Blockchain Papers

Srinivas Jangirala, Ambika Kurnia M, Aruna S, Gunjan Chhabra · 6 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Oyovwe Akajagbor, Ofuan James Ilaboya

No abstract is available for this record.

Nicola Dimitri

No abstract is available for this record.

Rui Qin, Xiao Xue, Yong Yuan, Xiaolong Liang

In decentralized governance, existing token-based voting mechanisms employed by Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) often suffer from centralization risks, as a small number of large token holders can dominate decision-making. While reputation-based voting has emerged as an alternative that reflects members’ historical contributions, it is also prone to ossification, where early contributors accumulate disproportionate influence over time. To address these challenges, we propose a novel hybrid dynamic voting mechanism that combines tokens and reputation in the voting power. Furthermore, we incorporate an exponential decay mechanism into the reputation component to ensure that voting power dynamically reflects recent and active participation rather than legacy status. We also utilize Gini and Nakamoto coefficients to evaluate the proposed mechanism. To validate our proposed mechanism, we design some computational experiments, and the experimental results show that the proposed hybrid mechanism achieves better fairness and decentralization, while allowing new contributors to more quickly gain meaningful influence. This work provides insights into designing adaptive, fair, and secure governance mechanisms for DAOs.

Wieland Müller

The dissertation explores theoretical and practical implications of smart contracts in supply chains through four studies. It examines technology adoption, trust dynamics, transaction costs, and applications in virtual supply networks. Building on literature and empirical data, the work highlights both opportunities and challenges of this technology and provides actionable insights for practitioners as well as contributions to advancing existing theoretical frameworks.

Chuxuan Fan, Tao Shu, Fei Xie

No abstract is available for this record.

Eric Alston, Bryce Bugge, William Lehr

No abstract is available for this record.

Chuki Hayama, Yoko Kamidoi, Masataka Kawasaki, Shin’ichi Wakabayashi

Cryptocurrencies are based on blockchains that are distributed ledgers for recording transactions. In 2024, these had a value of more than $3.70 Trillion in market capitalization. Ethereum is one of the most representative cryptocurrencies and dominates approximately 10% of total cryptoassets in 2025. The Ethereum blockchain system includes two types of account; contract accounts (CAs) and externally owned accounts (EOAs). We focus on the unilateral sending of cryptocurrencies to CAs and EOAs on Ethereum blockchain. We call this unilateral sending of cryptocurrencies without the recipient’s awareness, the recipient’s unapproved transactions. If the sender were malicious or criminal, the recipient of the unilateral sending might have been involved in some crime. In this paper, we provide two protection methods for CAs and EOAs on the Ethereum blockchain system and combine the two methods into a two-phase receipt mechanism for recipients to selectively reject unilateral sending of cryptocurrencies. We introduced and implemented this mechanism on open-source software for Ethereum developers, called Truffle Suite, and then executed experiments on a personal Ethereum blockchain called Ganache, provided by Truffle Suite. The experimental results demonstrated that the overhead of introducing the mechanism is reasonable at a few US dollars.

Cristiano Bellavitis, Paul P. Momtaz

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) crowdfunds to invest in various projects. The decentralization feature of DAOs submits that decision-making is a collective democratic action of all DAO members. The autonomy feature of DAOs suggests that decision-making is an algorithmic process governed by self-executing smart contracts. However, in reality, DAOs are neither perfectly decentralized nor completely autonomous. Our empirical analysis shows that deviations from the ideals of decentralization and autonomy are costly. Non-algorithmic off-chain voting governance of decision-making leads to a substantial discount in DAO value. Non-decentralized aspects such as large voting coalitions also affect DAO value. Interaction effects are also shown. The study implies that platform governance design choices are crucial for DAO success. • DAOs with off-chain voting raise 87% less funding. • Larger communities worsen the valuation hit from off-chain voting. • Big voting coalitions deepen off-chain governance drawbacks. • On-chain transparency is key to DAO success—especially in large technical teams.

