the they the people to for their articulated and helped the 1970s, most in the were that gave A community also in this was to local by the 1960s, the had the as a for local political and many of sponsored by Filipino churches or church became of to Marcos's policies and of this in the Born to a farming family in had attended a high school and college that many radical a with a community organizing NGO college in NGO to in the of to and his among the was when allied with local his in their small, upon the just the and would have if had NGO out of the and a for another NGO in met another radical NGO who was a was from a radical family. was one of the a group of who the for its and his had as to in the human for for a of liberal human the the more radical than their were particularly in community organizing to the of human found an to do an RLDS Church RLDS Church itself in the in 1966, four from a tiny church. These of their and family networks the RLDS church. also helped create the church's first NGO in the or This being in the of the First and Marcos's of in Marcos's with the New in the in A small RLDS in the of was in the The all of to their and from the the members of the RLDS and In RLDS Filipino leaders for to their RLDS and the church's the American and Filipino RLDS leaders upon a The would to from the and the of the the of their the RLDS would that the to in the new Furthermore, they would in how to like and this from of for This was successful as it was and As an of this, began to influence the RLDS Church, American thinking that local to in the in that the attention of American such as the early 1970s, his to the a mission of in and the RLDS this mission as its As the RLDS RLDS to the This the the of RLDS leaders and In RLDS the attended a on at the also the projects by in in an employee, was as the of for had not of a community organizing but of and their In the early an that to community organizing and human this to his In interest in community organizing to Toto a of the they created a they called or a that had a life of its in the RLDS and I have the I will just an from our radical of the and his valorization of the local the the could be for a variety of In it the to make liberalization in for the on this focused on in and of the of the global in the a and RLDS and a cultural and radical to participatory human to their This was on a too. the of the New Left and in the decades the 1970s emphasized the denominational leaders the of participatory human to a new of of their denominational for instance, church leaders opined that their denomination to be more from meetings to World became a that or even their to the church. It also some and offices. The and of the of which was one had a on the RLDS In a group of American RLDS leaders a to the church's of that meeting a to the denomination as “Community of The church who this emphasized that the denomination to be than people with a It was a of the and of the movement in the very of the American-based Barbara Herald article quoted at the of this Council of Twelve Apostles think we would be a a we had not the of that and I think be a if we had the might see and in of the 1980s. For example, of denominational for is of what it was in the late and its by a these latter the great of the 1970s and 1980s was a In this, of Christ other in it to if the success of the is by different small groups of people on the of the RLDS Church had created successful within the denomination by the late 1980s. RLDS could point to small things that had to projects the the inclusion of women in the priesthood, a networked with other liberal and peace and justice the what do we make of of liberalization and its as a The words of one of the of the church's liberalization a In Sharon Welch she was not about the of the global justice one that radical and Welch's RLDS American feminists helped cultivate within the RLDS Church in the 1970s and 1980s. she is that global justice by the and of who and to doing all that I can to it one should such a from a who grew in a small on the of a small For people like Welch and her of Christ is an in small
Kamilla Nazirkhanova, Vrushank Gunjur, X. Pilli Cruz-De Jesus, Dan Boneh
Ensuring the privacy of votes in an election is crucial for the integrity of a democratic process. Often, voting power is delegated to representatives (e.g., in congress) who subsequently vote on behalf of voters on specific issues. This delegation model is also widely used in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). Although several existing voting systems used in DAOs support private voting, they only offer public delegation. In this paper, we introduce Kite, a new protocol that enables $\textit{private}$ delegation of voting power for DAO members. Voters can freely delegate, revoke, and re-delegate their power without revealing any information about who they delegated to. Even the delegate does not learn who delegated to them. The only information that is recorded publicly is that the voter delegated or re-delegated their vote to someone. Kite accommodates both public and private voting for the delegates themselves. We analyze the security of our protocol within the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We implement Kite as an extension to the existing Governor Bravo smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain, that is widely used for DAO governance. Furthermore, we provide an evaluation of our implementation that demonstrates the practicality of the protocol. The most expensive operation is delegation due to the required zero-knowledge proofs. On a consumer-grade laptop, delegation takes between 7 and 167 seconds depending on the requested level of privacy.
MARGARET Fuller's essay-letter to William Henry Channing in the summer of 1842, “A Credo,” is her most forthright expression of radical Transcendentalism, affirming an evolutionary process of nature and spirit in both metaphysical principle and Biblical symbolism. Fuller directs her well-established understanding of world religions to comparison with Christianity, and she at least implies the possibility of new roles for women in the world's future. In both respects “A Credo” anticipates her major work, Woman in the Nineteenth Century.1 More immediately, however, she offers her testimony at a moment when competing ideas of Jesus stand at the forefront of the Transcendentalist movement and its related network of Unitarian churches. Fuller's statement of natural religion finds private expression but speaks powerfully within a collective history.Though occasionally excerpted in collections of her writing and commented upon by scholars, “A Credo” has lacked a critical text to stand among her works. This documentary project aims to provide Fuller's complete statement as well as position it within the Transcendentalist movement. The manuscript of “A Credo” has been overlooked largely through circumstances of transmission. Channing included a selection in Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli (1852), while also censoring its content. However, by 1883 he valued this statement enough to send it to Thomas Wentworth Higginson, then working on his biography of Fuller, as a central expression of her “Prophetic Spirituality & Conscious Communion with the Divine Influent Life.”2 Higginson's more secular study found no place for “A Credo,” though he preserved it among the Fuller papers he eventually donated to the Boston Public Library. Soon a scholar of German Romanticism, Frederick Augustus Braun, transcribed the text as an appendix to his book on Fuller and Goethe; however, he used it only to argue for Fuller as a disciple of the German Romantic writer, “not a Transcendentalist at all.”3 With the recovery of Fuller's work since the 1960s, “A Credo” has been excerpted and commented upon several times, whether from manuscript or from Braun. Always its participation in Transcendentalist discourse is assumed. Most recently, a study of Fuller's religious skepticism in this essay has focused on the constraints preventing a woman writer from publishing such views in 1842.4 None of the recent scholarship, however, proposes publication of “A Credo” for current readers.Fuller's testimony is capacious in scale and perspective, open to examination in more than one way. It offers an important sign of Fuller's growing religious feminism by attributing cosmic origins to a “spirit” that is also “angel mother,” later referred to again as “she.” At the same time, Fuller speaks in primarily masculine terms, even while naming deities and prophets, as she addresses the Transcendentalists through Channing. The shifting narrative perspective of “A Credo” allows these concerns to emerge together. First, she tells in abstract terms of creation, its future unknown to “this being who now writes.” As she envisions it, the human race has no binary separation from either nature or spirit, participating in one pantheistic entirety. Nor is gender a significant internal division; soon she speaks as “we,” the collective humanity that, like the spirit, breaks through obstruction and achieves knowledge. But then an individual, intensely devotional but self-affirming “I” emerges in her account of Jesus: one who has “no objection to the miracles, except where they do not happen to please me,” who finally believes in Christ “because I can do without him.” Fuller implicitly acknowledges this first-person voice as a woman's when she specifies the Biblical text for a sermon “[i]f I were to preach on this subject.” She has no opportunity to preach, but “A Credo” is her laywoman's sermon by letter.All of the issues evoked in this statement—the miracles of Jesus, the status of the Bible, the power of nature and intuition—had defined the Transcendentalist controversy since 1838, when Ralph Waldo Emerson's “Divinity School Address” characterized the church's “noxious exaggeration about the person of Jesus” as “Monster” rather than “Miracle.” In response, conservative Unitarian Andrews Norton blasted Emerson's words as the “latest form of infidelity,” going on to argue for the Bible's verifiable history of Jesus as the only ground for faith. Emerson made no direct response, but colleagues sprang to his defense by affirming truth as perceived by the individual mind. In “A Credo” Fuller was offering her own perspective on the miracles controversy. Earlier she had reported to Emerson on Norton's latest publications as well as describing the “paper-pellet” aimed by a younger critic at “that peculiarly nervous sect styled Transcendentalists.”5 Now, as she wrote to Channing, she composed “A Credo” because a friend had asked specifically for her views of Jesus.6 Fuller's own “infidelity” joined with Emerson and his allies, even as she went beyond them in directly presenting her cosmology of past and future.A long process of self-expression and interchange with others led to her testimony, extending from years before Emerson's manifesto to the moment of writing in 1842. Fuller held a position of quasi-clerical authority among Transcendentalists by this time. The third season of her Conversations with women had just concluded: since 1839 she had been leading path-breaking discussions of the truths suggested by Greek mythology and the fine arts, with frequent cross-reference to the Bible. She had described her first session's theme as a “genealogy of heaven and earth.”7 In the same period that such ruminations on divinity and humanity grew, furthermore, Fuller was serving as editor of the movement's Dial magazine, soliciting and judging work on religious and philosophical subjects from both men and women. All of those to be named in this essay had contributed to it. As editor, she reached out widely to the community of progressive belief. In “A Credo” she quoted a sentiment without identifying its author: “The soul must do its own immortal work.” Such words might have been Emerson's, but instead they were from a poem by Eliza Thayer Clapp, a woman outside Fuller's immediate circle, as published in the Dial a year before.8“A Credo” epitomizes Fuller's vision during this time of double cultural leadership; moreover, it embodies the personal transformation that she claimed amidst such work. At the opening of the second season of Conversations, in autumn 1840, Fuller wrote to Channing that she had found a warm reception from the group after telling of her “great changes,” recent experiences of mystical identification with the divine. In the same letter she also reported on her own writing experiments, “The Magnolia of Lake Pontchartrain” and “Yuca Filamentosa,” which would soon be published anonymously, with her as editor, in the Dial. Along with “Leila,” a third piece of experimental fiction, these appeared throughout the months between Fuller's “great changes” and the beginning of 1842, the year of “A Credo.” In them she affirmed the power of female forms in the natural and spiritual worlds: woman-identified flowers bursting into bloom under the moon's influence; a grand tree, “Queen of the South,” singing to herself in solitary power; the goddess “Leila,” her wild hair blowing in the wind, who embodied the Holy Ghost's descent into matter. And the personal immersion in divine nature that Fuller expressed in such work was confirmed by a contemporary journal entry remembering her earlier self-consecration, when after exiting from church she had found illumination in the sun's glory and vowed to sow “new and immortal plants in the garden of God.”9 The revelations of 1840 and their expression in fictional and autobiographical form offer a direct prelude to her apparently spontaneous essay-letter of 1842.Significantly, Fuller wrote her creedal statement as a letter rather than in published form, even though the Dial had already offered her the possibilities of anonymous authorship. Any statement that directly claimed kinship with divinity apart from Christ and the church was a scandal, all the more, as Caitlin Smith notes, from a woman.10 But in addition, Fuller was prompted to write “A Credo” by particular friends, both the person who initially asked about Jesus and the letter's recipient, Channing, amidst an ongoing dialogue with him. Letters underlay all of the Transcendentalist movement, as texts with a life of their own. Later writing tearfully from Rome, Fuller told Caroline Sturgis of her need to continue “friendships I had paid for with so much heart's blood,” admitting that without letters from her and from Channing, “so many thoughts in the long past seemed to flee from me.”11 “A Credo” lies within that body of thought and feeling. Here I will suggest how four epistolary exchanges anticipate its voice and theological ideas: first those with James Freeman Clarke and Emerson, then those with her even more memorable partners, Sturgis and Channing.From the early 1830s, James Freeman Clarke supported her growth in new German learning, later a strong foundation for “A Credo.” With him she waxed about and of this friend to the about the who the history his by and how and had Fuller also reported to Clarke and Frederick Henry on her immersion in Biblical under the of German She thought of from its expressed in and found in a new to her exchanges and her Biblical immersion directly in “A Credo.” Fuller's of a in as both and have in particular from who had for the of nature and humanity out of Biblical furthermore, to “A Credo,” even as like in the truth of with Emerson was both and through their long In 1840 she the power of his work first him it in four years later she it from the was to how much more I it now than at I the now I the The years do not in “A Credo” was in its of it was also not with however, and after the “great changes” later in 1840, she his her of mystical have I to the central she to her she wrote not the friend I the same year that she composed “A Credo,” in his “The Emerson the movement him as it in or not she wrote in to her essay found a position by on the of not their to the And where Emerson characterized the Transcendentalist as one who from the for it to offer work of response, Fuller both nature and humanity in and As she had to Caroline she rather than the who seemed to have She but also Fuller's a friend with she both of the beginning Fuller's letters expressed an upon Greek and mythology even while as well about the of Jesus as a friend and of She quoted about the his directly to the rather than the who She was a in these letters by the need for and whether with or with its its its the and the growth would only she do not direct like the But is in the Fuller this friend as the first to of her “great changes” in I is found And at the of is can be no but all the in must be of from Emerson, she found with In both their and their expression of religious Fuller's letters to her directly anticipate the of “A Credo,” where she by as an of within the spirit and by the in Fuller's however, was the friend who directly “A Credo.” with William Henry Channing out of Dial when Fuller from the to to in the grand she a new it on 1840 But their as to the after only grand their letters were to Fuller her own of and to in the before with Channing both the of her and the “great changes” in her first claimed her as a as an to she out in after her personal with the of I were a and then would be I in this of Divine I out into before I it. I I I I More was at for her than a to authority as a as she that with for the particular her to Divine the and that she would soon more in “A Credo.” With an from her to she her own and those of Channing in the of the Unitarian to a sermon that the new to an of and Fuller the instead as for herself to for would now preach the Holy as as have been and instead of the understanding and instead Fuller was her own religious apart from church or of however, not Fuller's for such a among the claimed to the Unitarian than she had James Clarke a for the of the he and Fuller but not And Channing, to this moment his an focused on the of humanity in Christ he claimed a religion that would this is the he wrote to his of Transcendentalist on the Boston that year to the about and Fuller had no as Caroline later an between Fuller told Channing in how much she sermon which with the of Soon such ideas in “A on the and in which to a theological manifesto and in his from the Unitarian of the and authority claimed by their on miracles as of his But he as the of his of and Clarke Channing joined in the of Fuller, while their of his views in the new of also held of her Credo” might be Fuller's statement of to Channing in of Christ had seemed at first a for In early of 1842, Channing wrote to his of an for all At the same time, however, he a of Christianity, Jesus as of the of in And though his from such his letter first a new of the of beyond so as to a which the not the Fuller of this and soon asked Channing to how to At the same time she him as directly as he had just The she had been to him the of the its As “A Credo” would the of that she affirmed had beyond Jesus, both through the and the essay also both directly and was the one contemporary she named in it, to his in and from the as of the had claimed that an like that of to his thought at which with the of In “A Credo,” Fuller both and his of her for But this just after she had affirmed in the even it was rather than the of Fuller his life as of a She of Jesus at the of an by naming and before even the in to be from Jesus and prophets, her evolutionary as form was for future At the of “A Credo,” the sermon that she to preach might have been to both Channing and as she offered as its text to his is for that I he so that the spirit her journal from the Emerson that Fuller wrote in an to “A Credo.” with Emerson, a of letters from Channing, she herself to both must own no to but the Waldo must not in William in the fine that has I have of Channing, she she not need the is at in is to to a to but it is affirmed in the of own and the soul and nature all I have church where I by and Fuller was from the earlier statement as it had both the forms of and her own within it. In vision and “A Credo” is Fuller's most testimony about and the soul and by a and in to exchanges within the Transcendentalist is a spirit and it all is whether of or its it to it is to be an of forms not in the of this being who now of as This is the or publication of spirit upon the like in the This is a a new as for for for the of as through his he the which the divine The is in the of was this second the divine to for for for the in the which the as the of it in the of the of is when he is is as through and has no to this as through and of into the nature of the Divine it is from own though the of where all already is this must has been by the of being must be for and only in time not do him and led by of of then the of the The moment have through an not but by the of to was to the and with soul that is it would that the Divine expressed his to more in than in the forms of and through him the which his forms of nature only in whether from or because he is not to the of the when is in a when he is not so with all as to their spirit, also must be at the form of nature and of the she has been to through those of men in the to one that this and spirit in the human But and is a of enough is through a to the and obstruction on the of through all the of thought the is in I well and many and offer to the whether of whether of do not to an upon the position and of because I of his and the of his The history of the the of the suggest already of being than and which more this of But I do his life to be the in one of in the and that all these to and when on these strong through which on the ground but how the in the to the as he now these forms is a of and a soul of the is to to to be And as the of spirit, a new for its is one in the garden of the his many religion The the history of the human it has into the but its several though expressed the not beyond and a the history of however, have been more and more and so in the history of of the have several is men from only in being made through the and words of is whether as or but its of expression though of it is is As the to its so do to the of do this through the others through the The first second these all all so as they to the of their and so as they to that of their as is a a form is as its as the the and is its as the and within the that is expressed in the as the and the and of and the and his so has of thoughts and its upon it to a a form which stand before it a of the of its It with and it them with it its life of in the it with It one life as as or It has made it has it of the of which humanity is and one of the in respects the it has was the life of Jesus of so much in his history as I own in the long of and the truth of I a in the of Jesus be the of his its and its and I in the as in the I in the prophets, and that they not only their but the of a an one to at the the would have made of the of his a of the of the I that Jesus when the time was that he was peculiarly a and of I have to in the of his the circumstances were in time he was of a and the a truth of the I have no objection to the miracles, except where they do not happen to please not a soul so and new and I can him the and the without of of not in the they is to such a upon and all who have him since on the have their within to it not be when I to that though I all this it is of no to whether it or that the truth such to is and that the of for had the and offered it to as a to as as I it would be just as how the that from the also that I in the history of the and its in as presenting one of spiritual It is to and a of I have no from the of for as it I it as a thought to be expressed by the of not that they who their through the to were and not more than an to Christ has made many of his not place Christ then in a place than for or because his life was not it was and he is a of the But then I the Greek as one men in Christ as a a soul must its for many only when men from and him by the of their own open to of the from can he be as he do not he on his own expression he but this is not in I like to of this in he was not and where men so was and is and where he them to the they not they with him and do not I in Christ because I can do without because the truth he I because it is in the nature of own But I do not to do without him. is and I will not and on him. he to I will when I to by I I do not the church men who can with in it. I I more widely than body of men I And as I than in the apart for that will not to do The the than at a of again that to be and I will they to But that time is not I & in and I with I as to religion in It would be a of But for the I will how it is with as to I as where spirit in It the of it it it But so the and a and the It is only one of the same Jesus breaks through the of the world's like through the & I its I it. But it is a of the is about it, but its will not though I in them one I most men in need of them their their them be them in the of past But of I in these and in as they more, they beyond I would from them to I no from the past to own soul or not to the of Jesus of will of that that was in the it is not but and it must future will like to the and the but to But as an for a & a for a so Christ for a life more complete and than that of have had the to and have a to out all the forms of human life with the and of a Greek with the of a with the & of have not with how the of the in Jesus for a But this as the by to his be of in a letter or essay on the process of in have not of his life as a so that his words all & they to with all the and of the of a divine It is the same with and in a with have not of men to from the same that them so on a or of the of In him the the But this is in as will must do its own immortal friends, from only to when can do without But when can and from to do without them they will no I were to preach on this I would for a text the words of Jesus, I the is for that I for I the will not but I I will send him
US states have been adopting a conservative approach to abortion that have far reaching percussions to women. By a conservative approach, I mean a legal framework ascribing personhood to a fetus from the moment of conception. Depending on the state it may mean that women are not able to get access, for example, to certain birth control which contain medicine that thins the wall of the uterus and so helps inhibit pregnancies from forming. In its most extreme some conservative legislation tries to restrict access to medical abortion prescriptions [1]. A conservative turn in the states, whether coming from the federal district court, a state’s court, or legislature, puts women who advocate for their right—some say their human right to control their own bodies in early pregnancy [2], to strategize about the best way to secure those rights. Setting aside self-help options for women seeking abortions, (moving to a state or going across state lines to states with clinics that will prescribe the medication,) the broader question for those seeking to allow for medical abortions in early pregnancy is how to change the law in the state. Is the best advocacy strategy through the courts, or whether it is better for them to use the political process to make their advocacy to the public generally? Should it seek to secure an even more explicit amendment to their state’s Constitution? At the heart of the strategy will be an important question: How best to persuade a court or body politic about the religious aspects of the question. Is the court or legislature or regulatory agency the best institution to be tasked with balancing deep intuitions about the sacredness of potential human life with shared goals of also protecting the health of women during their pregnancies? How can the discussion avoid polarization and demonizing that leads to political deadlock? Regarding the latter questions, some help may come from looking at the international history of jurisdictions with conservative approaches to abortion. Ireland, Poland, Mexico, and Argentina each have had their unique confrontations with more conservative legal-religious settings. All four share a religious Catholic majority in their citizens that needed (and in the case of Poland, still needs) to be addressed [3]. The “religious” setting in a particular US state will likely share some of the “Catholic” perspectives on when human life may begin, but will likely also have some significant differences, especially around the source of its religious authority for criminalizing abortion. On the other hand, a particular US state may share a more “pluralistic” perspective, which balances off strong nonrational religious views against religious freedom concerns of other faiths. As a result, important compromises in Ireland, Mexico and Argentina reveal the more irrational nature of approaches that try to deny abortions after conception, or even at heartbeat, on religious grounds. These jurisdictions then have composed compromises that still do reverence to later stages of fetal development but permit women to control their bodies during the first 12, and in the case of Argentina and Mexico, to 14 weeks. US states may do well to aim for a similar compromise. Ireland and Poland also have European legal settings that are both similar and different, that can help a state see what approach its state supreme court might take to the question of how its constitution will be interpreted. They share decisions from their Constitutional Tribunals that have marked conservative shifts toward giving personhood rights to fetuses in the midterm of pregnancy. They also share a legal umbrella, brought about by the fact they are members of the EU, and as member states have committed to a shared protections of human rights under the authority of the European Court of Human Rights (EHRC), they use the argument of “natural” law to ground rights of women to control early pregnancy. As a result, they present a contrasting legal setting that can amplify the legal setting a particular US state might find itself in. Mexico shares a more “federalist” structure of the US, but also has rejected a criminalizing approach in a particular state’s jurisdiction, that had criminalized abortions before 12 weeks. Mexico, then, shares many of the challenges that US states face, but has in principle, at least, set aside its previous religious based position criminalizing all abortions after conception. Briefly, the situation in each country is as follows: In Ireland, Irish progressives had tried in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to challenge the Irish Constitution. They lost in 2010 at the ECHR, and so turned to a national referendum to bring about change to its Constitution [4]. If progressives in US states adopt the approach that the Irish women did in 2018, they might take their case directly to the electorate and use state referendum provisions to amend the Constitution. An important feature of the Irish approach was that it then was forced politically to “trust” the Irish legislature to regulate abortion according to the majority will. They needed to present the case to the public generally, that “personhood” did not begin at conception. Having made that case to a majority of voters, they repealed a previously enacted 8th amendment to the Irish Constitution, declaring life beginning at conception, and were able to trust the Irish public health regulatory agency to enact health regulations that balanced the rights of women and the unborn. These regulations provide that Irish women have a right to choose during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy [5]. Thereafter, their rights are dependent on a woman’s ability to meet their burden of proof to health providers, regulated by the state, that they meet the exceptions provided by current Irish regulations, according to rape, incest, or, importantly, for health of the mother against the/right of the viable fetus [6]. In contrast to Ireland, in 2020, Polish women learned that their Constitutional Tribunal restricted their right to choose after years where abortion was widely available. The Tribunal found a right of the unborn not to be discriminated against based on “its” disability [7]. The Tribunal treated the fetus, even in early pregnancy, as a “person” for purposes of judging discrimination against it. That ruling has made a Polish right to choose virtually nonexistent, even when a woman’s life is at stake [8]. There seemed little appetite since then to challenge the holding by amending its Constitution. The history of abortion in Poland is made doubly political because of abortion having been linked in the mind of many Poles as being associated with Nazi concentration camps in Poland. It was also linked politically to “permissive” approaches to abortion backed by Soviet law pre-Polish independence. Add to that the Russia Ukraine war at its border, and some observers feel the time is not ripe to create political divisions on abortion rights in Poland [9]. There are also pragmatic worries about making the argument too political. They worry about how to amend the constitution in a way that won’t be interpreted by the Court in a manner that fails to be protective of their rights to control their own bodies. They are caught waiting on the ECHR to decide their case, and while their legal arguments might be strong, (the Court is more open to using Europe’s progressive morals as evidence of the existence of a human right), they are also subject to the court’s go-slow political reasoning when it comes to human rights. They also have brought the case as a class action, which may diminish the individual narratives of the women caught in the Polish legal trap. Those individual narratives demonstrate how protecting the fetus from disability discrimination requires medical providers to wait to determine the health of the fetus while risking the health of the mother. As a class it is harder to avoid the “self-help” possibilities available to women, generally, since abortion is so widely prevalent in other European states.
