I. Romani de Oliveira, T. Matsumoto, E. C. Pinto Neto
The large public interest in Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) will soon lead to congested skies overhead cities, analogously to what happened with other transportation means, including commercial aviation. In the latter case, the combination of large distances and demanded number flights is such that a system with centralized control, with most of the decisions made by human operators, is safe. However, for AAM, it is expected a much higher demand, because it will be used for people's daily commutes. Thus, higher automation levels will become a requirement for coordinating this traffic, which might not be effectively managed by humans. The establishment of fixed air routes can abate complexity, however at the cost of limiting capacity and decreasing efficiency. Another alternative is the use of a powerful central system based on Artificial Intelligence (AI), which would allow flexible trajectories and higher efficiency. However, such system would require concentrated investment, could contain Single-Points-of-Failure (SPoFs), would be a highly sought target of malicious attacks, and would be subject to periods of unavailability. This work proposes a new technology that solves the problem of managing the high complexity of the AAM traffic with a secure distributed approach, without the need for a proprietary centralized automation system. This technology enables distributed airspace allocation management and conflict resolution by means of trusted shared data structures and associated smart contracts running on a blockchain ecosystem. This way, it greatly reduces the risk of system outages due to SPoFs, by allowing peer-to-peer conflict resolution, and being more resilient to failures in the ground communication infrastructure. Furthermore, it provides priority-based balancing mechanisms that help to regulate fairness among participants in the utilization of the airspace.
Madeleine Woodburn, Wynita M. Griggs, Jakub Marecek, Robert N. Shorten
Over two thirds of women of all ages in the UK have experienced some form of sexual harassment in a public space. Recent tragic incidents involving female pedestrians have highlighted some of the personal safety issues that women still face in cities today. There exist many popular location-based safety applications as a result of this; however, these applications tend to take a reactive approach where action is taken only after an incident has occurred. This paper proposes a preventative approach to the problem by creating safer public environments through societal incentivisation. The proposed system, called "Herd Routes", improves the safety of female pedestrians by generating busier pedestrian routes as a result of route incentivisation. A novel application of distributed ledgers is proposed to provide security and trust, a record of system users' locations and IDs, and a platform for token exchange. A proof-of-concept was developed using the simulation package SUMO (Simulation of Urban Mobility), and a smartphone app. was built in Android Studio so that pedestrian Hardware-in-the-Loop testing could be carried out to validate the technical feasibility and desirability of the system. With positive results from the initial testing of the proof-of-concept, further development could significantly contribute towards creating safer pedestrian routes through cities, and tackle the societal change that is required to improve female pedestrian safety in the long term.
Xavier Marjou, Tangui Le Gléau, Vincent Messié, Benoît Radier · 6 authors
Reducing energy consumption is crucial not only to reduce OPEX but also to reduce the human debt to our planet. Over the past few years, most service providers (SPs) have actively tackled this issue, particularly targeting periods of low activity. Indeed, having fewer customers during these periods allows SPs to downsize or shut down part of their infrastructure. But this is not always optimal. Despite multiple energy-efficient optimizations, a mobile national operator (MNO) still need to maintain significant radio access network (RAN) infrastructure active at night. Could MNOs do better by cooperating with each other in such a way that an MNO can redirect its subscribers to a partner MNO, thus allowing its entire infrastructure to be temporarily deactivated while switching roles with the partner during a subsequent drop in activity period? To answer this question, we investigated a novel collaborative framework based on multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) allowing for negotiations between SPs as well as trustful reports from a distributed ledger technology (DLT) to evaluate the amount of energy saved. We leveraged it to experiment three different sets of rules (free, recommended, or imposed) regulating the negotiation between multiple SPs (3, 4, 8, or 10). Based on the observation of four cooperation metrics (efficiency, safety, incentive-compatibility, and fairness), the simulations showed that the imposed set of rules proved to be the best mode.
Giovanni De Gasperis, Sante Dino Facchini, Alessio Susco
Tax credit stimulus and fiscal bonuses had a very important impact on Italian economy in the last decade. Along with a huge expansion in constructions a relevant increase in scams and frauds has come too. The aim of this article is to design a possible system to track and control the whole tax credit process from its generation to its redeem through a Decentralized Autonomous Organization architecture enriched with a Multi Agent Systems to implement controllers.
