Blockchain Papers

Benjamin W. Akins, Jennifer Chapman, Jason M. Gordon

A Whole New World: Income Tax Considerations of the Bitcoin Economy

Daniel Folkinshteyn, Mark M. Lennon, Tim Reilly

No abstract is available for this record.

Robert Viglione

No abstract is available for this record.

Dorcas Mugure Mwangi

The rationale for considering decentralization in anti-poverty programs is that it might have positive effects on the economic development. Decentralization brings the government closer to the people. Local officials are better informed on the local needs, and are thus more capable of providing the optimal mix of local policies. While the SMEs subsector constitute close to 80% of employment, it only contributes to about twenty percent (20%) of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 in Kenya. This implies dismal subsector performance despite its potential contribution to employment, income and equity as was asserted in the ILO report in 1972. The performance of the SMEs in Kenya is linked to several constraints among which the regulatory and institutional framework is alleged to be one of the factors. SMEs in Kenya are threatened for survival as a competitive enterprise. The purpose of the study was to establish the effect of devolution on small and medium enterprises performance in Kenya. The study adopted a descriptive survey research design. The target population of this study composed of representatives of the various industries including the matatu, dairy, supermarkets, jua kali and small manufacturing companies in Nairobi and its environs. The target population of this study was therefore 1015. The study used stratified random sampling method to select 10% of the respondents who formed a sampling frame of 102 respondents. Data was collected using questionnaires. Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics done with the help of software program SPSS version 21 and presented using frequency tables. In addition, multivariate regression model was applied to determine the relative importance of each of the two variables with respect to SME performance. The study revealed that that fees and levies, affect the performance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya to a moderate extent. The study concluded that fees and levies, cess and rates by the county government affect the performance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya. The study also concluded that SME financing mechanism, fair trading practices, capacity development, mechanism for value addition and increase in supply, distribution and access to goods and services affect the performance of Small and Medium Enterprises affect the performance of SMEs in Kenya. The recommends that the county government should use the finances collected from fees and levies, cess and rates in proper and controlled manner with a goal of improving the working environment for the SMEs in Kenya. The study also recommends that the county government should put in strict measures to ensure that there is no corruption in the fees and levies, cess and rates collection process to ensure that the amount collected do not go to the hands of few individuals and that a substantial amount can be received to support the plans and policies of the county government. The study suggested that a similar study should be carried out in other counties to find out whether it will yield the same results. The study focused on SMEs, another study should be carried out to find out the effect of devolution on large companies.

Niels Vandezande

With the increasing use of virtual currencies such as bitcoin, tax officials have started paying attention. Privacy and virtual identity specialist Niels Vandezande of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT (ICRI) at the KU Leuven – University of Leuven explains the implications of the recent IRS ruling on Bitcoin in the US, arguing that it may undermine the core reasons such virtual currencies were created.

Tadej Ošlovnik

Razsirjenost uporabe virtualnih denarnih valut se v zadnjem casu naglo povecuje, kar napeljuje na potrebo po podrobnejsi seznanitvi z njimi. Virtualne denarne valute, ki iz tehnicnega vidika ponujajo relativno dovrsen in delujoc sistem, obenem prinasajo stevilne negotovosti na podrocju njihovega umescanja v obstojece zakonodajne okvire. Zakonodajalci in pravni strokovnjaki po svetu so sele pred kratkim zaceli odkrivati ta fenomen. V diplomskem delu je iz pravne, ekonomske in tehnicne plati predstavljen sistem virtualnih denarnih valut s poudarkom na valuti bitcoin. Sirok vpogled v delovanje sistema je podlaga za razumevanje zakonodajnih procesov, ki bodo sooblikovali prihodnost virtualnih denarnih valut. Diplomsko delo povzema del zakonodajnih in regulacijskih procesov v razlicnih pravnih redih, ki na teoreticni in prakticni ravni skusajo vkljuciti virtualne denarne valute v urejene pravne okvire.

