The term 'trustlessness' has given rise to a common misperception of smart contracts reducing or even eliminating the need for trust. At first glance, smart contracts appear to do away with the need for trust in the counterparty. Since performance is automatic, smart contracts enable the promisee to obtain what has been promised to them, without the need to depend on interpersonal trust vis-a-vis the counterparty or a system of contract law to enforce the promise. However, if we take into account the social, economic, and political contexts in which smart contracts operate, do they override the need for trust? In other words, are they really 'trustless'? We argue that a new set of trust concerns arise in the context of smart contracts, especially when they run on blockchains.
Decentralization is heralded as the most important technological design aspect of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). In this chapter we’ll analyze the concept of decentralization, with the goal to understand the social, legal, and economic forces that produce more or less decentralized techno-social systems. We first give an overview of decentralization as a political ideology and as an ideal and natural endpoint in the development of digital technologies. We then move beyond this discourse and treat decentralization, its extent, its mode, and the systems which it can refer to as the products of particular economic, political, and social dynamics around and within these techno-social systems. We then point at the concrete forces that shape the actual degree of (de)centralization. Through this, we show that the extent to which a techno-social system is (de)centralized at any given moment should not be measured by its distance from an ideological ideal of total decentralization but should be seen as the sum of all the social, economic, political, and legal forces that impact a techno-social system.
One of the pressing legal questions of the energy transition is how to integrate “prosumers”, consumers who start producing electricity, in the electricity market. So far, their influence remains limited or fully absent because their role as independent market participants is barely or not facilitated as they are usually subject to regulated remuneration schemes. Blockchain technology offers changing the approach of “integration in the market” into “becoming the market” by enabling peer-to-peer transactions. Currently, transactions are facilitated by third parties, suppliers and system operators, whose main task is centrally compiling and coordinating information on loads and generation and contracting supply and distribution services. Instead, blockchain technology enables new ways of organising decentralised persons without the immediate need for one centrally connecting entity. This implies profound legal- and policy consequences. Based on information on first use cases of blockchain applications in the electricity sector, this article identifies those main policy implications for EU electricity law and thereby adds to the discussion how blockchain technology could facilitate “prosumers” to develop as independent market participants in the electricity sector from an energy law perspective.
It is widely assumed that the selection process in a blockchain is based on proportional winning probabilities. The reliability and security of any blockchain is based upon this assumption. However, making an analogy between the Bitcoin protocol and the classical statistical urn problem, we argue that, at least on a theoretical level, the selection process in several blockchains is based on nonproportional winning probabilities. This reveals a misconception regarding the incentive structure of many blockchain protocols. We develop an empirical approach to testing for nonproportional winning probabilities in any blockchain, and offer a solution to this problem.
A great challenge for democracy is to account for the conflict between the ideal of self-governance and the capacity of the average person to participate in democratic decision-making. This challenge has led some observers to question the defensibility of democracy and consider other systems of social organization. I argue instead that the problem can be solved with a technologically enhanced version of Thomas Christiano’s choice of aims model of democracy. I begin by setting up the voter competency problem: I describe the ideals of democracy and the role that is ascribed to citizens under traditional accounts of democracy, then proceed to a discussion of the empirical evidence that shows how unlikely it is that voters could ever adequately perform such a role. While I consider a number of alternative democratic models which attempt to reconstruct the role of citizens in a way that is consistent with their capacities and with the democratic ideal of self-governance, I find that the choice of aims model strikes this balance in a way that is most tenable. Despite this, I argue that changes to the way information is distributed in modern democracies, to do with the rise of the internet, pose a serious threat to the viability of even this model, as it is becoming increasingly difficult for voters to ascertain reliable information. The second half of the thesis offers support to Christiano’s model in the form of technologically enhanced institutions. Chapter 3 provides a basic understanding of an emerging technology called distributed ledger technology, which offers a new paradigm for how information is stored, controlled, and distributed around society. The final chapter demonstrates how this technology can be used to strengthen democratic institutions so that citizens are able to truly be said to self-govern in a way that is consistent with their capacities.
Democracy requires rules that are designed to prevent the abuse of power and money. Blockchain technology is sometimes heralded as a solution to mitigate the problems associated with voting procedures, such as counting errors, fraud, or the improper use of money to influence the outcome of the collective choice procedure. In this article, I argue that the democratic potential of the blockchain hinges on the specific design of the rules governing the validation of blocks.In support of this argument, I shed light on the governance problems raised by standard protocols such as proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, and on-chain voting.
This study highlights the potential impacts of blockchain technology on the collaborative economy (CE), colloquially known as the sharing economy. This conceptual review first analyzes how the CE intersects with the blockchain technology. Collaborative consumption involves an intensification of peer-to-peer trade, underpinned by robust digital infrastructures and processes, hence an increased use of new technologies and a redefinition of business activities. As an inherently connected economy, the CE is, therefore, prone to integrating the most recent technological advances including artificial intelligence, big data analysis, augmented reality, the smart grid, and blockchain technology. This review then furthers the examination of the organizational and managerial implications related to the use of blockchain technology in terms of governance, transaction costs, and user confidence. A closing case finally examines the role of a prominent social networking site (i.e., Facebook ) in the CE-blockchain nexus.
