Francesca Stabile, Walter Lúcia, Amr Youssef, Giuseppe Franzè
The proliferation of cloud computing technologies has paved the way for deploying networked encrypted control systems, offering high performance, remote accessibility and privacy. However, in scenarios where the control algorithms run on third-party cloud service providers, the control’s logic might be changed by a malicious agent on the cloud. Consequently, it is imperative to verify the correctness of the control signals received from the cloud. Traditional verification methods, like zero-knowledge proof techniques, are computationally demanding in both proof generation and verification, may require several rounds of interactions between the prover and verifier and, consequently, are inapplicable in real-time control system applications. In this paper, we present a novel computationally inexpensive verifiable computing solution inspired by the probabilistic cut-and-choose approach. The proposed scheme allows the plant’s actuator to validate the computations accomplished by the encrypted cloud-based networked controller without compromising the control scheme’s performance. We showcase the effectiveness and real-time applicability of the proposed verifiable computation scheme using a remotely controlled Khepera-IV differential-drive robot.
Conventionally, organizations have used Privileged Access Management (PAM) techniques to secure, control, and monitor access to their critical information and resources. The PAM concepts have envisioned designing protocols that help protect user accounts that are deemed to have access to sensitive data ?the most valuable asset of a business. While in the past these techniques have proven vital to data protection and security, the onset of increasingly sophisticated technologies and more determined malicious actors warrants a change of data control and privacy strategies. It becomes impossible to secure a system to achieve 100 percent efficiency. Any system that is attached to the internet is vulnerable to cyberattacks. Hackers have numerous ways to compromise systems if traditional boundary security mechanisms are deployed. Detecting an intrusion in such a setup becomes increasingly challenging if an attacker successfully breaches that boundary layer of defense. Since traditional authentication and authorization might not be reliable in network systems, the zero - knowledge proof model comes in handy. Adding the zero - knowledge proof to the PAM to authenticate users or members and disclose or anonymize them through decentralized identifiers helps in solving the identification and privacy protection problem. We propose a PAM and zero - knowledge proof - inspired approach to address the authentication, data security, and privacy concerns. A zero - knowledge proof is a method that allows the prover to prove to the verifier that they know a certain information without disclosing it.
Motivated by progress in the field of zero-knowledge proofs, so-called Arithmetization-Oriented (AO) symmetric primitives have started to appear in the literature, such as MiMC, Poseidon or Rescue. Due to the design constraints implied by this setting, these algorithms are defined using simple operations over large (possibly prime) fields. In particular, many rely on simple low-degree monomials for their non-linear layers, essentially using x ↦ x3 as an S-box.In this paper, we show that the structure of the material injected in each round (be it subkeys in a block cipher or round constants in a public permutation) could allow a specific pattern, whereby a well-defined affine space is mapped to another by the round function, and then to another, etc. Such chains of one-dimensional subspaces always exist over 2 rounds, and they can be extended to an arbitrary number of rounds, for any linear layer, provided that the round-constants are well chosen.As a consequence, for several ciphers like Rescue, or a variant of AES with a monomial Sbox, there exist some round-key sequences for which the cipher has an abnormally high differential uniformity, exceeding the size of the Sbox alphabet.Well-known security arguments, in particular based on the wide-trail strategy, have been reused in the AO setting by many designers. Unfortunately, our results show that such a traditional study may not be sufficient to guarantee security. To illustrate this, we present two new primitives (the tweakable block cipher Snare and the permutation-based hash function Stir) that are built using state-of-the-art security arguments, but which are actually deeply flawed. Indeed, the key schedule of Snare ensures the presence of a subspace chain that significantly simplifies an algebraic attack against it, and the round constants of Stir force the presence of a subspace chain aligned with the rate and capacity of the permutation. This in turns implies the existence of many easy-to-find solutions to the so-called CICO problem.