I was a high school senior in September 1993, when Lavina Fielding Anderson, Avraham Gileadi, Maxine Hanks, D. Michael Quinn, Paul Toscano, and Lynne Kanavel Whitesides were disfellowshipped or excommunicated from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. While these six people's lives were being upturned via Church discipline, the great drama in my life was spending too much money on the homecoming dance and then sulking that I didn't get asked to the next girls’ choice dance. My daily journal from the time, in which I painstakingly documented what I was learning in history, English, or calculus class on any given Tuesday, gives no intimation that I even heard about the excommunications. I was serving on seminary council and faithfully reading B. H. Roberts's History of the Church while some of the people whose works about Latter-day Saint history and theology I would read and admire only a few years later were being expelled from the LDS Church, if not necessarily the Mormon community. Despite my ignorance at the time, these events ended up having a profound effect on the trajectory of my life.I enrolled at Brigham Young University the following year, in fall 1994. No one in my social circles was talking about Mormon history, at least not in any academic sense. I don't recall any of my professors mentioning the September Six during my freshman year. The excommunications didn't really register for me until four years later, during my final year at BYU, when I took a course on Mormon history from David Whittaker, who was the curator of Mormon and Western Americana in the BYU library's special collections. It was my first exposure to scholarly Mormon history. Professor Whittaker talked about the September Six as the latest chapter in the long and complex relationship between the LDS Church and its intellectuals.That was the same year I applied to graduate school. I sought advice from several professors about my plan to pursue a PhD in American religious history. No one explicitly encouraged me to become a Mormon historian. Not Professor Whittaker—for whom I worked in special collections, who was one of my mentors, and who clearly thought highly of my abilities and potential. Not Richard Bushman, who was very gracious when I audaciously cold-called him. Maybe it was because they could tell I was interested in the broader American religious experience, not just Mormonism. Maybe it was because they believed—as I do—that it's important for students of Mormon history to also study other things. Or maybe it was because it was 1998, they had lived through 1993, and they were still nervous.From the perspective of institutional boundary maintenance, the September Six excommunications were a resounding success. The tactic worked, at least in the short to medium term. The show of force did exactly what it was supposed to. It made clear that Church leaders would not tolerate intellectual exploration that they perceived as challenging Church doctrine and what they deemed to be apostolic prerogatives. This wasn't about Church leadership feeling threatened by one individual or drawing the line on one issue, as we later saw in the high-profile excommunications of the 2010s (Kate Kelly and John Dehlin being the most prominent cases). It was a broadside, a frontal assault on the entire independent Mormon intellectual community. The fact that the six recipients of Church discipline were writing about different issues and occupied different positions across the ideological spectrum is precisely what made the excommunications so effective. The not-so-subtle message to the rest of the LDS scholarly community was clear: it could happen to you too.Part of the mythical power of Church discipline—the way that it intimidates those who are not directly affected by it—is the way that the decisions of Church leaders, working individually and together, are shrouded behind the veil of bureaucracy. Even three decades later, we don't know all the details about who directed these six cases to go forward all at the same time, or the degree of communication and coordination between General Authorities (which ones exactly?) and the various bishops and stake presidents on the ground. Boyd K. Packer's name frequently comes up, but the cast of characters was no doubt much larger. Their names and roles are largely anonymous, however, because they were acting in institutional roles that left no paper trail (or at least not a publicly available one). It's not really accurate to say that “the Church” excommunicated or disfellowshipped any of these six individuals; most Church members had no knowledge of these disciplinary actions. Though we frequently speak of it as such, “the Church” is not a historical agent. Collectivities (like “the Church”) neutralize the individual responsibility of any one person acting on behalf of the whole. Accountability is anonymized and diffused to the point that there is no longer any real accountability to speak of. And that allows collectivities—whether mobs, corporations, governments, or churches—to act with at least a certain amount of impunity.With all of this in the background, it makes sense that no one encouraged me to pursue a career in Mormon history. They didn't want to cheerlead me into a professional dead end or an antagonistic relationship with Church leadership. In the late 1990s, the prospect of ushering me, an eager and faithful young LDS undergraduate, to a doctoral program to study Mormon history would have seemed tantamount to pushing me out of the trenches and sending me across the demilitarized zone to a doomed fate on the other side. My professors had learned well the lessons of September 1993.But I hadn't. When I eventually learned about the excommunications, it seemed like ancient history—something that happened, like that homecoming dance, way back when I was in high school. Besides, the late 1990s were halcyon years for Mormons and Mormonism. The Church was the “fastest growing religion in the world”—at least, that's what we told ourselves, aided by sociologist Rodney Stark's grandiose projections.1 Anything that happened in 1993 was not just one but two Church presidents ago. The Church was in full Gordon B. Hinckley mode. No dour anti-communist, he. Instead, there he was smiling on national TV, matching Mike Wallace and Larry King stride for stride. What's more, the prophet was encouraging Church members to get all the education we could. Anti-intellectualism was a thing of the past!As I started graduate school, I had imbibed all of President Hinckley's ebullient optimism. I was living proof of Mormons’ newfound standing in the world. The Department of History at the University of Notre Dame was one of the best doctoral programs in the country for religious history, and it had admitted two—two!—Latter-day Saints. Yes, we were occasionally objectified, even exoticized; in almost every class session of a seminar we took with a distinguished Catholic historian, he gruffly asked, “What's the Mormon take on that?” But there we were, at the table! If any of my Catholic, evangelical, or secular colleagues and professors ever mentioned the September Six during those heady days, I don't recall.It was in the mid-2000s that it began to occur to me that perhaps 1993 was not so distant after all. I published my first article in Dialogue in the Spring 2004 issue. Two years later, I was invited to join the Dialogue Foundation's board of directors. I wanted to keep all my employment options open, so when I received the board's invitation, I called several people at BYU to ask if adding my name to the Dialogue masthead would be a problem were I to apply for a job in Provo. Most of them said that it was a new era—my board affiliation might get raised in an interview, but any concerns could easily be allayed once the interviewer heard me express my heartfelt commitment to the Church. Only one of my former professors cautioned me against joining the board, warning that any formal association with Dialogue would undermine an otherwise strong application to teach at BYU. I learned firsthand on two different occasions over the next few years that she was right.Fortunately, BYU wasn't my only professional option, as I found other good jobs to begin my academic career. Right as I was publishing my first book, The Mormon Menace, Claremont Graduate University opened a search for the Howard W. Hunter Chair of Mormon Studies. A chaired professorship in Mormon studies at a secular university was still a novelty. I decided, almost on a lark, to throw my hat in the ring. I knew I had no chance: I was thirty-four years old and had (barely) published one book. Endowed professorships are supposed to go to accomplished mid-career or senior scholars, people in their forties or fifties or sixties who have a long publication record and are recognized as leaders in their respective fields.The establishment of the Hunter Chair represented an opportunity to pass the torch to the next generation of Mormon studies scholars. But the handoff was a stretch. There was a pool of qualified candidates, but it was much smaller and more academically junior than it should have been. What explains the gap between Mormon history's founding generation and mine? No doubt there are multiple factors, but the fallout from 1993 must rank high on the list. The September Six excommunications resulted in a lost generation of Mormon intellectuals—smart, talented people who should have written books, led scholarly organizations like the Mormon History Association, and shaped both the academic field of Mormon studies and the broader public understanding of the religion.2 Latter-day Saints were primarily affected, but non-Latter-day Saint scholars also picked up on the cue that the Church wasn't enthusiastic about open inquiry into its past. A few Latter-day Saint intellectuals stuck with it, foremost among them Terryl Givens (interestingly, a literary scholar, not a historian). But there should have been an entire generation of Terryl Givenses.The Hunter Chair should have gone to a senior scholar. In fact, it had originally, with Richard Bushman coming out of retirement at Columbia University (where he held another endowed professorship) to get the endeavor off the ground. But when Bushman stepped down from the Hunter Chair in 2011, most members of the founding generation of New Mormon History were either at or near retirement age. Furthermore, many of that generation had spent their careers teaching at BYU or working in the Church History Department—neither of which was an especially attractive career profile for a secular university like Claremont. Philip Barlow would have been an excellent choice, but he had recently been hired as the inaugural holder of the Leonard J. Arrington Chair of Mormon History and Culture at Utah State University. There was another younger member of that generation who had published enough influential scholarship to be a potentially competitive candidate for the job. His name was D. Michael Quinn. Yet the principal donors to the Hunter Chair, who did not control the search but whose generous gifts creating the position afforded them some degree of influence with university administrators, made it clear that they did not consider an excommunicant to be an acceptable candidate for a position named after a Church president.3 September 1993 loomed large over Mormon studies, even at a secular university. The fact that a thirty-four-year-old with one book was hired for an endowed professorship at a highly regarded university can only be regarded as a fluke. The stars aligned in an unpredictable way that worked out splendidly for me, but only after many others had paid the price.Times change. Things did get better in the early 2000s. The archives started to open up again. The Church History Department started producing and supporting first-rate historical scholarship, most notably the Joseph Smith Papers and the research that culminated in Ronald Walker, Richard Turley, and Glen Leonard's masterpiece Massacre at Mountain Meadows. Latter-day Saint intellectuals found new confidence, and more non-Latter-day Saint scholars gravitated to the field. Mormon history has blossomed and expanded into the multidisciplinary field of Mormon studies. Social scientists, theologians, philosophers, literary scholars, scripture scholars, and others are all producing pathbreaking work. We are living in a golden age of Mormon studies. Tellingly, most of the work is being done by people who were either young enough, or started graduate school late enough, to have not been scared away by the events of September 1993.There are still whispers. Fear remains, even if we try to push it to the back of our minds. I am frequently asked, “Have you ever been called in by a General Authority for something you wrote or said?” The answer is yes, once. We spent a little over an hour together, enjoying a wonderful conversation that I genuinely cherish. He revealed himself to be a deep thinker and compassionate minister of the gospel. But I'd be lying if I said I didn't think of the September Six when I opened the letter and read this leader's “invitation” to meet with him in his office. When friends and colleagues publish or say things that push the envelope, I actively pray they will be met with the same generosity and understanding I experienced.4 There are no guarantees. Some of Joseph Smith's most poignant insights into the human condition came when he languished in Liberty Jail during the winter of 1838–39.5 In his masterful prison letter to the Saints, excerpted in Doctrine and Covenants section 121, he reflected on the nature of power in a fallen world. Power may be exercised in various ways. Too often it is used “to exercise control of dominion or compulsion upon the souls of the children of men.” When this is the case, “the Spirit of the Lord is grieved.” In heaven's eyes, the unrepentant wielder of that kind of dominative, manipulative, compulsory power is in a posture of hostility or enmity not only toward other humans but also toward God. Alas, “sad experience” reveals that “almost all men” will “exercise unrighteous dominion” at some point.6 They may get what they want—God offers no promise to intervene in such cases—but this is not the order of heaven.The prophet's key insight comes next. “No power or influence can or ought to be maintained” unless it is predicated on the divine qualities of persuasion, longsuffering, gentleness, meekness, kindness, pure knowledge, and most of all “love unfeigned.”7 This oft-quoted scripture is usually interpreted with an emphasis on the ought. That is to say, we ought to be kind and gentle and loving in our relationships with one another. But the statement is more radical than that. This passage is not simply about the way the universe should work; it tells us the way the universe does work. It is descriptive, in other words, not merely normative. The key words are can, only, and maintained. Certainly, it's nice when people are nice. But in a world of agentive souls, power and influence can only be maintained over the long term when assent is granted freely. Compulsion, dominion, and manipulation can and do work in the short term. People can be controlled or subdued with the use of intimidation, fear, and violence. But the human soul yearns for freedom and fulfillment. Any form of power based on compulsion rather than persuasion, intimidation rather than invitation, fear rather than love is therefore inherently limited—not just in its ethical value but in its efficacy.The September 1993 excommunications effectively and tragically cowed a generation of Latter-day Saint intellectuals. When institutions and individuals are threatened by new ideas, there is always a temptation to retrench. The blunt force of Church discipline worked in the short term. Even within a few years, however, its effect had diminished. Why? Because ideas cannot be quelched by fiat. And, more fundamentally, because “no power or influence can or ought to be maintained” by fear, dominion, intimidation, and compulsion. A new generation of intellectuals arose and carried the torch of inquiry forward.Churches thrive when they count their intellectuals as assets not liabilities, partners not villains. Will intellectuals think unruly thoughts? Yes, because it is the divine nature of the human mind to inquire, to explore, to expand. The pursuit of knowledge resists institutional correlation. If members or leaders of a group encounter thinking they deem to be dangerous, they are generally served best not by attempting to prevent or squelch that thinking but rather by providing better, more persuasive thinking. Numerous historical examples suggest that the compulsory silencing of ideas deemed “bad” is ultimately more dangerous than the ideas themselves. Churches, like governments, lose their authority precisely when they have no recourse other than mere authority. If Church leaders want to promote or discourage certain ideas, they have ample opportunity to use their power as teachers to persuade the Church membership of their position. Even in a digital age, it is the rare intellectual who can even approach the reach of the general conference pulpit and other modes of official Church communication.Thirty years later, we can be grateful that the collective excommunications of September 1993 proved to be an exception rather than the rule in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints's ongoing relationship with its intellectuals. We cannot change the past. But hopefully we can learn from and avoid the unnecessary tragedy of future lost generations.
Thomas Jefferson’s fame as an advocate of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, equal rights of men, religious freedom, and democracy has been frequently questioned. For many scholars, his racist statements, his scant concern for women’s rights, his apparently unrealistic anti-slavery policies, and his anti-Federalist politics suffice as proof of the very opposite of his reputation. This article argues that politics can be viewed as the centerpiece of Jefferson's worldview, according to which all purposes needed to be brought into compliance, to the effect that one ended up with different politics for advocating democratic institutions, for progressive science, for personal self-development, and for socioeconomic issues, including slavery. The never-ending process of creating policies for bettering American society also gave politics its own character as a moral concept.
