The rapid rise of cryptocurrency prices led to concerns (e.g. the Financial Stability Board) that this wealth accumulation could detrimentally spill over into other parts of the economy, but evidence is limited. We exploit the tendency for metaverses to issue their own cryptocurrencies along with non-fungible tokens (NFTs) representing virtual real estate ownership (LAND) to provide evidence of the wealth effect. Cryptocurrency prices and their corresponding real estate prices are highly correlated (more than 0.96), and cryptocurrency prices Granger cause LAND prices. This metaverse bubble reminisces the 1920s American real estate bubble that preceded the 1929 stock market crash.
Kanis Saengchote, Tālis J. Putniņš, Krislert Samphantharak
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is built on a fundamentally different paradigm: rather than having to trust individuals and institutions, participants in DeFi potentially only have to trust computer code that is enforced by a decentralized network of computers. We examine a natural experiment that exogenously stress tests this alternative paradigm by revealing the identities of individuals associated with a DeFi protocol, including a convicted criminal. We find that, in practice, DeFi does not (yet) fully remove the need for trust in individuals. Our findings suggest that that because smart contracts are incomplete, they are subject to run risk (Allen and Gale, 2004) and personal character and trust of individuals are still relevant in this alternative financial system.
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is a new financial industry built on blockchain technologies. Decentralized financial services have consequently increased the ability to lend, borrow, and invest in decentralized investment vehicles, allowing investors to bypass third party intermediaries. DeFi's promise is to reduce the cost of transaction and management fees whilst increasing trust between agents of the Financial Industry 3.0. This paper provides an overview of the different components of DeFi, as well as the risks involved in investing through these new vehicles. We will also propose an allocation methodology which will integrate and quantify these risks.
Abstract We develop a continuous‐time control approach to optimal trading in a Proof‐of‐Stake (PoS) blockchain, formulated as a consumption‐investment problem that aims to strike the optimal balance between a participant's (or agent's) utility from holding/trading stakes and utility from consumption. We present solutions via dynamic programming and the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations. When the utility functions are linear or convex, we derive close‐form solutions and show that the bang‐bang strategy is optimal (i.e., always buy or sell at full capacity). Furthermore, we bring out the explicit connection between the rate of return in trading/holding stakes and the participant's risk‐adjusted valuation of the stakes. In particular, we show when a participant is risk‐neutral or risk‐seeking, corresponding to the risk‐adjusted valuation being a martingale or a sub‐martingale, the optimal strategy must be to either buy all the time, sell all the time, or first buy then sell, and with both buying and selling executed at full capacity. We also propose a risk‐control version of the consumption‐investment problem; and for a special case, the “stake‐parity” problem, we show a mean‐reverting strategy is optimal.
This paper is concerned with the stability of shares in a cryptocurrency where the new coins are issued according to the Proof of Stake protocol. We identify large, medium and small investors under various rewarding schemes, and show that the limiting behaviors of these investors are different -- for large investors their shares are stable, while for medium to small investors their shares may be volatile or even shrink to zero. For instance, with a geometric reward there is chaotic centralization, where all the shares will eventually concentrate on one investor in a random manner. This leads to the phase transition phenomenon, and the thresholds for stability are characterized. In response to the increasing activities in blockchain networks, we also propose and analyze a dynamical population model for the PoS protocol, which allows the number of investors to grow over the time. Numerical experiments are provided to corroborate our theory.