Open access
Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Fukang Liu, Mohammad Mahzoun, Morten Øygarden, Willi Meier
Designing novel symmetric-key primitives for advanced protocols like secure multiparty computation (MPC), fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and zero-knowledge proof systems (ZK), has been an important research topic in recent years. Many such existing primitives adopt quite different design strategies from conventional block ciphers. Notable features include that many of these ciphers are defined over a large finite field, and that a power map is commonly used to construct the nonlinear component due to its efficiency in these applications as well as its strong resistance against the differential and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, we target the MPC-friendly ciphers AIM and RAIN used for the post-quantum signature schemes AIMer (CCS 2023 and NIST PQC Round 1 Additional Signatures) and Rainier (CCS 2022), respectively. Specifically, we can find equivalent representations of 2-round RAIN and full-round AIM, respectively, which make them vulnerable to either the polynomial method, or the crossbred algorithm, or the fast exhaustive search attack. Consequently, we can break 2-round RAIN with the 128/192/256-bit key in only 2111/2170/2225 bit operations. For full-round AIM with the 128/192/256-bit key, we could break them in 2136.2/2200.7/2265 bit operations, which are equivalent to about 2115/2178/2241 calls of the underlying primitives. In particular, our analysis indicates that AIM does not reach the required security levels by the NIST competition.
Samuel Dittmer, Karim Eldefrawy, Stéphane Graham-Lengrand, Steve Lu · 6 authors
Despite the notable advances in the development of high-assurance, verified implementations of cryptographic protocols, such implementations typically face significant performance overheads, particularly due to the penalties induced by formal verification and automated extraction of executable code. In this paper, we address some core performance challenges facing computer-aided cryptography by presenting a formal treatment for accelerating such verified implementations based on multiple generic optimizations covering parallelism and memory access. We illustrate our techniques for addressing such performance bottlenecks using the Line-Point Zero-Knowledge (LPZK) protocol as a case study. Our starting point is a new verified implementation of LPZK that we formalize and synthesize using EasyCrypt; our first implementation is developed to reduce the proof effort and without considering the performance of the extracted executable code. We then show how such (automatically) extracted code can be optimized in three different ways to obtain a 3000x speedup and thus matching the performance of the manual implementation of LPZK of lpzkv2.[13] We obtain such performance gains by first modifying the algorithmic specifications, then by adopting a provably secure parallel execution model, and finally by optimizing the memory access structures. All optimizations are first formally verified inside EasyCrypt, and then executable code is automatically synthesized from each step of the formalization. For each optimization, we analyze performance gains resulting from it and also address challenges facing the computer-aided security proofs thereof, and challenges facing automated synthesis of executable code with such an optimization.
Yuyang Sang, Ning Luo, Samuel Judson, Ben Chaimberg · 8 authors
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a powerful cryptographic primitive used in many decentralized or privacy-focused applications. However, the high overhead of ZKPs can restrict their practical applicability. We design a programming language, Ou, aimed at easing the programmer's burden when writing efficient ZKPs, and a compiler framework, Lian, that automates the analysis and distribution of statements to a computing cluster. Ou uses programming language semantics, formal methods, and combinatorial optimization to automatically partition an Ou program into efficiently sized chunks for parallel ZK-proving and/or verification. We contribute: (1) A front-end language where users can write proof statements as imperative programs in a familiar syntax; (2) A compiler architecture and implementation that automatically analyzes the program and compiles it into an optimized IR that can be lifted to a variety of ZKP constructions; and (3) A cutting algorithm, based on Pseudo-Boolean optimization and Integer Linear Programming, that reorders instructions and then partitions the program into efficiently sized chunks for parallel evaluation and efficient state reconciliation.
A pivotal feature of IPv6 is its plug-and-play capability that enables hosts to integrate seamlessly into networks. In the absence of a trusted authority or security infrastructure, the challenge for hosts is generating their own address and verifying ownership of others. Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) solves this problem by binding IPv6 addresses to hosts' public keys to prove address ownership. CGA generation involves solving a cryptographic puzzle similar to Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work (PoW) to deter address spoofing. Unfortunately, solving the puzzle often causes undesirable address generation delays, which has hindered the adoption of CGA. In this paper, we present Bitcoin-Certified Addresses (BCA), a new technique to bind IPv6 addresses to hosts' public keys. BCA reduces the computational cost of generating addresses by using the PoW computed by Bitcoin nodes to secure the binding. Compared to CGA, BCA provides better protection against spoofing attacks and improves the privacy of hosts. Due to the decentralized nature of the Bitcoin network, BCA avoids reliance on a trusted authority, similar to CGA. BCA shows how the PoW computed by Bitcoin nodes can be reused, which saves costs for hosts and makes Bitcoin mining more efficient.