David Nyange, David Tschirley, Hussein Nassoro, Abeid Francis Gaspar · 8 authors

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Rural taxation policy is a major issue in many countries of Africa as they pursue more decentralized forms of governing and at the same time work to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of their tax systems. Tanzania has struggled with this issue since at least 1962, when it expanded countrywide the limited decentralization that had occurred under the colonial regime, then abolished LGAs in 1972 in favor of “Madaraka Mikoani,” only to reinstate them and enshrine them in the constitution in 1984. With wide powers to set tax policy and practice at local level, made possible by the Local Government Finance Act (LGFA) of 1982, Tanzania soon experienced a dizzying array of taxes and fees, with dramatically differing rates across LGAs. The situation became so extreme that some claimed that Tanzania by the late 1990s had “about 110 local authorities ... each with a different tax system” (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000). A sustained effort at reform culminated in 2003, when the “head tax” and a series of “nuisance taxes” were abolished, and the produce cess was limited to a maximum of 5% (compared to rates as high as 20% in the past). Though the resulting system of local taxation is substantially less complex, less variable across LGAs, and less onerous than it was prior to these reforms, important problems remain, and stakeholder demands for further reform have been growing. Since the produce cess became the most important source of local revenue after 2003, much of the demand for reform has focused on it. In response to these concerns, GoT included a commitment to “reduce or abolish” produce cess when it signed the G8’s “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” declaration. This study took advantage of a newly available database of LGA revenue and expenditure and complemented it with fieldwork in 27 LGAs with varying levels of reliance on the produce cess. Its overall purpose is to generate new empirical understanding that contributes to the on-going debate on produce cess and that informs the GoT on pros and cons of potential options for reform. Key new findings include: 1. Dependence on the produce cess varies widely among rural LGAs, from 0% of total locally generated revenue in Ngorongoro to 90% in Urambo; 2. Relative to the value of their marketed production, traditional export crops generate more than three times as much cess revenue as do food crops; 3. Much potential cess revenue goes uncollected: nationally, LGAs collect not more than one- quarter of the revenue potentially available from produce cess charges. This low level of collection reflects both limited human and institutional capacity at local level and widespread tax evasion, some of it likely featuring the collaboration of some local officials; 4. Because it is charged on the gross value of production, current cess rates can result in very high tax (even confiscatory) on net revenue among farmers that use a large amount of inputs but experience small net margins; Confirmed previous findings include: 1. With the reforms of 2003, local revenue fell sharply as a share of total LGA revenue, from 20% to a current level of 7%. Central government transfers provide the rest. Such a low share of locally generated revenue makes meaningful decentralization quite challenging. 2. Nationally, cess contributes only 1.8% of total LGA revenue, with other local taxes accounting for 5%; 3. Yet cess is the largest source of rural LGA own revenue, at 43%. Because this revenue is very flexible (it does not come with the spending dictates that accompany central government transfers), it is highly valued by local authorities, and is largely used for Councilor allowances and other “costs of doing business”; 4. Cess rates are highly variable across LGAs, varying by a factor of as much as four (Beans in Handeni at Tshs 1000/bag vs. Lushoto at Tshs 4000/bag); 5. Tax evasion is widespread and likely a more serious problem than tax avoidance; 6. But avoidance – farmers or traders or others changing their production and marketing behavior due to the tax (and especially due to the variation over space in tax rates) – can be a serious problem in particular instances. For example, some sugarcane growers in Mvomero are considering shifting their farming activities to Kilombero due to lower cess rates in the latter; and farmers and traders report that traders favor some districts over others in their food trade due to differences in cess rates; Reform options include: 1. Abolish cess in one step 2. Gradual phasing out of cess 3. Reduce the cess rate, broaden its base, and improve capacity for collection 4. Institute a differential cess for food- and non-food crops 5. Completely remove cess in food crops, leaving it only for traditional and other export crops. Simple simulations of option 3 combined with option 4 (3% for traditional cash crops, 2% for food crops) indicate that LGAs would need to improve their efficiency in collection (the share of potential cess that is actually collected) from the current estimated 28% to 41% to maintain revenue, and would increase revenue with further improvements. Complete elimination of cess on food crops (option 5) would make LGA’s jobs quite challenging, especially if rates were reduced on traditional export crops. Leaving the rate on these crops unchanged at 5%, LGAs would have to achieve nearly 60% efficiency in their collection to maintain their current revenues; dropping the cess on traditional export crops to 3% while eliminating it on food crops would require an almost certainly unattainable 83% efficiency. Based on the analysis in the paper, and in keeping with the view that improvement in tax systems is a long-term process featuring continuous, incremental improvement, the report suggests that option 3 combined with option 4 – reducing the rate of the cess (thereby reducing its variability over space), introducing a slight differential between food crops and traditional export crops, and broadening the cess collection base by working continuously to improve the human and institutional capacity of LGAs to collect taxes in efficient and fair fashion, is likely to be the best option for Tanzania. Piloting of technological and institutional innovations such as the use of mobile money for cess payment are proposed as one way to address both the inadequate local capacity and the scope for corruption in cess collection.