Lennart Ante

This paper investigates the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) agents—autonomous software entities capable of adapting, learning, and executing multi-step operations—and decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystems. It highlights how the adaptive decision-making capabilities, flexible governance frameworks, and data-driven optimization strategies of AI agents reshape market coordination and organizational architectures. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of 306 major crypto AI agents, the study introduces a typology that maps their diverse application areas, including algorithmic trading, portfolio management, sentiment-driven communities, and immersive entertainment. To further conceptualize the role of AI in decentralized governance, the paper develops a quadrant-based framework that distinguishes four archetypal system configurations: Traditional Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) Tools, Maximally Distributed Agency, Closed Systems, and AI Dictatorships. These configurations, defined by varying degrees of autonomy and decentralization, reveal critical trade-offs between transparency, efficiency, adaptability, and control. This framework serves as a lens to theorize how AI agents reconfigure trust mechanisms, power dynamics, and decision-making processes in decentralized ecosystems. Grounded in economic and socio-technical theory, the paper positions AI agents as transformative intermediaries in tokenized environments. While demonstrating their capacity to streamline operations, enhance decision quality, and enrich user engagement, the study also addresses the governance risks posed by algorithmic control and systemic opacity. Taken together, the conceptual and empirical insights lay a foundation for ongoing interdisciplinary inquiry into the evolving role of AI agents in decentralized finance. • Introduces a typology of 306 AI agents across key DeFi application areas • Maps AI agent roles in trading, governance, community, and entertainment • Develops a governance framework for AI agent autonomy and decentralization • Shows how AI agents reduce transaction costs and reshape market structures • Highlights risks of opacity, misalignment, and centralization in DeFi AI use

Asnaf Ahmad, Hamza Mehmood

Financial industry operations have been substantially reformed through the adoption of decentralized applications (dApps) as well as blockchain technology during recent years. This research aims to handle three main issues within decentralised finance (DeFi) by focusing on transaction functionality execution and system scalability and enhanced security features. We implemented secure measures for integer overflows and reentrancy avoidance through extensive testing which proved successful in eliminating reentrancy gaps and integer overflows. The scalability tests demonstrated functioning performance with network congestion but bigger congestion caused noticeable delays alongside elevated latency levels. Due to the nature of large transaction processing additional optimization measures need implementation. The results of functional testing showed that 100% of token transfers succeeded together with 97.5% success rate for asset management operations. The success rate of decentralized trade operations reached 96% according to results. Smart contract implementations succeed in protecting transactions yet need additional work to increase scalability and improve decentralized exchange functions. The research concludes that smart contract-based DeFi solutions show substantial promise yet demands continuous advancement to gain more widespread market adoption.

Fatou Ndiaye Mbodji, Boladji Vinny Adjibi, M. Diouf, Gervais Mendy · 7 authors

Due to the inherent immutability of blockchain technology, smart contract updates require their deployment at new addresses rather than modifying existing ones, thus fragmenting version histories and creating critical blind spots for analyses. Indeed, for example, this fragmentation severely hinders security researchers ability to track vulnerability lifecycles across contract versions. While platforms like Etherscan provide detailed information about Ethereum smart contracts, they lack crucial functionality to trace predecessor-successor relationships within smart contract lineages, preventing systematic analysis of how vulnerabilities emerge, propagate, and potentially remain unresolved across versions.To address the challenge of tracing smart contract lineages, we adopt a Design Science Research (DSR) approach and introduce ContractTrace, an automated infrastructure that accurately identifies and links versions of smart contracts into coherent lineages. This tool enables the construction of lineageSet, an up-to-date, open-source dataset specifically designed to support security research on vulnerability, defect or any other property evolution patterns in smart contracts. Through a security-focused case study we demonstrate how ContractTrace reveals previously obscured vulnerability life-cycles within smart contract lineages, tracking whether critical security flaws persist or get resolved across versions. This capability is essential for understanding vulnerability propagation patterns and evaluating the effectiveness of security patches in blockchain environments. In the evaluation phase of our DSR approach, we validated our lineage detection methodology against an alternative approach using Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) to cluster contract versions, confirming the security relevance and accuracy of our technique.