Like most theories of democracy, democratic republicanism has usually taken for granted who the demos is. However, precisely one of the most frequent sources of political conflicts in contemporary history is the determination of its boundaries, particularly –though not only– in secession conflicts. This article aims to answer a related question: what kind of right to secede from a modern democratic state,1 if any, can be acknowledged from a democratic republican viewpoint? By answering this question, I hope to make a contribution both to republican literature (in which secession has barely been analyzed) and also to the normative literature on secession (in which republicanism has very rarely been used as a normative framework). The core tenet of the republican theory of secession developed here is the recognition of a non-unilateral2 right of secession for any democratic secessionist community within a democratic state, coupled symmetrically with a non-unilateral right to territorial unity for that democratic host state. The rationale behind this theory is to deny both sides the power to impose their will without having to consider the interests and opinions of the other side; that is, to deny arbitrary power, which in republican terms is synonymous with domination. As we will see, this in turn minimizes the chances of permanent majorities and powerful minorities achieving arbitrary power in center-periphery conflicts. This article does not discuss secession as a general phenomenon, but focuses particularly on secession conflicts where both secessionists and the host state (and the unionists within it) are peaceful3 and democratic. The rationale behind this analytical choice is to minimize what we might call normative noise, i.e., normative issues that distract our attention from the ones that we initially intended to discuss. Modern democracies, however imperfect they may be, are the closest polities to democratic republican ideals that exist in our contemporary world. Thus, when neither the host state nor the potentially seceding territory are attempting to move away from this political model in a non-democratic direction, secession appears normatively “naked” in democratic-republican terms. I am not trying to find out whether democratic secessionists are legitimated in seceding from undemocratic states, nor whether democratic states are legitimated in suppressing an undemocratic secessionist attempt. The article presents this theory over eight sections: (1) a review of current theories of right of secession, pointing out why republicanism can be a useful framework to overcome their weaknesses; (2) an overview of the main tenets of republicanism, explaining why (and how) republicanism must analyze secession conflicts as a type of factional conflicts; (3) the presentation of the normative core of my republican theory of secession, based on non-unilateralism; (4) the outline of a non-unilateralist framework for secession conflicts; (5) an outline of three problematic scenarios for the theory, and of the role that unilateral mechanisms can play in order to tackle one of them; (6) an exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of two possible institutional translations of this theory (constitutionalization and internationalization); (7) a discussion of some foreseeable criticisms of the theory; and (8) a summary of my conclusions. For the purposes of this article, a secessionist movement is a group of people that seek secession for a broader group of people, namely the target group. 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The people does not deny a to secession, but for of the and of their secessionist is who be to call the my be an democratic that the target this is the in target as within modern democratic However, this will not be the the target group may to a state. that the host state has for the target group with some kind of in order to call a secession if secessionists clear democratic in order to call the this of that they be a clear majority in the they also an of over that we can be that has a its this be in with the people that a secession has been in a that has been in with the I and that has in a clear this not to any the target group be to arbitrary permanent that on the other to to unilateral secession, this make the host state to this in order to both both sides an to in I we can state that two in when both their the and trying to in a For if the potentially seceding territory a that to be for the host neither over the a they seek some kind of in order to an in and from the The that a a secession is a arbitrary permanent the other the that a in a is a does not make to the host state with secession in order to if the to secession is a with that host state. However, an this institutional framework has the secession and its also the of a secession and the a The here is the host state this two (1) to the terms of and (2) to and a unity that is to the secessionist within the host state, that to be secessionist in the the the in the we a my this we the the secessionist non-unilateral right of secession, on the one and on the the host non-unilateral right to territorial to the this both to their and the their the host state the this will that to make a for territorial unity this is the of a in which the host state and the secessionist with neither particularly are both very to their to this be to an to this with other democratic in order to For if the host state in for the and neither the secessionist are to nor the host state to (and a be in the secessionist in this be to whether they secession if they what the host state is The if is very be taken in order to a The and the secessionist community to in its for secession, the be for the host state to but to a also a question: the secessionist that has the the power to call my secessionists to call as as they they will the host state the of a on the will the secessionist target group the of arbitrary permanent Thus, in with this theory to secessionist to call for a a but a The of this to be the of an and be the that can their For the of we that when this general is to if to the might three problematic (1) one of the territory secessionists as potentially seceding is not of the political in which the secessionist movement the democratic power to call for a in the of an secession in the (2) one of the territory secessionists as potentially seceding is, in a majority of people who secession the of and (3) one of the two of the this non-unilateralist the I be not to the territory in the secession the of that territory to be democratic The can be I the very of non-unilateral The of this to this be on the democratic republican that its to the secession However, I that we must this two a majority of the to secede from the broader a majority of the to secede from the broader territory if the broader territory to secede from the host state. I the for a majority be in the in the The rationale behind this is the people an will that is of the secession of the broader territory a on the of the as a people if they to in the of the broader territory seceding from the host state. the that one of the two is attempting to impose its the of the democratic host state, I that this is (1) secession a of of minorities the potentially seceding territory (2) the target group be, any a secessionist i.e., of a (3) the secessionists are attempting to secede in the unilateral secession a democratic secessionist community be (1) is the host state (in the (2) the host state is a (3) the host state is to its territorial unity and a secession in the Thus, the for having a right to be for both they this right if the to be be that this non-unilateralist when to to out but a (1) on the we other the secessionist (2) what be the for a clear (3) in the of a clear can be whether the host state and the secessionist community are in (4) can be whether the host state the secessionist community are any of the scenarios that The to be Thus, we to who answer i.e., who be the of the and what and political framework that are two possible of (1) and (2) the is usually that and secession are synonymous the of a right of secession has the attention of to to but of the has been out from the of of democratic The of this right that the of this non-unilateralist framework be a the in state, with the of i.e., the host state its its on the my this a a right of secession, in terms of and will be the that the of will be, in the one of the to the host that is, a power to one of the does not that this power will be to be the but in terms of this However, the of and secession, in the is I is a possible institutional of this republican its non-unilateralist be taken within the a of and to democratic states, as as and democratic secessionist to This outline an institutional framework for a non-unilateralist of secession political conflicts. the in this framework be a the with the of the the of this non-unilateralist framework within the a This be in with the in their to current republican within usually for a (1) democratic and (2) the of and and the of a state the to this and a state. to an is to and of of and two The of republican in the that of the to republican and a of republican the they are two that republican for a (1) the of and (2) that is not to a state. However, has been on the of the of the republican who with secession, an for the to be the is states, be in the we an to be a is that is not a is states, the in one secession are not states one secessionist but one state one secessionist to that an be to be an as the host state. a the be to that the of of is that they are the states that are to be they are usually a of one state that an institutional of this republican be an framework to secession conflicts. if the be problematic of the of a the be problematic is states, democratic to be of their over their the when they in their with secessionist in the the most for the of this republican (1) to as democratic as possible state and of the of this non-unilateralist to secession that they to when secessionist and (2) to for the of this both in as as in when and where I that main criticisms can be this democratic republican republican and two The republican be a to as an factional not be for a democracy, the to a right of if majority are a in the host state, this is they a factional my factional does not nor is that is the other an institutional that factional arbitrary power in will to discuss and other The republican namely that of of that republicanism to to in of the This can from a with the political secession can this and a republican secession in very As in the I this one and secession conflicts precisely when this kind of is people to a state does not in any that they are to to we that this be based democratic we that that two the is not particularly their to the of and the of the and and the in the this the of a non-unilateralist framework for a secession can two (1) an to a (2) an for unity and the the host state, as as the seceding will political the host state to in the the host state will the secessionist community that to be secessionist in the Thus, is to that this democratic republican if will be in terms of political which are to their republican be that of The be that this precisely the of in are some people a right to secede from a modern democracy, a non-unilateral (1) to some people over a that the political and (2) to the of the political community as i.e., as my both of this be the we can consider that secession political if we for granted that political one is the host state, which be secession the host state in the as taken the of the host state its this is an secession, be an the of the host state. this a for the host state and its in a non-unilateral framework for secession conflicts. not the of this secession does not the people the other of the in the in for from in the the a in which been to and if are to the the people of the of not be any from they are from the in any they be from the but not from which the of the will to be of a democratic The territorial of their will be their within that will republican one of as the republican to that will in Thus, secession will be to any republican However, I this is The that and modern as in the of and the related of and on the one and of on the the what for democratic republicanism is to and as as to may the the one that this theory, if in be in terms. Modern democratic states are states, and as they to their not to However, for The of the as having a of the of the a useful in order to the of the states their its in an framework has not been in order to that states but (1) has a to and (2) to has an of power for I hope the in this republican if they a on the of states and The the for for center-periphery However, I (1) my theory does not the of (2) secession for any a over the a majority with its state, that an for its and (3) is some that the very of a secession the and of Thus, the of a secession and not in the of is also a for a permanent to a permanent majority from an The democratic republican developed here can be as (1) secession conflicts must be as factional ones (in as the the of center-periphery (2) a democratic republican framework for secession conflicts within modern be based on a non-unilateralist that be a non-unilateral right of secession for any democratic secessionist a non-unilateral right to territorial unity for its democratic host state, a right for both sides to when the to be and (3) the and of the framework be institutional is that are that out of the of this article, but which to be in order to this are two main of issues that to be (1) the of the of the theory what a on secession we an for secession be the of an to a in a on and (2) the of this theory on its be to non-democratic they be to other territorial as I secession conflicts as not having a based on answering the the demos question, to current I that is clear answer to this question, in in the has to be if states are to be demos if also is whether this of power the main of a democratic republican theory is not to is but to that are to and I to and for their and useful and the and the to this I conflicts of to is an the of and as as a of its interests are theories of and its its and its and its and weaknesses in with normative issues in modern
THE LAW OF ORGANIZED RELIGIONS: BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENT AND SECULARISM By Rivers, Julian Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010 Pp. 400. Hardcover, $120.00. CHRISTIAN SLAVERY: CONVERSION AND RACE IN THE PROTESTANT ATLANTIC WORLD By Gerbner, Katharine Philadelphia, PN: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018 Pp. 296. Paper, $24.95. LAW AND IDENTITY IN COLONIAL SOUTH ASIA: PARSI LEGAL CULTURE, 1772–1947 By Sharafi, Mitra Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014 Pp. 368. Paper, $36.99. In November 2018, President of Ireland Michael D. Higgins signed into law the thirty-seventh amendment to the Irish Constitution, removing the word “blasphemous” from Article 40.6.1.i (which prohibited “the publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter”). A crime since the document’s 1937 ratification, the blasphemy provision was scrapped after a public vote in which nearly sixty-five percent of participants agreed to its removal. Ireland’s Constitution can only be changed by referendum. The blasphemy vote was one of several such referenda held in recent years. It followed the May 2018 decision to repeal the eighth amendment (which, by giving equal legal status to both the fetus and the woman carrying it, criminalized abortion) and 2015’s equal marriage referendum, in which Ireland became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage by popular vote. Given that the official Catholic hierarchy campaigned heavily against both proposals, these votes were read as evidence that the Church was no longer the primary guiding force for the Irish people. For many outsiders, this spate of referenda—and the changing place of the Catholic Church that they were taken to signify—was met with glee: proof that the arc of history bends toward social liberalism. If conservative, religious Ireland could vote to legalize same-sex marriage, the New Yorker breathlessly suggested, so too could Mississippi (Sorkin 2015)! While some celebrated, however, others wondered how bans on abortion and blasphemy could have survived so late into the twenty-first century. “The population has moved on, [people are] no longer controlled by the Catholic Church, but a lot of the laws that were put in place are still there,” argued Michael Nugent, the head of Atheist Ireland and a veteran campaigner against the blasphemy law. “We have to chip away at them and get the state to catch up with the people” (Graham-Harrison 2018). But what would this “catching up” look like? Narratives of legal and cultural progress in which conservative religious shackles are slowly shed may make for good copy, but they rarely reflect the complicated reality governing the interaction of law, politics, and religion in contemporary nation-states. Indeed, studying the historic interaction of religion and law in named polities—that is, the law’s regulation of religion, religion’s influence on legal norms, and the semisubmerged theological underpinnings of many contemporary legal categories—is more likely to lead to recognition of the contingency of these relationships than to an acceptance of the “tidy stories” in which one is slowly filtered out from the other (Johnson, Klassen and Sullivan 2018, 5). This review offers three case studies as an introduction to historical accounts of law and religion. Focusing on the law’s regulation of religion and religion’s salience to law in post-Reformation England, the seventeenth-century Caribbean, and British-controlled India, these historical investigations of the law-religion nexus shed light on the broader contexts in which states, constitutions, communities, and “religions” are formed and governed. In particular, they emphasize the ways in which legislation concerning “religion” has involved the production and regulation of difference in multicultural, multiethnic, and multireligious states. This is demonstrated by, inter alia, the changing place of the established church in England, where the distinction between Catholic and Protestant has been somewhat superseded by the distinction between religion and the secular; the role of Christian missionaries in the racialization of slavery in the Americas, where legally enshrined Protestant supremacy developed into white supremacy; and the strategic mobilization of the law in India, where the embrace of litigation cemented a distinctive ethnoreligious identity among Zoroastrian Parsis. As all three regions struggle with political polarization and the normalization of ethnonationalism, these works shed light on the historical developments underlying such divisions, offering much needed context for scholars working in and on these countries today. If “law and religion” is a growing subfield of legal and/or religious studies, it is one that raises definitional issues familiar to scholars of both. So notes Julian Rivers’ The Law of Organized Religions, which begins: “This is a systematic study of English law as it applies to organized religions. None of these terms is particularly satisfactory” (vii). Given this difficulty, Rivers’ ability to synthesize centuries of legislation and legal cases into a coherent narrative is impressive. Beginning with the Roman conquest of Britain circa 43 CE, he provides an overview of the legal regulation of religion(s) to the present day, albeit with a focus on developments from the nineteenth century onward. It is an undeniably ambitious project, not least because, as he puts it, there is no clear “constitutional principle” that could be said to govern organized religion in English law (345). The narrative he tells is one of rising religious diversity (and tolerance of that diversity) alongside the emergence of a commonly held belief that church and state ought to be kept separate. By the mid-nineteenth century, English law had begun to move from the assumption that all religions were unlawful unless they were specifically recognized and provided for to the assumption that all religions were lawful so long as they were not outlawed. In this way, the “changing law of Church and State [is characterized by] a slow transition from the maintenance of one true religion to the principle that there is, in law, no false religion” (24). (Another way of putting it, as Rivers intimates, is that all religions are now recogniszd as being equally false, legally speaking.) Given the coterminous fact of religious establishment and separationist assumptions, the Church of England (CoE) has come to function as a kind of paradigm for church-state engagement, normalizing the presence of religion in public life for both established and nonestablished traditions. “This dynamic tension,” Rivers suggests, “has been the substitute for any statement of constitutional principle” (345). This is a story in which religious establishment and religious pluralism, although initially opposed, increasingly rely on one another to justify their place in the public sphere. Establishment continues, but it is no longer the explicitly discriminatory, punitive regime of prior decades. Indeed, representatives of the established church increasingly seek to speak on behalf of those framed, in the parlance of our times, as people of faith (as opposed to people of a particular faith, religion, or tradition)—a sharing of privilege only thinkable in a context where the critical difference is no longer that between Anglicans and Catholics, but between people “of faith” and those who do not so identify. (“Religion,” as former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams once put it, is increasingly seen to be the preserve of “oddities, foreigners and minorities” by members of the political class [Batty 2009]; and such oddities must stick together.) While this move toward religious pluralism has made it easier for members of nonestablished traditions to organize their worlds according to religious precepts and practices, it has also been accompanied by a “thoroughgoing process of secularization” that Rivers worries will impact this relatively newfound ability (25). In particular, he argues that the state’s tendency to view religious liberty as a matter of individual conscience (as opposed to actions, practices, and community norms and standards) is a troublingly narrow understanding of what religious freedom means (30–36). This strand of analysis runs throughout the book, which is critical of legal efforts to enforce normative, romanticized visions of what religion “is” or should be (for example, through requiring religious organizations to be “publicly beneficial” for the purposes of charity law, or by insisting that these organizations comply with equalities legislation in the same way other associations are expected to). Following an initial overview of the history of English law and religion, the book then adopts a thematic approach, discussing legislation and case law relating to, among others, ministers of religion; chaplaincies; faith-based welfare; and religious schools. Rivers does an admirable job of highlighting the ambivalence that seems to undergird much of the relationship between religious organizations and the law. For example, Chapter Three focuses on what he terms “the centre of the law of organized religions,” that is, “the legal constitution of religious bodies” (72). Historically, this relationship has been defined by ignorance or hostility, at least for nonestablished traditions. Roman Catholic and Jewish organizations, for example, could be easily disrupted by a legal system that did not recognize their institutional structures or social forms. More recently, however, the situation has been marked by a different kind of tension, one in which judicial oversight is simultaneously requested and resented. Religious organizations may seek the protection of the law, but they are also wary of submitting themselves to secular power. Similarly, the courts are keen to protect religious citizens even as they are wary of venturing into disputes that might be deemed “theological.” As a result, today’s English judges are (in theory) less willing to rule on issues relating to doctrine than their nineteenth-century forbears, either these in or to the of a Rivers suggests, not as a of the between regulation and but there are of and as to its If a religious a on an that the as or theological (as opposed to there may be the courts the these judges between theological and legal is, of a matter of A is in the state’s regulation of religious as which one of the of church-state law. the of New a faith-based no longer a historic but have been as of a of a tendency to public to In to with the and other Protestant the state also and the of faith are While this has been by many religious Rivers notes that it has not come state to state The of religious to and that to equalities legislation “the to which the law of is into a in which only specifically religious and As faith are a particularly clear of Rivers’ they efforts to recognize religious pluralism by on a by also secular norms and that as a to these Rivers’ is not only It is also in a of what he the of is critical of efforts to church and state and worries state into religious that although courts are increasingly willing to recognize that religious issues are they to to of the public Indeed, he that and diversity have the to in the one this will influence to the may with the that state efforts to by religious on the of or (for example, as the of are as after at least some of the for such norms from the these could as easily that these religious are by their as that their religious are by the there is a to be made that inter alia, and should be in of religious and Rivers for religious on these he to with the fact that religious liberty for some may come at the of and that is by the fact that religious is place at the same as the of secular and assumptions, on religious organizations not ought to be these would be for not to religious liberty as an In the since The Law of Organized was first religion and have to make is some evidence that judges have taken on Rivers’ of state for example, which held that Christian could not be to a with the the case law Rivers’ view that there is no “constitutional principle” governing this (345). In legal more the situation is For this of principle is A coherent of law would religious and individual citizens to where they what is expected of and from which laws they can For these the of a of religion in English law. For our however, the English case is it a guiding the law is of the fact that it has developed in to political both and to the of tolerance and as to be and to the in religious by the of As Rivers puts it, “The relationship between law and religion in any country is a of historical and England is for the legal likely to from its from the In a increasingly the regulation of religious diversity a and the “law of organized will be an of legislation and litigation long is this more than in the of and religion in what Katharine Gerbner, in recent book Christian “the Protestant on from the and from the through to the late how Protestant missionaries were in the legal of white supremacy and slavery in the More the move from Protestant supremacy (in which Protestant was with liberty and political to (in which although it was deemed with to white supremacy which than religion, had the of In so to of the and and a somewhat romanticized of Protestant missionaries as the of By how these missionaries to slavery to their Christian to legislation that Protestant status was with If their can be as the of the they should also be the long history of for of these to the lot of contemporary white supremacy has its in their efforts to this of This is an As much historical on in the focuses on its relationship to the not for their to such as the and have had scholars a into their As a of those with the for from the these Protestant missionaries and a for Christian slavery that the for the of the and nineteenth focuses on to the of from the to the late In the were that As they were opposed to the religious of those they had and missionaries with By the of the century, however, the emergence of the doctrine of Christian slavery had many such to the presence of some of as a means of and than their a of and legislation to make the case that and missionaries a role in this the for a to Chapter for example, which the for the of the in efforts to focuses on the of named and in New and to the of Protestant supremacy by the of with laws to the of Christian all to make a that they did not seek of any to from the and to their Chapter Christian to the in legislation of the word with the word as a of While have long recognized that from the this by on the relationship between the of and the of In for example, this salience in to the but population of By the late century, some members of this community were for according to English law, to be and Given that could all these to the relationship between and political The result, was the legal of a for this growing community from the to vote or for For example, between and the was rarely in Indeed, it three in years. its between and which the community was in the first of the century. The of the by an As the century, had as the primary of such as the for the of and white and the to and preserve the of legally both and of to the status of a of their religious or cultural While these to place throughout the This the in New and the of which to to the of by a that “the of not the of the as to or While had been a in the legal of those example, as in the case of who for freedom in in on the of and of of the century the of freedom from the context in which the of historical on and slavery in and the focuses on and where were into the Catholic Church against their some in which Protestant and Catholic missionaries and could one efforts at and In this way, slavery in to Catholic Similarly, among the Protestant a role in the different to for the of The Church, for example, in to from the Christian does not away from the and underlying one of the that of While some scholars the for and/or (in to religion by that one one system for it than the of to recognize this tension, a of and how and their in Christian for many some of which would have their recognized the of Protestant some as a way of and as a means of or slavery some will have been of the or of will have involved a of some example, those of have been out against the of or The case of a on in is a of the of for the and of While the the of white named is not It is likely that was by it would social or or not it an had a narrow of The same is true of the many other or with to their was an in a context of and and are “the and missionaries in the and a and religious for a system of This and to the former on which Christian Given the out and by to book is It is an for scholars and to and in our While some have or religious others the law to such was the case with Zoroastrian in the lead up to embrace and of law is the of Mitra Law and in Focusing on of the legal system from to both the of a system of law and interaction with the legal system as legal to law, and the law that controlled them by into the legal system than to English norms or their identity to the of the of them to its and to protect themselves by interaction with the the did the the of of at the of the legal and political 5). by the ways in which Zoroastrian from other in British-controlled circa While and were of law law were taken to legal As they were according to the laws of By the of a century however, the situation was only had the courts to a of law, but they had also some of the and were in English law and both working in courts and them to disputes with their Parsis. in legal was by what a In the century, the community was made up of throughout in where the community was the were only percent of the they made up percent of involved other so in the The is In to being willing to those from the community to were also willing to legalize Given that might have in a to issues the community out of a to interaction with or regulation by the seems to than on or doctrine as an focuses on the institutional that to to law. notes that they did not have at the community A there was no clear hierarchy in and the role was one of than the provision of or will to the the of a legal to or which law was an and subfield of religious (72). other in that recognized law could to had come to from between the and centuries no such of law to which to of their had been in of in other of religious may have been as a of changed the organized themselves into that and for the of legislation to marriage and English legal norms with those that this their system of law, a system by and In marked to the situation and communities, the of which were by a law system that on than were to their community and to their understanding of also how such the law to of particular is of which a role in to the as a of community While the of and in has on of a of cases to emphasize the of studying between This is a to the on and and the cases to this and on and of the racialization of community For both and the century a focus on the of as a of true This is in cases such as the of a was into the Zoroastrian religion at the of was likely was as been to an Christian This a of to seek to from the members of the community could the and the The presence of the would a the of community was the religious and or and on the of the first of the (and a of a understanding of the in held that although could be to the on a was not to by decision an increasingly of identity not only on and religion, but on as as a spate of against those who a light on “changing and religion this For a community that their distinctive identity would unless was “the of the the of of suggests, the focus on as a of the of or could not to the laws they to of the and by But being was no longer the Zoroastrian what was it In as an Given the that so it is no that these so out in (and the role of the law in of it is no that a and of was also a is in of the impact of legal analysis of and individual legal all that made law was not Zoroastrian as much as it was the fact that made also of that “law also made the for example, in the way legal this of the relationship up much less in the and the is to and were not more by legal than is as the fact that is working with historical it to the impact of these cases on an it a not least the religious and or cemented by the law system so in contemporary this with a As will no have not a not in the study of the If has not with in the focus this review on legal to the of law and the of one is that the present on the are with other tendency to between to from one context to or to relationships between and for example, that the present do not the that view today’s as the of the is to in a that its from the and works to them are what is the three is how contemporary much of the historical In England, the Americas, and India, legal disputes on the of ethnoreligious to make In all three the history the by the of a on the of for example, with the legal establishment of in England, as Julian Rivers does in The Law of Organized Similarly, the into the system studying the racialization of slavery in the century, as Katharine Christian the contemporary to the and rule to the law of which Mitra Law and such light of to be the is equally As scholars of law and religion, must be to the both and of of religious and to Ireland’s recent of constitutional who can both The New and Atheist Ireland’s Gerbner, Rivers, and for of law and religion to