The integration of cryptographic algorithms like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is pivotal in bolstering the core attributes of blockchain technology, especially in achieving decentralization, tamper resistance, and anonymization within the realm of medical applications. Despite their widespread utilization, the conventional AES and ECC face significant hurdles in security and efficiency when dealing with expansive medical data, posing a challenge to the effective preservation of patient privacy. In light of these challenges, this study introduces HAE (hybrid AES and ECC), an innovative hybrid cryptographic algorithm that ingeniously amalgamates the robustness of AES with the agility of ECC. HAE is designed to symmetrically encrypt original data with AES while employing ECC for the asymmetric encryption of the initial AES key. This strategy not only alleviates the complexities associated with AES key management but also enhances the algorithm’s security without compromising its efficiency. We provide an in-depth exposition of HAE’s deployment within a framework tailored for medical scenarios, offering empirical insights into its enhanced performance metrics. Our experimental outcomes underscore HAE’s exemplary security, time efficiency, and optimized resource consumption, affirming its potential as a breakthrough advancement for augmenting blockchain applications in the medical sector, heralding a new era of enhanced data security and privacy within this critical domain.
Deebakkarthi Chinnasame Rani, Sai Ganesh Janakiraman, K. S. Chandra, Elambharathi Padmavathi Thangavel · 7 authors
Presented herein is a novel algorithm for multi-round, zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), devised specifically for authenticating factorisation proofs within a variety of cryptographic applications. This advanced algorithm, while maintaining computational complexity within acceptable bounds, offers a secure and proficient solution. The functionality of the algorithm is marked by multiple rounds of interaction between the Prover and Verifier. Initially, the Prover generates a random value and calculates a commitment. Subsequently, the Verifier issues a random challenge, eliciting a computed response from the Prover. To validate the proof, the Verifier verifies the equality of the commitment and the computed response. Efficaciousness of the proposed multi-round ZKP algorithm is demonstrated across diverse input sizes and parameters. Results indicate a success rate exceeding 90% on average, showcasing the robustness of the method. The recurring interaction between the Verifier and Prover enhances the Prover's authentication, thereby improving the algorithm’s reliability. Implementation of the algorithm, achievable through standard cryptographic tools and protocols, can fortify the security of multiple cryptographic applications. A significant application can be found in Digital Identity Management Systems (DIMS). Currently, these systems are vulnerable to a myriad of threats, including identity spoofing, data breaches, and internal security risks. The application of the ZKP algorithm can simultaneously augment security and withhold sensitive information, potentially transforming the DIMS security landscape. Future research may focus on improving the efficiency and scalability of the multi-round ZKP algorithm. There also remains a vast potential for exploring additional applications of this technique within various cryptographic domains.
Mustafa Ibrahim Alnajjar, Mehmet Sabır Kiraz, Ali H. Al‐Bayatti, Süleyman Kardaş
A distributed ledger is a shared and synchronized database across multiple designated nodes, often referred to as miners, validators, or peers. These nodes record, distribute, and access data to ensure security and transparency. However, these nodes can be compromised and manipulated by selectively choosing which user transactions to include, exclude, or reorder, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. This is known as a miner/maximal extractable value (MEV) attack. Existing solutions can be classified into various categories, such as MEV auction platforms and time-based ordering properties, which rely on private transaction Mempools. In this paper, we first identify some architectural weaknesses inherent in the latest proposals that divide the block creation and execution roles into separate functions: block builders and block executors. The existing schemes mainly suffer from the verifiability of the decryption process, where a corrupted builder or executor can simply deny the inclusion of specific targeted transactions by exploiting the fact that all transactions are in plain format. To address this, we propose an enhanced version that incorporates a verifiable decryption process. On a very high level, within our proposal, whenever an Executor or a Builder performs a decryption, the decrypted values must be broadcasted. This enables any entity in the network to publicly verify whether the decryption was executed correctly, thus preventing malicious behavior by either party from going undetected. We also define a new adversary model for MEV and conduct a comprehensive security analysis of our protocol against all kinds of potential adversaries related to MEV. Finally, we present the performance analysis of the proposed solution.