Richard M. Bird, Enid Slack

SUMMARY Many countries are decentralizing in various ways. Decentralization is often intended at least partly to make government more efficient, flexible, and responsive. Many studies have evaluated the effects of decentralization on the provision of such services as health and education as well as on corruption, stability, and growth. Because what governments do and how well they do it is inseparably entangled with the question of how they are financed, this article outlines why and how a key element in a sound decentralization program should be to strengthen the linkage between local expenditures and local revenues—called here the Wicksellian Connection. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Cosmas S. Mbogela, Henry Mollel

Decentralization is the allocation of power between central and lower levels structures of the government. The dimensions and the extent to which powers are transferred from one level to another vary across countries depending on the goal a country wishes to achieve. But one of the common aspects included in the transfer of powers to the lower level structures is financial decentralization. The reason is clear. It makes no sense to transfer power to the lower level structures without finance to execute own decisions.  Transfer of financial powers to lower level structures and creating an alignment that support efficient and effective operation of each structure,  has often been one of the major challenges in the implementation of decentralization model of government. Tanzania has been one of the victims in this situation. In view of various government reports, since independent in 1961, the several attempt tried by the government to transfer powers to the lower level structures led to either little or no success. The adoption of Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) in 2000 could be considered as the government attempt to correct the existed bottlenecks that led to the failure in the previous initiatives to decentralise. This paper attempts to answer the question: ‘is financial decentralisation realised under the DbyD, and what are the factors that contribute or hamper the financial decentralisation? The paper is based on the research findings presented in Mbogela (2009). The report consisted of descriptive presentation on financial matters from four case councils namely: Mbozi District council, Mbeya City council, Mbeya District council and Morogoro Municipal council. The findings from the four cases are presented, examined and compared. Keywords: Decentralisation by devolution, financial management, Local government authorities.

Thomas W. Slattery

No abstract is available for this record.

Eva Sáenz Royo

After over thirty years of decentralization in Spain and having to face the acute economic crisis, it may be time to raise new proposals that could increase the economic efficiency by means of increasing the responsible performance of regional demand and supply of public goods and services. This is the context of this article, which is a critical analysis of expenditure and revenue responsibilities in Spain from a comparative law perspective. Regarding the expenditure responsibility, this article highlights the imprecision of the Spanish system and its underdeveloped legal theory and judicial cases on the subject compared to federal states. After a comparative analysis on the revenue responsibility, this article highlights some of the major drawbacksof Spanish system of regional financing, and finally it makes severalproposals addressed to improve the fiscal responsibility of the autonomous communities.

Gover Barja Daza, Sergio Villarroel Böhrt, David Zavaleta Castellón

The second generation fiscal federalism (sGff) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spending with local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). findings at the prefecturall level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAt (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.

Jennifer Isom

No abstract is available for this record.

Omri Y. Marian

Virtual currencies are online payment systems that may function as real currencies but are not issued or backed by central governments. As demonstrated by recent events, virtual currencies present regulators with significant challenges. On May 23, 2013, the U.S. federal government brought an indictment against the operators of Liberty Reserve, a popular virtual currency, charging the operators with money laundering and operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business. The same month, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") made public a report exploring the potential tax-compliance risks associated with virtual currencies and economies. Legislators have also taken particular interest in one type of virtual currency-Bitcoin. On August 13, 2013, the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security announced plans to start an inquiry aimed at establishing a regulatory framework for Bitcoin. This short Essay describes the mechanisms by which "cryptocurrencies"-a subcategory of virtual currencies-could replace tax havens as the weapon-of-choice for tax-evaders. I argue that it is reasonable to expect this shift to occur in the foreseeable future due to the contemporary convergence of two unrelated, yet parallel, processes. The first process is the increasing popularity of cryptocurrencies, of which Bitcoin is the most widely recognized example. Unlike other virtual currencies that are associated with the existence of a virtual economy-usually in computer games-cryptocurrencies "function as a unique currency with [their] own free-floating exchange." Over the past three years, Bitcoin gradually gained the confidence of consumers, retailers, and service providers, and it is now effectively functioning as a currency in the real world. In fact, in August 2013, Bitcoin was officially recognized as a legal form of tender in Germany. Only two weeks earlier, a federal judge ruled that for purposes of U.S. securities regulation, Bitcoin is indeed "money."

