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Santosh S Doifode, Anand Singh Rajawat
No abstract is available for this record.
Zhe Chen, Xiaohan Zhang, Ning Zhang, Guihua Gu · 7 authors
Cyber–physical systems (CPSs) increasingly rely on complex software components whose vulnerabilities may affect both digital services and physical processes. Fuzzing is a practical technique for discovering such vulnerabilities in CPS-facing parsers, protocol handlers, and edge services. Distributed fuzzing improves throughput, but outsourcing fuzzing tasks to multiple untrusted nodes introduces privacy risks: valuable seeds, especially crash-triggering samples, may reveal vulnerability information before affected users are protected. In this paper, we propose PrivFuzz, a privacy-preserving collaborative fuzzing framework. PrivFuzz allows organizations and individuals to collaborate and receive rewards while keeping fuzzing seeds confidential and enabling controlled encrypted seed reuse among untrusted fuzzing nodes. The key idea is to combine trusted execution environments (TEEs) with blockchain-based smart contracts to support confidentiality and fair reward settlement. We give game-based definitions and reduction-style arguments for seed confidentiality, worker soundness, outsourcer atomicity, and duplicate-claim resistance under an attested execution model. We implement a PrivFuzz prototype and evaluate it on four open-source parsing targets. Separately, native AFL++ sanity checks suggest that CPS-facing industrial protocol parsers such as Modbus and OPC UA fall within the same fuzzable target domain. Demonstrating end-to-end PrivFuzz on CPS control programs is left as future work. Using PrivFuzz, we discovered nine bugs and reported them to the developers.