We mine the leaked history of trades on Mt. Gox, the dominant Bitcoin exchange from 2011 to early 2014, to detect the triangular arbitrage activity conducted within the platform. The availability of user identifiers per trade allows us to focus on the historical record of 440 investors, detected as arbitrageurs, and consequently to describe their trading behavior. We begin by showing that a considerable difference appears between arbitrageurs when indicators of their expertise are taken into account. In particular, we distinguish between those who conducted arbitrage in a single or in multiple markets: using this element as a proxy for trade ability, we find that arbitrage actions performed by expert users are on average non-profitable when transaction costs are accounted for, while skilled investors conduct arbitrage at a positive and statistically significant premium. Next, we show that specific trading strategies, such as splitting orders or conducting arbitrage non aggressively, are further indicators of expertise that increase the profitability of arbitrage. Most importantly, we exploit within-user (across hours and markets) variation and document that expert users make profits on arbitrage by reacting quickly to plausible exogenous variations on the official exchange rates. We present further evidence that such differences are chiefly due to a better ability of the latter in incorporating information, both on the transactions costs and on the exchange rates volatility, eventually resulting in a better timing choice at small time scale intervals. Our results support the hypothesis that arbitrageurs are few and sophisticated users.
In this paper, we construct a decentralized clearing mechanism which endogenously and automatically provides a claims resolution procedure. This mechanism can be used to clear a network of obligations through blockchain. In particular, we investigate default contagion in a network of smart contracts cleared through blockchain. In so doing, we provide an algorithm which constructs the blockchain so as to guarantee the payments can be verified and the miners earn a fee. We, additionally, consider the special case in which the blocks have unbounded capacity to provide a simple equilibrium clearing condition for the terminal net worths; existence and uniqueness are proven for this system. Finally, we consider the optimal bidding strategies for each firm in the network so that all firms are utility maximizers with respect to their terminal wealths. We first look for a mixed Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, and then also consider Pareto optimal bidding strategies. The implications of these strategies, and more broadly blockchain, on systemic risk are considered.
Carlos Castro-Iragorri, Julián Antonio Ramírez, Velez, Sebastian
We provide an overview of decentralized protocols like Compound and Aave that offer collateralized loans for cryptoasset investors. Compound and Aave are two of the most important application in the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. Using publicly available information on rates, supply and borrow activity, and accounts we analyze different elements of the protocols. In particular, we estimate ex-post margins that give a comprehensive account of the cost of financial intermediation. We find that ex-post margins considering all markets are 1% and lower for stablecoin markets. In addition, we estimate quarterly indicators regarding solvency, asset quality, earnings and market risk similar to the ones used in traditional banking. This provides a first look at the use of these metrics and a comparison between the similarities and challenges to our understanding of financial intermediation in these protocols based on tools used for traditional banking.
This discussion applies quantitative finance methods and economic arguments to cryptocurrencies in general and bitcoin in particular -- as there are about $10,000$ cryptocurrencies, we focus (unless otherwise specified) on the most discussed crypto of those that claim to hew to the original protocol (Nakamoto 2009) and the one with, by far, the largest market capitalization. In its current version, in spite of the hype, bitcoin failed to satisfy the notion of "currency without government" (it proved to not even be a currency at all), can be neither a short nor long term store of value (its expected value is no higher than $0$), cannot operate as a reliable inflation hedge, and, worst of all, does not constitute, not even remotely, a safe haven for one's investments, a shield against government tyranny, or a tail protection vehicle for catastrophic episodes. Furthermore, bitcoin promoters appear to conflate the success of a payment mechanism (as a decentralized mode of exchange), which so far has failed, with the speculative variations in the price of a zero-sum maximally fragile asset with massive negative externalities. Going through monetary history, we show how a true numeraire must be one of minimum variance with respect to an arbitrary basket of goods and services, how gold and silver lost their inflation hedge status during the Hunt brothers squeeze in the late 1970s and what would be required from a true inflation hedged store of value.
How crypto flows among Bitcoin users is an important question for understanding the structure and dynamics of the cryptoasset at a global scale. We compiled all the blockchain data of Bitcoin from its genesis to the year 2020, identified users from anonymous addresses of wallets, and constructed monthly snapshots of networks by focusing on regular users as big players. We apply the methods of bow-tie structure and Hodge decomposition in order to locate the users in the upstream, downstream, and core of the entire crypto flow. Additionally, we reveal principal components hidden in the flow by using non-negative matrix factorization, which we interpret as a probabilistic model. We show that the model is equivalent to a probabilistic latent semantic analysis in natural language processing, enabling us to estimate the number of such hidden components. Moreover, we find that the bow-tie structure and the principal components are quite stable among those big players. This study can be a solid basis on which one can further investigate the temporal change of crypto flow, entry and exit of big players, and so forth.
