Blockchain Papers

Conor Desmond

No abstract is available for this record.

Claire Barraud

Cette thèse cherche à savoir si la méthode décentralisée, officiellement mise en avant dans la gestion des crises de la dette souveraine depuis leur origine, est non seulement réalisable, mais également efficace en termes de répartition équitable du fardeau de la dette. Nous définissons en effet un processus de restructuration efficace comme une procédure de courte durée (inférieure à un an) et qui respecte les besoins des deux parties prenantes au contrat. Si du côté des créanciers, la décote ne doit pas être abusive, du côté du débiteur, la dette doit redevenir soutenable, au sens à la fois économique et social du terme. Le terrain d'analyse des processus de renégociation de la dette se concentre exclusivement sur les économies d'Amérique Latine, dans la mesure où elles représentent les débiteurs ayant enregistré le plus grand nombre de défauts au cours de l'histoire. À travers une méthode pluridisciplinaire, nous défendons finalement la thèse selon laquelle l'échec des différents processus de restructuration est directement subordonné à l'iniquité du partage du fardeau de la dette, laquelle fait suite à un déséquilibre des pouvoirs de négociation inhérente au cadre de gestion décentralisée. Notre posture macroéconomique et notre démarche inductive induisent un cadre d'analyse socio-économique, lequel fait appel à un approfondissement historique, en termes d'économie politique, mais également à une étude basée sur la psychologie sociale. La thèse est structurée autour de deux parties, elles-mêmes subdivisées en deux chapitres. La première partie s'attache à comprendre les origines et les modalités de prévention et de gestion des crises, ainsi que leurs échecs. Elle conjugue de fait l'observation empirique et les soubassements théoriques de la décentralisation. De fait, le premier chapitre fait état, au vu de la double responsabilité à l'œuvre dans le déclenchement et l'enlisement dans la crise, de l'échec de la méthode décentralisée sur le long terme. En effet, non seulement la décentralisation apparaît inapplicable, puisqu'une tierce partie est systématiquement contrainte d'intervenir, mais elle ne permet pas non de plus de répartir équitablement les coûts de la crise. Le second chapitre cherche consécutivement à comprendre pourquoi ce processus de restructuration est néanmoins maintenu. L'économie politique de la décentralisation montre alors que le choix entre la régulation et le « laissez-faire » ne tient pas tant à des critères d'efficacité économique qu'à des considérations idéologiques et politiques. La deuxième partie de cette thèse propose symétriquement des pistes de réflexion afin de pallier les principaux écueils relevés lors des différents épisodes de défaut et de restructuration. Ainsi, si le troisième chapitre répond au second, le quatrième fait écho au premier. En effet, le troisième chapitre montre que la décentralisation ne peut aboutir en raison non seulement de ses écueils techniques, mais surtout de la nature des deux parties au contrat. L'immunité souveraine ayant été relativisée dans les deux premiers chapitres, il s'agit ici d'analyser le fonctionnement des marchés selon une méthode alternative au concept d'efficience. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous faisons appel aux préceptes de Keynes (1936) et de son analyse en termes psychosociaux, que nous approfondissons au travers du courant de la finance comportementale. Une telle étude révèle ainsi l'incapacité des créanciers à s'organiser de bonne foi, laquelle représente pourtant la condition sine qua non de la réalisation et de l'efficacité de la méthode décentralisée. Par conséquent, le dernier chapitre de ce travail conclue sur la nécessité d'un revirement en faveur d'une approche plus centralisée, laquelle inclut une tierce partie neutre, compétente et institutionnalisée.

Claudia Dziobek, Miguel Alves, Majdeline El Rayess, Carlos Gutierrez Mangas · 5 authors

A useful but little known feature of the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) is the information on the structure of governments. Institutional tables, included in the GFSY, provide detail on the central, state, and local levels of governments, social security, and extrabudgetary units. We refer to the main levels of government as GL1, GL2, and GL3 in ascending order of institutional coverage. We present maps of the various levels of government for 74 countries to illustrate the usefulness of this database and make it more accessible to users. The maps provide information about how centralized or decentralized government finances and employment are and their size relative to the overall economy. Government map data facilitate the monitoring of fiscal policy and fiscal rules.