What would Abraham Lincoln do? Can his wisdom elucidate 21st-century problems? Particularly during times of discord and polarization, Americans regularly revisit the life and legacy of the sixteenth president. Writers of all political stripes have loved Lincoln and loathed him; some eagerly co-opt his image, while others curse his memory. Various left-leaning authors have praised Lincoln’s virtues, rebuked his racism, and debunked the “Great Emancipator” narrative.1 As a group, conservatives tend to be more critical. Libertarian revisionists, for instance, have condemned Lincoln for using the Civil War as a pretext to aggrandize his power. By their reckoning, an ongoing decline in American liberty can be traced directly to Lincoln’s presidency.2 Others have tarred Lincoln as a socialist sympathizer with dictatorial tendencies.3 In contrast, conservative scholar Thomas Krannawitter has defended Lincoln against attacks from the right and left alike.4 Lincoln’s legacy remains fiercely contested within and between segments of the political spectrum.The worst of these books, which are legion, rip facts and quotations out of context and arrange them to support a pre-ordained partisan position. But when trained scholars, who respect nuance and are well-versed in primary and secondary sources, take up the case, their findings deserve close consideration. A Just and Generous Nation: Abraham Lincoln and the Fight for American Opportunity is a good example. Co-authored by prolific Lincoln scholar Harold Holzer and economist Norton Garfinkle, this book reappraises Lincoln in light of the economic issues, including wealth disparities and diminishing social mobility, which shape modern political debate. Much like scholars who probed Lincoln’s racial beliefs during the Civil Rights Movement,5 Holzer and Garfinkle invite us to reevaluate Lincoln’s economic ideas in the era of Occupy Wall Street and the campaign for a $15 minimum wage. Lincoln regularly fell short of 20th-century standards for racial egalitarianism, but Holzer and Garfinkle find that Lincoln has much to teach us about liberty, equality, and economic opportunity. They contend that “Lincoln, as our most clear-eyed president, was the first to fully understand what America is all about and to tell us so in unfailingly clear terms how to use positive government action to build and maintain a successful middle-class society.” (257)The authors develop their two-pronged thesis in a fast-paced and accessible book divided into two parts. Part One focuses on Lincoln’s life, weaving his economic thought into an engaging narrative which covers his humble origins, swift rise to prominence, and tumultuous presidency. The main point is that Lincoln, a quintessential antislavery Whig, consistently supported public policies that fostered upward mobility by creating opportunities for working people to attain middle-class comfort and security. For Lincoln, government was part of the solution, not part of the problem. Tariffs, internal improvements, and investment in education helped make his dream of a vibrant middle-class society a reality—at least in the North.Lincoln’s middle-class American Dream also shaped his stance on slavery. Restrictions on slavery’s expansion would shield socially mobile northerners from the stagnant, aristocratic South, where laborers languished in servitude or grinding poverty. Fully convinced of American—specifically free-state—exceptionalism, Lincoln believed that the fate of working people was at stake in the battle over slavery’s westward extension. It was to protect their opportunities that Lincoln joined the Republican Party and, eventually, fought the Civil War. “Lincoln focused his entire political career, in peace and war alike, in pursuit of economic opportunity for the widest possible circle of hardworking Americans,” write Holzer and Garfinkle. “To achieve this ambition he was willing to fight a war to maintain the perpetual existence of the one nation in the world that held the highest promise for people dedicated to his cause.” (2) Economic ideals formed the bedrock of Lincoln’s antislavery Unionism.After outlining the origins and substance of Lincoln’s economic worldview, the authors argue that it shaped his handling of the Union war effort and his eventual support for abolition. At times Lincoln’s economic vision seems rather tangential to the narrative, particularly during discussions of Civil War strategy and campaigns. But the authors demonstrate the depth of Lincoln’s commitment to upwardly mobile free labor and illustrate how profoundly it shaped his Unionism and his critique of slavery. Anyone wondering why “the Union” mattered so much to Lincoln, or why an Illinois attorney was so preoccupied by the fate of Kansas, will find compelling explanations here. As a fresh and accessible discussion of Lincoln’s political and economic thought, A Just and Generous Nation is a welcome contribution to a crowded field.Part Two traces the post-1865 history of Lincolnian political economy. Building on Garfinkle’s The American Dream vs. The Gospel of Wealth: The Fight for a Productive Middle-Class Economy (2007), the authors argue that American politics has hinged on a contest between Lincoln’s version of the American Dream, upheld by the likes of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, and an elitist Gospel of Wealth which coalesced during the Gilded Age and persists under the guise of supply-side economics. Ironies abound. Post-Civil War economic development supplanted Lincoln’s society of independent producers with one dominated by corporate titans who defined freedom in Social Darwinian terms and rejected public programs to help working people. Long-cherished ideals of thrift, industriousness, and personal responsibility now justified staggering inequality. According to the increasingly authoritative Gospel of Wealth, the notion that one could rise through hard work was “transmuted from Lincoln’s message of hope” into a “rationale for . . . condemning the working poor for their very poverty.” (175)When Lincoln’s vision returned in the 20th century, it was primarily embraced by Democrats, who consciously aligned themselves with the first Republican president. None did so more faithfully than Franklin Roosevelt. Holzer and Garfinkle contend that the New Deal “was a modern version of Lincoln’s commitment to government action to support a prosperous middle-class society.” (198) It updated Lincoln’s policy prescriptions to fit the realities of an industrial society, but its spirit was similar. Crucially, it worked. For several generations, key New Deal innovations, including unemployment insurance, regulation of financial markets, and Social Security, undergirded a flourishing middle-class society. Late in the 20th century, however, conservatives counterattacked by giving the Gospel of Wealth a populist appeal. Claiming to be Lincoln’s heirs, they sponsored policies that created vast disparities of wealth and limited upward mobility for the poor. Perhaps nothing better demonstrated their misappropriation of Lincoln than Ronald Reagan’s speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention. Reagan contended that Republicans adhered to Lincoln’s principles, quoting several memorable maxims as proof: “You cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong. . . . You cannot help the poor man by destroying the rich.” (224) Days later, a sharp-eyed journalist showed that the sayings were not Lincoln’s at all, but aphorisms written fifty years after Appomattox by William Boetcker, a minister who conscripted Lincoln into serving his anti-trade union activities.Holzer and Garfinkle admire Lincoln’s American Dream and urge present and future policymakers to rediscover it. They argue that Lincoln “left a legacy of guidance for subsequent American leaders” to achieve his worthy goals. (156) In a prescriptive final chapter, they endorse proposals, from an estate tax hike to investment in infrastructure that would harmonize federal policy with Lincoln’s ideals. They acknowledge the difficulty of selling these programs to a skeptical electorate and a recalcitrant Congress. But they also demonstrate that Americans need not look overseas to figure out how to use “the resources of the federal government to give reality to the idea of America as an enduring middle-class society.” (259) Lincoln and Roosevelt can be our guides.Some of the ideas in this book will be familiar to specialists. In 1978, renowned historian Gabor Boritt published Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream, in which he argued that the “right to rise” was essential to Lincoln’s vision of a just and prosperous society. Striving to find consistency between Lincoln’s obscure early career and his illustrious presidency, Boritt argued that Lincoln’s commitment to “the ideal that all men should receive a full, good, and ever increasing reward for their labors so that they might have the opportunity to rise in life” was a “central theme” of his political life.6 Early on, it encouraged Lincoln to champion a Whiggish program of state-supported economic development. After the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), it inspired Lincoln’s antislavery activity and steeled him to battle the Confederacy. Published in a time of economic stagnation, popular disillusionment, and ideological polarization, Boritt’s study remains relevant today, and Holzer and Garfinkle cite it approvingly. Their book can be read as an effort to reinvigorate and popularize Boritt’s thesis after forty years of political history shaped by the Reagan Revolution and the ascendancy of the Gospel of Wealth.Holzer and Garfinkle’s post-1865 analysis and policy prescriptions distinguish A Just and Generous Nation from Boritt’s work and will likely make their volume more controversial. Some readers might balk at the authors’ candid search for a useful past. But if we refuse to learn from history, what good is it? Still, even the most sympathetic readers may wonder if this book will change many minds. Holzer and Garfinkle write with great passion and sophistication. But in a contentious political climate, a direct appeal to Lincoln’s legacy may not win many converts. The recent popular literature on Lincoln—not to mention the sentiments expressed in customer reviews and other online sounding boards—suggests that many people who support policies associated with the Gospel of Wealth also detest Lincoln. In this context, it would require Lincolnian political skill to convince skeptics that an active federal government can promote individual freedom, upward mobility, and economic growth.Some specialists may also wish that the authors had explored the less-inspiring foundations of the middle-class northern society for which Lincoln spoke, fought, and died. In terms of labor and social mobility, it was certainly very different from the Old South; no honest reader of James H. Hammond’s “Mudsill” address could deny it. But the slave plantation was an integral part of the national and global economy.7 Northern workers processed slave-grown cotton. Northern consumers smoked slave-grown tobacco. Northern farmers sold food to slaveholding buyers. These interconnections suggest that antebellum America’s distinctive but interdependent regional economies cannot be compartmentalized. Upward mobility for northern laborers may have been threatened by slavery’s expansion, but it was also bolstered by slavery’s existence. When one reflects on the dispossession of Native Americans—who appear as shadowy foes during Lincoln’s abbreviated Black Hawk War service—the story of northern economic opportunity grows even grimmer.These observations do not discredit Holzer and Garfinkle’s key arguments about Lincoln’s economic and political ideals. They have grounded Lincoln’s career in an inspirational vision of broad opportunity, and they have clarified what Lincoln was doing when he fought to preserve, and eventually expand, American liberty. But one hopes that efforts to revive Lincoln’s American Dream will not promote veiled or invisible injustices. Lincoln’s contemporaries readily ignored the miseries of those who were overlooked or oppressed by the American Dream. It would be easy for us to do the same, particularly because we have outsourced so much of the labor exploitation and environmental devastation that makes modern middle-class life possible. Holzer and Garfinkle have explored many pertinent questions about liberty, opportunity, and public policy in the 19th and the 21st centuries. Hopefully, their work will inspire other scholars to follow suit.
After John J. Duff and John P. Frank published books on Abraham Lincoln’s legal career in the early 1960s, more than forty years passed before another book on the subject appeared.1 This remarkable drought for the fecund soil of Lincolniana ended, however, when the Lincoln Legal Papers project (LLP) revitalized interest in lawyer Lincoln. Under the leadership of Cullom Davis and Daniel Stowell, the LLP collected, cataloged, and scanned thousands of documents. A complete edition was published in 2000 in DVD format; it has been superseded by an online edition that appeared in 2009.2 A four-volume selected edition was published by the University of Virginia Press in 2008.3 Moreover, members of the LLP staff—the late William D. Beard, Davis, Susan Krause, John A. Lupton, Stacy Pratt McDermott, Christopher A. Schnell, and Stowell—also were producing much of the new scholarship on Lincoln’s law practice or, more generally, law in Lincoln’s Illinois.4In the antediluvian era, biographers paid little attention to Lincoln’s law practice. Lincoln biographies usually included a couple of chapters that touched on his legal career. Albert J. Beveridge, in his 1928 biography, mentioned a fair number of cases but discussed at length only a handful; those cases have become canonical. Until the onset of the LLP, most biographies only mentioned the same cases that Beveridge had highlighted: In re Jane Bryant (the Matson case); State v. Armstrong (the Almanac Trial); Illinois Central Rail Road v. McLean County; McCormick v. Talcott (the Manny Reaper case); and Hurd v. Rock Island Bridge Company (the Effie Afton case).5Biographers had neglected Lincoln’s law practice for a couple of reasons. First, as Herndon once wrote, “a law office is a dull, dry place.”6 Biographers weren’t interested in the legal practice, because they believed the legal practice wasn’t interesting. But there were other reasons as well. J. G. Randall, in 1936, noted how important sources for Lincoln’s law practice “still remain difficult of access.”7 Mark E. Neely, in 1993, concluded that “Lincoln’s professional life remains surprisingly inaccessible to the historian as well, though the problem in this realm is largely archival.” Neely also believed that “more specialized studies” of the “arcane legal practices” of Lincoln’s day were needed.8 Those two problems—accessibility of documents and demystifying specialized studies—have been met by the publication of the legal papers and by the extensive scholarship by the LLP staff and others.Although David Donald’s 1995 biography was written while the LLP was still collecting and sorting documents, it nonetheless showed the LLP’s impact on Lincoln scholarship. Donald hailed the LLP as “perhaps the most important archival investigation now under way in the United States.” Donald had been able to examine unpublished documents from the LLP files and thus gave the most complete accounting of Lincoln’s law practice in a biography. The benefits of the LLP were again seen in Michael Burlingame’s magisterial biography, published in 2008. Recent books that have focused on the pre-presidential years also reflect the influence of the LLP in their treatment of the law practice.9Other writers also have benefited from LLP’s vast riches. At least fourteen books on Lincoln’s law practice have been published since 2000. There have been two general treatments of the law practice, a study of Lincoln’s cases involving the medical profession, an analysis of Lincoln’s murder cases, a collection of articles on different aspects of the law practice, and two books examining Lincoln’s circuit riding.10 Seven books have focused on one particular case handled by Lincoln. Five are on canonical cases: two on the Almanac Trial, two on the Effie Afton case, and one on the Matson case.11 The other two books explore relatively overlooked murder cases.12Both Dekle and McGinty have taken great advantage of the materials collected by the LLP. McGinty notes that “all modern studies of Lincoln’s legal practice are indebted to the Lincoln Legal Papers project.” After noting the Legal Papers are “indispensable sources of information,” McGinty states, “This book could not have been written, nor could the story of the Effie Afton case have been told—or told as well—without them” (10). Dekle reproduces all the legal documents from the LLP case file on the Almanac Trial as an appendix (151–64). Both cases were included in The Papers of Abraham Lincoln: Legal Documents and Cases.13Dekle and McGinty have very different goals for their books. Dekle calls the Almanac Trial Lincoln’s “most famous case.” He does not argue that the case was particularly important for Lincoln or that it has any wider significance for American history. He is interested in trying to uncover what actually happened at the trial. McGinty calls the Effie Afton case the “most significant of Lincoln’s career” and “one of the most important ever heard in Illinois.” If anything, McGinty believes that this “strangely neglected” case should be more widely known. His goal is not only to tell the story of the Effie Afton case but to explain Lincoln’s role and to place the case in a broader context of the “epochal clash of the railroads and the steamboats at the river’s edge” (2). Both authors achieve their aims in writing these books. And both books share something else: well-chosen illustrations.Most of the documents uncovered by the LLP yield little without great effort. Docket entries, pleadings, and subpoenas are all mostly formulaic. The materials available for these two cases are markedly different, and the two authors capitalize on the differences. The Effie Afton case was one of only three cases handled by Lincoln that produced what would now be called a transcript of the trial (102).14 Because the Duff Armstrong murder trial was featured in Lincoln campaign biographies, participants and observers left behind many reminiscences.15 Dekle’s main task is sorting out these conflicting reminiscences to determine what probably happened at the trial.Both Dekle and McGinty are lawyers. James G. Randall in his 1936 essay “Has the Lincoln Theme Been Exhausted?” observed that “the hand of the amateur has rested heavily upon Lincoln studies.” Randall believed that Lincoln scholarship required “further critical development by historically trained scholars.”16 The hand of lawyers has rested heavily on studies of lawyer Lincoln. The first five books about Lincoln’s law practice were written by lawyers who had no historical training: Frederick Trevor Hill (1906); John T. Richards (1916), Albert A. Woldman (1936), Duff (1960), and Frank (1961).17 When Neely revisited Randall’s essay in 1979, he noted that “legal history is an area where professionalism has been slow to take command.” In 1979 this was still an area where Randall’s “trained historical specialist is rarely seen.”18Dekle in the preface to his book modestly admits he is “neither a historian nor a Lincoln Scholar” (x). Dekle practiced criminal law for thirty years as an assistant district attorney. He is now the director of the Criminal Prosecution Clinic at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. McGinty left the practice of law to become a professional writer and historian. Like Lincoln the lawyer, McGinty the historian is self-taught. Among his ten previous books are well-received studies of the Supreme Court during the Civil War and the case of Ex parte Merryman.19Both authors believe that their own experiences as lawyers help them understand lawyer Lincoln. This, in fact, is the central conceit of Dekle’s book. Dekle says that he “felt equal to the task of unraveling the Almanac Trial because if I had learned anything during my three decades as a criminal trial lawyer, I learned how to investigate, prosecute, and defend murder cases.” Dekle carries this argument of authority too far, and it sometimes leads him to presentism. He assumes throughout the book that practicing law in Illinois in 1850s is the same as practicing law now. Dekle often makes conclusions based on his own experience, assuming that his time spent in a Florida courtroom in the past thirty years are the same as Lincoln’s experiences in antebellum Illinois. For example, he says, “In my experiences as a trial lawyer, negative character evidence of this type is near worthless” (104).For example, Dekle points out that Duff Armstrong could have had a lawyer appointed to represent him if he couldn’t afford the services of one but that the lawyer wouldn’t have been paid. Dekle then asserts, “It is an unfortunate fact of life, however, that underpaid lawyers often do not defend their clients with the zeal displayed by well-paid lawyers” (3). But has this “fact of life” always been true? Armstrong’s case was tried when judges and lawyers rode the circuit. Each county of the circuit held two terms of court. Holding court was a form of public entertainment, and members of the community would turn out to see trials. With large crowds in attendance, wouldn’t even an unpaid lawyer have a lot at stake? Effective representation would be an advertisement for future legal services.This presentist viewpoint permeates the book. One example is the discussion of William Norris, who was charged with murder along with Duff Armstrong. Norris, who had been charged and acquitted of murder a year earlier in Macon County, did not attempt to change venue to another county, a move that might have benefited him. This fact has led to “unjustified criticism” of his lawyer, William Walker, according to Dekle, who explains that this “gross error” wasn’t his lawyer’s fault.The assumption is what is lawful or ethical for lawyers now was lawful or ethical in Illinois in 1857. The law of lawyering was not fully developed in antebellum America; there weren’t any laws or formal bar association rules that are analogous to modern codes of ethics or disciplinary rules.20Dekle rejects one version of Lincoln’s cross-examination of Charles Allen (which claimed Lincoln didn’t question Allen about the almanac but instead turned to the jurors and asked whom they believed), because it would have been “excellent theater but improper trial procedure. During the examination of a witness, the lawyers simply ask questions of the witness without making asides to the jury.” Lincoln’s purported behavior would have been a “breach of courtroom protocol” (88). While this behavior would undoubtedly be a breach of courtroom protocol in any modern courtroom, I’m not sure the rule applied in 1857. A complicating factor for Dekle’s assumption about courtroom rules is that in 1857, an Illinois statute said that the jury was to “be judges of the law and the facts.”21Dekle in his penultimate chapter is more careful about not applying twenty-first-century standards to the Almanac Trial. Some writers have characterized Lincoln’s final argument as inflammatory and unethical, as Lincoln assumed facts not in evidence and made emotional appeals based on his relationship with the Armstrong family. While Dekle concedes by “modern standards” Lincoln’s argument was objectionable, he answers this criticism by pointing out, “We have no business using a twenty-first-century yardstick to measure a nineteenth-century speech” (113). Another criticism of Lincoln is that he unethically refused to hear what a witness wanted to tell him about what he saw that fateful evening. Lincoln was planning to call Will Watkins to establish that he was the owner of the possible murder weapon. Watkins, who later said he had seen Armstrong strike Metzker with a wagon hammer, was afraid that once he got on the witness stand he would have to tell what he saw. According to one account, Watkins “began to tell Lincoln what he knew, and Mr. Lincoln would not allow him to tell him anything” (135). Dekle establishes that there would been no duty for a defense lawyer in 1857 to discover what Watkins knew. Finally, Dekle discusses whether the cross-examination of Watkins by the state would have been restricted to matters Watkins had testified about during Lincoln’s direct examination, as some writers have questioned whether that rule existed in antebellum Illinois. While Dekle can’t find a case on point from Illinois before 1929, he cites a U.S. Supreme Court opinion that in 1840 had recognized this rule as “well established” (115–16).Dekle presents three different versions of the Armstrong murder trial that he has found in the literature about the case. Version one has Lincoln securing acquittal by his masterful cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. Through the use of an almanac, Lincoln proves that the witness would not have been aided by moonlight to have seen what he claimed he saw. This version “has entered the pantheon of great moments in the history of American trial advocacy” (7). The urtext for the version was the novel The Graysons: A Story of Illinois (1887).22 Version two (which, chronologically, appeared first) has Lincoln securing acquittal primarily through an emotional appeal in his closing argument that mentioned Lincoln’s relationship in New Salem with Armstrong’s father, who had recently died. This version, which doesn’t mention Lincoln’s cross-examination or use of the almanac, was tied to Lincoln’s campaign for president; it first appeared in the Cleveland Leader the day after Lincoln was nominated for president at the Republican national convention. Lincoln’s representation of Duff Armstrong then figured prominently in campaign biographies, which obviously helps explain why it became Lincoln’s “most famous case” (13).23 Version three also was connected to Lincoln’s presidential campaign; it was the counternarrative advanced by Lincoln’s opponents. This version depicted Lincoln faking the almanac. Instead of the virtuous lawyer, there was “Lincoln the Trickster” (18–19).Dekle ultimately concludes that “the famous cross-examination” didn’t happen. He looks at the various versions of it. (That Dekle calls these versions “variant transcripts” is like calling a forged Monet painting a “variant Monet,” since none of them is a transcript of the cross-examination [87].) Some of these versions are rightly dismissed out of hand because they are fictional or dramatizations of what the writer believed likely happened. Others are dismissed because they are factually inaccurate. Irving Younger, an expert of the law of evidence, concocted a mixture of earlier versions (94).Dekle is convinced that Lincoln used an almanac to contradict Allen’s testimony. The dispute, for Dekle, “arises over when Lincoln did his contradicting” (87). Lincoln could have immediately confronted the witness during the cross-examination, or he could have waited to contradict the witness during his final argument. Dekle concludes Lincoln waited. J. W. Donovan, the first to claim that Lincoln confronted Allen during his cross-examination, did so in 1898 (over forty years later!) and appears to have appropriated the cross-examination from Eggleston’s fictional account.But what good did the almanac do? Dekle details the “precise nature of the contradiction Lincoln found in the almanac.” Charles Allen, the key witness against Armstrong, testified that he saw the by the of the Some sources claim that the almanac showed there was no in the that while claim Lincoln’s almanac showed the was near Dekle concludes that the almanac showed the was near He rejects those who the almanac no as their as they Dekle also rejects the which first appeared during the presidential campaign of for 1857 showed the on the the almanac would have been a because the for 1857 showed that the had not that the was a Dekle the that Lincoln used a almanac by pointing out that the would have him as Dekle had a McGinty the Effie Afton case on the The first five chapters the of the by the of the Effie Afton against the Bridge McGinty with a discussion of the of on the He also discusses Lincoln’s with and and his early for like and McGinty also details the of The chapter be the of Lincoln’s law chapter details the of the Rock Island In gave of way to public to any by a state to a The Illinois the Bridge it to a near Rock Island so as it did not the of the McGinty also does a good of the in and the legal in earlier One of the more aspects of Lincoln’s career is how some who would later prominently during the Civil War his years Davis the story as of the War Davis tried to the of the probably because he a to the The U.S. for Illinois to the but John McLean later in the McLean did that if were by any of by the then the would be chapter does a masterful of the which two after the The Effie Afton had and over of The of the the Effie Afton with a before for the When it was through the it one of the then and then a in the of the and The was also with the on the Illinois against the was The chapters are about that The were and had significant were also by in and other who for the After the was in court in for the of Rock Island Lincoln didn’t the defense after the was books are of how Lincoln often with other lawyers to In the Almanac Trial, Lincoln and William in Duff Lincoln the defense many had been and many had been was Lincoln’s McGinty fair with the evidence and concludes that the did not believe that Lincoln was to as Dekle’s book is based largely on McGinty on on the case that appeared in the trial for the and for the and later the McGinty notes that recognized the trial one of the most that had ever taken place in an American The trial in 1857. Lincoln does not to have taken in the The then over Lincoln does not to have made his during the case in was then the and McGinty were about to their by a lawyer from with a remarkable and a of trial as the lawyer for the Lincoln made his first in the trial an whether about the over the was The to this because it wasn’t to the of the first for the that “the good of the should be Lincoln then that the would not be a one in of the of the While the for an of the in Lincoln’s as they should to the nature and of McLean the evidence for the of the of the the evidence couldn’t be used to “the nature of the other significant to the defense was one of the closing to the closing and he only gave of what he the most important by the lawyers” McGinty is able to use to a of how good Lincoln was as a trial Lincoln by the jury did not to that he to as he but not Lincoln many used of two He that the of the the of railroads and and the of the Lincoln also that the was if the jury the would Lincoln are by the to the when a along it is for him to on of this which has been trial in a a for the since the had the of While the case wasn’t Lincoln’s tried their with other which didn’t One of the Effie Afton a which was dismissed in A to the was in Lincoln’s Afton career. He in my to the Effie Afton case a for Lincoln’s to the Because of the for Lincoln and at the state in were critical for Lincoln’s If Lincoln in then Lincoln wouldn’t have been the and there wouldn’t have been a and then Lincoln wouldn’t have been the Republican in explains that history two First, railroads over steamboats and a key role in a new Lincoln became a in an American The Effie Afton case how lawyer Lincoln to the with to the on the and to turn the an future of and books to Lincoln McGinty has written the of the Effie Afton case by not only the but also wider Dekle the of what probably happened at the Almanac the most famous cross-examination in American history didn’t actually But he written the on the trial. on Dekle’s a future of lawyer Lincoln to explain why this trial became Lincoln’s “most famous case.”