XRP is a modern crypto-asset (crypto-currency) developed by Ripple Labs, which has been increasing its financial presence. We study its transaction history available as ledger data. An analysis of its basic statistics, correlations, and network properties are presented. Motivated by the behavior of some nodes with histories of large transactions, we propose a new index: the ``Flow Index.'' The Flow Index is a pair of indices suitable for characterizing transaction frequencies as a source and destination of a node. Using this Flow Index, we study the global structure of the XRP network and construct bow-tie/walnut structure.
To non-experts, the traditional Centralized Finance (CeFi) ecosystem may seem obscure, because users are typically not aware of the underlying rules or agreements of financial assets and products. Decentralized Finance (DeFi), however, is making its debut as an ecosystem claiming to offer transparency and control, which are partially attributable to the underlying integrity-protected blockchain, as well as currently higher financial asset yields than CeFi. Yet, the boundaries between CeFi and DeFi may not be always so clear cut. In this work, we systematically analyze the differences between CeFi and DeFi, covering legal, economic, security, privacy and market manipulation. We provide a structured methodology to differentiate between a CeFi and a DeFi service. Our findings show that certain DeFi assets (such as USDC or USDT stablecoins) do not necessarily classify as DeFi assets, and may endanger the economic security of intertwined DeFi protocols. We conclude this work with the exploration of possible synergies between CeFi and DeFi.
Kaihua Qin, Liyi Zhou, Pablo Gamito, Philipp Jovanovic · 5 authors
Financial speculators often seek to increase their potential gains with leverage. Debt is a popular form of leverage, and with over 39.88B USD of total value locked (TVL), the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) lending markets are thriving. Debts, however, entail the risks of liquidation, the process of selling the debt collateral at a discount to liquidators. Nevertheless, few quantitative insights are known about the existing liquidation mechanisms. In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the breadth of the borrowing and lending markets of the Ethereum DeFi ecosystem. We focus on Aave, Compound, MakerDAO, and dYdX, which collectively represent over 85% of the lending market on Ethereum. Given extensive liquidation data measurements and insights, we systematize the prevalent liquidation mechanisms and are the first to provide a methodology to compare them objectively. We find that the existing liquidation designs well incentivize liquidators but sell excessive amounts of discounted collateral at the borrowers' expenses. We measure various risks that liquidation participants are exposed to and quantify the instabilities of existing lending protocols. Moreover, we propose an optimal strategy that allows liquidators to increase their liquidation profit, which may aggravate the loss of borrowers.
In the wake of financial crises, stablecoins are gaining adoption among digital currencies. We discuss how stablecoins help reduce the volatility of cryptocurrencies by surveying different types of stablecoins and their stability mechanisms. We classify different approaches to stablecoins in three main categories i) fiat or asset backed, ii) crypto-collateralized and iii) algorithmic stablecoins, giving examples of concrete projects in each class. We assess the relative tradeoffs between the different approaches. We also discuss challenges associated with the future of stablecoins and their adoption, their adoption and point out future research directions.
Ana Fernández Vilas, Rebeca P. Dı́az Redondo, Daniel Couto Cancela, Alejandro Torrado Pazos
Cryptocurrencies are a type of digital money meant to provide security and anonymity while using cryptography techniques. Although cryptocurrencies represent a breakthrough and provide some important benefits, their usage poses some risks that are a result of the lack of supervising institutions and transparency. Because disinformation and volatility is discouraging for personal investors, cryptocurrencies emerged hand-in-hand with the proliferation of online users’ communities and forums as places to share information that can alleviate users’ mistrust. This research focuses on the study of the interplay between these cryptocurrency forums and fluctuations in cryptocurrency values. In particular, the most popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin (BTC) and a related active discussion community, Bitcointalk, are analyzed. This study shows that the activity of Bitcointalk forum keeps a direct relationship with the trend in the values of BTC, therefore analysis of this interaction would be a perfect base to support personal investments in a non-regulated market and, to confirm whether cryptocurrency forums show evidences to detect abnormal behaviors in BTC values as well as to predict or estimate these values. The experiment highlights that forum data can explain specific events in the financial field. It also underlines the relevance of quotes (regular mechanism to response a post) at periods: (1) when there is a high concentration of posts around certain topics; (2) when peaks in the BTC price are observed; and, (3) when the BTC price gradually shifts downwards and users intend to sell.