Peer-to-peer energy trading and next generation local energy market mechanisms are expected to provide new use cases and opportunities within the future sharing economy landscape. To this anticipation, we propose alternative incentive mechanisms as energy policy instruments that can be used by policy makers for directly supporting local energy producers, and hence indirectly the consumers, at current local energy markets using capabilities provided by contemporary distributed ledger technology. Under such peer-to-peer local market setting, we first detail market pricing and relevant market parameters thoroughly, and then we discuss fair incentive distribution to local producers in detail, by means of two distinct incentive systems what we call as the fixed stipend and the decaying stipend incentive mechanisms, respectively. We provide an analysis of market pricing and market parameters under German power market conditions, and an illustration of proposed support instruments with resorting to three scenarios experimented on a local energy market test bed that is equipped with realistic energy generation and consumption profiles for its participants.
Fostering Worker Cooperatives with Blockchain Technology: Lessons from the Colony Project In recent years, there has been growing policy support for expanding worker ownership of businesses in the European Union. Debates on stimulating worker ownership are a regular feature of discussions on the collaborative economy and the future of work, given anxieties regarding the reconfiguration of the nature of work and the decline of standardised employment contracts. Yet, worker ownership, in the form of labour-managed firms such as worker cooperatives, remains marginal. This article explains the appeal of worker cooperatives and examines the reasons why they continue to be relatively scarce. Taking its cue from Henry Hansmann’s hypothesis that organisational innovations can make worker ownership of firms viable in previously untenable circumstances, this article explores how organisational innovations, such as those embodied in the capital and governance structure of Decentralised (Autonomous) Organisations (D(A)Os), can potentially facilitate the growth of LMFs. It does so by undertaking a case study of a blockchain project, Colony, which seeks to create decentralised, self-organising companies where decision-making power derives from high-quality work. For worker cooperatives, seeking to connect globally dispersed workers through an online workplace, Colony’s proposed capital and governance structure, based on technological and game theoretic insight may offer useful lessons. Drawing from this pre-figurative structure, self-imposed institutional rules may be deployed by worker cooperatives in their by-laws to avoid some of the main pitfalls associated with labour management and thereby, potentially, vitalise the formation of the cooperative form.
У статті розглянуті особливості інновацій, що лежать в основі технології розподілених реєстрів, її різновиди, потенційні і фактично реалізовані напрями застосування, організаційні форми відповідних проектів. Показано, як ця технологія трансформується в напрямку наближення до централізованих реєстрів, але водночас стимулює удосконалення і модернізацію останніх. Виявлено, що для максимального використання потенціалу ТРР необхідна інтеграція децентралізованих систем з правовим полем і зміна технології не лише у проблемних ланках, що найбільше виграють від її застосування, а й в середовищах, з якими ці ланки взаємодіють. Як свідчить досвід реально запроваджених ТРР-проектів, найбільш успішними з технічних та інституційних причин виявляються платформи, що перебувають десь посередині спектру централізованих і децентралізованих реєстрів, тож втілення радикальної лібертаріанської місії ТРР ще не знайдено – системам потрібний централізований арбітр, координатор, суб’єкт відповідальності і гнучкість, якої можна досягти за допомогою авторитетного втручання в протокол. Зроблено висновок, що навіть максимальне поширення ТРР не означатиме перемогу мереж над ієрархіями і демократизацію: по-перше, тому, що будь-яким мережам властиві процеси подальшої ієрархієзації, а по-друге, відновлення ієрархічного порядку може виявитися необхідним для запобігання сповзанню в анархію.
Italian Abstract: Blockchain puo significare anche riorganizzazione dei sistemi di sicurezza sociale. Di qui l'idea di approfondire l'applicazione possibile della blockchain a alcuni istituti previdenziali, tra cui il distacco europeo, l'invalidita e il REI, per definire il quadro delle potenzialita e delle criticita. Nel saggio si studia anche il concetto di smart contract.
English Abstract: Blockchain technologies and smart contracts can be applied to social security systems. The paper is aimed at investigating the possible social fields of such application, the legal consequences, the critical points. Posting and invalidity benefits regimes are examined in light of the possible application of blockchain.
This article examines the labor power of digital miners. Though an obscure and still incipient facet of the digital economy, crypto‐mining powers and secures transactions across blockchains, or public distributed digital ledgers. Drawing from interviews with cryptocurrency enthusiasts, blockchain advocates, and developers; participation in online and offline discussions; and a survey with small‐scale crypto‐miners, this article takes on the material and technoscientific valuation of crypto‐mining to understand how a future of open, decentralized accountability implicates human labor alongside automated processes. The work of digital mining, performed in the work of inscribing, registering, and politically organizing mining operations, enables the formation of democratic communities in the digital economy and remains inevitably embedded in social relations as a mode of productive, meaningful action.