This paper considers growing fiscal capacity of the European early modern states as contingent to taxpayer’s consent in higher tax loads. It puts forward the hypothesis that war damages were the main factor guiding the taxpayer’s cost-benefit assessment of consenting or violently resisting to a fiscal innovation. To test the hypotheses, we consider data on Portugal in times of political struggle against the Habsburgs to restore and keep the political autonomy after 1640. The war was financed by an entirely new, universal income tax, remaining in the Portuguese fiscal system well until the liberal revolution in 1820, although enforced by a decentralized and nonspecialized administration. A model derives the optimal tax rate from the standpoint of the taxpayer as a function of war intensity, risk aversion, and awareness that evasion would enhance war damages. Data on damages, contemporary assessments of the tax base, and amounts enforced allow the model’s calibration. Results suggest the accuracy of the hypothesis and draw the conclusion that taxpayers’ utility in paying the new tax determined the efective tax rate (tax enforced). This paper claims that ultimately improvements in the fiscal capacity of states needed taxpayer’s perception of high levels of destruction, hence any political regime in early modern Europe must have found in war damages a persuasive argument to make efective a fiscal innovation. The other contribution of this case study is pointing out the advantage of the assignment of the tax collection to local, non-professional administration, for the endurance of a fiscal system, which incorporated an income tax that withstood the liberal revolution. It enhanced the role of peer monitoring and turned out to be an efective way of instilling social norms contributing to build up the taxpayer’s liability, which somehow the liberal state in 19th century exploited within a different technological environment.
How Banks Worked (and Sometimes Did Not Work) in the Early Republic Trying to understand the workings of American banking and finance before the Civil War can be baffling. There was no central bank and no national currency, but rather a mostly decentralized system of banks of varying sorts that circulated thousands of different paper banknotes throughout the country. Counterfeiting was widespread, banknote values fluctuated wildly and varied from place to place, and chains of credit and debt created through promissory notes and bills of exchange easily became byzantine. Fundamental instability was endemic to the economy, and only the exigencies of the war itself led policymakers to craft an economic order that began to resemble that of the modern world.
International legal positivism in some of its radical forms in the 21st century operates as theological voluntarism. It is the ambition to translate an overwhelmingly practical art into a general theory of law that has squeezed these theories into a theological structure of thought. If such a thing could ever exist, a general theory of law ought to reveal the role played by morality in the normative pronouncements about law. However, a general theory can only emerge at the expense of taking the existential decision about identifying law with morality or severing law from morality.2 Hans Kelsen writes that ‘law is an order of human behaviours’.3 But is this order founded upon morality or not? This very question articulates a fragmented view of reality falling between fact (morality) and value (law) that we have learned to take for granted.4 Practitioners know that the correct professional approach is to be interested in the legal aspects of a case and not in its moral aspects. Moreover, both in theory and practice, one can often limit oneself to act as a morally responsible person.5 There are, however, several sensitive areas in which even minimal theoretical work calls for the adoption of a moral-normative standpoint.6 However, the ‘general theory’ type of thinking urges the theological question7 – will the law punish my immorality or not?8 The theoretician devising a general theory will lay out the question of morality and law in absolute terms. Independently of the answer, articulating this question involves the assumption that the lawyer should take a theological approach, which is also reflected in the non-neutral outcome of the following two absolutist approaches.9 If law is to prescribe what is moral, every legal judgment is a moral judgment about good and evil. Law is endowed with power in order to apply a moral code, and secular law becomes superfluous. The second approach, based on the separability of law and morality, denies that the normativity of law makes claims connected with morality. What is at stake is not whether law ignores or refrains from expressing whether a particular behaviour is moral or not but, rather, the assertion of the idea that no violation of the law is a moral evil and no legal judgment is a moral condemnation. Morality is irrelevant to this approach. Both types of general theory work in the realm of the ideal with an a priori type of human being. The sinner belongs to the first category; the god to the second.10 In both cases, the theologian-theoretician devising a general theory employs law that works in history in order to model behaviour in practice. In the first case, the human being becomes absolutely dependent on the ideal type to which she has to conform, the supreme legislator (presumably representing God) being in charge of its implementation. As if in parallel, in the second choice, the morality of human beings is considered to be autonomous from that of the supreme legislator (embodied by the people, the consent of the state and so on). A theory of law that demarcates strictly legal norms declares that moral normativity in its varied forms, including reason, nature, justice, politics, the real world or humanity, never comes into contact with legal judgments.11 A human being’s behaviour ought to be examined through law without this type of considerations. Law as ideality is, as it were, enclosed – it is disconnected from any claim to substantive moral content, but, more importantly, it is also disconnected from the sphere of practical action in which the legal actor takes a moral decision when necessary. The troubled history of natural law theories proves that the first option described above has never been attempted, let alone implemented.12 Moreover, there is no moral code that can produce a complete system of (international) law – not even Sharia does that.13 Equally, the few alleged attempts made in the realm of theory to produce any form of neutral normativity, independent from morality, have failed with similar regularity. The (healthy) inconsistency of the formulations attempted to this end has been laid bare by the fact that their authors have introduced rational considerations of morality and justice when this was felt to be necessary or unavoidable.14 The condition of voluntarism concerns a classical position of Western theology that differentiates between the absolute power of God to adopt any possible course of action without contradiction and the divine ordained power by which God is committed to act in a certain manner. While we are moving within the realm of strict theology, the voluntarist element appears when emphasis is placed on all of the logical possibilities open to God to create different worlds. Everything from the beginning is considered to be contingent (‘it could have been otherwise’) and therefore no rationality can bind the will of God.15 Instead of observing the reality around him, the 14th-century voluntarist theologian felt compelled to focus his epistemological view on the normative character of God’s command. He accordingly focused on the idea that God’s command was binding even though he considered it to be, logically speaking, deprived of inherent rationality, morality and so on – or in modern formalistic terms, empty and neutral.16 In his book, Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen sketches a similar type of theological voluntarism with some wit: From the point of view of a theory of positive law, there is no fact that by itself – that is, regardless of a consequence stipulated by the legal order – is a delict. There are no mala in se, but only mala prohibita. This is only the consequence of the principle, generally recognized in criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena singe lege; and this principle which is valid not only for criminal law, not only for criminal but for all delicts, not only for punishments but for all sanctions, is merely a consequence of legal positivism.17 Kelsen continues by explaining that it was self-evident that certain behaviour was criminalized when the legal authority regarded it as ‘harmful to society’. However, ‘from the point of view of an analysis of the immanent meaning of the legal order, this circumstance is irrelevant for the concept of delict’.18 The invocation of the positivist principle nullum crimen sine lege makes Kelsen’s thought look voluntarist it a of the nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege that in to limit the power of the and the of the crimen sine lege a from all that is morally The idea was to the of a as a criminal only on the of what has been as law. Kelsen made his claim to that there was no that this principle to that there are no that are not or only have been by law. it does not as that when one human behaviour from a positive law one a the principle of nullum crimen sine lege the lawyer to to positive law, if there is In the principle to law in criminal law of any but it is not its to morality from a legal point of in his to Kelsen articulates his theory with all the in law of a voluntarist in law is not by any particular rationality or Law could have The two in International A and and the of International A Theory of the of in the epistemological of theological voluntarism. The legal theoretical ambition of the two appears to be to one should of an law that state consent at the that morality be placed law. In a similar to century legal the existential by these is by not by Moreover, the two authors to apply the radical of a positivist general theory of law to this theory but, rather, it – Kelsen’s this both the by their legal theoretician the of in Kelsen’s normativity of law. In the and theoretical first by of normativity by to without about its However, it is no that several of to legal In the of and this theory appears to a of power to the law to which have an of in which legal are being the of of law, one with and of the between the of law and and of the of law to some of the in this law is connected to such a theory the of in of from the of law. However, the theory type of normativity of in International Law and and the of International Law an ideal for law, it to its The of its politics, not to its morality, makes the – the theological type of thinking as Kelsen law is and ought not to be with of morality. as was the case with this type of theory to with to the What are the of the of law the can legal to that and all of the of the to an ideal of law and morality has never of the theoretical of law, and of such as or one to whether be the to take such a However, this is not to that the not and and that in some the modern The International in a a of around the general of positivism and legal theory by and is by a different theoretical In the of the of the two which is that the authors are the of this the a positivist and a and with the of and – and the also in their of the the power of the for law or attempts to the between natural and positivist law. In this the of the of both expressing the in law – which is, in their positivist – and the of positivism in The forms a of with the which this for its to through the the in upon this Moreover, not only is the an independent but of the also form of their that that one can with is that are about law. the theological of positivism are in the the of the in the the adoption of a moral point of view in law, with the of substantive by which the of law can be In morality is with what the of the century has to their in radical positivism in their and have in or even Kelsen’s and – does as with a minimal of natural of the adopt the with to the of However, one the in the on this particular the that the to the several of the in to theological voluntarism are In the one does not that is about the to be a in to the theories of that made claims The of legal is but are with the of with a world in which is to be in of legal In this the legal of the century works in with what is in reality and is not on of of legal theory or – the as on the through This about is with to Pure Theory is to legal theory in in International A In the is often with the legal theory of to a decision of the authority is as as a legal In the have Kelsen’s Pure Theory as both of more to of Kelsen’s work and articulating the of and the law to Kelsen with the create Kelsen this idea Moreover, the of to Kelsen’s legal thinking is not to the emphasis on the of in law. In Kelsen’s was the very question that ought to in the of law. on the of was to whether the to and Kelsen that it was that the itself its to be that the of could be when the felt to be open the question of – the state or the itself was also and Kelsen The question of be by no decision necessary. But such a does not in law. There are no in only by the The is the can never be only two of Kelsen’s one his in to and his in the of the law to be by the are in order to that is not a particular from the of the of the legal the of is and is in the 21st a when several of legal Kelsen have legal and have to and in of It is only natural that the is to be no a in the of law. While there is in law, the century have law itself as the to the state of in In the of law as a to the fact that it was considered to be the when thinking in of book, however, with type of This is one to and to epistemological as Kelsen’s theory within the of theological as of the theory of the is founded on the from no from an of the Pure Theory does not that law is an legal order or that is not by It is in this that in International Law with the of that and of the in of to the that has to and as as the of in International Law is about to itself as both an and a about the of valid law without the of morality and state the of at thought that in he on in the as we as being that which is of have both and aspects take the in the be by the described the of an act of as being on the He that is to the to with so that the act of is from all the of the which are about the or the This in which is about thinking with and about thinking with is in of the idea of voluntarism as an epistemological in in International A as to the Pure Theory will that and are in in International The to a Pure Theory to law calls for to a priori the between and to the The to this in the in which he his work on legal theory to in the very in the to the made the book, in which the Pure Theory is as both and does in theoretical or a of what in the 21st in to law. Moreover, very in the the that is and a in the classical – a to one will not be he to and of when the adoption of the Pure Theory is as an act of one a as to the thought it a on that particular this at the end of the is an of existential to and is Kelsen’s also be as through an act of in the Pure However, he never attempted a of the Pure Theory to of law. This is from of International Law, which is a of the law of his It be the case that he not to to the law of his – which from the – or he felt the was not for that through he his in of law, as to the of the between and law the that in the of the Pure Theory is a in a as as refrains from any of Kelsen’s to of the of a theory of law that was to be to above in of of from the and the regarded that as the only to However, in his theory of law, Kelsen the There is to that his that as a of principle it was a to moral and judgment in law. In the of the of the committed by the Kelsen made no about the and and to the morality of the However, we can only with on the the of his What is is that Kelsen’s theory of law in of Pure from The of to through Law and of International Law the real of of International A is that it what Kelsen never In this its is at the very of The a very to the thought of and the few to work on his and moral However, the and analysis of Kelsen’s – the of The of taking Kelsen’s work and as a that Kelsen in these and of Kelsen’s legal theory on the of the two the only The the Pure Theory to law in International Law is a and from which any interested in legal theory will Moreover, in of the substantive it with – law and and of – the a of thinking that through the of legal the of the Pure as a for the of in its to the of the law, its in the of law, and its to the of and in the case of to the approach of radical This approach, to to with the Pure and that is a valid and through to the of is the of is as the between and to legal makes possible the of norms as is in the as the to every theoretical and even are to for to that In one a with This is in the which are more with legal of the normative to be the of the to apply and law as it is in the of the However, the in no that this to the to what the to the Pure should not act with in of This is for from the of the law of of the in The with a on the different of within the and law legal the for to have to such as or that positive law. on that are open to to in the of the of of the of law to in the of in It is not so an inherent of that the but an of to the for the of both theoretical and practical on the on the of or of laid in of the which in to by in this case to the in the the from which an in of the general of the The idea is to to what the law and the of But law on the of be but as and the of for or for have their and that the of can be also This look However, what is of is that he the – to and through law. on the of normativity was an in the of the century by legal In so the of the of to that a has law. The in legal theory is in the in which this is is the between Kelsen law as and the in at a when law was and could not have been to the and to He was thinking of the when the of law which was the of the and the by the of It is for to know or this to be so in the history of legal However, was in a that the of of law that – that of with the of the about law being law and a in which the an in the normativity of law. and the of International Law belongs to this of the to the of is, one of the one from the appears more to a epistemological for (international) law. This works in with the that the to a in his all the to but, to the between a and a of the of that law is what the makes the of However, it is on the He to in – that is, the idea that have of their – as principle of of The by and the that it – by as and – is what the to on the of in that law be he on the of and the the to this type of theory of of which was a makes more the that the at the As the the of natural law and of the will of the state the to the of law. The on a of natural law and state will the the as being As an natural law can be and – from of natural to the of the or the of law, the of law and the the or will of the state – that – also when as a of of is the of a normativity in of the in the book, Kelsen’s theory is all in the very of and the of International Law in of the by and that their meaning through a in the that in the of the of a theory of law, as the of legal is the makes the question of of the legal order as a and his theory to the and Kelsen the of through the of law is the of the theory in the However, even though the claims that he is not in devising a general theory of law this does not that the does not one – to a of the particular theory introduced in this is Kelsen’s even – it is The of and the of International Law does not merely to a theoretical of but also to produce a theory of in the of the of of Moreover, one can on the of one the of theories that could the work that has the fact that the several and a legal the of theory and is by the of the of theory in the This that the of can be by of such a formalistic However, this is the general of radical and the of International Law is at and to The is to know more about the of this theory in practice, and the at the end of the about only on the of the that in calls for the and of his never at the of to idea idea in such a that we at but legal Moreover, their work about legal and this in their of the works of and and What is in this is the fact that the authors generally adopt to the with to The are and for a and point of In are with the in which law the real world and The the that the the of positivism is to a by the fact of and by the that can into the power to apply law. In this the the classical of law between and are more to the are with the The of the between positivism and in the of the system of law is reflected in the of the to a this is with legal The that for the radical positivist position a good of its more in a Kelsen’s as the assumption of the and the of the he that is at a – this is what when a as a on his a more role in his in the and on the of legal and the of the of the lawyer the of In an the of a at the that be as act of in the of a morality, could the lawyer whether she or he has a responsible In a different that the of law should of professional that the in its form of This and such as on legal analysis of legal on a for positivist legal thinking and on the of positivism and through its as the general of the is the of such legal thinking is by about the of a of authors in legal thinking for their of the power of the has to it is to that he appears to be to an of the the This was by the but is in the several authors and on and to this it have been a good idea to have it in the In the a of natural law. As as this is to of his an question open at the end of the What be the in as which is the of the natural law he law with a theology in the at the beginning of this or is it an of the human necessary to in the more the of the positivist of and for his the classical legal in in his state consent several legal The that more with the with the as to the to which morality is with law. the of of a fragmented view of human beings based on different of ideal normativity with no – morality As it is a that the theological of a theory of law is in its to the between morality and law. This is not to that the authors a the the involves an of the of But of the both at the that work in the legal sphere is with a of morality. is at to the of the positivist principle nullum crimen sine However, his that what is at stake in the of this principle in the case of criminal law is that the by which the or of an is is and does not in a about human but, rather, human are in by positive law. He that human are the of divine a but a of some for which the consent of is therefore the beginning and the the of law when norms to normative considerations and any to be in violation of the the she the of law to forms of law in a general manner. However, analysis also moral-normative considerations as a of course in the of law. The by and is on the law to the of and is the on the of when and moral are at In one could the with in several of the in this without of The following is a good of what have in is by no that positivist to legal should be an when the to a different In this case as by is to upon a or a or a or a such as this the at the beginning about the of the of a general theory of law in to a practical art such as law. the general of the in this on positivism in a world a for responsible by and in different to that the of of If there be to be it be and not very to the to claim that was the There is no that this is However, this position does not to be the in this The from some of only two of the are an fact that one for thought. one can about with some the of in a on an analysis of the of a with law is this of what is a of the in this has to what is are and and one should the for a not only of law but also of some of the from which it with legal or for that with law will from the with to the of and and in law and will from to it from to have in this that theological about morality and law to the that ought to be autonomous or that ought to history and and from the from legal history at two about the between morality and law. both in the in the legal the in with one at the normative of the first of what makes a good or of the of what makes good law and the of we are thinking in of practical it is in that practical law has its in a and The of International in International Law of International Hans Kelsen in International in International Kelsen and on International and Law International and International and International and to International Law International Law International law in and from a International Law International Law and of
In October 1976, political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset studied recent polls and predicted that “if present trends continue,” the upcoming presidential election would be the first “in which Catholics have not been considerably more supportive of the Democratic nominee than Protestants.” Just a few weeks earlier, former governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter had enjoyed a comfortable lead over Republican President Gerald Ford in national public opinion surveys. But several different polls now revealed that no longer was the case. Lipset blamed the “Catholic defection” from Democratic ranks that he believed had come, at least in part, because of Carter's perceived shift to the left on a variety of issues; he appeared to many voters to be more liberal than he had been during the primary campaign. In addition, Carter's “cultural and religious style,” combined with a media fixation on abortion and his relationship with Catholics, had undermined his support among the nation's largest Christian denomination.1 This came at an inopportune time for Democrats, whose identity and relationship to the nation's religious people were in flux. As William Prendergast has written about the post–civil rights period: “Lost to the Democratic Party were millions of Catholics who would have enlisted under its banner in earlier times. Most had not become Republicans. They were adrift in a state of independence awaiting a candidate, a cause, a party more congenial to their values than the party of their fathers had become by the dawn of the decade of the seventies.”2 There were those who believed that Carter could have been that candidate. It was not to be. In short, Carter had what observers at the time labeled a “Catholic problem.” As it turned out, he also had a Protestant problem, as he represented the ways that the Democratic Party coalition was unraveling along religious lines. Both Catholic and Protestant problems resulted from the convergence of several interrelated forces. First, the civil rights movement that peaked in the mid-1960s had drawn its moral energy from a particular religious vision for America. The black freedom struggle legitimated religious activism to achieve a desirable liberal political end.3 After much internal struggle, Catholics and many Protestants accepted that vision—at least rhetorically—and reaffirmed America's Christian heritage. Protestants had long marginalized Catholics and neglected their place in that heritage. Now, however, Catholics demanded acceptance on their own terms. Carter's Catholic problem, then, came at a time when the nation's largest Christian denomination believed that they had finally been embraced as part of the nation's Christian heritage. At the same time, however, other events of the 1960s accelerated trends toward secularization. For some people, Carter—the most openly devout presidential candidate since William Jennings Bryan—represented the possibility to reclaim a moral and religious vision for America and to encourage Protestant and Catholic cooperation to achieve that vision. He symbolized a postracial, more inclusive South, the antithesis of a nation that had become increasingly secular. His religious vision for the nation, however, and his ideas about the separation of church and state meant that his candidacy threatened the avenue through which Catholics had participated in public life since the nineteenth century. In a bit of historic irony, the nation's perceived secularization had roots in Carter's Southern Baptist theology and ideas about church and state and religious liberty. In a sense, of course, Carter's Catholic problem was not new. Catholics and Protestants had long viewed each other with at least suspicion, if not outright hostility. What was different now was that Catholics' position in public life had changed since the 1960s. For the first time, Catholics qua Catholics were part of the public debate. That is, in 1960, John F. Kennedy had been elected president only after assuring American Protestants that he could govern in a secular manner, that his being Catholic in effect would not matter.4 Now, however, the civil rights movement had changed the nation's political and religious landscape and created new opportunities for religion in public life. At its best, the civil rights movement reflected Catholic inclusion and they now expected to be a part of the new religious and political dialogue. Despite Catholic misgivings, the fact that Carter was a man of faith encouraged them that a shared religious vision for America could give them common ground. Carter's problem with Catholics—or their problem with him, to be more accurate—revolved around several issues. In one way or another, all the issues touched on Carter's stance on the separation of church and state. The potentially most explosive issue was abortion and where the candidate stood on the need for a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution. Second was the possibility of state support for parochial schools. Finally, Carter's being an outspoken and active Southern Baptist layman aroused general suspicion among the nation's voting Catholics. In the 1970s, these were interwoven, a complex web of issues that were difficult to separate from each other. Together they pointed to the paradox of Catholic involvement in politics. On the one hand, Catholics now expected to be taken seriously on their own terms in public life. On the other hand, they continued to suffer (at least in their own minds) marginalization. One unnamed Milwaukee, Wisconsin, priest summed up the problem succinctly. He wrote Congressman Clement J. Zablocki about the “very real danger that Catholics are being alienated by the seeming indifference of these Democratic Leaders to the problems of American Catholics.” His parishioners were no longer solidly Democratic and were skeptical of Carter. “They seem to think that [Carter] and the Party is [sic] not concerned about a deterioration of respect for life, eg. [sic] abortion, about the deterioration of the cities, about those constitutional aids to parochial education.” Indeed, “Mr. Carter seems to favor secularization of all education.” This priest recalled “the anti-Catholic attitudes of the Baptists in Bay View,” and his and his parishioners' allegiance to the Democratic Party was shaken.5 For him and others, abortion, the separation of church and state, and secularization of society all were of a piece. Sociologist, Catholic priest, and Carter supporter Andrew Greeley was one of the most public observers of Carter's Catholic problem. The worst part of it for Greeley was that the problem was one that Carter could have addressed and alleviated, with only a little effort. In fact, “it took a lot of effort on his part to get into trouble on a number of ‘Catholic’ issues.” On abortion, according to Greeley, Carter's personal position resembled that of Catholics. Carter should have simply said nothing; however, he, was “under pressure from feminist militants who wanted another symbolic victory over Catholics.” Feminists would not suddenly favor Ford over Carter, Greeley reasoned, but Catholics might.6 The 1976 Democratic plank amounted to two sentences in a lengthy document that covered the full range of issues expected to face a president—from taxes and health care to