Open access
2 source records
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
With the increasing interest for advanced protocols for Multi Party Computation, Fully-Homomorphic Encryption or Zero Knowledge proofs, a need for cryptographic algorithms with new constraints has emerged. These algorithms, called Arithmetization-Oriented ciphers, seek to minimize the number of field multiplications in large finite fields F2n or Fp. Among them, Ciminion is an encryption algorithm proposed by Dobraunig et al. in Eurocrypt 2021. In this paper, we show a new univariate modelization on a variant of Ciminion proposed by the designers. This instance restricts the attacker to at most 2 s/2 data, where s is the security level. Because the designers chose to reduce the number of rounds in that specific attacker model, we are able to attack the cipher for large security levels. We also propose some slight modifications of Ciminion that would overcome this vulnerability.
The rise of modern cryptographic protocols such as Zero-Knowledge proofs and secure Multi-party Computation has led to an increased demand for a new class of symmetric primitives. Unlike traditional platforms such as servers, microcontrollers, and desktop computers, these primitives are designed to be implemented in arithmetical circuits. In terms of security evaluation, arithmetization-oriented primitives are more complex compared to traditional symmetric cryptographic primitives. The arithmetization-oriented permutation Grendel employs the Legendre Symbol to increase the growth of algebraic degrees in its nonlinear layer. To analyze the security of Grendel thoroughly, it is crucial to investigate its resilience against algebraic attacks. This paper presents a preimage attack on the sponge hash function instantiated with the complete rounds of the Grendel permutation, employing algebraic methods. A technique is introduced that enables the elimination of two complete rounds of substitution permutation networks (SPN) in the sponge hash function without significant additional cost. This method can be combined with univariate root-finding techniques and Gröbner basis attacks to break the number of rounds claimed by the designers. By employing this strategy, our attack achieves a gain of two additional rounds compared to the previous state-of-the-art attack. With no compromise to its security margin, this approach deepens our understanding of the design and analysis of such cryptographic primitives.
Aydin Abadi, Dan Ristea, Artem Grigor, Steven J. Murdoch
Time-Lock Puzzles (TLPs) enable a client to lock a message such that a server can unlock it only after a specified time. They have diverse applications, such as scheduled payments, secret sharing, and zero-knowledge proofs. In this work, we present a scalable TLP designed for real-world scenarios involving a large number of puzzles, where clients or servers may lack the computational resources to handle high workloads. Our contributions are both theoretical and practical. From a theoretical standpoint, we formally define the concept of a “Delegated Time-Lock Puzzle (D-TLP)”, establish its fundamental properties, and introduce an upper bound for TLPs, addressing a previously overlooked aspect. From a practical standpoint, we introduce the “Efficient Delegated Time-Lock Puzzle” (ED-TLP) protocol, which implements the D-TLP concept. This protocol enables both the client and server to securely outsource their resource-intensive tasks to third-party helpers. It enables realtime verification of solutions and guarantees their delivery within predefined time limits by integrating an upper bound and a fair payment algorithm. ED-TLP allows combining puzzles from different clients, enabling a solver to process them sequentially, significantly reducing computational resources, especially for a large number of puzzles or clients. ED-TLP is the first protocol of its kind. We have implemented ED-TLP and conducted a comprehensive analysis of its performance for up to 10,000 puzzles. The results highlight its significant efficiency in TLP applications, demonstrating that EDTLP securely delegates 99% of the client’s workload and 100% of the server’s workload with minimal overhead.
Rabimba Karanjai, Sangwon Shin, Xiong, and Wujie, Xinxin Fan · 11 authors
Cryptographic schemes like Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), while offering powerful privacy-preserving capabilities, are often hindered by their computational complexity. Polynomial multiplication, a core operation in these schemes, is a major performance bottleneck. While algorithmic advancements and specialized hardware like GPUs and FPGAs have shown promise in accelerating these computations, the recent surge in AI accelerators (TPUs/NPUs) presents a new opportunity. This paper explores the potential of leveraging TPUs/NPUs to accelerate polynomial multiplication, thereby enhancing the performance of FHE and ZKP schemes. We present techniques to adapt polynomial multiplication to these AI-centric architectures and provide a preliminary evaluation of their effectiveness. We also discuss current limitations and outline future directions for further performance improvements, paving the way for wider adoption of advanced cryptographic tools.
