This research sets out to analyze the message promoted by start-up enterprises that apply blockchain technologies for the purpose of e-voting [blockchain-powered e-voting (BPE)], and their perceived effects of this technological solution on democratic outcomes. Employing Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA), I examined the written output of seven BPE start-ups (Agora, DemocracyEarth, Follow My Vote, Polys, Voatz, Votem, and VoteWatcher), as displayed in their websites. The close attention of CDA to power relations brought out relevant topics of discussion for analysis. Notably, these included: voting as an expression of democracy; technological determinism; individual versus communitarian understandings of democracy; the prominence of neoliberalism and the economic sphere; and technological literacy. Findings from the literature suggest that the assumptions of BPE start-ups about a blockchain-powered democracy diverge from widely accepted understandings of democracy. BPE start-ups envision a democracy determined by positions and institutions of power, by the technologically able, and by economic interests. This research argues that this conception of democracy disempowers voters from any form of decision-making regarding how democracy is run beyond their expression in the form of a vote decided by these established powers. The widespread addresses to existing elites to enable BPE, as well as what is left unsaid about community, collective rights and the not so technologically literate population, imply that BPE developers display concern for one particular expression among the many diverse and heterogeneous understandings of democracy, while disregarding outstanding privacy, security and accountability concerns associated to implementations of the technology for BPE. This work is a contribution to much needed research on technology and democracy’s deepening intersections, at a time of rapid technological innovation and turbulent democratic scepticism.
This article discusses the cultural conceptions of trust underpinning the experimentation of blockchain startup applications beyond the financial sector. Based on qualitative research undertaken in the context of the so-called “Blockchain 2.0” scene, we show how a peculiar conception of trust, which blends the libertarian views of blockchain inventors with the neoliberal culture of competition and meritocracy that is typical of the startup world, underpins these implementations. As a result, we argue that “Blockchain 2.0” entrepreneurs ultimately fail to recognize the eminently social nature of the trust-building process. They emerge from our observation as unable to comprehend the extent to which the implementation of blockchain in a societal (i.e., not purely financial) context cannot do away with considerations about what kind of “social” the technology intervenes within, and find difficult to effectively conceive of how this technology embeds in existing social relations and power structures.
Abstract This article presents a socio-anthropological analysis of the formation of a business ecosystem around blockchain technology in the Netherlands, within the broader context of the European Union and the digital single market. I argue that while reproducing widespread global models of business group and network formation, the relations created by these networks also reveal particularities of local business and governance cultures. Such particularities emerge from the pragmatics of collaboration and competitive market relationships, as well as legal heterogeneity and plans for legal harmonisation in digital innovation and governance in Europe. They also emerge from the challenges and transformations that current experimentation cultures for digital innovation bring to the interactions between market players, regulators, and government. These challenges and transformations materialise in increasingly informal connections and strategies for experimental legitimisation, which occur in parallel to more formal and traditional forms of regulatory and governmental interaction. The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork in the Netherlands and in online terrains, including observation periods and 32 interviews with entrepreneurial project teams, as well as with individuals involved in financial incumbents’ innovation labs.
This piece explores algorithmic governance as a strength and a vulnerability in the experience of building participatory communities known as "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations". The Cypherpunks were terrified of surveillance. They envisaged the combination of cryptography and computer technology fundamentally altering the nature of trust and reputation and built cryptographically secure blockchain-based infrastructure to counter this threat. Now, not just on chain transactions are being tracked but every move of participants in blockchain communities. Reputation in blockchain systems could become the new algorithmic authoritarianism if mis-used for social control. This piece analyzes the ways in which decentralization efforts can be a threat to themselves by exploring the question, 'Are "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations" (DAOs) the next panopticon of algorithmic governance or a different panacea, and what does this mean for human autonomy in "autonomous" systems?'. By employing ethnographic methods and case study analysis, this piece provides an important qualitative contribution to the early dynamics of the aspirations and problems of decentralized, autonomous organizations.
The rise of blockchain as a techno-solution in the development sector underscores the critical imbalances of data power under ‘computational capitalism’ ( Beller, 2018 ). This article will consider the political economy of techno-solutionist and blockchain discourses in the developing world, using as its object of study blockchain projects in Pacific Island nations. Backed by US State Department soft power initiatives such as Tech Camp, these projects inculcate tech-driven notions of economic and political development, or ICT4D, while opening up new terrains for data accumulation and platform control. Blockchain developers in search of proof of concept have found the development sector a fecund space for tech experimentation as they leverage a desire for tech-development and exploit regulatory weakness. The material implications of blockchain projects and discourse have been to create governance solutions which bypass the developing world state as a largely corrupting intermediary. In the Pacific, this has meant blockchain supply-chain management systems, proprietary financial innovation in humanitarian relief and an Asian Development Bank project to manage indigenous Fijian lands exclusively on the blockchain. In all these instances, discourses of solutionism, innovation and data empowerment have been deployed in aid of blockchain cartographies of control.