Cordial Miners are a family of efficient Byzantine Atomic Broadcast protocols, with instances for asynchrony and eventual synchrony. They improve the latency of state-of-the-art DAG-based protocols by almost 2X and achieve optimal good-case complexity of O(n) by forgoing Reliable Broadcast as a building block. Rather, Cordial Miners use the blocklace -- a partially-ordered counterpart of the totally-ordered blockchain data structure -- to implement the three algorithmic components of consensus: Dissemination, equivocation-exclusion, and ordering.
Simon Tschirner, Shashank Tripathi, Mathias Roeper, Markus M. Becker · 5 authors
Blockchains provide environments where parties can interact transparently and securely peer-to-peer without needing a trusted third party. Parties can trust the integrity and correctness of transactions and the verifiable execution of binary code on the blockchain (smart contracts) inside the system. Including information from outside of the blockchain remains challenging. A challenge is data privacy. In a public system, shared data becomes public and, coming from a single source, often lacks credibility. A private system gives the parties control over their data and sources but trades in positive aspects as transparency. Often, not the data itself is the most critical information but the result of a computation performed on it. An example is research data certification. To keep data private but still prove data provenance, researchers can store a hash value of that data on the blockchain. This hash value is either calculated locally on private data without the chance for validation or is calculated on the blockchain, meaning that data must be published and stored on the blockchain -- a problem of the overall data amount stored on and distributed with the ledger. A system we called moving smart contracts bypasses this problem: Data remain local, but trusted nodes can access them and execute trusted smart contract code stored on the blockchain. This method avoids the system-wide distribution of research data and makes it accessible and verifiable with trusted software.
An option is a financial agreement between two parties to trade two assets. One party is given the right, but not the obligation, to complete the swap before a specified termination time. In todays financial markets, an option is considered an asset which can itself be transferred: while an option is active, one party can sell its rights (or obligations) to another. Todays blockchains support simple options in the form of cross-chain atomic swap protocols where one party has the choice whether to complete the swap. The options implemented by these cross-chain protocols, are not, however, transferable. This paper proposes novel distributed protocols for transferable cross-chain options, where both option owners and providers can sell their positions to third parties. The protocol ensures that none of the parties can be cheated, that no unauthorized party can interfere, and that the transfer succeeds if the buyer and seller faithfully follow the protocol.
Growing excitement around permissionless blockchains is uncovering its latent scalability concerns. Permissioned blockchains offer high transactional throughput and low latencies while compromising decentralization. In the quest for a decentralized, scalable blockchain fabric, i.e., to offer the scalability of permissioned blockchain in a permissionless setting, we present L4L to encourage decentralization over the permissioned Libra network without compromising its sustainability. L4L employs delay towers, -- puzzle towers that leverage verifiable delay functions -- for establishing identity in a permissionless setting. Delay towers cannot be parallelized due to their sequential execution, making them an eco-friendly alternative. We also discuss methodologies to replace validators participating in consensus to promote compliant behavior. Our evaluations found that the cost of enabling decentralization over permissioned networks is almost negligible. Furthermore, delay towers offer an alternative to existing permissionless consensus mechanisms without requiring airdrops or pre-sale of tokens.
While the physical lives of many of us are in democracies (one person, one vote - e.g., the EU and the US), our digital lives are mostly in autocracies (one person, all votes - e.g., Facebook). Cryptocurrencies promise liberation but stop short, at plutocracy (one coin, one vote). What would it take for us to live our digital lives in a digital democracy? This paper offers a vision, a theoretical framework, and an architecture for a grassroots network of autonomous, people-owned, people-operated, and people-governed digital communities, namely a grassroots democratic metaverse. It also charts a roadmap towards realizing it, and identifies unexplored territory for further research.
Blockchain is an essentially distributed database recording all transactions or digital events among participating parties. Each transaction in the records is approved and verified by consensus of the participants in the system that requires solving a hard mathematical puzzle, which is known as proof-of-work. To make the approved records immutable, the mathematical puzzle is not trivial to solve and therefore consumes substantial computing resources. However, it is energy-wasteful to have many computational nodes installed in the blockchain competing to approve the records by just solving a meaningless puzzle. Here, we pose proof-of-work as a reinforcement-learning problem by modeling the blockchain growing as a Markov decision process, in which a learning agent makes an optimal decision over the environment's state, whereas a new block is added and verified. Specifically, we design the block verification and consensus mechanism as a deep reinforcement-learning iteration process. As a result, our method utilizes the determination of state transition and the randomness of action selection of a Markov decision process, as well as the computational complexity of a deep neural network, collectively to make the blocks not easy to recompute and to preserve the order of transactions, while the blockchain nodes are exploited to train the same deep neural network with different data samples (state-action pairs) in parallel, allowing the model to experience multiple episodes across computing nodes but at one time. Our method is used to design the next generation of public blockchain networks, which has the potential not only to spare computational resources for industrial applications but also to encourage data sharing and AI model design for common problems.