foreign policy. Democrats acknowledged “the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion.” Nevertheless, a constitutional amendment was “undesirable.” Roe v. Wade should be allowed to stand.7 Blaming Carter for the platform was not entirely fair, since the platform did not meet all of the standard bearer's demands. To be sure, his would not have many Catholics His would have neglected to it would have simply to health care and with their own In to abortion, and former and first pointed to Catholic in the Baptist a that had since the 1960s but was perceived Carter and its for for Catholic about Carter's President Ford an to Catholic that the Carter to the Catholic to the of but to the and of by Catholics.” Carter should his personal to abortion and the fact that he had with Catholics, to his by the to the of on the Catholic John F. Kennedy for Catholics Protestants for their and it was time to the the of religious and Jimmy Carter as a a Southern and to as as a former candidate for the Carter that the problem was not the of or Greeley or Jimmy Indeed, it was and it would Carter on election Catholics were in and most of them were For they could not be or taken for For a to he Catholics to as a when they would be more to Catholics would not a way Americans would a with and on of the would they would for in a voting and give it to the The problem could be but not by with or of Catholic it first that Carter the nature of the problem and the to which Catholics the American and the Democratic the were two Democratic one of William Jennings and the other of The former is the was Catholic two had been at since the nineteenth but each to the party that did one The party of its roots to and was for most of the of American The with and was for most of the of as and of and As and other observers Catholics had been Democratic since the nineteenth century. At the same time, as a coalition of the Democratic Party Protestants as much of the liberal or Protestant to support for the time of Carter's however, that had to liberal Protestant support for and many of them their support to Democratic That liberal Protestant toward the Democrats to be the most of the political party in the of the to Carter could not the in his own party in the same way that he the and roots of the relationship and in the The the two Catholics and their of and the those Catholic “They were the most of people, as than his was Catholic of in the and political to were This parochial symbolic what the parochial if not that they were in to public that openly for the Protestant and for and all its and There were that Carter The first and problem was the 1976 Democratic Carter the with the support of and black with no active Catholic It was of to the of American Carter had Martin to on the platform at the But it was a not a Catholic to the for what be the first time in Carter's Democratic coalition be than and black Protestants a few In to a general it Catholics. What was that Catholics believed that Carter in to liberal on after the be to get was not a of Catholics. Indeed, in his of the problem, at they as of than with the political Nevertheless, the problem was more than one of perceived and It was real for many more for it had political Catholic revealed the of in the Democratic Party in the 1960s. As liberal and had taken of the party from and the of those Catholics. that by the 1960s Catholics had enjoyed opportunities that and movement up the In fact, were than the whose was the of during Nevertheless, they the of that and the and real of of and their the of by Greeley and that They marginalized and Greeley with that Martin a of the and to on the platform with Carter. of a of the an at left from a of anti-Catholic and Catholic of their place in the public Carter's acceptance the of a who have and had to for or to suffer from the public are or by their to For Greeley, that was a that “the fact that most of those who to Catholic are who are not Catholic but a for their that Carter people who were is, who had or This would be more than It would Carter who could problems and the candidate into and from of anti-Catholic The most of what could came with Carter's of the issue of to parochial the Catholic is its to What Carter did not seem to was that of church and state is an anti-Catholic It is to to parochial because it is the of all the and Protestant that to to to parochial and to their over To to would be political to parochial was one of two issues that as abortion other was that Carter could about a that would the first to in to with to be a to the of the This would parochial which were and to Catholics that Carter had their in they did not in Carter's not as as would have the had to Catholic One revealed the difficult position Carter was as he to these political with Democratic secular to his own personal That concerned the relationship church and state in It Carter's position as being one of a in the for the separation of church and state. a position reflected the “in that religious freedom be threatened by a from in the “the public to parochial The candidate continued to however, to to public schools. to religious at the of America's and it is also a the has Nevertheless, that a some to some from public could in the of that was to all and and of the they had as a public than a to The did an of “the of to freedom of at the same time, the public or to a After the is one way Americans achieve desirable the of and in 1976, the Carter a to the Catholic The Carter's a and for for to whose It that a parochial had a long and a and in the of What was at however, was “the of millions of and Americans to a religious for their This at the of America's and It is a not by Carter a on a Georgia that would give to and schools. In Carter that as be to that the freedom of and that parochial have in the in the Carter's in the separation of church and state was in his ideas about personal and should be from to his own and about moral issues on that to and moral to were the state should The American Protestant was that Catholics, who their allegiance to the in were not to their own is no that Carter shared the that threatened religious he did his about the of to the issue of This to the that was a Catholic As Catholic and political observers it threatened the political on the of the who had long up their In October 1976, a presidential among its President Gerald Ford of the Carter with by revealed abortion as according to a was no that those to the of the the more issue was the Democratic Party which a constitutional amendment Roe v. Carter's own position on abortion was He his personal to the but was to support to Roe v. long he had been to the is He the governor of Georgia after v. was in state and he had been governor for a of when it was with Roe v. the Carter's and that Carter to the in That is not in the but was a in that that to abortion What was Carter wrote the to a in by and an of and a of all of which for the need for of and The would be the of of In his Carter his in with him now the of each and to many they would to have and when they would to have them as an for and as an for and Carter was that it was now to these issues more it was the of each to what he or to the of to wanted into on a Carter's to in a problem for him in the but that after the appeared Carter's on abortion a bit and he his to This came in to in a public and to the of As a by the time he was a presidential candidate, Carter to a personal to abortion, but an to effort that would Roe v. He did the Carter as he would support a to national and that Carter had acknowledged that “under he would support a constitutional amendment on a Georgia state Despite the fact that of Carter's position on a constitutional amendment from in and appeared on to the that was to Catholic support for Carter over the only Catholic candidate in the After the Carter that the took his of and was in fact, a of his to a constitutional After he the he and his did to up his Catholic At the of on a in he with Catholic of of of the of Catholic John of John J. of and of were of the of the Catholic The Catholic were that Carter in his support of Roe v. but they were encouraged that he, according to a with not an effort to a constitutional to to Carter, he his own it that Catholics, or have a to an would to an At least one of people, Catholics for a that Carter was on the of his position on abortion in to Catholic on the Catholics for a had in a with Carter, a fact that to the was in of recent with the of Catholic Catholics for a was that Carter continued to a constitutional amendment and the to which most Catholic were to Indeed, the that that a of Catholics that abortion should be a a and in a of the in was At least one priest, his that the Carter and the Catholic would to President Ford and Catholic support for Jimmy The wrote in The was that on abortion threatened to the to a In fact, he the Democrats had long been more in with the of the church on issues than the stance of the Republicans. Both Democrats and Catholics are by a common for the of and the people of society and Catholics to the abortion issue to become a in the from Wisconsin, where the of Catholic believed that their own could be to the Carter campaign. The had for in wanted Democrats to a Catholic on life from abortion to to As to the life issues on the with if Life is the only one that the to would have a problem To that Carter could be to a constitutional “the Catholic and the political be to to a of the problem. Democratic Catholics are to a to In his that Carter should not his own position on abortion, which was as it and be in in the What was Carter should not be concerned about the in since the are more to than to lead Carter should that the movement at the and those have their own Carter should to and he did be all was that was the and who did not in to all that the or them to But abortion was to Catholics. It could not be as as to a of in fact, as out, the were in effort. in the revealed that abortion was the issue on which was of among The same could not be said for the nation's Indeed, if was on abortion it was that it was a Catholic issue that threatened to of religious liberty. In Protestant Catholics were to the separation church and state. This was the opinion of the of the Southern Baptist Christian Life was a of the of a in the in an effort to amendment that would have Roe v. The acknowledged among the nation's religious people about The issue for them was religious which “the freedom to abortion in of his or own and religious and in with Most Southern Baptists had the issue much in 1976, and Carter's position was with most of those who Nevertheless, as a political issue was After Roe v. Wade abortion a national voters who were their own of those Carter They that abortion would not most of Carter not to on the It was more that he his position and and former candidate for the Democratic presidential a Carter that is being up by the in the on abortion.” Nevertheless, Carter's position was the that fact, the what the Carter political should be. to Carter's was to to on the abortion than two left in the and with Ford that was of the has to be on to those Carter should the of the of to to to them only a of voters who were more concerned about Carter's to with the political Democratic William the of abortion as an issue that could In he a election when his him with the issue in the of their campaign. first Carter, not Carter's personal to abortion and to the as as his that should to encourage were general and become and a of voters in an effort to an few Carter and those for him on the on the the position on position should be as of political of about the of Carter should also Ford and personal about they would for abortion in their position no more than The to Carter's was to the The that Carter's Catholic problem did not him in In fact, he of the Catholic to along with of the Protestant That of the Catholic was considerably than the that had in it also was than Carter would in when he of the Catholic in he did little to his Catholic He did to the of to for This an among his and those who had him during the campaign. In a of Carter's in the of the the to the president for public the outspoken and addressed the president in a to be for and and over Carter's about for concerned among that Carter would position and support the of for when in the of the They also that Carter's to and and in a in an Carter's of that his position potentially of of the the an most these Carter the his would in he had much on state would have in his he that his was to during campaign. is more liberal than Despite pressure from his own Carter stood his that his own stance on the relationship church and state his in he to Southern Baptist and but with other In fact, the problem had the the of the polls that Carter to have the election all but he to a of with in an to up his The was that Carter's religious faith would lead him to a new state that would the of his In a on in the face of own however, Carter that he had on a lot of with have in many of was for a Southern Baptist Carter, and particular was a of on the But it came in the at the time for Carter. were by his of the and by the fact that his came the of a of and In a sense, Carter's to his and to to his was with his The support for separation of church and state was in the that and personal would This was most in an in which most people were with the of a that was at least in In the was not and Carter was not a But events of the 1960s had drawn the into the nation and the nation into the South, a that had to its by the Carter continued to that personal and but his to new religious revealed the to which position in national society had He a relationship with several of the Southern Baptist the Jimmy president of the from to As Carter encouraged the of a by the and Baptist to the for what appeared to be The of the Georgia Baptist The Christian his in a through the Carter's with Baptist in some The president should be for a with those religious the same as he would be with that the to the into the and to of and for the President to which become in and Southern Baptists to some Carter's of what Baptists that John F. Kennedy would have he their at in during the campaign. to for other Georgia Baptist In his to Carter by the personal and The as his and he with during his Carter had from but a As governor of Georgia and as president of the Carter had and to religious of all in the separation of church and state and would not to in at Carter's of a was from where Baptists believed their primary Nevertheless, Carter and he to be in the be that Baptists have no to be concerned about Carter's relationship with other religious the that expected from the in his Carter an effort to to religious then, however, it was In fact, his own denomination in The that of the denomination that with Carter on the nature of religious and the of the in a particular moral vision on the The new of the denomination was more concerned with they believed that Carter's of religious had encouraged the nation's secularization. This the for abortion to become a political issue for Southern Baptists in the and for them and Catholics to a shared religious vision of America that had in the of the civil rights Carter's had drawn into the political if Carter turned not to be their candidate. Carter had to from to his faith for political not an active a vision that to Carter's Southern As a most Southern Baptists their way into the Republican Carter's ideas about religious and about the separation of church and state. in the they the need to abortion as a moral and religious issue than a Catholic It an issue in the nation's religious heritage. One Baptist the to abortion a Catholic issue was a which the of the millions of who are not changed and in the a of Southern Baptists for Life acknowledged that Southern Baptists have the to to the of They to and they with over the the Christian Life should abortion in the They that but only after in Most Catholics and came to on Nevertheless, many Catholics continued to however, they now did the of a party that Carter's on the of religious The among many observers was that the Democrats had become the secular the one to religious In fact, Carter's position would be the one by Catholic Democratic in the a position that them at with of the
In the fateful year before peace came at Appomattox—as slaves pursued their exodus from bondage and the Civil War dragged on—a counterpoint arose between two antislavery decrees under debate in the United States Congress. That counterpoint illuminates conceptions of universal human rights forged at an epic moment in the downfall of New World slavery. One decree became the Thirteenth Amendment; all but forgotten is the other, a congressional act to “encourage Enlistments” in the Union Army. The amendment provided for abolishing slavery everywhere in the United States and its territories. The enlistment measure freed soldiers' wives and children owned by masters in the loyal border states exempt from the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation. As destroying slavery became inseparable from vanquishing the South, bondsmen refused to go to war unless, in exchange, they won their families' freedom as well as their own. “It is a burning shame to this country,” affirmed congressional abolitionists, “to hold the wives and the children in slavery of men who are periling their lives before the rebel legions.” A month before the war's end, on the very day of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural, March 4, 1865, the measure took effect. As the Thirteenth Amendment awaited ratification and as the president spoke of malice toward none, upwards of 50,000 slave wives and children went free.1 In a world in flux, where constitutional change flowed from the tides of war, the abolition of slavery fused with freedom endowed by marriage, thereby tethering a new birth of human rights to enduring domestic bonds. That counterpoint casts new light on the making of abolition—a problem of enduring historical and constitutional significance. It reveals not simply how Congress asserted its sovereignty to nullify chattel relations and secure human rights, but also what counted as slavery and freedom as the advance of the Union Army overthrew old ways of life. Simply put, it manifests what abolition was meant to overturn and to create. For both the Thirteenth Amendment and the enlistment measure were acts of abolition. Both split asunder the relation of master and slave, destroying constitutionally protected property in human beings without compensating owners. Both turned chattel into free persons. Arising together amid the crisis of the Civil War, they belonged to a tradition of declaring rights and invalidating unjust forms of sovereignty that had emerged throughout the Atlantic world in the Age of Revolution, a tradition that wedded emancipation to marriage bonds among ex-slaves—from Haiti to Jamaica to the American South to Brazil.2 Their juxtaposition, however, has never been systematically studied; indeed, the enlistment measure barely appears in landmark scholarship on abolition or constitutional transformation.3 Overshadowed by the antislavery amendment, the wartime of freedom has the for a from the of to the of 1865, Congress the decrees month as never before that the Atlantic the rights of The abolition amendment was a and of the enlistment measure was an act of abolition—a on slave marriage bonds. it an of congressional the domestic of the slave loyal masters of the wives and children of bondsmen turned Union the for the emancipation on slave not in a to the of the the measure what slavery the of chattel to and a In the amendment and the measure the of abolishing slavery as a domestic by property in human for in the of the slavery and marriage to together as relations of domestic the master of a to the and of both and in and the in the of the the of all the of chattel bondage to In Thirteenth Amendment not what abolition but what freedom as to as slavery. the counterpoint between the abolition decrees is the of an amendment in in It to light a the of in for abolition but their from Thirteenth Amendment the of the antislavery by the of human rights by chattel slavery. under the abolition amendment, slavery has to a of and the of slavery in abolition never in Thirteenth Amendment It is as and the of Congress had never universal emancipation by of In the of the Thirteenth Amendment illuminates a of the American human rights of rights in the of Congress to in of the and as slavery by the a of landmark and of and the Thirteenth Amendment has never been a of rights the of to the in under the Congress in the slave but never to the of slavery or the domestic slave has to hold is at Amendment of and it is the that the Congress has in from and to of and rights, as the not to or are not as human rights but from exchange, by congressional constitutional from that the of the emerged not with slave emancipation but from it the of antislavery to where the Thirteenth Amendment as a of universal human The of that rights to abolition and to the counterpoint between the Thirteenth Amendment and the enlistment In that counterpoint a of the of slavery and freedom at the moment of abolition and the of and sovereignty to that on both the of the of slavery abolition and a rights tradition with the of the of the two abolition decrees reveals that the of the Thirteenth Amendment in the slave where the master both and to new into the Thirteenth its and its to its The is to as to advance antislavery and of human rights at the or the second is a what the but what meant by on the as they the to slavery and affirmed freedom as to The is what the of slavery had to with the Thirteenth and what the Thirteenth Amendment had to with antislavery of human the of the of the of the chattel relations by the a all the the freedom that a owned by a loyal master to in a of As the abolition amendment and enlistment measure in president It is to to go to on the are and what to for this or as as and The Congress as the debate abolition of human beings with freedom and the to slavery as a constitutional amendment or by a act as the of chattel slavery and the of Congress to that the enlistment measure abolition by For both decrees Lincoln's that slave property to masters loyal to the Union by the Civil debate on the amendment, as in the of Congress the of slave wives and it is to this of slavery and a at the of A year as Union a “It is for the and that of with and abolishing the slavery by the and and the two abolition decrees and in the in amendment to the the enlistment measure from on and the a year they were both of In Congress the the enlistment measure into the war dragged on and the states with the The counterpoint between was to all in Congress. it is a measure to “It is a very and It simply for the and the of the with its It of constitutional with all that the slave property of loyal the of the the freed soldiers' owned by rebel the Emancipation rebel and the of the as a for for the The was to the amendment and the measure in two to end, As the is to slavery it for a constitutional amendment but how it to that both of to it to its by the of the of the men the measure as to but not that it is for the of to the United the are that the amendment not by the and are to all and in to to this in advance of the Thirteenth Amendment or as a the at slave wives and children owned by masters loyal to the property by the the bonds of marriage between the enlistment measure slavery. the amendment was universal in its by all in Congress that the amendment and meant to free slave wives and it was all the that the on the amendment, on came to on its for but all The the of the Thirteenth but to light the of constitutional abolition and the rights at of two for the amendment before the were the by the and from the of slavery as a for the been the United or to their Congress to this by were the by who on of the of are before the that hold as a and the Congress to all and to this into everywhere in the United was the amendment had in was for the of the enlistment in the on the of the to the 1865, and of A in the constitutional of slavery was that the amendment spoke amendment spoke persons. The amendment the everywhere and slavery in the amendment a of universal human rights, all as the not it provided a for for a moment to to the rights of and in the of Both of the abolition amendment universal the the of the by that of freedom to as of human rights is in of a as was of and Congress that as as a new and into it to in the is at won by emancipation of the has been to the As by amendment the before the that was a the was to all as by free or by before the by a of to the of it was was the the as the American not from the not with historical of who had in the amendment, that to but not to all to or and go to the old by For the of chattel slavery. the Thirteenth Amendment not universal the freedom of all not For a in the of arose the that the abolition amendment been the of a that of all as free and before the also of in the Civil and the in the of the the rights arose to to the was or the relation between men and is to the or before the in a the of all men before the a to a a as free as a A to and as free as before the the was meant to the amendment, not in the who is slavery not to in its a of the who that very day had amendment to a in the by that the marriage from the of relations as in and and been for a abolition. a freedom went as the the amendment, not the and the of a universal of human a before it was to the of the in that had to marriage with bondage in from of constitutional abolition by human rights that the on the of slavery was but It was the enlistment measure that to the of the freedom by the debate on the Thirteenth both to the Union Army and to at the slave Congress on the and masters in the loyal states in slave and children and their the from slave property as it never the as for Congress to the For that an antislavery of property in human beings and as the for the new of in congressional abolition turned on of war, marriage, and the the for Union Congress the of the enlistment it constitutional abolition as a war to the of human bondage to the property rights by the the measure both the Emancipation and the it rebel or loyal masters for the of their it property rights in as well as in human and to the measure to the to its It was a debate at as as that the Thirteenth and it went on indeed, the for the had been in it a of from to of but were to at it the in of or of in Union and freedom to as well as and in a that spoke in universal of into making war for the United States and simply that and children were as of or marriage was or was not or by the Congress the for their the of slave marriage, the of and the of of the counterpoint between the measure and the in March The of the congressional and the constitutional at as the debate into the was not human rights the and the the of Congress to war a slaves in loyal on slave marriage bonds at the turned Union and not how and to in and and to bondage that the and it that by the constitutional to of the slave master and to human a and rights by the and of Congress It has been and that the is the Congress has the to the and the is in that spoke of war, and congressional spoke of and constitutional both on and was Congress the to loyal masters of slave to what of the on Congress the to a that Congress has the to the that it has to the That was the to also a tradition to of a at war for In for the of arose the of as the Civil War was for the not for the the tradition had never the to slave and In making constitutional with the of of Union and with an to on of congressional abolition. of both and of from of the rights of with spoke war and The in its that secure the of the and in its and spoke of and to its to an but also in and the of to the emancipation to as as to the and the this from the of the and to an in freedom on slave marriage, the of Congress on both and It was an that the of the with for the Thirteenth was in the for a at this moment is master of the of slavery everywhere in the United without constitutional It it all of to this of congressional the between slave and the between master and slave, the of the abolition an was with of the for Amendment property rights were the antislavery of and property and its for without to the wartime of the constitutional that amendment has been the enlistment measure as slavery as as and as as all the that in the Congress to the to rights of were bondsmen to for the border states had of to the were slave wives and children of as they not into the war for the the measure as well as the of in the a is the of the is to slave of their it is to the it is to it is to the and to slave It was and In the to loyal masters as with a of property rights and with a to the of chattel slavery. to the of and in for slave wives and a of emancipation by the of the had been by abolition in the of and slave the measure to at as well as slave property by all an in in or making or by or by of for the the of the to this they are and for to their spoke of abolitionists, also spoke of toward slaves protected by masters the of As slavery affirmed its a of abolition with a of that freedom was to a of and the Union for slave wives and children free by Congress. the relation between the and children and their not without As spoke of to a and of both the that a and the that the is Congress to the and the the is the to a in the of in the the antislavery of the enlistment measure in abolition before the day of the Thirteenth but the was that the measure as As act to the of its as in a and the rights constitutional and As in this the of loyal masters to slave wives and children to the of the of war, and the bonds of slave marriage as for Congress to abolition. In the of the enlistment amid the of the South and the Congress turned to the and the of slavery and It was not that simply as a to the of the Thirteenth Amendment in of human rights free it was the very of the of the debate abolition. by as well as by the of Union Army Congress to for the Thirteenth Amendment or with the enlistment measure or the the of abolition the slave but also of and a of slave antislavery Congress came to the of slavery. under the enlistment freedom in bonds of marriage that the bonds of as as under the as were a of as a slave as a freed was to rights simply by of the antislavery on the enlistment as the men in Congress. it the of the of the it as and as and that the was slavery by antislavery The as that had the on the both antislavery and was the of the slave to both a loyal master and a the In was the of a turned as slaves had marriage rights by was the Union for in light of the counterpoint between the abolition free a measure with constitutional of for the not and but also men of and men the the debate became a on the of slavery. the of the war and the the of rights, and the of property in to from slave wives and the on their was a slave That was the to and to For the measure on the that the bonds of slave marriage were as to the bonds of chattel slavery. is the of a the antislavery of as the in as was March to the that men a the and the and the As of this and it very to who has a or how wives to the of the slave was for it not the between and but also the of of as well as the of the slave as into the of that was marriage relation in between chattel had rights of on in for slave to as has a the for the of the is to in or where has a and to the of the the enlistment measure simply took slave marriage for border however, who to in a was a in the of slaves were and but chattel to are to a in has a in and that the to with to is not marriage was a of Congress “to as marriage that is not marriage, the of a of slave all freedom by the and to it by the the are at very in a that but an is to the to abolitionists, the the of the not how slave marriage bonds free a from the bonds of slavery. As the of the measure was its of freedom not the of a slave is the of a the war freed the of and but not as a that the relation of and is not with and this relation is of as a measure of who the of