Modern cryptographic protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs and secure multi-party computation have increased the demand for a novel category of symmetric primitives. These primitives are not optimized for traditional platforms such as servers, microcontrollers, and desktop computers but rather for their ability to be implemented in arithmetic circuits. To enable efficient arithmetic operations, they define operations over larger finite fields and use low-degree invertible functions to construct their non-linear layers. Grendel is an arithmetization-oriented permutation that leverages the Legendre Symbol to enhance the growth of algebraic degrees in its non-linear layer. In this paper, we present a preimage attack on the sponge hash function instantiated with the full rounds of the Grendel permutation using algebraic methods. We introduce a technique that allows us to eliminate two full rounds of substitution permutation networks (SPN) in the sponge hash function with minimal or no additional cost. This method can be combined with univariate root-finding techniques and Gröbner basis attacks to break the number of rounds claimed by the designers. By utilizing this strategy, our attack achieves an improvement of two additional rounds compared to the previous state-of-the-art attack. While not breaking its security margin, it allows us to further understand the design and analysis of such cryptographic primitives.
A commitment scheme is a cryptographic tool that allows one to commit to a hidden value, with the option to open it later at requested places without revealing the secret itself. Commitment schemes have important applications in zero-knowledge proofs and secure multi-party computation, just to name a few. This survey introduces a few multivariate polynomial commitment schemes that are built from a variety of mathematical structures. We study how Orion is constructed using hash functions; Dory, Bulletproofs, and Vampire using the inner-product argument; Signatures of Correct Computation using polynomial factoring; DARK and Dew using groups of unknown order; and Orion+ using a CP-SNARK. For each protocol, we prove its completeness and state its security assumptions.
Handong Cui, Kwan Yin Chan, Tsz Hon Yuen, Xin Kang · 5 authors
Abstract In most threshold Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures using additively homomorphic encryption, the zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs related to the ciphertext or the message space are the bottleneck in terms of bandwidth as well as computation time. In this paper, we propose a compact ZK proof for relations related to the Castagnos–Laguillaumie (CL) encryption, which is 33% shorter and 29% faster than the existing work in PKC 2021. We also give new ZK proofs for relations related to homomorphic operations over the CL ciphertext. These new ZK proofs are useful to construct a bandwidth-efficient universal composable-secure threshold ECDSA without compromising the proactive security and the non-interactivity. In particular, we lowered the communication and computation cost of the key refresh algorithm in the Paillier-based counterpart from $O(n^3)$ to $O(n^2)$. Considering a 5-signer setting, the bandwidth is better than the Paillier-based counterpart for up to 99, 95 and 35% for key generation, key refreshment and pre-signing, respectively.
Philipp G. Haselwarter, Exequiel Rivas, Antoine Van Muylder, Théo Winterhalter · 9 authors
State-separating proofs (SSP) is a recent methodology for structuring game-based cryptographic proofs in a modular way, by using algebraic laws to exploit the modular structure of composed protocols. While promising, this methodology was previously not fully formalized and came with little tool support. We address this by introducing SSProve, the first general verification framework for machine-checked state-separating proofs. SSProve combines high-level modular proofs about composed protocols, as proposed in SSP, with a probabilistic relational program logic for formalizing the lower-level details, which together enable constructing machine-checked cryptographic proofs in the Coq proof assistant. Moreover, SSProve is itself fully formalized in Coq, including the algebraic laws of SSP, the soundness of the program logic, and the connection between these two verification styles. To illustrate SSProve, we use it to mechanize the simple security proofs of ElGamal and pseudo-random-function–based encryption. We also validate the SSProve approach by conducting two more substantial case studies: First, we mechanize an SSP security proof of the key encapsulation mechanism–data encryption mechanism (KEM-DEM) public key encryption scheme, which led to the discovery of an error in the original paper proof that has since been fixed. Second, we use SSProve to formally prove security of the sigma-protocol zero-knowledge construction, and we moreover construct a commitment scheme from a sigma-protocol to compare with a similar development in CryptHOL. We instantiate the security proof for sigma-protocols to give concrete security bounds for Schnorr’s sigma-protocol.