Grassroots currencies are means for turning mutual trust into liquidity, with the goal of providing foundations for grassroots digital economies. Grassroots coins are units of debt that can be issued by anyone -- people, corporations, cooperatives, banks, municipalities and governments -- and traded by anyone. They are more similar to `inside money' (a medium of exchange backed by private credit) and to fiat currencies (for which the issuer controls scarcity) than to global cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, which are unbacked and for which scarcity is controlled by the protocol. In this paper we introduce the principles that underlie grassroots currencies; show that they naturally admit basic fiat currency measures regarding foreign trade such as foreign debt, trade balance, and velocity, and basic accounting measures such as cash ratio, quick ratio, and current ratio; elaborate economic scenarios enabled by these principles for grassroots currencies issued by natural and legal persons; relate grassroots currencies to extant work, including notions of personal currencies, community currencies, cryptocurrencies, and inside money; formally specify grassroots currencies as digital entities, governed by the Grassroots Currencies Protocol; discuss the security (safety, liveness, and privacy) of the protocol; and prove that the protocol is grassroots. An implementation of grassroots currencies via a blocklace-based payment system is described elsewhere.
Brett Hemenway, Bin Gu, Gerry Tsoukalas, Niuniu Zhang
Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) are transforming how content creators, such as artists, price and sell their work. A key feature of NFTs is the inclusion of royalties, which grant creators a share of all future resale proceeds. Although widely used, critics argue that sophisticated speculators, who dominate NFT markets, simply price in royalties upfront, neutralizing their impact. We show this intuition holds only under perfect, frictionless markets. Under more realistic market conditions, royalties enable creators to capitalize on the presence of speculators in at least three ways: They can enable risk sharing (under risk aversion), mitigate information asymmetry (when speculators are better informed), and unlock price discrimination benefits (in multi-unit settings). Moreover, in all three cases, royalties meaningfully expand trade, implying increased transaction volume for platforms. These results offer testable predictions that can guide both empirical research and platform design.
We present a novel mathematical framework for the specification and analysis of fault-resilient distributed protocols and their implementations, with the following components: 1. Transition systems that allow the specification and analysis of computations with safety and liveness faults and their fault resilience. 2. Notions of safe, live and complete implementations among transition systems and their composition, with which the correctness (safety and liveness) and completeness of a protocol stack as a whole follows from each protocol implementing correctly and completely the protocol above it in the stack. 3. Applying the notion of monotonicity, pertinent to histories of distributed computing systems, to ease the specification and proof of correctness of implementations among distributed computing systems. 4. Multiagent transition systems, further characterized as centralized/distributed and synchronous/asynchronous; safety and liveness fault-resilience of implementations among them and their composition. The framework is being employed in the specification of a grassroots ordering consensus protocol stack, with a grassroots dissemination protocol and its implementation of grassroots social networking and of sovereign cryptocurrencies, and an efficient Byzantine atomic broadcast protocols as initial applications.
The rapid expansion of data worldwide invites the need for more distributed solutions in order to apply machine learning on a much wider scale. The resultant distributed learning systems can have various degrees of centralization. In this work, we demonstrate our solution FLoBC for building a generic decentralized federated learning system using the blockchain technology, accommodating any machine learning model that is compatible with gradient descent optimization. We present our system design comprising the two decentralized actors: trainer and validator, alongside our methodology for ensuring reliable and efficient operation of said system. Finally, we utilize FLoBC as an experimental sandbox to compare and contrast the effects of trainer-to-validator ratio, reward-penalty policy, and model synchronization schemes on the overall system performance, ultimately showing by example that a decentralized federated learning system is indeed a feasible alternative to more centralized architectures.