Seungwon Jeong

In the Delegated Proof-of-Stake blockchain, block producers (BP) are elected by stake-weighted vote. The supermajority of BPs can change the rule of the blockchain; thus, preventing the centralization of votes is important. We find the optimal number of votes per account (VPA) that minimizes takeover risks while maximizing voting flexibility. A smaller VPA requires more stake for takeover, but only up to a certain point, implying that the ‘one vote per account’ rule adopted by some major blockchains to mitigate centralization may be unnecessary. Our results are applicable to any environments in which multiple decision makers are elected by voting.

Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) rewards. We employ empirical game-theoretic analysis based on simulations to examine how advantages in latency and MEV access shape builder strategic bidding and auction outcomes. We find that a small set of dominant builders leverage these advantages, consolidating power, reducing auction efficiency, and heightening centralization. Our results underscore the need for fair MEV distribution and sustained efforts to promote decentralization in Ethereum's block building market.

Haoqian Zhang, Michelle Yeo, Vero Estrada-Galiñanes, Bryan Ford

No abstract is available for this record.

Xu Liu, Junwu Zhu

Smart contracts , being security-critical code, facilitate consensus among players and ensure secure and accurate value transfer, and formal verification is necessary to guarantee functional correctness of contracts. Game theory serves as one of the tools in formal verification by assessing whether the outcomes of contract executions meet the expected goals. While most studies employing game theory to verify smart contract functionality assume rational players, in practice, players may invoke and deploy smart contracts involving irrational behavior, casting doubt on the correctness of verification results. The aim of this study is to propose an alternative game model to verify smart contract functionality in dynamic player interactions where irrational behavior is involved. Specifically, a belief-based smart contract execution game (BSC-game) model was introduced, utilizing belief – the probability that a player believes in the irrationality of others – to capture how the irrational behavior of others affects a player’s contract execution decisions. Reasonable economic incentives were introduced to encourage honest behavior of players. Moreover, a computationally feasible method was designed to update players’ beliefs in large-scale dynamic smart contract executions. Theoretical analysis discloses the existence of equilibrium in the BSC-game, as well as the conditions for the number of faulty players within the system’s fault tolerance . We conducted the simulation experiments, and verified the business-oriented smart contract written in G language by the BSC-game model. The results further indicate that although players’ beliefs impact their decisions to execute contracts, reasonable economic incentives can motivate players to execute contracts honestly. This ensures that smart contract functionality aligns with expected goals, showing that the BSC-game model can verify and guarantee the correctness of contract functions. This new approach significantly contributes to bolstering smart contract security and credibility, positively influencing blockchain stability.

Shangqi Liu, Yuntao Xu, Xingyu Yang, Bozhi Hui · 5 authors

As one of the technical elements supporting the blockchain to realize decentralized autonomous organizations, smart contracts are crucial for understanding the inherent properties of blockchain systems through formal research. Most existing formal models of smart contracts focus primarily on static properties, lacking the depiction of dynamic processes such as conditional responses and internal state migration during contract execution, which complicates effective supervision. In this paper, a novel formal model of smart contracts, based on finite state automata, named Variable-State-Trigger (VST), is proposed, which presents state migration and conditional response mechanisms during smart contract execution. The VST model is verified to portray both the static and dynamic properties of smart contracts, providing new avenues for effective supervision during contract execution. Moreover, the VST model is used to illustrate the life cycle of a UAV mission smart contract, demonstrating its feasibility. With the growing integration of blockchain and emerging technologies, smart contracts have found applications in various fields, including drone swarm coordination. In this context, smart contracts enable secure, decentralized management and automation of interactions between autonomous drones, ensuring compliance with predefined conditions and enhancing the reliability of complex drone operations. The VST model can be extended to such applications, offering dynamic supervision and enhancing the coordination efficiency in decentralized autonomous drone systems.

Diego Marmsoler, Asad Ahmed, Achim D. Brucker

No abstract is available for this record.