Inte Gloerich, Martijn de Waal, Gabriele Ferri, Nazlı Cila · 5 authors
Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) such as blockchain have in recent years been presented as a new general-purpose technology that could underlie many aspects of social and economic life, including civics and urban governance. In an urban context, over the past few years, a number of actors have started to explore the application of distributed ledgers in amongst others smart city services as well as in blockchain for good and urban commons-projects. DLTs could become the administrative backbones of such projects, as the technology can be set-up as an administration, management and allocation tool for urban resources. With the addition of smart contracts, DLTs can further automate the processing of data and execution of decisions in urban resource management through algorithmic governance. This means that the technological set-up and design of such DLT based systems could have large implications for the ways urban resources are governed. Positive contributions are expected to be made toward (local) democracy, transparent governance, decentralization, and citizen empowerment. We argue that to fully scrutinize the implications for urban governance, a critical analysis of distributed ledger technologies is necessary. In this contribution, we explore the lens of “the city as a license” for such a critical analysis. Through this lens, the city is framed as a “rights-management-system,” operated through DLT technology. Building upon Lefebvrian a right to the city-discourses, such an approach allows to ask important questions about the implications of DLTs for the democratic governance of cities in an open, inclusive urban culture. Through a technological exploration combined with a speculative approach, and guided by our interest in the rights management and agency that blockchains have been claimed to provide to their users, we trace six important issues: quantification; blockchain as a normative apparatus; the complicated relationship between transparency and accountability; the centralizing forces that act on blockchains; the degrees to which algorithmic rules can embed democratic law-making and enforcing; and finally, the limits of blockchain's trustlessness.
Over the last decade, the term ‘gig economy’ has risen to prominence in public discourse, but has failed to attract sustained attention from political philosophers. The gig economy is a subsection of the overall economy that predominantly relies on ‘on-demand work’:11 Prassl 2018, p. 11. workers22 Throughout this article, we deliberately speak of ‘workers’ in a broad sense: not only those permanently employed count as workers of a firm, but all those who actually work for it. receive short-term and freelance contracts rather than permanent jobs. Firms treat them as independent sellers of services and only hire them to perform a particular ‘gig’, that is, to complete a specified task or project. Gig work thereby increases the granularity of work contracts: work is sold in ever smaller quantities and, in extremis, firms only buy the exact amount of labour they need, at the particular moment they need it. On a social level, the higher granularity of labour market transactions leads to an expansion of the reach of markets. Not only a one-off hiring decision, but the conditions of every single micro-labour contract become subject to the market forces of supply and demand. From an economic perspective, the ability to hire and dispense with workers at will is often seen as a measure for ‘removing friction’ in labour markets, and unlocking efficiency gains as ‘unproductive human capital’ is ‘set free’.33 On the flexibilization of labour markets in the 1990s, see Davies and Freedland 2007. Major expositions of this policy programme include European Commission 1994; OECD 1994. Whenever a firm can do without a worker’s additional unit of labour, she re-enters the labour market, which can then, in theory, allocate her work to the most productive use. The business practices of ride-service providers like Uber and Lyft in the US best embody this trend, paying drivers by the ride and only if there are rides. But, beyond such extreme and well-publicized cases, many firms are gradually moving away from the paradigmatic form of employment in the industrial age—a job with a fixed number of hours, worked in set shifts, in one place, and for a predetermined salary (call this ‘standard employment’)—towards work that is contracted at short notice on the basis of current demand (call this ‘gig work’).44 Some other forms of work, like fixed-term employment with a longer duration or employment at temporary work agencies, lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. They often display many of the normatively problematic features of gig work, but to a lesser extent. While various statistics employ different criteria for determining whether or not someone counts as a contract worker, the number of people affected by this shift has dramatically increased over the past decades and is projected to rise further. According to a recent study, those in alternative work arrangements—like on-call workers, contract workers, and freelancers—made up 15.8 per cent of the US workforce in 2015, up from 10.7 per cent a decade before.55 Katz and Krueger 2019, p. 382. At Google, contract workers are now reported to outnumber permanent staff.66 Wakabayashi 2019. The trend towards gig work poses a challenge to the paradigm of standard employment, which is modelled on the industrial worker and has dominated debates in political philosophy and labour economics.77 See also Vallas and Schor (2020), who focus on the specific context of the platform economy, where firms obtain a near-monopoly position in connecting buyers and sellers of labour. They contend that such gig-economy platforms require new regulatory approaches, as they reject responsibility for individual but over one many regulatory of the past the work and not to gig such work rise to the context of standard employment, has a social workers will not become but they will work, only of or at a social like as is not to short-term the but trend towards work and a new for that on the of in on to the rise of forms of employment and that the shift in employment is best as a of of firms business by of workers, thereby them to that this that current and the shift are normatively the of the article, this has the shift from the of affected that workers, ability to form and thereby of of gig work not we the gig economy to of and, the shift from the of that firms in the gig economy in a they a on the of the on the of work in affected and on social the as the of gig the to at an the of gig work, and for the of this article, such is a the of a of which that the and a form of employment, the higher the to social by the which can the of a has to the of gig work the of gig workers by a new this we that there has a shift towards forms of