Gover Baja Daza, Sergio Villarroel Böhrt, David Zavaleta Castellón

The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. Findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spending with local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). Findings at the prefectural level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAT (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.

Heidi Jane M. Smith

This dissertation examines local governments’ efforts to promote economic development in Latin America. The research uses a mixed method to explore how cities make decisions to innovate, develop, and finance economic development programs. First, this study provides a comparative analysis of decentralization policies in Argentina and Mexico as a means to gain a better understanding of the degree of autonomy exercised by local governments. Then, it analyzes three local governments each within the province of Santa Fe, Argentina and the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. The principal hypothesis of this dissertation is that if local governments collect more own-source tax revenue, they are more likely to promote economic development and thus, in turn, promote growth for their region. By examining six cities, three of which are in Santa Fe—Rosario, Santa Fe (capital) and Rafaela—and three in Guanajuato—Leon, Guanajuato (capital) and San Miguel de Allende, this dissertation provides a better understanding of public finances and tax collection efforts of local governments in Latin America. Specific attention is paid to each city’s budget authority to raise new revenue and efforts to promote economic development. The research also includes a large statistical dataset of Mexico’s 2,454 municipalities and a regression analysis that evaluates local tax efforts on economic growth, controlling for population, territorial size, and the professional development. In order to generalize these results, the research tests these discoveries by using statistical data gathered from a survey administered to Latin American municipal officials. The dissertation demonstrates that cities, which experience greater fiscal autonomy measured by the collection of more own-source revenue, are better able to stimulate effective economic development programs, and ultimately, create jobs within their communities. The results are bolstered by a large number of interviews, which were conducted with over 100 finance specialists, municipal presidents, and local authorities. The dissertation also includes an in-depth literature review on fiscal federalism, decentralization, debt financing and local development. It concludes with a discussion of the findings of the study and applications for the practice of public administration.

Anwar Shah

During the past decade, Indonesia has
\n transformed itself from centralized governance to
\n decentralized local governance. Local governments were given
\n extensive expenditure responsibilities while keeping the tax
\n system centralized. To finance decentralized
\n provincial-local expenditures, Indonesia implemented a new
\n system of intergovernmental finance. This paper provides a
\n review of the equity and efficiency implications of the
\n current system of central-provincial-local transfers. It
\n finds that the system of intergovernmental finance
\n represents one of the most complex systems ever implemented
\n by any government in the world. The system is primarily
\n focused on a gap-filling approach to provincial-local
\n finance to ensure revenue adequacy and local autonomy but
\n without accountability to local residents for service
\n delivery performance. This is done through a great degree of
\n academic rigor using highly complex procedures. The
\n complexity leads to a lack of transparency, inequity and
\n uncertainty in allocation as well as creating incentives for
\n jurisdictional fragmentation and reducing own-tax effort.
\n Simpler alternatives are available that have the potential
\n to address equity objectives while also enhancing efficiency
\n and citizen-based accountability. Such alternatives would
\n represent a move away from complex gap filling and special
\n allocation approaches to simple, output based transfers to
\n finance operating expenditures. These would be complemented
\n by capital grants to deal with infrastructure deficiencies,
\n and fiscal capacity equalization as a residual program with
\n an explicit standard to ensure that all local jurisdictions
\n have adequate means to deliver reasonably comparable levels
\n of public services at reasonably comparable levels of tax
\n burdens across the country. The paper argues that such an
\n alternative system of intergoveernmental finance would
\n preserve autonomy, while enhancing equity, simplicity,
\n objectivity, transparency and accountability.

Jörg Faust

No abstract is available for this record.

