Decentralization policies are an integrated component of health sector reform in an increasing number of countries. The ability of such policies to improve the health system's quality and efficiency is backed up by limited scientific evidence. This study intends to evaluate the impact of decentralization on a specialized field of disease control (leprosy control) in Colombia and Brazil. It analyses the respective juridical base, epidemiological indicators and local publications. Furthermore, 39 semi-structured interviews with key informants were conducted. In both countries, the devolution of technical responsibility and financial resources to the municipalities was the implemented form of decentralization. Access to preventive and curative health care and the community participation in decision-making improved clearly only in Brazil. The decentralization to private providers in Colombia had dubious effects on service quality in general and still more on public health. The flow of finances (including finance collection through state-owned taxes instead of insurance companies) seemed to be better controlled in Brazil. Leprosy control in Brazil took advantage of the decentralization process; in Colombia, it came close to a collapse.
Innocent Semali, Don de Savigny, M Tanner, C. Akim
Following successful establishment of Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) in the 1970's as vertical program, the burden of disease for many of the vaccine preventable diseases was pushed to low levels. The current round of health reforms in Tanzania calls for decentralization and integration of vertical programs. This has the potential to assist or erode generally good performance of EPI. Reforms on the programme have been undertaken in Tanzania since 1996, and have included 1) integration of the procurement, storage, and distribution of vaccine and related equipment into the operations of a quasi-autonomous drug procurement agency. 2) government financing of procurement of the oral polio vaccine, cold chain kerosene, and 3) the integration of kerosene and vaccine distribution, supervision and monitoring to district health system. Our analysis shows that the integration of the procurement and distribution of vaccines into the operations of the drug procurement agency, and privatization of the distribution of the cold chain kerosene initially stalled EPI reforms for several reasons and had an adverse effect on EPI decentralization and coverage. The major cause of the problems was opposition from the EPI providers at district level who had to accept decreased income consequent to the reforms. We conclude that greater involvement of all stakeholders in the planning of the programme, would have presented an opportunity for forecasting the opposition and developing mitigating strategies.
John Grundy, Valentine Healy, L Gorgolon, E Sandig
INTRODUCTION: In 1991 the Philippines Government introduced a major devolution of national government services, which included the first wave of health sector reform, through the introduction of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Code devolved basic services for agriculture extension, forest management, health services, barangay (township) roads and social welfare to Local Government Units. In 1992, the Philippines Government devolved the management and delivery of health services from the National Department of Health to locally elected provincial, city and municipal governments. AIM: The aim of this review is to (i) Provide a background to the introduction of devolution to the health system in the Philippines and to (ii) describe the impact of devolution on the structure and functioning of the health system in defined locations. METHOD: International literature was reviewed on the subjects of decentralization. Rapid appraisals of health management systems were conducted in both provinces. Additional data were accessed from the rural health information system and previous consultant reports. RESULTS: Subsequent to the introduction of devolution, quality and coverage of health services declined in some locations, particularly in rural and remote areas. It was found that in 1992-1997, system effects included a breakdown in management systems between levels of government, declining utilization particularly in the hospital sector, poor staff morale, a decline in maintenance of infrastructure and under financing of operational costs of services. CONCLUSION: The aim of decentralization is to widen decision-making space of middle level managers, enhance resource allocations from central to peripheral areas and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of health services management. The findings of the historical review of devolution in the Philippines reveals some consistencies with the international literature, which describe some negative effects of decentralization, and provide a rationale for the Philippines in undertaking a second wave of reform in order to 'make devolution work'.
Nazmul Chaudhury, Jeffrey S. Hammer, Edmundo Murrugarra
This study examines the impact of a fee-waiver program for basic medical services on health care utilization in Armenia. Due to the reduction in public financing of health services and decentralization and increased privatization of health care provision, private out-of-pocket contributions are increasingly becoming a significant component of health costs in Armenia. To help poor families cope with this constraint, the Government of Armenia provided a free-of-charge basic package service to eligible individuals in vulnerable groups, such as the disabled and children from single parent households. Drawing upon the 1996 and 1998/99 Armenia Integrated Survey of Living Standards (AISLS), which allows the identification of eligible individuals under this program, we estimate the impact of the fee-waiver program on utilization of health services, particularly among the poor. Across the two survey rounds utilization rates have indeed declined despite comparable levels of income, and this decline has occurred among both the poor and the rich, with average utilization falling by 12 percent between the two surveys. However, families with four or more children, the largest beneficiary group under the "Vulnerable Population" program, have decreased their usage of health care services in a disproportionate manner -- 21 percent reduction in usage between the two survey rounds. This precipitous drop in health care usage by this vulnerable group despite being eligible for free medical services, suggests that the program just by itself was inadequate in stemming the decline in the usage of health services. We furthermore present evidence to suggest that the free-of-charge eligibility program is acting more like an income transfer mechanism, particularly to disabled individuals. Contents...