employment, which is best but not the rise of the gig has by who and to by social by and of in with and the of the trend towards gig that this trend is best as a the of firms business by of workers, thereby them to increased on we a broad of as or where of human has at and where the is p. are by in business are are business can for increased in is often by and social that See for a of in debates in the philosophy of work, this of is for the of forms of the to is an and political in See and to the of the or See in the and the to a social and social and can if they do not as we will by people from and Over the past labour markets in seen a rise in the number of people who are in temporary or forms of that the of work can the of conditions over and the or to in of work is by an of economic a a recent that the in US employment the has in temporary and contract Katz and Krueger 2019. the for that the number of is, of employment contracts that do not amount of the has risen from to over the past for Not has become an for the and that per cent of the by from in from the and p. the flexibilization of employment has to the forces of and and the of in the of in regulatory political in the labour market not but only by of are of in the of has as has the of by as a form of has are to the rise of temporary in as temporary workers to and and at the are also the of of the of the flexibilization of the labour the of forms of employment is not that they with or to but that they workers to thereby them in a form of and ability to and to the recent not in of an or a but a business is to workers and thereby business as as The in a which in or in an in to a The most of this is by them on to See who as business and the a firm can employment and in to demand or for other this to workers to such increases in they to or buy additional The up a firms but in the context of standard employment they of permanent work fixed with and workers from such an to for other of business on to that this is but the to which they all on the rise the in most to the contracts of permanent to employ workers only contracts as workers need not to contracts of to the number of of work a for business The most extreme of this trend are where do not number of of work and workers are only if The from fixed or contracts a of platforms the to the for individual gig and only at the a worker not but set by a for business is in the from fixed work firms to in a to in demand. often to on work at short and to work if the for on to workers a or the workers the for such by and work is of thereby to the other the in the of rather than the the for and workers are are but to business and the of such by on to firms in the to which they do the of specific but is also affected by the of business of the of labour the of in firms like Uber and Lyft the in an employment a fixed number of work hours, a fixed work they hire people as in workers often labour for a single Throughout all of the economy, employ of They on to temporary workers, only temporary to new workers or work contracts for if the most the that the gig economy in also a number of that on of in or the or in the of business in the gig economy, this a of this The the of gig work on workers and at which the of gig we a new paradigm for conditions of a of often has of and not only at but also at is The subsection gig work in shift the of where gig work is is to that it. Not all gig work is to The freelance over the past become the of the gig at a she has from the rise of short-term employment contracts by the her to in work in which she has a and to her services in a labour market by and longer receive to or and are a a number of work per in the of 2019. and work them for the of they most workers in gig economy in a position different from that of the the on a subsection of the gig economy, on gig While is to of the of the labour in the gig economy, like workers, and form an the employment contracts and for a on a job and the for all other Gig work On the one and to the US in has become the for 2019, p. that the employed often a of in or new jobs. The of in a new of p. The need to market and to for employment can The is for those who to without for a short this is the rather than the as the one in US over per cent of with that they are the of the work and a to the of gig work the ability of workers to and on recent to treat as an and a of 2019. While they focus on the amount of we are with of is affected not only by one but also by and thereby on a by p. that the to and of is as as the amount of such is the ability of an a to towards the of an to do need to a that that the of which they at do not the of the 2018, p. See also p. a of over But, as of economic the of people to and to for the and this in in and in the of the with economic they to work towards that require a or a if one not whether one will a job in in the of work people to in that require sustained with a or a political at fixed but work is one has to to every extreme where one is subject to for a as as the in is not only with in to the in to new on of the for and that economic also which they as a of by the that and are and the in ability to to and and 2018, p. See also other we can that a in the and of On a level, this not as a on many of human to is to the human of to for that as a human to a p. the of towards a is to people to of the which will the form of a is not only the of a to of as a a by a p. the of her her is only we the longer and are and the are to the p. According to are for a of the p. that the this is normatively at we gig work to a for a the of gig workers to increased is not only a to various a in if as a of work this is to in the of and, in extremis, to an from ability to a as an 2018, At this an additional to if a worker to a gig is this not that she from we are to standard economic theory, gig work as an additional if there are by for gig work we this for workers such as the The freelance but also higher not work for workers who all workers the of or not a of and of in workers are in supply and is to to the of workers, also on whether gig work is of or rather one that from job or see Schor that many workers but to the employment of the gig a recent by that a of the a permanent The that per cent of over higher in the in the of the and in of work, many workers for work as an and now a permanent p. the from of is to in that the of gig work not labour markets are firms the that employment, like that of a are gig like that of an gig work often firms a on thereby the to a of the rise of gig work, employment become or to at if people gig work is the best they this not other or not gig work has to problematic from the of an individual worker will on her which is for her of to and her position is as in the of is that the worker the in for like increased or her position is she The of the for by that whether a in a can only by the set of the economic contracts can as as but are by in the social which such are p. to