Arindam Das-Gupta, Richard M. Bird

A “good” tax system for developing countries was once considered one based on progressive income taxes. More recently, the emphasis has been placed on securing revenues from broader bases at lower rates from consumption as well as income taxes. A framework for evaluating public finance structures and institutions in terms of revenue and spending as well as the fiscal balance is set out, and some key areas such as VAT, earmarking, tax evasion, and administration, and non-tax revenues are discussed. Increased globalization challenges national tax bases and makes it even more important to improve local fiscal expertise and institutions in developing countries. Finally, if local governments are sufficiently reliant on own revenue to promote fiscal discipline, decentralization may produce gains in both efficiency and local accountability that may outweigh any costs that might arise from the loss of some macroeconomic control and altered investment priorities.

Nikolei M. Kaplanov

In 1601, Elizabeth I and her government devalued the Irish coin from nine ounces fine to three ounces fine of silver in order to finance the high cost of the Nine Years War in Ireland. 1 This unilateral move by the English government, combined with the failure to remove the old sterling from circulation, caused catastrophic problems throughout Ireland. 2 In addition to rapid inflation in common foodstuffs, the people in Ireland would only accept the new coin at its reduced intrinsic value rather than face value. 3 Further, merchants refused to accept the devalued coin in commercial transactions leading to a shortage of vital goods from England. 4

Benedictus Raksaka Mahi

Decentralization policy in Indonesia has given an increase of authority to local government in managing their own local finance. One of the characteristics of the decentralization policy is to increase local taxing power, with the objective to optimize local own revenue in supporting local spending. Given the current data observation, it is obvious that many local governments do not have significant local own revenue to support their local spending. This paper-adopting tax elasticity method-attempts to evaluate the present local own revenue optimization. Furthermore, by adopting a decomposition of tax elasticity, this paper also attempts to elaborate factors affecting local own revenue collection. The estimated local own revenue elasticity show that most taxes and user charges, which are the main sources of local own revenue, are considered not a buoyant tax. More analysis using a decomposition of tax elasticity shows that tax to base elasticity is weak, suggesting that local governments need to improve discreationary tax changes at local level, such as local base changes, collection changes, and enforcement changes. The analysis also shows that some local tax bases are not responsive to the economic growth, which leads to the recommendation to improve local business environment, such as streamlining local regulations and reducing harmfull local taxes and user charges. Keywords: local finance, local government owned revenue, fiscal decentralization, local tax elasticity, local tax base, nuisance local taxes, local economic growth

Jorge C. Ávila

The essay provides support to the hypothesis that financing of provincial public spending through national transferences leads to overspending. We rest on persuasive economic and politicoinstitutional arguments. Fiscal illusion and the Leviathan model help to explain the overspending. And cartelization of tax collection helps to explain why governors are so reluctant to decentralize this task. We conclude that a fiscal organization closer to that of a confederation would be desirable. Two ways of organizing fiscal relations between the Nation and the provinces are considered. One way consists of paying for national spending by means of periodic provincial transferences; control of public spending by tax-payers would be the greatest possible in this scenario, though leaving national financing in provincial hands could be a risky affair. Another way consists of allowing the Nation some taxing power and incorporating constitutional restrictions as regards the kinds of public goods the national government is permitted to provide.

Hiroko Uchimura, Yurika Suzuki

This paper focuses on the fiscal decentralization in the Philippines after the 1991Local Government Code. It first examines the intergovernmental fiscal relationshipbetween central and local governments by using fiscal decentralization indicators,and then investigates its impact on local finance. After fiscal decentralization, thelocal expenditure responsibility is expanded while the local fiscal capacity is notstrengthened in the Philippines. Local governments consequently comes to dependheavily on fiscal transfers from the central government, internal revenue allotments(IRAs), which has a substantial influence on local finance. The heavy dependence onIRAs makes local finance unpredictable and unstable. The distribution of IRAs alsoaffects the horizontal balance between provincial governments.

Emiru, Alazar

This project tries to look at decentralization of VAT revenue and administration to sub national governments in Ethiopia in light of the international practices. It used individual in-depth interview to collect primary data from Ethiopian revenue and custom Authority (ERCA), Addis Ababa regional city administration tax office and ministry of finance and economic development (MOFED). The methods used for analysis were both qualitative and quantitative. The project discusses the problems in connection with decentralization of VAT administration and assignment of VAT revenue. The project suggests that decentralization of VAT administration needs capable and autonomous regional government and strong central government that could monitor and evaluate decentralization; and the assignment of VAT revenue also needs the central governments' follow up to minimize the distortions and should be applied in consistent with the constitution