Johannes Rude Jensen, Victor von Wachter, Omri Ross
Novel blockchain technology provides the infrastructure layer for the creation of decentralized appli-cations. A rapidly growing ecosystem of applications is built around financial services, commonly referred to as decentralized finance. Whereas the intangible concept of decentralization is presented as a key driver for the applications, defining and measuring decentralization is multifaceted. This pa-per provides a framework to quantify decentralization of governance power among blockchain appli-cations. Governance of the applications is increasingly important and requires striking a balance be-tween broad distribution, fostering user activity, and financial incentives. Therefore, we aggregate, parse, and analyze empirical data of four finance applications calculating coefficients for the statistical dispersion of the governance token distribution. The gauges potentially support IS scholars for an objective evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of token governance and for fast iteration in design-driven governance mechanisms.
Jakob Albers, Mihai Cucuringu, Sam Howison, Alexander Y. Shestopaloff
In light of micro-scale inefficiencies induced by the high degree of fragmentation of the Bitcoin trading landscape, we utilize a granular data set comprised of orderbook and trades data from the most liquid Bitcoin markets, in order to understand the price formation process at sub-1 second time scales. To achieve this goal, we construct a set of features that encapsulate relevant microstructural information over short lookback windows. These features are subsequently leveraged first to generate a leader-lagger network that quantifies how markets impact one another, and then to train linear models capable of explaining between 10% and 37% of total variation in $500$ms future returns (depending on which market is the prediction target). The results are then compared with those of various PnL calculations that take trading realities, such as transaction costs, into account. The PnL calculations are based on natural $\textit{taker}$ strategies (meaning they employ market orders) that we associate to each model. Our findings emphasize the role of a market's fee regime in determining its propensity to being a leader or a lagger, as well as the profitability of our taker strategy. Taking our analysis further, we also derive a natural $\textit{maker}$ strategy (i.e., one that uses only passive limit orders), which, due to the difficulties associated with backtesting maker strategies, we test in a real-world live trading experiment, in which we turned over 1.5 million USD in notional volume. Lending additional confidence to our models, and by extension to the features they are based on, the results indicate a significant improvement over a naive benchmark strategy, which we also deploy in a live trading environment with real capital, for the sake of comparison.
Non Fungible Token (NFT) Industry has been witnessing multi-million dollar trade in recent times. With rapid innovation of the NFT market environment by technology, innovation, and decentralization, it is becoming hard to distinguish between genuine NFT from fads and scams. This article discuss the NFT market microstructure, with a focus on price formation, market structure, transparency, and applications to other financial areas. Market manipulation in NFT market with the context of wash-sale patterns has also been surveyed. The article concludes by providing pointers on due-diligence activity that can be adopted by investors to mitigate NFT trading risk.
Carol Alexander, Jun Deng, Jianfen Feng, Huning Wan
Bitcoin prices are driven by upward as well as downward jumps and so the bitcoin implied volatility surface behaves differently from those of established options markets. We analyze tick-level Deribit option price data, demonstrating increasing support for the limits-to-arbitrage hypothesis. Hence market makers are managing order imbalance and inventory more effectively as Deribit bitcoin options trading volumes increases. On the demand side, volatility traders drive both at-the-money and out-of-the-money option prices, the latter also being driven by directional traders. Directional effects were most pronounced during the price bubble of 2021. Further refinements of our tests assess time-to-maturity and time-of-day effects.