the to workers by gig work also the of and At in the of the gig economy, where workers and the shift towards gig work to in of and According to for to conditions need to such that is to on over than the of to over which that social is by or p. that for the of the of and the to which the of is by can all in the in the labour market for gig work is best of as a The of many gig workers to work a of to a which is most where the supply of labour is this can firms to without in the towards gig work can such an of on to workers who to it. gig work is the the granularity of work contracts firms to and over conditions of At firms will that without as the one of subject to is problematic in but the gig economy to of According to for and if and only if and are in a in which to a from p. On to someone is to treat her as a in that of her to subject to the of and to a that overall According to this at gig firms and workers as there are for the gig economy is to such many of the gig economy, the of firms over the conditions of employment with a of where firms in business without they a in the form of an in conditions and are While is to exact for as of and as the of gig firms on for which to drivers to work in those and at those that on and of as as on who the efficiency of various Uber Uber not the of workers are a Uber can to treat workers as a and to and of in other of employment as there are for that the gig economy is to rise to of the higher granularity of work at the of the gig many of the gig economy, we this a as is of in can in an firms can buy work in ever smaller they are to the of workers and the for them in ever the for that the shift towards gig work in the place, the higher granularity of work to an is this of and that at gig firms a position to is a whether firms of this as the of Uber is to that at of them the of gig work from the of individual workers, we now attention to on the of business can without social on the of public such as the of a an and from and there is a that business in the of the conditions that in the While the is with to the of and the of the there is to in this we there is an of social in the of a set of social the business of gig firms to than those of firms standard they on the of workers, on ability to to and on social if one to that we as they the in that forms of are by which the gig economy the of gig economy to those who work for The of employment a for if one the workforce to one has to in is that many gig are that require often demand a and a a of work a that an economy with business See 2019. the of short employment the of workers to is in the of workers in that are specific to firm or this increases but also them to from current a to the to which workers are and for they will to in current in the of set will in OECD the of employment with the of if workers are to or employment in the gig economy them with to do the need to work and most people with to to in the form of or the of economic and the where conditions of work become in this in or to they conditions of in which the gig economy to is that employment conditions the ability of workers to in and The is not with of workers, but with that there will a of as as has in the work of who a at firms in an see is that firms not only but in labour from Firms are on as is for there to a of they on to workers from work and from for the and a in the is if the is to p. 11. Over the past there has The of labour market has risen in OECD and the paradigm of the and the is as that for the of and the While all this has to the of and work are the work to While firms do and work they to to that such Firms in the gig economy in particular to to do we the work they has a number of on the work and workers to increased of and need to to work and the of are in that require other to they also on the of if is on social to to the to which other as and are to work towards has a of to and who various an see on social are a as firms in the gig economy, like all on the of at a of social that the in which they While is to a the rise of the gig economy and a of social the that such a as the gig economy we a of employment, where one at to the other which is to rise to forms of are in the US and the where a of and by work the of if the of employment in a higher of gig workers on the social this the of the to such if the of gig work ability to thereby also ability to in as this ability to work towards a to social The that gig work with for individual workers as as at that there are the of gig They standard employment is But, that on forms of employment can also The of workers, like and the of The employment of the of from the of gig workers, which firms to services at we the work is of the freelance we do not that of gig work can an we do that the of the of gig work is up to to that there are specific form of gig work, such a to which a business on gig work people other than that conditions of standard to that social the social of gig one to an that on gig workers and for the of is with a for social and social a for and a of is to on for the of to the of the by gig work, we for a specific will require and to the of for one not only to on to but also to the of which in an of for an While in are not only in but also away from the of a of gig work in we will not to we to the of we that there are the of gig work and that this the of where gig work is are but we this can policy to the rise of gig this has a of the the rise of the gig economy and of this we to a the rise of the gig is by the of gig we to fixed to to See p. They to buy labour on an this them a over those that forms of is by the that many to social hiring the for at an an contract worker her than of her permanently employed for and 2019, p. in cases, firms to standard employment for economic for if the of this in the of gig work that is the of this an for this on other firms to to work to of the the of to the rise of the gig economy in we set for a policy of the of and with other the the shift and the of business to the workforce and other to of gig work that in particular on can seen as a demand of if gig work is to in the of but individual workers to for the of only that to them in that to from of the of the shift that the gig is to that we do not that of is the gig economy also rise to other like or other we to for the of a gig The and a work the higher the to social by the The additional to new forms of that for short-term in of those in employment for the as as the of at one of the On the the the of a on a on a market that social which to to social See this we social as a broad measure for that are by rather than the economic to The is towards the work the the shift and the towards ever work of the a on work is the of the of this the to per cent higher than the salary of with or permanent While there is that this in current form has not of and and is not with and is a towards the economic to gig such a not the of the is to the to them a new on the of a gig work, most