In the industry, blockchains are increasingly used as the backbone of product and process traceability. Blockchain-based traceability participates in the demonstration of product and/or process compliance with existing safety standards or quality criteria. In this perspective, services and applications built on top of blockchains are business-critical applications, because an intended failure or corruption of the system can lead to an important reputation loss regarding the products or the processes involved. The development of a blockchain-based business-critical application must be then conducted carefully, requiring a thorough justification of its dependability and security. To this end, this paper encourages an engineering perspective rooted in well-understood tools and concepts borrowed from the engineering of safety-critical systems. Concretely, we use a justification framework, called CAE (Claim, Argument, Evidence), by following an approach based on assurance cases, in order to provide convincing arguments that a business-critical blockchain-based application is dependable and secure. The application of this approach is sketched with a case study based on the blockchain HYPERLEDGER FABRIC.
Jin Xing Lim, Barnabé Monnot, Shaowei Lin, Georgios Piliouras
Formalization of mathematics is the process of digitizing mathematical knowledge, which allows for formal proof verification as well as efficient semantic searches. Given the large and ever-increasing gap between the set of formalized and unformalized mathematical knowledge, there is a clear need to encourage more computer scientists and mathematicians to solve and formalize mathematical problems together. With blockchain technology, we are able to decentralize this process, provide time-stamped verification of authorship and encourage collaboration through implementation of incentive mechanisms via smart contracts. Currently, the formalization of mathematics is done through the use of proof assistants, which can be used to verify programs and protocols as well. Furthermore, with the advancement in artificial intelligence (AI), particularly machine learning, we can apply automated AI reasoning tools in these proof assistants and (at least partially) automate the process of synthesizing proofs. In our paper, we demonstrate a blockchain-based system for collaborative formalization of mathematics and programs incorporating both human labour as well as automated AI tools. We explain how Token-Curated Registries (TCR) and smart contracts are used to ensure appropriate documents are recorded and encourage collaboration through implementation of incentive mechanisms respectively. Using an illustrative example, we show how formalized proofs of different sorting algorithms can be produced collaboratively in our proposed blockchain system.
Smart contracts are programs stored on a blockchain that run when predetermined conditions are met. However, designing and implementing a smart contract is not trivial since upon deployment on a blockchain, it is no longer possible to modify it (neither for improving nor for bug fixing). It is only possible by deploying a new version of the smart contract which is costly (deployment cost for the new contract and destruction cost for the old contract). To this end, there are many solutions for testing the smart contracts before their deployment. Since realizing bug-free smart contracts increase the reliability, as well as reduce the cost, testing is an essential activity. In this paper, we group the existing solutions that attempt to tackle smart contract testing into following categories: public test networks, security analysis tools, blockchain emulators and blockchain simulators. Then, we analyze these solutions, categorize them and show what their pros and cons are.
Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 1559 was recently implemented to transform Ethereum's transaction fee market. EIP-1559 utilizes an algorithmic update rule with a constant learning rate to estimate a base fee. The base fee reflects prevailing network conditions and hence provides a more reliable oracle for current gas prices. Using on-chain data from the period after its launch, we evaluate the impact of EIP-1559 on the user experience and market performance. Our empirical findings suggest that although EIP-1559 achieves its goals on average, short-term behavior is marked by intense, chaotic oscillations in block sizes (as predicted by our recent theoretical dynamical system analysis [1]) and slow adjustments during periods of demand bursts (e.g., NFT drops). Both phenomena lead to unwanted inter-block variability in mining rewards. To address this issue, we propose an alternative base fee adjustment rule in which the learning rate varies according to an additive increase, multiplicative decrease (AIMD) update scheme. Our simulations show that the latter robustly outperforms the EIP-1559 protocol under various demand scenarios. These results provide evidence that variable learning rate mechanisms may constitute a promising alternative to the default EIP-1559-based format and contribute to the ongoing discussion on the design of more efficient transaction fee markets.
In this paper we describe LUNES-Blockchain, an agent-based simulator of blockchains that relies on Parallel and Distributed Simulation (PADS) techniques to obtain high scalability. The software is organized as a multi-level simulator that permits to simulate a virtual environment, made of many nodes running the protocol of a specific Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), such as the Bitcoin or the Ethereum blockchains. This virtual environment is executed on top of a lower-level Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network overlay, which can be structured based on different topologies and with a given number of nodes and edges. Functionalities at different levels of abstraction are managed separately, by different software modules and with different time granularity. This allows for accurate simulations, where (and when) it is needed, and enhances the simulation performance. Using LUNES-Blockchain, it is possible to simulate different types of attacks on the DLT. In this paper, we specifically focus on the P2P layer, considering the selfish mining, the 51% attack and the Sybil attack. For which concerns selfish mining and the 51% attack, our aim is to understand how much the hash-rate (i.e. a general measure of the processing power in the blockchain network) of the attacker can influence the outcome of the misbehaviour. On the other hand, in the filtering denial of service (i.e. Sybil Attack), we investigate which dissemination protocol in the underlying P2P network makes the system more resilient to a varying number of nodes that drop the messages. The results confirm the viability of the simulation-based techniques for the investigation of security aspects of DLTs.