Devora Chait-Roth, Kedar S. Namjoshi

Smart contracts form the core of Web3 applications. Contracts mediate the transfer of cryptocurrency, making them irresistible targets for hackers. We introduce ASP, a system aimed at easing the construction of provably secure contracts. The Asp system consists of three closely-linked components: a programming language, a defensive compiler, and a proof checker. The language semantics guarantee that Asp contracts are free of commonly exploited vulnerabilities such as arithmetic overflow and reentrancy. The defensive compiler enforces the semantics and translates Asp to Solidity, the most popular contract language. Deductive proofs establish functional correctness and freedom from critical vulnerabilities such as unauthorized access.

Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre

The block-building process on the Ethereum network has changed significantly with an upgrade of its consensus protocol. Network participants access blocks through block building auctions at a decentralized financial market, termed builder market, where builders vie for the right to build blocks and earn Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) rewards. This paper employs empirical game-theoretic analysis to examine builders’ strategic bidding incentives in the Ethereum block building auctions, termed MEV-Boost auctions. We study various scenarios with different auction game settings and evaluate how critical elements such as network connectivity and access to MEV opportunities impact builders’ strategic bidding incentives. Through our analyses, we highlight the challenge of creating a decentralized yet competitive builder market.

Li Wei, Liang Peili, Li Fei

Abstract On‐chain sealed auctions represent a novel approach to electronic bidding auctions, wherein the introduction of zero‐knowledge proof technology has significantly enhanced the security of auctions. However, most mainstream on‐chain sealed auction schemes currently employ Bulletproofs to prove auction correctness, which leaves room for optimization in terms of verification time and inherent security. Addressing these issues, an on‐chain sealed auction scheme based on zero‐knowledge succinct non‐interactive argument of knowledge (zk‐STARK) is proposed. This scheme leverages the decentralization and immutability of blockchain and smart contracts to eliminate third‐party involvement while ensuring the security of the auction process. The Inter Planetary File System is utilized to provide a qualification review mechanism for the auctioneer, enabling the screening of unqualified bidders before the auction. Additionally, the scheme employs RSA encryption to conceal bidders' bids, Pedersen commitments to ensure the consistency of bidding information, and zk‐STARKs to verify the correctness of the winning bid. Security analysis and experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme meets the required security standards, with time consumption at various stages of the auction being within acceptable limits, and effectively reduces the time required for proof verification.

Soumya Kanti Datta

This paper presents a reference architecture designed to integrate computable smart contracts with existing blockchain platforms. The proposed architecture addresses key challenges in the development and deployment of smart contracts, including security, interoperability, and compliance. A central feature of the RA is the introduction of a multichain adapter, which enables seamless deployment of smart contracts across different blockchain environments. By providing a standardized framework, the architecture enhances modularity, accelerates development, and reduces costs while ensuring robust security and regulatory compliance. The main goal of the architecture is facilitating cross-chain deployment and operations of computable smart contracts.

Bonsu Adjei-Arthur, Sophyani Banaamwini Yussif, Sandra Obiora, Daniel Adu Worae · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Mohamad Sadegh Sangari, Kar Wai So, Atefeh Mashatan

Purpose Blockchain technology (BT) presents a decentralized approach that has promising potentials to alleviate many of the long-lasting risks and inefficiencies in trade finance (TF) and supply chain finance (SCF) operations, providing international traders greater access to working capital. Despite this, the actual adoption of the technology and related issues in this space has remained under-researched. This paper examines the state of the practice to identify the main drivers and inhibitors faced by TF/SCF parties in their BT adoption efforts. Design/methodology/approach This exploratory study applies a multi-stakeholder perspective and a mixed-methods approach using semi-structured interviews with practitioners in various stages of BT implementation in TF/SCF initiatives across North America, Europe and Asia. The study then determines the priority of the identified factors using the Bayesian best-worst method (BWM). Findings The findings show that while the discussion has focused on the technological drivers of BT adoption for TF/SCF, practitioners rely more on non-technological factors such as peer adoption and fostering innovation. The findings also reveal how practitioners address common BT issues, including scalability and interoperability. Originality/value The study offers insights into important requirements for realizing the full benefits of BT in support of TF and SCF from an extended technology-organization-environment (TOE) perspective. On a more general level, it highlights what is required to transform this industry toward digitization.