to the The of a the of on to the the is in place, business become and are are that only that is, they on an business economic them to one for social by the will include a that the to gig work by the social it. of the gig work to as in the of a a on forms of employment will set at an level, the will those business that are only they to of and of the of an will not only on economic the but also on the of the of gig is a business can also that are not by the business to of that in this not amount to a the of to a on all to for the they and to a for those that not for by the The for the gig Gig work and the if to specific forms of gig work, they do On the the that the from the to new forms of social that to short-term in labour worked towards conditions for those in standard employment, for work and The to this standard by a of in the gig economy, workers are longer in employment or but and they the that social are not to an up a worker’s to a of her labour over the past the to a moving of the labour a workers to work not but to that workers an to work rather than on the this the the to thereby the economic that with gig work and are not of a that has but the of are on the At many social by of social and OECD 2019, p. The the to workers by the the and of an social by the of gig can on that in the in the the of on a basis and a a for the we the current of the is not in this the of is and, for a for to an for the the and that the to a in gig work, but that a While a for work, will the amount of gig work, the can only from not the of the of and the a on work the but not for those who subject to that is not this is a in to that are of various the set and they in in the context of a specific economy or in is then, to the of the we a policy rather than a for this is the of forms work can and the social and labour market a policy require to and with and other social At the the the of gig work in a this to to than like all workers of on we that the a of a policy to the rise of the gig economy, and one that has we do not that the is for the we that there are that is to alternative in of the rise of the gig a on forms of employment and the of a on forms of employment that workers are from But, as we business gig work and of the to can by forms of a a on work in form of a is to on work contracts where the on workers are and that work on short notice a as the of workers such require to the conditions and the position of workers, and has in in to of see and 2019. a that and has a firms shift on to workers without and of and are to But, in of the we to on at also a on forms of employment, as a to the by gig firms in a problematic is to the at at from a of the the of as as to for the of the of the the the only for the gig economy, the a by the to those who the of the rise of the gig economy is the of social by workers are to labour in a for The higher granularity of work contracts the of labour markets in which human can to most productive this article, we to that the expansion of the gig economy at human gig work in a shift of from to At in the of the gig economy, workers are not for on such additional The of this of which if the not are normatively The shift the most by them to with to and the of ability to form which in and of But, also on in that of we the of and that that by this can the trend towards gig work and the challenge of of an gig economy a they that labour is not a like but one that is On the one labour is the of a of workers, and a On the other labour hours, and to social the basis of the and of workers and, of and labour as a and firms in the gig economy this social of labour. They to from the social from and to is that this that will political and to and this
Research by political economists typically highlights policymakers, regulators, economists and consultants as the makers of economies. This paper foregrounds a different actor entirely, what I call the ‘hacker-engineer’ as an important protagonist in the making of decentralised digital network economies that are forged through the emerging field of ‘cryptoeconomics’ and blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies. Responding to critical literature stating that blockchain and ‘cryptoeconomics’ merely extend neoliberal processes of economisation, the paper recovers the neglected hacker culture of cypherpunk and histories of peer-to-peer decentralised networks in order to foreground concerns that depart from the continuation of economics and economies as usual. Hacker-engineers are dedicated to decentralisation as a ‘disruptive’ response to network control and surveillance, and share a pragmatist sensibility that seeks to make decentralised networks ‘work’ in order to provide informational security and privacy. While further broadening the range of agents that provide the focus for political economy research into the production of economies, the paper also draws attention to the technical decisions of hacker-engineers that attempt to reconfigure the material infrastructures of digital economies.
The transparency and visibility engendered in Distributed Ledger Technology allows, for the first time, disparate stakeholders to agree on common resource existence, ownership, and rules of exchange, while keeping the coordination costs comparatively low with respect to earlier methods. This infrastructure can finally facilitate a self-organising market mechanism, where people can decide upon the market rules themselves and potentially self-select into any particular marketplace dependent upon their personal beliefs and preferences. Reinventing the apparatus of the economy upon shared distributed infrastructure may finally allow the emergence of actual shared ownership, unlike the existing systems where short-term rentals or access-based consumption are often confused with sharing and social exchange.
Abstract The role that trust plays in blockchain-based systems is understood and portrayed in various manners. The blockchain technology is said to enable and establish trust as well as to redirect it, to substitute for it, and to make it obsolete. Furthermore, there is disagreement on whom or what users have to trust when using the blockchain technology: (only) code, math, algorithms, and machines, or still (also) human actors. This paper hypothesizes that the divergences of the depictions largely rest on implicitly adhering to different accounts of trust. Thus, the goal of this paper is to outline how the current lack of a shared understanding of the term “trust” leads to diverging interpretations of the blockchain technology’s core features. Furthermore, it shows how this lack of common understanding obstructs scholars from referring to one another meaningfully in the discourse on blockchain technology. To do so, this paper outlines the most prominent depictions of the setup of relevant trust relationships within blockchain-based systems and traces their roots to different underlying assumptions on the nature of trust.