the that the measure for the to with new of slave marriage, or a year of the measure that slaves or or enlistment day counted as of marriage, with children to freedom the marriage had the of the Thirteenth is this to the in is a who was not a of a The was freedom by slave marriage bonds that the of both and The was that and it was and or the of a slave this who the Thirteenth affirmed that slave marriage and as and a to the of the slave who the slave to and the to to human not property to not to their marriage the of the slave as was the of how the slave was and under the were not in the a slave without how loyal a the who had the abolition amendment but congressional abolition had to by the the slave of a loyal and for the of the slave and the with a new in March that loyal masters to by and came to debate the with Congress on the of a slave as the of of this chattel in the or or a or a the and they it to the war's the in slave not it very to for the master that by the In a slave at this in the of also a slave very on the slave as on a antislavery were in the loyal slave and for a of freedom the Union the the slave for of simply it for the Union to into the to slaves the is a antislavery men of as of in or at is to are a in the of the was that to the slave however, Congress that the of a slave was For it the of property in human for abolitionists, who it to the both property in and the in they antislavery to not this to the of of to the are in the of the United States in the that to for property for it is that the that slaves are property and by the Congress of the United that the a by a was from the enlistment an act that a slave counted as property under the for a Congress from a loyal master and to a what was the in and The was that had That the not for the Thirteenth all the of the enlistment the of slave marriage by the of with abolition the Congress the counterpoint between the measure and the It was a between antislavery and that had emerged with in the and in wartime with the of Congress free the slave or for an abolition in as was to its March to the in Congress to their the the enlistment measure a to the act the of this by and by and that the the to to the of the and the of the that on the of the and the in the new the amendment had been in both of were and the was to act at all on the enlistment that amendment slavery is throughout the United a this measure the the or for of a slave from the to the and of That free the slave the amendment slavery Congress for a was not simply by but also by the who that the enlistment measure was but in the amendment in they to the and as to who A year with the amendment in the had that this constitutional amendment and this not the to not to free slave in the were to the of to free human where to the hold by of a to freedom to for the counterpoint between the measure and the amendment old between abolition and to the It to to a of the antislavery to the Civil War as an a between and human As Congress abolition or for the amendment that a and the antislavery in the of both and The the of a constitutional amendment the of the to the of the who for their for in the of the not that the men who the the of the by the as it is change it in a constitutional had the on the Thirteenth the of the was for congressional abolition. It was the of the slave that this by the The of abolition by on at the loyal In the of a slave and and refused that not to for the Thirteenth of the of Congress. as never in the a to of before all to a had in in the of was all to a was all to was and the who had been a Union that had of and as the the slave freedom to of their loyal masters were the wives and children of making of their and and it as for their into Army. this by with a year that Congress was the slave was all of to from and on the came that was of the for slave were on a in the border were in in with and all of that the soldiers' wives and are and by wives were or to were from slave wives to at As by was by a master to of was and and and of to and as the loyal the to to their by slave wives and but to for For a the of slaves and and in the congressional debate abolition. was the from of the country,” a a to in how is not to and children to a that were to the enlistment measure that their was by the of the The crisis was by the of a and slave who was a from a and this was and It a from to the the but the emancipation of for the of to the an provided at from the the of the slave for congressional from the border states to the Congress on the of slavery. to free the slave that slaves between loyal masters and and were freedom on marriage with the of antislavery in their that the the a on the as well as to for the Thirteenth Amendment that a what of men to act and and slave wives and the amendment, an from the to a slave to and however, they the of by to and wives and children or a the For a antislavery throughout the Atlantic world had been with of in Congress. and slave all the of the of and marriage all the the the of a the of to and as of of the Atlantic slave to the of antislavery as crisis into In the the and that as a free in the that debate on had of slavery is that it the marriage the of the debate on the Thirteenth it was for to in by of that the of the is the of and who in the of The of the not simply slave emancipation but also of freedom as an The of the universal of human as the of chattel relations of and to is it is to the of the American at its in the of the to the of from the of its from the or of the slave the of freedom as for its the American the for and and this that but on a The and the a That is was an by the slave bondsmen to their had all slaves wives from and before In the of are in and the of a who simply to a slave it to the relation of master and in the of the that it a of slavery. to the old with in with all of and and the from an of the American for and of The enlistment measure to the of also its For the American not the of Congress to slavery its slave states in to the that the and the sovereignty of to on the of the slavery that under the has to with of the slave into the loyal border the enlistment measure that antislavery the Thirteenth the measure a of in the measure the of For in freedom on marriage it congressional to antislavery that the very bonds property in and a free of an The by abolition was has a to the antislavery the slave is not the but the to with the from property into a abolition also of slave marriage bonds and the of the slave As the an antislavery that a slave to slave who but never to the of as the the rights, chattel slavery became the for A free was chattel a that is the slave turned the slave from loyal master to a Union antislavery as well as the of marriage as a to freedom but of slavery. The of the was the sovereignty that the slave the of of as The the among free or the sovereignty as the of In it was the that to in the loyal slave in the bonds of slavery marriage the the slave freedom but the to an freedom to a of the relation between the Union and the had the of slavery in the and affirmed marriage the enlistment measure slave marriage the very of American abolition. spoke of to the slave but to and of to the for the to as a but to the as a for for the a of go to a and to to the of that the moment is turned and children to Simply the of from the of the the that the debate the Thirteenth at slavery marriage, by of their as property relations of the thereby slaves and wives into For the marriage bonds as the very of abolition. the enlistment spoke of the rights of but without rights to slave of antislavery men that of slave wives beings and was the of Congress to and the of Union to the toward their wives and children that men as as and where is the who in the Army of the United States and and children to the the and of a and of In the the antislavery belonged to who the enlistment measure in the it belonged to the who the abolition of in slave for the as by not the slave freedom was simply of under the to the and of to that a of and is to men who are all for and for the of this For a Congress the slave what was and to how and to for the Thirteenth the of to never For all the of and the of not to a of rights of the to a of but as a not master of in 1865, as the enlistment measure Congress. the Thirteenth Amendment had been by the states in the and slavery had been by
The American present is at odds with representations of the American past. The American present witnesses the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, penal, military, and war powers as contemporary commentators such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Giorgio Agamben contemplate the contours of American hegemony and superpower in a new era of empire.1 The global impact of present American politics, political economy, and foreign policy is obvious to any casual observer of current affairs. The story of the American past, on the other hand, continues to be told in narratives that seem to be heading off somewhere else. In place of the growth of power, the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of relative powerlessness—a usually benign tale of legal-political self-abnegation, emphasizing constitutional restraints such as federalism, checks and balances, the separation of powers, limited government, the rule of law, and laissez-faire. When presented more positively, American history is usually framed as a quest for freedom—the struggle for political liberty, emancipation from bondage, the rise of civil, economic, and social rights. Property, contract, and freedom of speech, press, and association form the constitutional backbone of a free market, a vigorous civil society, and a democratic polity—hallmarks of a free people. Oddly, key elements of this tale are kept alive in both older political histories of the liberal tradition in America and newer histories highlighting the rights and agency of particular cultural communities. Coming to terms with the historical rise of the mechanisms of legal, political, economic, corporate, and technological power that currently shape so much of the globe is thus a more difficult task than it should be. A true philosophical and political history of the American present continues to elude historians.2 This disjunction between historical perception and political reality is not an entirely new phenomenon in the United States. As early as 1887, in a penetrating essay titled “The American State and the American Man,” Albert Shaw chided Americans for their laissez-faire fantasy: “The average American has an unequaled capacity for the entertainment of legal fictions and kindred delusions. He lives in one world of theory and in another world of practice … Never for a moment relinquishing their theory [of laissez-faire], the people of the United States have assiduously pursued and cherished a practical policy utterly inconsistent with that theory, and have not perceived the discrepancy.” Surveying thousands of regulatory laws passed by state legislatures in the late nineteenth century, Shaw concluded that “the one common and striking characteristic of this huge collection of new statutes is its utter disregard of the laissez-faire principle … They deal with the citizen in every conceivable relation. They seem to have left nothing for future Legislatures to regulate.” One hundred years later, in the middle of Ronald Reagan's America, Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D-SC) similarly observed the powerful role of government in the construction of modern life and its renunciation in the American historical self-conception. Seeking the 1984 Democratic nomination for president, Hollings delivered a stump speech deploying several different versions of a story about “a guy who came home from the Korean War, went to college on a form of the GI Bill, opened a business with a Small Business Administration loan, made sure his parents' farm was adequately wired through Rural Electrification and irrigated with assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers, saw his kids get subsidized school lunches at a school that received lab equipment from a National Science Foundation grant, got his mortgage from the FHA and hurricane disaster relief from FEMA, and one day, took AMTRAK to Washington to complain to his congressman about getting big government off people's backs.” Like many Americans, “the guy” never saw the role of collective power in the creation of his individual declaration of independence.3 Shaw and Hollings reveal a disconnect at the heart of the American experience—a tension between the story that Americans themselves like to tell themselves about individualism, self-reliance, voluntarism, associationalism, free labor, and the free market and the actual history of the “concrete national institutions,” as Shaw put it, that have been capable of wielding such broad interventionist, coercive, and regulatory power at home as well as abroad. Samuel Huntington once dubbed this yawning gap between facts and norms “cognitive dissonance”—an almost pathological tendency to confuse a fictional American ideal with historical political reality. From Thomas Jefferson's elision of slavery in the Declaration of Independence to Ronald Reagan's anachronistic invocation of John Winthrop's shining “city upon a hill,” examples are obvious and legion and not always merely rhetorical. At the turn of the last century, Roscoe Pound surveyed the damage done when the United States Supreme Court took a “long step into the past” and imposed the fallacy of “liberty of contract” on modern industrial labor relations, as if the parties were still individual “farmers haggling over the sale of a horse.” As Pound's example suggests, the problem is one not so much of psychology as of political economy. Shaw and Hollings foreground a particular American version of the tension at the center of social and political thought—the between and power, freedom and and and and A of this American the power, and of the American much of modern history with the of powerful and the of their and of the American state one of the more in in a different and a The “the American is as of an in a of and When at the American version of a state is as not to the that modern and tendency to the American state its history as continues to a with American power in the The and of this historical of the American The of the American state is to the history of American the is to American constitutional and laissez-faire is to American political economy. Like the of and the of a American state is the of a tendency to American history as the history of the of a the historical and of is of the of America as a place of American from a state of As John with almost in the the was The the of individualism, civil society, free labor, and a free in American it the more historical and role of collective law, government, and in American In this the state itself is as of a that never a place in a and The of a American state in and on individualism, associationalism, and to the power of the state in many of democratic and have his American state was in “the government of the United States is to get by it from its of it the of the tradition of in the American state not on perceived to be an from the United States was a at “The of the of this State is not and and the for a not for a State and a a of has the of the late nineteenth and were of commentators to the to is in the United in an American political a characteristic the for the of the of the American state was the the heart of In the of with American to between American and the a of on an national historical American in liberty, voluntarism, and a market, the role of the state in social and In political such as to a a and national that as the of a for over individual over collective and and over and state this the history of the American state its and almost and regulatory in the of national cultural of was the American it was a the of an to new for the of the of and free the most to the of the of the American state is the to this has been by with and an social in the and the state to the of American by historical such as and political such as the of the American state The tendency to the American state as of a to of a continues the of of American political As American has not been by it has on a new new form has a of that the as to and American state power with and for another and The modern American state is still as and the of historical and by social in the of the nineteenth The tendency to about the American state the of has never been more for most the of that an of still to be The American state in of the most historical and “a “a “a and “a a an of the modern American state is an and its in the has a historical This on the of an of Samuel Thomas and the and the actual power and of the American state in this have been for the new and into state by their and early to such as in American and the of this has on a life and of its a more of and political who have of in an era when state have and more the American form of legal and is the The obvious present reality of American state power in the early is a of the history of the rise of a global The most and of this is that the American state is and always has been more interventionist, and than was in of histories of the American state to one of the facts about modern American of a and is contemporary American to the of of the and of the American American history has the in the of one of the most powerful in world that American history of the construction of American state power from the of the to the past. for has the history of the American the creation of a that “the true of the American was not to to more power, to and an entirely new power was a state in the United it have been the of government in a most of has similarly the of a powerful and national to the of the the historical that a national and regulatory the of the John has almost of the of government in the nineteenth through his of the role of the state in the and of from the to the and has government power at the center of the new history of and and As the of a of social and cultural and and of and were not the of laissez-faire a to on the powers of the state a for people The of the state is over The powerful role of the American state in labor has been the of a of on “the state and the has on the role of in the creation of a national in the United States. power was present in the social from such as to more in and is in this that John examples of in came from the United not and the of the The powers of American and are new has the history of American state of has the history of national and disaster a of new histories from John and have to the powerful of social and social The growth of and in the has on new in the histories of and One the rise of American national and the role of the the and powers in American to a state The of American state is the past, and for the in present should not be into that the American state is the and the and to a more of and laissez-faire. the the power of the government to and its well as other never been As contemporary should be to the of in late is and In to the of the American the historical well to the and construction of new of state power American This story of state not into such as modern social it not the to about American voluntarism, it is the story of the creation of powerful modern mechanisms of American and the rule of were of this new state as social one should not to a historical of liberal and legal elements with “The liberal state has always been as as the political and social and the of has and with the of it has its with the of it has and its with the of the it has and … has upon and law, upon and This of the American liberal both and law, and and new of historical In a of a of historical and political to the of “the of social theory and their in about the social and political of and the almost of American social theory and is more when of modern state The problem historical of the American state is the tendency to American into a the of modern more than a In the ideal of and are of modern a and legal and to a of business with to an of the power to rule and and the its and the to and the as by the and have the of modern from this to be as of to the of the the In the from the American state is almost to for state is an of state a of at the American state than from other of the and of American government to other that for the power of the American of more for the American The historical in this of and the American in the of new to the of an American of state are a of the of a to the problem of a of the of in American a of the power of the American rule of and a of the as was a when it made to the and of and as of state and the of political In the early century, such the world and the future to be by social different from the of the early and state than a of the political by and of and the and social of the century, the state of social theory more like a of the than a of the the to and have and when to their and American that and not well the a of have the of the United in the the of to be and the of the and the of the when about a state as about the of the of people At the an of the of should the state usually into a of the of The Michael a with his between different of state power and power, to the capacity of state to rule by other of power by civil power, in to the capacity of the state to civil and a for of the the power of the American The American state the American that is is about and powers and balances, and the constitutional of state terms life big the creation of a of government and an is this and of that most have in when about American American by this for power and for in the of state of power to be of and are not by the power is as as to any of power to be their upon the for the power the in the power of the American state have been the and of its power is and always has been From the of the national to the of from the creation of a for the of to the construction of a powerful and from the of powers of and to the of new of and in the of national the power of the American state at as American legal, corporate, economic, and cultural the is this about American state it the that the of the American state its is to to and state power than the by social was the problem of political for most of its for actual power of state in to have on social theory The problem of a new of power democratic and modern power more with a individual the the as well as into the of modern social and the problem of early American social The of and John the of and John the of and and the of Roscoe Pound and an for modern state One of the of the of John and their was to a about the of ideal and of legal as to the In place of the practical world to ideal a more and in the an and to and by actual and of and in As so put it, was that to an to from one place to another and to common of and historical In place of about and the actual social of an for The of the well In law, political and American social theory and social in the early In law, and an with of the of “the the of the of the of and a quest for a more of state and in John for the the of the state in of a more of the of the state as a by at it in the “the state in was more than its in In law, legal a the and of about and the of than He “The of about is the business of the people who have the in be are of the about is to the through of this are so as is their as The American and to the in other the of and that state that American state that one in at state of state The at policy was government to more about the of the the state through the of that the and of people in the This of is as power a much of the of the American The of A that American state power so is that it is so an of and are more than in the United States. the national government and state and school with powers and the national government the and of power be The and more than and The as well as a of The and more than and that in almost of and in the One an of the and of American state by at a of such as In almost and state were by such as the the of and and The and of and a that continues to state with and with The American more than a people. The in more than this is by the American and national This of is not the of a is it a at this of American and is of a The characteristic of the American state is key to both its and its In social theory, the state is through an of with of and The American in is more is and than frequently and is to of the power of school in the United States as well as the powers of The power of government to in the of and in the of than the national the terms of the the national government has The power for the for state for the people. to to the power of the American state the of American policy by at the national center the is to much of the the and state the As American government on the powers of from the This American state by mechanisms for an and Coming to terms with the American state a of this power on the state theory on state power at the it is not so at the of power to the power is by of the state to the of the The of and government are different from the of of different as the task of the of the at the center is from the of the people on the are frequently for and of power, and democratic and are not of state the in many are the of The American of government, with its of of state separation of powers, federalism, and the rule of for an of the state through civil to the for a and legal of rule that has of the most The rule of A to American state power thus an of the state in than in theory, from the than the of the as much as the as much as and the and of power as much as its and is another it is to for state power in the United and that is the rule of One of the of American is the place of in state and policy From the role of the in the creation of the to the of law, and legal in the United States is a legal as with the and separation of powers, the of the American state has been a of and the of constitutional the rule of is as a on American state to the of modern regulatory From the histories of to the the has been as of a to liberal of a and American tradition that the of a American as legal and legal have been for American has as more than a constitutional on state has been an and of political and power, a than role in the creation of the modern American has been the of such a and of power, that in place of a of to power should be as “the of upon histories the of in state from the of contract, and to market in the nineteenth century, to the of the power and and regulatory in the One to for the rise of a modern state in the United States in and and labor and and and and the of and laws and American state power is a of legal of and The of as state be into a of state through law, and other legal the power of the American state such as John and have been as an of American state is to be as another American for state through of the most policy in American and and the Americans with on as a of the and relative of such should the that law, and are of state the such examples the power of to a citizen into civil and the to the the of the When to this to its of have an of American state power and The a in an American of state the The to American state power the of civil is in the in it and the This the American state has the to The of through law, the and and is one The of the powers of to the of a national through the of powers such as to and is of the American and the American to a role in social and and collective into the than power, and policy in the of a the American state and powers through the its its and its in the the history of government and other of power to the is well the other of the role of the American state in the creation of the From the role of state in the of and to the role of in the of the the market, and cultural the powers of the state were to the and of American civil As observed about the market, history that the of national was in the of the and emancipation of the from the the market has been the of a and on the of social and cultural have been a about the construction of and The most of American power have always to the problem a the people the the state the the and to American state the of and of and in to this is the that American power has been a of and not as for of the of the American the American the American the American the the the American the American the the and the National The power at the of is of the of and in the United States. emphasizing the of the legal-political and the the the of in more and power, and and The of such a is by the of American such as and The of was on the of rights contract, and the market to to the of In a of and the role of and the state in and and rights. the of the hand, the state in the legal-political of the In the and the of and power that “the of as power and He of that the ideal of has never in been In through of the powers and He that the the role of the state in the that so much of the of and power in American on the of and power in the actual of the American state has it to the of state the to of the power over the of the to the of such of As and the of in the United States be as the of market that market was itself the of and political are difficult to from the of by the of contract, and in and politics, the the of to the of power in a democratic When are about the as well as the as well as be more As be as to that the of never be by as it be to that the of political power never be In his essay the of on the role of fictions and in the of power, as well as more to who with a philosophical the with the many are by the and the with their and to of their When by this is as is always on the of the the have nothing to From the of to to the of a government of laws than national and historical of and have kept the of from into the and of modern The of the American state is such a of both and In an era by both and state theory, the story of an and version of that state in the United States was the in politics, and global the last the of the American state as is should be The aggrandizement of power the American and historical as as well as new of and of state theory the of not be the for the new of power that in global political economy. is an In the early century, a of and and American social of at power in its economic, political, and to by of American that with and the and of American power is From and John to and John to and early American a of a and of American and the and of power in a United States. the problem of power in America as and not as it the of state and civil than the of the of the on of power in in the and that American than the of power to the of political theory the political of social a more of as is to are political and legal never the of and the that from American political the of the of legal and political They never the that state so at the of his and the that legal and political place a of and The of American state power are In a democratic should always be on the of the the history of that power has never been more
“Front-loading” primaries and caucuses - the movement of state delegate selection contests to the beginning of the nomination calendar - is problematic for the integrity of the presidential nominating system. Because it results from decentralized decision making by self-interested states, front-loading also poses a problem for federalism. Indeed, most proposed remedies for front-loading would impinge on federalism in some manner. In analyzing those remedies, one must assess their interaction with federalism both procedurally and substantively. For example, a federally imposed national primary would be harmful to federalism on both dimensions; regional primaries negotiated among states would be best for federalism procedurally but are of dubious efficacy; the national parties have an ambiguous relationship to federalism; and a change in federal campaign finance rules would seek to combine a centralized process with a decentralized result. The best solution might be to use available central levers to try to change campaign dynamics and thus the incentives for states to schedule their primaries early.