The current need and enthusiasm for health reforms open an important arena for deeper analysis of the policy process with a view to understanding the political determinants of reforms and strengthening implementation. The studies described in this thesis analyse positions of different actors in the reform process, their actions in support or opposition of the process, and their impact on the health sector reform process. Globally and especially in developing countries health sector reforms have been implemented over long periods. Although there have been improvements in health, the remaining burden of disease in many countries is still very high. Reasons for the high burden of disease have been classified into lack of resources and poor organizational and managerial capacity. Good stewardship was needed to facilitate improvement in the performance of health systems. Stakeholders’ alignment and support was one of the most important components of good stewardship. However, stakeholder analysis had not been a common undertaking in developing countries despite the reforms that were being implemented in most of them. It was the aim of this study to answer the question: What has been the role and importance of stakeholders in supporting or opposing the health sector reform process? The study was conducted in Tanzania as one of the poorest countries in Africa, using the decentralization of the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) as a case reference. The study units were the Ministry of Health Headquarters, Medical Stores Department, Expanded Programme on Immunization, national archives, regions and districts. At district level the study units were District Council, Council Health Management Team, EPI managers at regional and district levels, ward and village authorities, health facility, facility providers and households. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect data from January 2000 to June 2002. Relevant data collection instruments were prepared and pre-tested. The qualitative data collection methods included document review, \nin-depth interviews, key informants interviews and observations. Quantitative \nmethods involved retrieval of secondary data, health facility survey and \nhousehold surveys. Regular discussions with key informants and data \ncollectors were held to verify the findings. Qualitative data was analysed \nmanually. Quantitative data was captured and analysed using Epi Info version \n6.1 and STATA version 6.0. The study involved answering five main questions. The first question was: Do \nreforms learn from history? Analysis of the waves of health reforms prior to \nthe current reforms from 1926 was done to answer the question. The main \nstakeholders in the reforms were the political party in power, the government \nand donors who supported the reforms each time. Each wave of health sector \nreforms provided information on health provision, financing and resource \ngeneration. Due to the political contexts, information on failures of health \nfinancing did not provide lessons for succeeding reforms of the health sector. \nStakeholders’ political interests opposed lessons that did not match the \npolitical ideology at the time i.e. free public services versus privatization and \npaying for social services. Lessons from previous health reforms were \nselective, and did not consider health-financing needs among others. The \nongoing health reforms needed to use information from all functional aspects \nof the health system to provide lessons for improving the health system. The second question was: Who were the stakeholders in the current health \nreforms and what were their interests and reactions? The main stakeholders \nwere donors, and the government. The two had a very high support for the \nreforms evidenced by their participation in problem identification, justification, \nreform design, planning and implementation. The health sector reforms thus \nhad high political support at central level. In the implementation process, \nissues that triggered stakeholders’ reaction included sectoral versus local \ngovernment decentralization. Another issue was the donor modality in \nfinancing the health sector and need for adopting new financial management \nsystems. Among the donors there was hesitancy to join the common financing \nmodalities that included a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and Basket \n Funding. As a result, there was delay in the process in order to reach better \nconsensus. \nThe third question was: What was the impact of stakeholders in the process of \nreforming a vertical programme like EPI? Health Sector Reforms in EPI \nincluded integration of generic functions, for example, vaccine procurement to \nmedical stores department. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected \nand analysed from the Ministry of Health, EPI management unit. This again \nrevealed that EPI reforms were well supported by the government and donors \ncentrally. EPI managers at both district and regional levels opposed some of \nthe EPI reforms. They argued that coverage was falling due to the reforms. \nHowever, there was no concrete evidence relating reforms in the EPI \nprogramme and falling coverage. The primary aim of certain actors was to \nmake sure that they continued receiving extra income from EPI functions. One \nof the effects of stakeholders’ reaction was reversal of reforms (recentralization) \nand return to the status quo. The fourth question was: What was the immediate reaction of stakeholders to \ndecentralization at district level and how might it have affected performance of \nEPI functions and the challenges? The immediate reaction of stakeholders \nwas reduced cooperation between the Council Health Management Team \n(CHMT) and the District Council who were politically supreme in the district. \nWithin the Council Health Management Team there was inadequate \ncommunication, which led to poor teamwork. The result of this was reduced \nsupervisory visits to peripheral health facilities. The EPI coverage in the study \ndistrict was 52.8 per cent, which was well below the previous national average \n(80 per cent). A logistic regression model for EPI service quality variables on \nchildren between 12 months and 23 months who had completed vaccination \nwas applied. Certain EPI quality of service variables predicted significant \nchanges in the odds ratio for completing vaccination. It was then suggested \nthat strategies were needed to improve management skills among the CHMT \nand District Council members. Also there was a need of hastening the \nprocess of increasing remuneration and motivation of peripheral health \nworkers. The fifth and final question was: What was the interest of the stakeholders \nand prospects of increasing EPI coverage at district level? Decentralization \nand integration of EPI functions were among the reforms at district level. The \nanalysis revealed that active stakeholders at district level were the Ministry of \nHealth, CHMT, EPI managers at district and regional levels and facility \nproviders. The Ministry of Health opposed integration of EPI at district level by \nissuing the directive that DCCOs and MCHCOs (EPI manager at district level) \nshould resume their tasks. However, the CHMT had no option but to comply. \nThis action reversed some of the health reforms at district level. Analysis of \nthe importance the community attached to EPI, using willingness to pay for \nEPI cold chain kerosene, was done. The support was low (48.7 per cent). EPI \nservice quality variables were significantly negatively associated with odds \nratio for willingness to pay for EPI input. Simulation with Policy Maker \ncomputer software predicted that an increased number of stakeholders \nthrough community participation would significantly improve the current low \nlevel of EPI coverage. It was then proposed to do a similar analysis in other \nvertical programmes and implement on a trial basis the results of the \nsimulation. \nIn conclusion, stakeholders were found to be active and influential in the \nhealth sectors of developing countries like Tanzania but poorly considered in \nimplementation of reforms. Stakeholders are important since some strongly \nsupport while others oppose the reforms. The reaction of stakeholders is \nevident through deployment or non-deployment of information depending on \ninterest and context. This would result in poor management leading to \ninefficiency in resource use, which would then be followed by poor quality of \nservices, poor support by communities and consequently poor utilization of \nhealth services. It is suggested that stakeholder analysis be conducted in \nother vertical programmes in the process of integration. Promotion of \nstakeholder analysis and also Policy Maker as a tool to manage stakeholders \nwill facilitate the management of reforms in the health sector.
The introduction of user-payment for health services is frequently followed by concern about the impact on equity of access for poor people. Decentralizing governments often try to remedy the created inequities by putting in place safety nets in the form of exemptions and waivers in the user-fee systems. However, where user payments merely operate as local government strategies for health financing, without national policy they are likely to be self-defeating, as local governments are frequently more interested in raising revenue to meet recurrent costs of devolved services than in promoting equity. Thus guidelines put in place by the central government to operationalize safety nets are seen by local governments as being contradictory to this goal, and are thus ignored or altered to suit the district revenue aims. This study was carried out to investigate the context and the constraints in implementing exemption schemes. Data were collected in two selected administrative districts of Uganda (Mbarara and Mukono). Qualitative approaches to data collection were adopted, namely focus group discussions and key informant interviews with policy-makers, health administrators, service providers and community members. These methods were combined with document review. We found little evidence of safety-net guidelines initiated by decentralized/local governments, since district local governments had little motivation to extend exemptions, waivers or credits. The conclusion is that safety nets such as waivers and exemptions will only be effective if they are backed by a national health financing policy, they reconcile the often competing demands of local government revenue needs, and are strictly enforced and supervised by both the local and central governments. The implications of the findings for remedying the tension between the needs for cost recovery and for attainment of equity goals through exemption policies for the poor and indigent are discussed.
Decentralization is commonly championed as a means for achieving equity. To date, however, there has been little discussion of the mechanisms underlying this relationship, and several of the few empirical investigations that have addressed the topic have found the converse; that decentralization has exacerbated inequalities. This article examines the performance and equity in financing of the Honduras Ministry of Health's (MOH) decentralized user fee system. The MOH of Honduras established a national user fee policy in 1989. It provided a framework of rules and regulations and decentralized administration of the system to the regional offices. A survey conducted under the auspices of this study provided detailed information about the structures and operations of MOH user fee systems. The survey revealed that the systems vary markedly by region, creating horizontal inequities, and that they have numerous other shortcomings. The average price of a consultation is low, US dollars 0.16, and revenues have consistently equalled just 2% of MOH expenditures. The systems' administrative costs are equal to 67% of their revenues. Eliminating the user fee systems in all but the national and regional hospitals would actually save money and/or enable the MOH to provide more care. Average consultation prices are highest in health posts, intermediate in centres and lowest in the national hospitals, thereby encouraging the inappropriate use of the MOH's pyramidal referral system and fostering MOH inefficiency. Fee levels and exemption practices are horizontally and vertically inequitable. The likelihood of paying for an ambulatory visit is highest at a health post, 89%, and lowest at a hospital, 49%. Individuals from the poorest one-fifth of households are the most likely to have to pay for care. Honduras' experience demonstrates that a decentralized user fee system is not necessarily equitable, and that, more generally, the gains that can be realized from decentralizing user fee systems are not automatic. They must be anticipated, planned for and cultivated by a well-designed and well-implemented initiative that is not a single, one-time event, but rather a dynamic, on-going enterprise.