The core contradiction in neoliberalism (studies) is that markets are organised and require significant bureaucratic coordination and governance. In light of the increasingly technoscientific nature of contemporary capitalism, it is important to examine exactly how markets are organised and their governance configured by digital processes. In this article, I argue that the entanglement of digital technoscience and capitalism has led to an 'automated neoliberalism' in which markets are configured by digital platforms, personal lives are transformed through the accumulation of personal data, and social relations are automated through algorithms, distributed electronic ledgers, and rating systems. Two issues arise as a result of these changes: first, are markets being automated away, in that market exchange no longer underpins social organisation? And second, does individual and social reflexivity problematise techno-economic automation, in that new platforms, data assets, ranking algorithms, etc. are all dependent on individuals telling the 'truth'? My aim in this article is to answer these questions and to consider the political implications of automated neoliberalism and our reflexive enrolment in it.
Robbie Morrison, Natasha C. H. L. Mazey, Stephen C. Wingreen
This paper reviews the recent case of The DAO “hack” in June 2016 and analyzes The DAO's response in its time of crisis, and its implications for corporate and IT governance. There was no human-led governance in The DAO. Instead, The DAO placed its trust in the smart contract they had built together on the blockchain, which became its governance mechanism. The events that follow allow us to see hitherto unobservable organizational behaviors that are unique to trustless organizations, and hence The DAO gives us a glimpse at a new species of corporate governance. This paper explores the implications of these ideas: we propose the emergence of a spectrum of organizations based on the alienation of trust, we consider the economic impact and legality of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), smart contracts, work and job design, and what happens when corporate governance is managed solely by IT governance.
Candy So Suk Yi Candice, Eric Yung, Samuel Lee, Christopher Fong · 5 authors
A Deloitte (2016) survey report states that blockchain technology can have an impact on the telecommunications industry in preventing fraud, identifying as-a-service and data management, 5G enabling, and IoT connectivity. For example, fraud costs more than USD 38 billion a year. In a panel of industry experts, Carrier Industry is looking for ways to cut costs, boost revenues, and market segments through blockchain technology (Total Telecom, 2018). Blockchain is treated as a breakthrough technology for managing the operation of telecommunications such as identity management, smart contracts, payments and transactions, reporting and analysis, network management, billing / OSS, etc. A statistical analysis shows that blockchain in telecommunications and postal services in 2017 amounted to more than USD 39 million and is expected to achieve an estimate of more than USD 641 million by 2023-end, suggesting powerful market growth over the next few years (Market Research Future Report, 2018). Since carriers apply telecom standards to run its business and operations, and thus blockchain technology, a high secure of distributed ledger and trust processes to solve the high traffics. According to a survey by IBM Institute for Business Value (2018), it states that 36 percent of Communication Service Providers (CSP) are already considering or actively engaged with blockchain, 41 percent of CSP may support their strategy by assuring data management, and 46 percent of CSP are already exploring or engaging with blockchain and already invested in it to develop new business models. Carriers in telecommunications Industry Hong Kong are mainly private-owned, and thus they must follow the Telecommunication Ordinance (Cap. 106) governed by Office of the Communications Authority (OFCA) of HKSAR. Telecommunications services such as fixed-line, internet broadband and mobile service support business and residential customers. Hong Kong Telecom (HKT), Hutchison Telecommunications Hong Kong Holdings Ltd (HTHK) and Hong Kong Broadband Network Limited (HKBN) are selected by this study as a number of operators (fixed-line and broadband, mobile, or a mix of both fixed-line, broadband and mobile). HKT (Stock Code: SEHK: 6823), is the major operator to meet the needs of public, local and international businesses with a wide range of services such as local telephony, local data and broadband, international communications, mobile service and enterprise solutions. HKT employs approximately 17,400 staff, the headquarters are located in Hong Kong, and telecommunications network covers more than 3,000 cities and 140 countries (HKT, 2019) Hutchison Telecommunications Holdings Hong Kong Limited (Stock Code: SEHK215), conglomerate of CK Hutchison Holdings, is the leading operator provides mobile service in Hong Kong and Macau. HTHK employs 1,180 staff and the headquarters are located in Hong Kong (HTHK, 2019). Hong Kong Broadband Network, Stock Code: SEHK: 1310), is the foremost operator provides broadband service to commerce and residential customers. HKBN is an aggressive operator with merger and acquisition with New World Telecommunications in February 2016 and WTT Holding Ltd in February 2019. HKBN employs approximately 3,000 staff, and the headquarters are located in Hong Kong (HKBN, 2019). An example of two dominating carrier representatives, Marc Halbfinger, Chief Executive Officer of PCCW Global (subsidiary of HKT) and the Chairman of the GLF, and Andrew Kwok, CEO of Hutchison Global Telecommunications (ex-mega conglomerate of CK Hutchison Holdings sold to Asia Cube Global in Jul 2017) partnering with Colt Technologies Service to conduct trial blockchain technology to re-shape business practices (Colt Technology News, 2018). Other example of blockchain, HKT and PCCW obtained a virtual banking license in early 2019 to expand finance business (South China Morning Post, 2019). Given examples of operators actively study on blockchain technology to its core business and the role of blockchain plays a tremendous role in telecommunications landscape. The research paper is focussed on blockchain/blockchain technology impact to Human Resources hiring and off-boarding practices in telecommunications sector in Hong Kong.