Cristina Vilchez Moya, Juan Ramón Bermejo Higuera, Juan Ramón Bermejo Higuera, Javier Bermejo Higuera · 6 authors
The problem of digital identity acquires more relevance every day in the eyes of a society that spends more and more time connected to the Internet. It has evolved throughout its history to reach a decentralized model known as Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), which finds its natural tools in the blockchain technology and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs). ZKPs, in this context, allow users to prove that their credentials are legitimate without revealing more information than is strictly necessary, and constitute one of the most promising areas of applied cryptography. In this work, an application is developed for the study of Zero-Knowledge Proof methods and, specifically, in their application for authentication in public-private key encryption systems. It focuses on the study of three ZKP protocols (Feige-Fiat-Shamir, Guillou-Quisquater, and Schnorr, which rely on the problems of large number factorizations and discrete logarithms for security) in the practical use-case where a prover wants to demonstrate knowledge of a private key for a public key without revealing the key itself. The application allows the user to modify the necessary parameters in each method to achieve a better understanding of their role in their safety and efficiency. Several types of attacks are carried out against the above-mentioned protocols to analyze their degree of security and what recommendations can be made to improve it.
Due to the rapid growth experienced by the market for non-fungible tokens in 2021, the topic has become much more present. Even people who have not previously dealt with the topic of cryptoassets are finding interest in it. What exactly is hidden behind the term NFT, which areas of application there are and in which direction crypto tokens are developing will be briefly presented in this article. Significant changes on the market and in the technological field will be highlighted, as well as opportunities and challenges.
Open access
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Threshold signatures are a fundamental cryptographic primitive used in many practical applications. As proposed by Boneh and Komlo (CRYPTO'22), TAPS is a threshold signature that is a hybrid of privacy and accountability. It enables a combiner to combine t signature shares while revealing nothing about the threshold t or signing quorum to the public and asks a tracer to track a signature to the quorum that generates it. However, TAPS has three disadvantages: it 1) structures upon a centralized model, 2) assumes that both combiner and tracer are honest, and 3) leaves the tracing unnotarized and static. In this work, we introduce Decentralized, Threshold, dynamically Accountable and Private Signature (DeTAPS) that provides decentralized combining and tracing, enhanced privacy against untrusted combiners (tracers), and notarized and dynamic tracing. Specifically, we adopt Dynamic Threshold Public-Key Encryption (DTPKE) to dynamically notarize the tracing process, design non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to achieve public verifiability of notaries, and utilize the Key-Aggregate Searchable Encryption to bridge TAPS and DTPKE so as to awaken the notaries securely and efficiently. In addition, we formalize the definitions and security requirements for DeTAPS. Then we present a generic construction and formally prove its security and privacy. To evaluate the performance, we build a prototype based on SGX2 and Ethereum.
Arnab Roy, Matthias Johann Steiner, Stefano Trevisani
In this paper we propose the (keyed) permutation Arion and the hash function ArionHash over $\mathbb{F}_p$ for odd and particularly large primes. The design of Arion is based on the newly introduced Generalized Triangular Dynamical System (GTDS), which provides a new algebraic framework for constructing (keyed) permutation using polynomials over a finite field. At round level Arion is the first design which is instantiated using the new GTDS. We provide extensive security analysis of our construction including algebraic cryptanalysis (e.g. interpolation and Gröbner basis attacks) that are particularly decisive in assessing the security of permutations and hash functions over $\mathbb{F}_p$. From an application perspective, ArionHash aims for efficient implementation in zkSNARK protocols and Zero-Knowledge proof systems. For this purpose, we exploit that CCZ-equivalence of graphs can lead to a more efficient implementation of Arithmetization-Oriented primitives. We compare the efficiency of ArionHash in R1CS and Plonk settings with other hash functions such as Poseidon, Anemoi and Griffin. For demonstrating the practical efficiency of ArionHash we implemented it with the zkSNARK libraries libsnark and Dusk Network Plonk. Our result shows that ArionHash is significantly faster than Poseidon - a hash function designed for zero-knowledge proof systems. We also found that an aggressive version of ArionHash is considerably faster than Anemoi and Griffin in a practical zkSNARK setting.