We analyze Bitcoin mining from the perspective of a game and propose an optimal mining model that maximizes profits of pools and miners. The model is a two-stage Stackelberg game in which each stage forms a sub-game. In stage I, pools are the leaders who assign a computing power to be consumed by miners. In stage II, miners decide of their power consumption and distribution. They find themselves in a social dilemma in which they must choose between mining in solo, therefore prioritizing their individual preferences, and participating in a pool for the collective interest. The model relies on a pool protocol based on a simulated game in which the miners compete for the reward won by the pool. The solutions for the stage I sub-game and the simulated protocol game are unique and stable Nash equilibriums while the stage II sub-game leads to a stable cooperative equilibrium only when miners choose their strategies according to certain criteria. We conclude that the cooperative optimal mining model has the potential to favor Bitcoin decentralization and stability. Mainly, the social dilemma faced by miners together with the balance of incentives ensure a certain distribution of the network computing power between pools and solo miners, while equilibriums in the game solutions provide stability to the system.
Ali Raheman, Anton Kolonin, Ben Goertzel, Gergely Hegykozi · 5 authors
We present the cognitive architecture of an autonomous agent for active portfolio management in decentralized finance, involving activities such as asset selection, portfolio balancing, liquidity provision, and trading. Partial implementation of the architecture is provided and supplied with preliminary results and conclusions.
We study a game-theoretic model of blockchain mining economies and show that griefing, a practice according to which participants harm other participants at some lesser cost to themselves, is a prevalent threat at its Nash equilibria. The proof relies on a generalization of evolutionary stability to non-homogeneous populations via griefing factors (ratios that measure network losses relative to deviator's own losses) which leads to a formal theoretical argument for the dissipation of resources, consolidation of power and high entry barriers that are currently observed in practice. A critical assumption in this type of analysis is that miners' decisions have significant influence in aggregate network outcomes (such as network hashrate). However, as networks grow larger, the miner's interaction more closely resembles a distributed production economy or Fisher market and its stability properties change. In this case, we derive a proportional response (PR) update protocol which converges to market equilibria at which griefing is irrelevant. Convergence holds for a wide range of miners risk profiles and various degrees of resource mobility between blockchains with different mining technologies. Our empirical findings in a case study with four mineable cryptocurrencies suggest that risk diversification, restricted mobility of resources (as enforced by different mining technologies) and network growth, all are contributing factors to the stability of the inherently volatile blockchain ecosystem.
Automated market makers (AMMs) are automata that trade electronic assets at rates set by mathematical formulas. AMMs are usually implemented by smart contracts on blockchains. In practice, AMMs are often composed: and outputs from AMMs can be directed into other compatible AMMs. This paper proposes a mathematical model for AMM composition. We define sequential and parallel composition operators for AMMs in a way that ensures that AMMs are closed under composition, in a way that works for "higher-dimensional" AMMs that manage more than two asset classes, and so the composition of AMMs in "stable" states remains stable.
Bitcoin uses blockchain technology to maintain transactions order and provides probabilistic guarantees to prevent double-spending, assuming that an attacker’s computational power does not exceed 50% of the network power. In this article, we design a novel bribery attack and show that this guarantee can be hugely undermined. Miners are assumed to be rational in this setup, and they are given incentives that are dynamically calculated. In this attack, the adversary misuses the Bitcoin protocol to bribe miners and maximize their gained advantage. We will reformulate the bribery attack to propose a general mathematical foundation upon which we build multiple strategies. We show that, unlike Whale Attack, these strategies are practical, especially in the future when halvings lower the mining rewards. In the so-called “guaranteed variable-rate bribing with commitment” strategy, through optimization by Differential Evolution (DE), we show how double-spending is possible in the Bitcoin ecosystem for any transaction whose value is above 218.9BTC, and this comes with 100% success rate. A slight reduction in the success probability, e.g., by 10%, brings the threshold down to 165BTC. If the rationality assumption holds, then this shows how vulnerable blockchain-based systems like Bitcoin are. We suggest a soft fork on Bitcoin to fix this issue at the end.