Abstract There is a wealth of information, hype around, and research into blockchain’s ‘disruptive’ and ‘transformative’ potential concerning every industry. However, there is an absence of scholarly attention given to identifying and analyzing the political premises and consequences of blockchain projects. Through digital ethnography and participatory action research, this article shows how blockchain experiments personify ‘prefigurative politics’ by design: they embody the politics and power structures which they want to enable in society. By showing how these prefigurative embodiments are informed and determined by the underlying political imaginaries, the article proposes a basic typology of blockchain projects. Furthermore, it outlines a frame to question, cluster, and analyze the expressions of political imaginaries intrinsic to the design and operationalization of blockchain projects on three analytic levels: users, intermediaries, and institutions.
Purpose Blockchain, which was originally created to enable peer-to-peer digital payment systems (bitcoin), is considered to have several benefits for different sectors, such as the real estate one. In a standard European-wide real estate transaction, several intermediaries are involved. As a consequence, these agreements are usually time-consuming and involve extra difficulties to cross-border operations. As blockchain, combined with smart contracts, may have an important role in these transactions, this paper aims to explore its prospective challenges, limitations and opportunities in the real estate sector and discover how the traditional intermediaries have to face a possible implementation of this technology. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyses the current intermediaries in the real estate sector in European Union (EU), their functions and how can blockchain strengthen the security of these transactions while reducing their time. The author uses a legal methodology to approach it. Findings Blockchain, combined with smart contracts, has both challenges and opportunities for the real estate sector. On the one hand, it may improve procedures, allow EU transactions and the interconnection between public administration. However, to not reduce parties rights, this blockchain should have some special features, such as the possibility of being amended. Originality/value This paper provides a valuable overview of all the intermediaries that could be affected by blockchain protocols. It is of interest of blockchain developers, public administrations and researchers who are working on blockchain and property conveyancing.
Samuel Brülisauer, Anastasia Costantini, Gianluca Pastorelli
"Digitalisation and other advanced technologies are increasingly reshaping our economy, including social economy enterprises. Disruptive technologies can inspire the social economy and vice versa. Blockchain for instance carries an intrinsic decentralisation approach that could have many implications for services and generate a high social added value through traceability, fair pricing, commonly recognised and verified standards and democratization of access to services and products in all societies and areas." - Ms Ulla Engelmann, Head of Unit for Advanced Technologies, Social Economy and Clusters, European Commission, DG Grow In the first two decades of the new century digital technologies have started to reshape work, leisure, behaviour, health, education, money, governance, and other aspects of human life. As people and businesses start using digital appliances for all kinds of interaction, an increasing amount of communication and value exchange shifts to the digital realm. This megatrend holds many promises to spur innovation, generate efficiencies, and improve services, and in doing so boost more inclusive and sustainable growth. But these technologies also tend to disrupt traditional ways to organize our economy and society, entailing important consequences for people, organisations and markets, and raise important issues around jobs and skills, privacy, security. We use the term digital transformation to describe these social, cultural, and economic changes resulting from digital innovations, and identify four socio-technological areas in which people are particularly affected by this transformation: work and income goods and services, money and finance, and state and governance. Digital platforms and blockchains (and other distributed ledger technology) are two of the most impactful technologies. Because of the astonishing possibilities these technologies offer, observers regularly fathom that it is not only unfeasible but also undesirable to ‘stop’ the digital transformation. Rather, it is argued that digital technologies and their impacts must be actively managed and leveraged to ensure their alignment with people-centred development and sustainability. In this context, a growing number of social economy innovations aim to create an internet and digital appliances that put individual users and society first. Social economy enterprises and organizations are either based on participatory governance where users are ultimately in (partial) control over the platform/technology, or bound by a statutory purpose asserting the priority of social and environmental goals before financial returns. The digital social economy innovations discussed in this paper aim to realize this vision in the four areas undergoing digital transformation. Our analysis is informed by insights from the workshop organised by Diesis on “Blockchain, digital social innovation and social economy. The future is here!”, as well as case studies elaborated in close collaboration with various digital social economy enterprises. The study finds a vivid variety of digital social economy enterprises, and important potential for further applications of social economy principles in the digital realm. Yet the realization of this potential depends on whether these enterprises manage the critical challenge to achieve sustainable and user-centred growth. We therefore conclude with a discussion of this challenge and some recommendations for policy, organization and entrepreneurship.