V. S. Naipaul's bookA Way in the World (1994) is perhaps most strikingly about obsession—about historical figures obsessed by an idea: dreams of new worlds, the fulfillment of large schemes, and the universal failure of such visions. In his long chapter “In the Gulf of Desolation: An Unwritten Story,” Naipaul imagines the wasted year that the Venezuelan revolutionary Francisco Miranda spent on the island of Trinidad in 1806, marooned after an abortive insurrection across the gulf on the mainland. Nine years before Miranda's arrival in Port of Spain, Trinidad was part of the Spanish empire, but now it is British. The island is dominated by plantations: “no place for a metropolitan man like Miranda,” writes Naipaul.1 And yet his work turns on the often hidden or forgotten exchanges between metropolitan spaces of empire and subjugated spaces of colonization. At Port of Spain, Miranda is met by General Thomas Hislop, the British governor. “Hislop is a man of jangled nerves,” Naipaul tells readers. And for good reason. The brutal repression of incipient slave revolt—“the hangings and the mutilations”—has raised legal questions back in London. Much of the chapter centers on imagined conversations between Miranda and Hislop. Hislop is deeply troubled by uncertainties, by the shaky foundations of Britain's Trinidad regime and his responsibility for actions, inhumane and possibly illegal, taken to maintain order. Most particularly, he is anxious about the investigation of General Thomas Picton, the island's first British governor, and by Picton's conviction in the court of King's Bench. “Strange,” Hislop observes, “that all the bigger charges of hanging and theft should have been thrown out, and this case of petty theft should have brought Picton down. Signing the order that the very respectable magistrate brought him for the torture of the young mulatto girl.”2 In fact, this glancing reference to an anonymous “young mulatto girl” marks a return, a reworking of themes and characters that Naipaul introduced twenty-five years earlier in The Loss of El Dorado: A History (1969). As he notes, his earlier book “is made up of two forgotten stories,” two moments when his native Trinidad “was touched by ‘history’” or was brought within European historical consciousness.3 The first story marks the final chapter in the search for El Dorado with Sir Walter Raleigh's return to Trinidad in 1617; the second is that of Louisa Calderon, the young mulatto girl whose torture brought Governor Picton to trial and whose case became a cause célèbre. Calderon now appears at the fringes of British history, given a walk-on part in histories of Trinidad.4 Picton is generally remembered not as a colonial governor but for his role in the Peninsular Campaign and as the highest-ranking officer killed at the Battle of Waterloo; his portrait hangs in the National Portrait Gallery, and his heroic death is commemorated by a statue erected in St. Paul's Cathedral.5 In his Nobel Prize lecture for 2001, Naipaul describes growing up without a sense of his own family's historical past: “All children, I suppose, come into the world like that, not knowing who they are. But for the French child, say, that knowledge is waiting. That knowledge will be all around them … In Trinidad, bright boy though I was, I was surrounded by areas of darkness.” Those “areas of darkness … became my subjects,” writes Naipaul, and that darkness sent him “to the documents in the British Museum and elsewhere, to get the true feel of the history of the colony.”6 The “postcolonial” moment has been one of recovery, as well as one for redrawing boundaries and identities. The blurring of cultural and spatial boundaries has led historians, as well as novelists and other writers, to rethink our own work, sending us back to the archives to get “the true feel,” or at least a new sense, of history. As Antoinette Burton explains, “the imperial turn” “is not a turn toward empire so as a return to the between and and the and the of the on to the case of Picton and the cause of Calderon, with new historical questions and of us who work on British have Picton's case legal that an of In my own A Way in the World and it to a to the to the trial the and the the But as historians, our or the documents after the of the and with other and to the story deeply on And Britain's historical is of the of that history, the by Picton's trial In or British about empire, it is on the of empire as a in empire in on the of colonial to the between a of and the of colonial As cause but one in the long and history of colonial one of The and us of the of empire and of the of exchanges between and this the of British in the and metropolitan about the of that by Picton's trial for Louisa Calderon colonial for a the of as observes, metropolitan was on of colonial the of often the between and and the of on was to The Picton's most the of cultural of and that the and of of to be the of and to and The of was The dominated British an of all British in this that the was an and of and not the the of British and French they the most A of in in all the British and of and a was by and the French of with of of and as the Trinidad was of a The island's and the of very with who French the of of and the island to a Spanish Trinidad became an and the slave to was a large of of who The British Trinidad in but after the of was it to the British Trinidad and it the of with the Spanish British in the and French Trinidad a for the of In the of the General Picton in of Trinidad with a he was governor in and to the of Picton and his within the of a thrown into by and the of the the the of or legal to in a by British his of Picton was by a with long that the of the in the of the him or of Picton this to it in of his was the he was brought to after the of on 1806, Picton's case before and a in the court of King's Bench. Picton was for a the to be Calderon, a in The case first before King's two years in but been sent on to Port of for the case has a the trial was a of a one in a legal The case the as it of death brought a to for or the In Picton been taken into in order to charges before the case was the charges of and was brought to King's for other that Picton was of and of the and of the by Picton around the that Calderon was Most at least for the was the that he without a young of and a of the case in on to when Picton was all charges and his of Picton's case was, in fact, part of a the of British colonial in the A colonial the In the of Picton as governor of Trinidad and him with a by with Picton as second and as and Picton of colonial and Picton was a of his own in and to a In this he was of with British for for and the who was to in to the as an of of imperial responsibility been at an earlier moment of imperial he as a the as an of and a of Picton was a who his at was a of the his at he as to the British in at he and as a of the of and he on in and in The between Picton and and a with a of in that documents at into The of the and to the imperial us to King's the of the the court was to have been a of the to after The trial was for Picton was brought to court on the the trial as the for him to the of the case to As in the the case Picton was of the most to our and has for a of Picton was he was the of the case was by the role of a for his who led the The was brought and by the the the case raised questions about Spanish or British the British of And Spanish was the legal and the case questions about of and the of colonial was the case by his that Picton, in his role as of our and governor of one of our colonial and to his … has the to he was been by the of the of that after the British Spanish to be but to the to his Picton's of British introduced the of Louisa At the of or been by “to with him as his to the court that such to us in this … yet in that the of is it is for them to at the of at that they or into a of with Calderon “was in an with one to him to of a of and Calderon taken into to in the and at the of the or Picton the the torture was first brought to the of and two or who to the on a of and a British governor for the first torture into a British as a for and and as a of a this Calderon in at the was The of torture was The was by one to a other was to and was by of a a the of on The for to by to this was that but was of a that the torture not be for an Calderon but was up but not to the was The the torture was for Louisa Calderon on the The of Governor Picton for the on Louisa Calderon was a British but that it be a the to the torture on Calderon by the the should be “that it be by the most by it be and be as a to such the of British and history. on the of the of was Picton's that it was to have the of the of this new a conviction of the they of the they the and of British to that of to of a to to the of Picton's to the now around was the In a the that was and was that of a and that was in with a on in the of the was and two one for Spanish and one for “the the of the was to in or to with that was to the years in this and the of was that not who taken “the was to his the at who the and who the and two to an of by in the so was by the to the with to and the in … in with the and his the of the that it was an to that he his have him to “the of the of the at the to of this before the it to be with the of the the that that should be made by the Calderon the court that on the was to to in and and a was in in a between for without a to be before arrival and his of the inhumane At the of the marks of torture in the of or on two Port of Spain, or and to British the to the of of torture and the of the by that the case was not and but of the to Picton and the at In Picton's the the between and the was a whose been “the of by and the a and in a to that of Louisa was as as a in the of and in a of with in a with the court that to the and of this have met on the … a a to a of this … the is to and the is by an The not in Picton introduced the to to the to and two years to the to torture he that Picton to the order after all other been As it was that Spanish was to be British Picton's case on that Spanish and that in this he without the between and well that two of be the of our and that of the the that a who for years on the island of St. to and was taken into on charges brought by a who in court and with his and his and that his been by the as for his a was him to be for his that of the been not and the of his that a of death been a man for his a and man who this But when the to the in St. that a slave who a was to the death the an is the of Spain, but the of an and was in that a to his at At was the Spanish as it was to be in a British court was to Spanish legal the island as a of that it a for of and other Picton was “no a man of he been with order colonial As for the of torture to the of inhumane and of this The of on Calderon was as in of and the this of is for the of the of the is it who and in the and for the of was for of of Spanish the was a The was to the of Spanish to torture in the to the that Picton's torture been in A for the was was to a of as it became that he about Spanish he his to Spanish without the of a The was by who was in A in who the Spanish he that he of that The case to a the Spanish torture in the that the that Picton with As in his Picton should have not be a but was an and governor of a British who should have or him in this his for the to as to who by the of the British have and will the in the of has the of his his to for his before a court of The a of but this was the of the for a new A case that with torture in that first in King's in when it was sent on to Port of and that to King's in 1806, was two years in a it torture to be legal in Trinidad at the of the island to and Picton not to have been by Calderon of the of the as on British But the case to come to as legal on the the of In the court the the case was Picton was on the the him this of cause was Louisa At one Picton's case and the his regime in Trinidad of within a a for colonial at other the case the of a between metropolitan and colonial of between of and cause with of British own this of was legal was to be the of a British The case raised British was in to other European as well as to of the world for colonial such with Picton's torture of it about in the of a British governor the Spanish brought torture to of the of Picton's was that the and Trinidad, Trinidad to In order to of Picton's the of torture and to the death that and have in for the In was or about was a to British of to Picton's actions, the of the of Britain's own and the St. of the man with his and as a colonial British slave generally of or The trial of the of of British in the Louisa was not a but was a of to been into In to this Picton and his by of Calderon as an of Picton that a been made to the of the in of a of the and most who with a or introduced into the of “to his and him of his between two was around the of a of to the of colonial In the role of or of became a of of the of the In the in Trinidad and the of a of torture to the British of the of colonial the of or was to a for As a into own in the but as a of a long one to colonial to of as with the of of and the of the was the in Louisa to the the of the imagined of and was perhaps to the As has the of torture is In at trial and the of trial the to the of the of Louisa and when the of the torture of torture and by to the the was given the was As Louisa to the The of and to Picton's In fact, of the to the was the most of the it is to the about the of given that and British legal The that own the was in the that was by a that the in was and in a for the that in have been by the of the in and of King's Bench. Picton to in to in the and in the as “the Governor of the case to the the by the of the and the The most of the the that in The this a of in of that it not be the and the of this the this trial is to be of Picton's that he his own to the British into in order to the by the in of the of Louisa that and the and of the part of the the and and has been to such and by the of the and the of torture the been in in and in all at to and in the the and with the the on his was so so so so of all to and that he have to and taken a lecture him to to the of his and of and us to the In the of Picton and his a be about as well as for cause was of of to the to this was was with the of with the by the of by the as and As the “was not so a and as an of themes and be taken and in or The of as the of the and the first of the a for the by the of and that be to the and of The of as on on new of and a of Louisa and story in and between and often with between the and the the it was a or story was by of to and trial to the of the was the was not to be and in when the was to a of it with a of the most the As to and Louisa appears in in of the torture appears The Picton Picton the of the the of the is a of very about years of and was in The was it to the of on the first of The the is as the of a is in the of this man … was of a the of a and As the governor of a Spanish island by Spanish Picton into the of the so in The was an a of was The of Port of Spain, with and on a of darkness and to a place by an in Trinidad and the of Picton's to the first him to the of Picton's within a of he to the about “the of that In a of and was on first a of was taken the so that on and in order to to was so young at the that not the is but by years was for without trial on Picton's with of work to The colonial was by Louisa Calderon other figures in a of with slave of and the of by was and for like the for of was the and the part of the charges brought Picton to of was by the of the to with the of on large “the of was before the and as a was and … the into the it the when the in the of the and a it to of it was on the a was one of the or so who on Picton's the the of to be the least of Picton's so on the brutal of a colonial regime of to a of metropolitan the of the and the was to the of the of the … The as the of repression in slave by of out, with As of and of “to a “the to into the of such not be but to metropolitan as well as colonial At the of the in a of to the in this with the And as the of and with the in “the of The was In the case of Louisa Calderon, was a with and case on a with the of colonial As have European on be without reference to a As a mulatto Louisa was a of for mulatto a of and they often in European as by and to work, and to the of British the of not the of European but “the of and for and slave and of about boundaries of the in the of on for European and Calderon an imagined between and was a of but was an of for to be taken into as his In metropolitan of Picton's trial with of torture in order to The of one of the by is of as it Calderon with in the to to in the the torture and the around the of the the is and a of of revolutionary The on of the to the perhaps on of of a for of a the of an that became part of the In the of is the as they be by But the slave is is a of on a a to the Louisa torture of Thomas Picton … Governor of the of Trinidad for Louisa Calderon by of The of the torture of a of a the of by of The The of story was that it brought the of the colonial to the between and in of and by the of colonial in such they an the on the of own into a by it at a the by the for to the and to the with to be about as it was him that cause touched on that of as a man of and on the fringes of metropolitan in the of such as he his own he at a young to the of the before at the slave he to have arrival at Port of in with A he Picton him of as a in not long for to get into at Port of Spain, cause with British for Picton him and the book in Trinidad, his return to was the most of Picton's As a of Picton's he the of a The the book as an given that the of the French of of and the the a for for as the of imperial and the a of for a such as that the by the to the and In a of other on the he the first was to a his he for in the for a in … this of his in all … the of all he is at into the of the of not Picton was of Picton brought and to Picton up with a mulatto his he to and “to Picton the for the and the this to all the in the to the of … Those who or on his became the of his of to of of and the British of the British Thomas the of on the island “is by the or of a of the has to Picton across an it was not for a colonial to a of as his or to such a was was in the in about the of and of the of as was a the of the of his was a to back the on to to the court of was an of The of figures to was a man on the he was a after his own he been to Picton's with Calderon as a of he was at Picton's trial to he have as a or at least as a British the of The of of the trial Louisa Calderon as of the of or in the of of colonial British British to the the in the of the the the slave the of The of Governor Picton General The and The is not As was in a British who not in to be as In the of the of questions with in the colonial slave in and for in in the British raised the of for in and questions about the legal and to such in Trinidad, part of the to British and an colonial about the of of and to be with revolutionary who colonial And about the an of to and to slave and other British troubled by in the as and the of in of the of as and by a of come within the of a in cultural history toward he As with work in this one the of historical it is not by of this but that and cultural As the story of torture the colonial the trial and it up cultural in of and The was to as well as to The story not in of but and it and on colonial and Calderon the of of as the case Picton the of colonial of and brought to be metropolitan The the metropolitan to colonial and the historical in a between it us to it to the as a an as of a of across made and the Britain's imperial and and about of the of imperial and the of colonial The of empire as a the of by to as the the of colonial to of to the of of the on and the as a of In fact, in the and brought before by in an to a of and to Picton's But the the place at they of and to the governor to the the of colonial in the of one the of colonial an of and the of imperial In Trinidad, Picton's as a to General Hislop, his whose regime Britain's to the a or to British legal and to The characters Picton's was in when the governor to the at of good Picton for the Peninsular Campaign on the of Miranda's the Calderon case At the Picton was an to a in part of the of the in that for the case Picton, in his to in a that the of his in the Picton a of As for Picton's him the of the of the between and and he became deeply in the most as for the of who was of before his death in A and a to the of And about Louisa is like to about at the in a Trinidad, in a my when I was that, with with his a the and about with them in they as the who was the of Picton's that the was introduced by to in be to that his young has a of by an to all his In before King's at Picton's new The St. to be and in knowledge of with and a in the that be a to return to be the as the in the of the of the in Port of as given in to an this be the of the to by A in History of Trinidad, in that Louisa Calderon of in on to Louisa As a colonial was the of became an of metropolitan and as well as in and a young of and as an within the boundaries to a of Most the world of cultural a of and perhaps Naipaul has that he one a to the the other the world that one In Louisa the of the our to or to story to a sense of that has to turn the historical to the in an to the of
In America free public education is a constitutional value. Yet, although free public education
for all is a constitutional value, America's public schools remain ravaged by savage
inequalities, many of which are the direct result of significant financial disparities. Given
the obvious conflict between the constitutional value of free public education for all and the
funding parities created by the States' school finance systems, it is not surprising that the
courts have been asked to intervene and vindicate the constitutional value of free public
education for all by declaring that the current system of financing the schools is
unconstitutional. However, a judicial solution to the problem has proved as elusive as a
legislative or executive solution. Paradoxically, a major reason for the States' failure to adequately finance the
achievement - the constitutional value of quality education for all - is the existence of other
constitutional values. In other words, there are values within the American constitutional
system that make it extremely difficult to achieve another constitutional value. This article
explains how two American constitutional values - judicial restraint and decentralization -
work together to prevent adequate funding of another constitutional value - a quality education
for all.