National leprosy control programmes currently face a number of changes to the environment within which they operate. This paper examines the issues arising from these. It focuses, in particular, on those arising from changes in the structure of the health sector as a result of policies of health sector reform which are being considered or adopted in many developing countries. These include decentralization, financing strategies, greater role for the private and NGO sectors and the integration of vertical programmes. The paper is structured around a number of key steps in the development of a strategy for sustainability of appropriate leprosy services. These are the assessment of the epidemiological, social and health services context, development of programme objectives, planning of human and financial resources, development of the strategy, mapping the roles of potential actors, development of regulatory and incentive mechanism, action planning and managing change and, finally, re-evaluation of the programme objectives and service delivery organization. The paper stresses the importance of process in developing ownership of a strategy. It concludes with a set of key questions which it suggests need to be addressed by leprosy programme managers in the development of a proactive response to the changes.
Summary This article analyses the structure and organization of RDRS, one of the largest rural development NGOs in Bangladesh. RDRS's Comprehensive Project works with 120,000 households, through small groups of about 15, motivating and educating people on joint savings and investment, agricultural and off-farm income generation, primary health and family planning, literacy, social awareness, and women's development. Groups have access to credit provided by RDRS or banks. No free inputs are given. The Comprehensive Project's Community Health Unit runs 55 antenatal centres and a leprosy treatment service. The Rural Works Project plants 250,000 trees per year, and supervises construction of schools, markets and small bridges and culverts in isolated rural communities. RDRS has almost 1,700 staff. Field implementation is decentralized to area-based units, within a common policy, activity, financial and personnel framework. Six sectoral advisory units are responsible for innovation, quality control and coordination across the whole programme. Résumé Les ONG: le cas du Service rural de Rangpur Dinajpur Le présent article contient une analyse de la structure et de l'organisation du RDRS, l'une des plus importantes ONG (Organisation non gouvernementale) rurales du Bangladesh. Le Comprehensive Project du RDRS intervient auprès d'environ 120 000 ménages sous forme de petits groupes d'environ 15 personnes; le RDRS a pour rôle de motiver et d'éduquer les participants quant aux économies et investissements conjoints dans le ménage; la génération de revenus fermiers et outre-fermiers; les soins de santé primaires et le planisme familial; les campagnes d'alphabétisation; les programmes de sensibilisation sociale; et le développement des femmes dans la population. Les groupes ont accès au crédit fourni par le RDRS ou par les banques. Aucune contribution n'est gratuite. Le groupe des Soins de santé communautaires du Comprehensive Project organise 55 centres de consultation prénatale, ainsi qu'un centre pour le traitement des lépreux. Le service des prestations rurales plante environ 250 000 arbres par an et contrôle la construction des écoles, des marchés et des petits ponts et caniveaux dans les communautés rurales isolées. Le personnel du RDRS compte presque 1700 effectifs. Les antennes exécutives rurales sont décentralisées en unités à base géographique, or elles restent liées par une organisation de gestion commune des politiques, des activités, du financement, et du personnel. Six groupes de conseil sectoral se chargent des programmes d'innovation, de contrôle de la qualité et de coordination du programme au niveau de l'ensemble. Resumen Organizaciones no gubernamentales: el caso del Servicio Rural en Rangpur Dinajpar El artículo analiza la estructura y organización del RDRS, uno de los proyectos de desarrollo rural más grandes de las Organizaciones no gubernamentales en Bangladesh. Este proyecto exhaustivo comprende 120.000 familias, en grupos de quince familias, motivando y educando a la población en áreas como: ahorro colectivo e inversiones, producción de ganancias fuera de la granja, salud y planificación familiar, alfabetización, conciencia social y el desarrollo de la mujer. Los grupos tienen acceso a créditos provistos por RDRS o instituciones bancarias. No se otorga dinero gratis. La Unidad del Proyecto de Salud Comunitaria maneja 55 centros pre-natales y un servicio para el tratamiento de la lepra. El Proyecto de Trabajos Rurales planta 250.000 árboles por año, y supervisa la construcción de escuelas, mercados, puentes y alcantarillas en comunidades rurales aisladas. RDRS tiene un personal de casi 1700 empleados. La implementación de base se descentraliza en forma de unidades en cada área, que sin embargo siguen una línea común en cuanto a a criterios, actividades y estructuras financieras y de personal. Hay seis unidades consultivas responsables por las innovaciones, control de calidad y coordinación de la totalidad del programa.