Abstract: Transformation of industrial districts has attracted much attention for long. The Ruhr area in Germany, which used to be a pillar of the industrial economy in the past and is a robust cultural and economic region now, is always a typical case. Based on field visits and semi-structured interviews, this paper takes Zeche Zollverein in Ruhr as an example, trying to find out how multiple agents take part in and cooperate with each other during its transformation and to summarize its mechanism of multi-agent governance. It is found that during the transformation in Zeche Zollverein, administrative, social and market powers actively participate and interact in the protection and development of industrial culture, financing and investment, renovation of buildings and environment, daily operation and management as well as social life and space activation. In the framework of multi-agent cooperation in Zeche Zollverein, different levels of governments combine top-down management and moderate decentralization, acting as a backbone; the public are important elements in the activation of social life while social organizations share public affairs with governments and citizens enjoy participating in public activities; market economies form a virtuous circle between their self-development and the regional transformation. From single subject controlling to multi-agent cooperation, the transformation of governance framework in Zeche Zollverein is a remarkable enlightenment for industrial districts in China. Under the realistic conditions of our country with Chinese characteristics, governments tend to be responsible for every stuff in cities and get overburdened. Learning from Zeche Zollverein, they can try to break away from the idea of "all-around arrangement", and to cooperate more with and release some functions to the society and the market, attracting them to locate in the district and develop themselves on their own initiatives, so as to promote regional transformation jointly.
Cryptocurrency is a method of remunerating employees (‘cryptoremuneration’). However, crypto-remuneration has not been examined within the existing regulatory framework governing labour. This article explores the regulation of crypto-remuneration in Australia, specifically how labour, taxation and superannuation laws (state regulation), as well as the parties themselves (self-regulation) may regulate cryptocurrency as a method of reward for labour. It is argued that the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and associated state legislation prohibits the payment of wages in cryptocurrency, and treats crypto-remuneration as a non-monetary benefit. The impact of regulation on how the parties may structure the remuneration package in the contract of employment is examined. Regulatory, price volatility and operational risks of crypto-remuneration are identified, as well as recommendations to stakeholders that can manage these risks.
The use of blockchain technology is one of the most promising areas in the development of the digital economy. The high potential of its applicability, obvious benefits from reducing the number of transactions and cutting costs mean that the implementation of blockchain technology is inevitable in social and labor relations (SLR). The impediment to this process is the absence of an established institutional environment that would determine uniform characteristics of the technology, language, ontology, and principles of using distributed ledgers. The purpose of this study is to develop recommendations for establishing framework standards for the application of blockchain technology in SLR. The ecosystem approach, practical analysis and institutional synthesis are used as research methods. As a result, the study proposes a set of areas for standardization of the application of distributed ledger technology in SLR. The pool of basic standardization areas includes institutional, technological, relational (stakeholder) conditions as well as conditions for ensuring security. Analysis of the national project (program) “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” identified areas for developing standards for the use of blockchain technology in SLR. In addition, the study described serious risks and obstacles to the implementation of digital technologies in this sphere of economic relations.
Over the last decade there has been a continuing decline in social trust on the part of individuals with regards to the handling and fair use of personal data, digital assets and other related rights in general. At the same time, there has been a change in the employment patterns for many people through the emergence of the gig economy. These gig workers include artists, songwriters and musicians in the music industry. We discuss the notion of the data cooperative with fiduciary responsibilities to its members, which is similar in purpose to credit unions in the financial sector. A data cooperative for artists and musicians allows the community to share IT resources, such as data storage, analytics processing, blockchains and distributed ledgers. A cooperative can also employ smart contracts to remedy the various challenges currently faced by the music industry with regards to the license tracking management.
Sociotechnical imaginaries are futures that people envision might be possible and desirable. They have a real impact on how systems are designed and what values they have embedded in their design. This article examines imaginaries about autonomous systems, decentralized systems, and decentralized autonomous systems. Through a discussion of the literature on autonomous and decentralized systems and how these imaginaries play out in the blockchain community based on my qualitative research, I demonstrate how decentralized autonomous systems are related to imaginaries about the organization of and the future of work. I identify three framings of imaginaries about autonomous systems: (1) autonomous technology as physical objects, (2) as mathematical rules, and (3) as artificial mangers. I also identify two sometimes conflicting framings of imaginaries about distributed and decentralized technology: these technologies as a new form of production and as freedom from control. These imaginaries intersect in decentralized autonomous systems, and I examine what they can tell us about the design and governance of such technologies. Lastly, I suggest ways of using the concept of imaginaries in participatory design.
Douglas W. Arner, Ross P. Buckley, Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, Bo Zhao · 7 authors
Abstract Since the launch of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies and their underlying blockchain technology have risen to global attention. It is now clear Bitcoin and a number of other cryptocurrencies were the focus of one of the largest speculative bubbles in history. This chapter explores blockchain, cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), as well as policy and regulatory responses in Asia. It demystifies key aspects of blockchain systems, while also disentangling concepts that are often (incorrectly) used interchangeably, such as distributed ledgers and blockchains. The chapter provides data on total capital raised through ICOs and analyzes the distribution of ICOs by country and region. Based on this framework, it conducts a comprehensive analysis of regulatory statements and disparate policy approaches in Asian countries toward digital assets, focusing on cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and ICOs.