Abstract Access to housing is a crucial issue worldwide. It is still under discussion whether collaborative economy is enhancing or, on the contrary, constraining access. In this context, the concept of ‘collaborative housing’ (collaborative economy applied to the funding, access and organisation of housing) arises to address a range of situations that might potentially help people to access housing, such as co-housing or the so-called ‘intermediate tenures’. Disintermediation through blockchain technology, and the resultant effect of a reduction in the transaction costs of access to housing, is one of those trends regarding collaborative housing. Accordingly, the adaptation of the disintermediation mechanism to the real estate conveyance and land registry, as in many other sectors of the collaborative economy, is timely. This can be achieved by exploring the potential of this mechanism in enhancing traditional methods of this sector through possible technological solutions. This paper presents a preliminary discussion on the different types of collaborative housing and the potentials of the blockchain technology to facilitate access to housing in relation to real estate conveyancing and registration.
This article studies the emergence of Share&Charge, a German platform that organizes the sharing of charging stations for electric vehicles (EVs) and the billing for the energy transactions. Share&Charge follows a peer-to-peer fashion, enabling direct transactions between charging station owners and EV drivers. On the demand side, the platform, with its interactive map, makes it possible for EV owners to find a charging station in the most suitable location, for instance, at their place of work or where they live. On the offer side, Share&Charge enables station operators (private individuals or companies) to rent their charging stations and eventually to sell the electricity they produce. Charging tariffs within the charging station network are determined by the charging station operators themselves, but the platform provides indicative tariffs. Launched in September 2017, Share&Charge follows other initiatives, such as the French platforms Wattpop and ChargeMap, and the Swedish Elbnb. Share&Charge’s network is already proven to be successful with German citizens. Share&Charge adds certain elements of value at different stages of EV utilization. First, this model allows for a co-financing of charging infrastructures by individuals and businesses in the private sector by sharing the infrastructure costs among EV drivers. Besides the purchase price of EVs, the implementation of charging infrastructures and their financing represent a significant barrier to the rise of e-mobility. Share&Charge helps remove this obstacle without adding a further burden on the governmental budget. In addition, this approach follows the “user pays principle,” which engages in fair and effective financing. Second, the platform increases decentralized production value and facilitates its expansion. It also helps in avoiding grid congestion and energy loss, as well as increasing flexibility within the electricity market. Third, data use enables the optimization of energy demand and supply, and the optimal determination of tariffs, although these remain facultative. Models like Share&Charge could thus positively impact energy policy by tackling several upcoming obstacles associated with the development of EVs and decentralized energy production capacities. However, new forms of network structures (decentralized networks, sharing economy) and new actors (prosumers, platforms, etc.) also raise regulatory challenges. This article presents some of the legal issues associated with the development of models like Share&Charge. In particular, we study the tax framework applicable to this model, assuming that as such, it would be introduced into the Belgian market.
All contracts are necessarily incomplete. The inefficiencies of bargaining over every contingency, coupled with humans’ innate bounded rationality, mean that contracts cannot anticipate and address every potential eventuality. One role of law is to fill gaps in incomplete contracts with default rules. The blockchain is a distributed ledger that allows the cryptographic recording of transactions and permits “smart” contracts that self-execute automatically if their conditions are met. Because humans code the contracts of the blockchain, gaps in these contracts will arise. Yet in the world of “smart contracting” on the blockchain, there is no place for the law to step in to supply default rules — no legal intervention point. The lack of a legal intervention point means that law on the blockchain works in a fundamentally different way from law in the corporeal world. Business organizational law provides a prime example of how the law uses default rules to fill gaps in an incomplete contract and how the law works differently in the blockchain context.
This chapter discusses the implications of blockchain technology for income inequality. Although inequality is identified as a complex and emergent (rather than simple and static) phenomenon, we nonetheless are able to identify channels through which blockchains are likely to affect the distribution of income. Any erosion of economic positions held by third-party intermediaries, charged with maintaining the integrity of conventional ledgers, is likely to reduce inequality. On the other hand job-creation opportunities which emphasize the need for specialist technical skills in the blockchain-enabled economy may increase inequality. The net effect of these two forces alone is ambiguous. There is the alternative possibility that the inequality-reduction potential of blockchain activity could be mitigated by the appropriation of distributed ledger technology by incumbents. To help prevent the possibility of income inequality being reproduced through the blockchain, an open and permissionless environment for blockchain participation should be maintained to the greatest extent possible.
Abstract This study investigates the impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on worker autonomy and monitoring using the second wave of the German Linked Personnel Panel, a linked employer-employee data set. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of ICT on workplace organization is ambiguous. On the one hand, the fast diffusion of ICT among employees makes it possible to monitor professional activities, leading to greater centralization. On the other hand, ICT enable employees to work more autonomously, so that workplace organization becomes more decentralized. Based on ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimates, we find that ICT promotes both centralization and decentralization tendencies. Furthermore, managerial employees are more affected by ICT-induced monitoring and autonomy than their non-managerial counterparts. Finally, the effect of digital ICT on employee autonomy is more pronounced than the corresponding effect on employee monitoring. Again, this does especially hold for managerial employees. All in all, our results support the view that unlike prior technological revolutions digitalization primarily affects the employment prospects and working conditions of employees at medium and higher hierarchical levels.