Uniswap is a decentralized exchange (DEX) and was first launched on November 2, 2018 on the Ethereum mainnet [1] and is part of an Ecosystem of products in Decentralized Finance (DeFi). It replaces a traditional order book type of trading common on centralized exchanges (CEX) with a deterministic model that swaps currencies (or tokens/assets) along a fixed price function determined by the amount of currencies supplied by the liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can be regarded as investors in the decentralized exchange and earn fixed commissions per trade. They lock up funds in liquidity pools for distinct pairs of currencies allowing market participants to swap them using the fixed price function. Liquidity providers take on market risk as a liquidity provider in exchange for earning commissions on each trade. Here we analyze the risk profile of a liquidity provider and the so called impermanent (unrealized) loss in particular. We provide an improved version of the commonly denoted impermanent loss function for Uniswap v2 on the semi-infinite domain. The differences between Uniswap v2 and v3 are also discussed.
Permissionless blockchains offer an information environment where users can interact privately without fear of censorship. Financial services can be programmatically coded via smart contracts to automate transactions without the need for human intervention or knowing user identity. This new paradigm is known as decentralized finance (DeFi). We investigate Compound (a leading DeFi lending protocol) to show how it works in this novel information environment, who its users are, and what factors determine their participation. On-chain transaction data shows that loan durations are short (31 days on average), and many users borrow to support leveraged investment strategies (yield farming). We show that systemic risk in DeFi arises from concentration and interconnection, and how traditional risk management practices can be challenging for DeFi.
Massimo Bartoletti, James Hsin-yu Chiang, Alberto Lluch Lafuente
Lending pools are decentralized applications which allow mutually untrusted users to lend and borrow crypto-assets. These applications feature complex, highly parametric incentive mechanisms to equilibrate the loan market. This complexity makes the behaviour of lending pools difficult to understand and to predict: indeed, ineffective incentives and attacks could potentially lead to emergent unwanted behaviours. Reasoning about lending pools is made even harder by the lack of executable models of their behaviour: to precisely understand how users interact with lending pools, eventually one has to inspect their implementations, where the incentive mechanisms are intertwined with low-level implementation details. Further, the variety of existing implementations makes it difficult to distill the common aspects of lending pools. We systematize the existing knowledge about lending pools, leveraging a new formal model of interactions with users, which reflects the archetypal features of mainstream implementations. This enables us to prove some general properties of lending pools, such as the correct handling of funds, and to precisely describe vulnerabilities and attacks. We also discuss the role of lending pools in the broader context of decentralized finance.
This is an expanded version of the lecture given at the AMS Short Course on Mean Field Games, on January 13, 2020 in Denver CO. The assignment was to discuss applications of Mean Field Games in finance and economics. I need to admit upfront that several of the examples reviewed in this chapter were already discussed in book form. Still, they are here accompanied with discussions of, and references to, works which appeared over the last three years. Moreover, several completely new sections are added to show how recent developments in financial engineering and economics can benefit from being viewed through the lens of the Mean Field Game paradigm. The new financial engineering applications deal with bitcoin mining and the energy markets, while the new economic applications concern models offering a smooth transition between macro-economics and finance, and contract theory.
Min-Bin Lin, Kainat Khowaja, Cathy Yi-Hsuan Chen, Wolfgang Karl Härdle
We investigate the relationship between underlying blockchain mechanism of cryptocurrencies and its distributional characteristics. In addition to price, we emphasise on using actual block size and block time as the operational features of cryptos. We use distributional characteristics such as fourier power spectrum, moments, quantiles, global we optimums, as well as the measures for long term dependencies, risk and noise to summarise the information from crypto time series. With the hypothesis that the blockchain structure explains the distributional characteristics of cryptos, we use characteristic based spectral clustering to cluster the selected cryptos into five groups. We scrutinise these clusters and find that indeed, the clusters of cryptos share similar mechanism such as origin of fork, difficulty adjustment frequency, and the nature of block size. This paper provides crypto creators and users with a better understanding toward the connection between the blockchain protocol design and distributional characteristics of cryptos.