Desislava Stoilova

This study is intended to examine the influence of the current worldwide financial and economic crisis on financial decentralization process in Bulgaria and identify the answers of the central and lo-cal governments to the critical situation in the context of specific conditions of the national economy and the stage of financial decentralization reform. Analysis is focused on dynamics of the main mac-roeconomic indicators, based on fact figures for the period 1990–2009 and forecast for the period 2010-2011, and its impact on the public finance. The most important actions, taken by the national government to consolidate the crisis are described and evaluated on the base of their effects on the lo-cal finance. A comparison is made between the loss of Bulgarian economy in the beginning of transition (1991-1993), during the financial crisis in 1996-1997, caused by credit crunch and series of bank bankruptcies, and the current financial and economic crisis. Finally, some conclusions and pol-icy recommendations are outlined, intended to improve crisis management in Bulgaria both on the national and local level.

Anton Korinek

No abstract is available for this record.

Yoshirō Miwa, J. Mark Ramseyer

Alexander Gerschenkron argued that banks facilitate growth in “backward” countries, and modern theorists sometimes similarly claim that banks can promote growth by reducing informational asymmetries and improving the allocation of funds. Japan has played a part in these debates. In early twentieth‐century Japan, firms relied heavily on bank debt, observers argue. Those firms with preferential access to debt outperformed the others, and those that were part of the zaibatsu corporate groups obtained that access through their affiliated banks. In fact, Japanese banks did not play the role attributed to them. Japan was not a bank‐centered economy; instead, firms relied on equity finance. It was not an economy where firms with access to banks outperformed their rivals; instead, such firms earned no advantage. And it was not a world in which the zaibatsu manipulated their banks to favor affiliated firms; instead, zaibatsu banks loaned affiliated firms little more than the deposits those firms had made with the banks. During the first half of the last century, Japanese firms obtained almost all their funds through decentralized, competitive capital markets.

Eduard Braun

The current economic problems in Southeast Asia can be attributed not to too much reliance on financial markets, but to too little . Like the U.S. economy a century ago, the emerging Asian economies do not have welldeveloped capital markets and so remain heavily dependent on their banking systems to finance growth. For all its benefits, banking is “not only basically 19th‐century technology, but disaster‐prone technology.” The extreme maturity (and, in some cases, currency) mismatch on banks' balance sheets plus the first‐come, first‐served nature of the deposit obligations mean that banks are inherently vulnerable to massive runs by depositors—and that their economies are subjected to periodic credit crunches. And, as the author says, “in the summer of 1997 a banking‐driven disaster struck in East Asia, just as it had struck so many times before in U.S. history.” In this century, In this century, the U.S. economy has steadily reduced its dependence on banks by developing “dispersed and decentralized” financial markets. In so doing, it has increased the efficiency of the U.S. capital allocation process and reduced its susceptibility to the credit crunches that have occurred throughout U.S. history. By contrast, Japan has not reduced its economy's dependence on banks, and its efforts to deal with its banking problems have served only to destabilize itself as well as its neighbors. Developing countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere are urged not to follow the Japanese example, but to take measures aimed at developing financial markets and institutions that will either substitute for or complement bank products and services.

Daniel Verdier

The internationalization of capital markets that occurred during the era of the classical gold standard (1870-1914) was part of a broader set of trends that threatened to drain local markets from capital and channel that capital to the national financial center and, from there, toward other national financial centers. Still, internationalization was neither inevitable, uniform, nor irreversible but was a political choice informed by redistributional considerations between rival domestic interests and decided by politically dominant coalitions. The domestic institutional structure in each country determined the composition of the politically dominant coalition. Decentralized structures allowed potential losers to curb public policies favorable to capital market internationalization, whereas centralized structures allowed expected winners to promote such policies. As a result, economies with centralized states ended up being the most dependent on the international capital market, whereas economies with decentralized states took a less active part in the globalization of finance.

James M. Boughton

The World Economic Outlook (WEO) exercise at the IMF evolved during the 1980s, partly in response to demands by policymakers in national finance ministries for objective and internationally comparable projections and policy scenarios. The exercise had begun as a staff initiative, encouraged by the Managing Director (Johannes Witteveen). Gradually, the Executive Board, the Interim Committee, the Group of Seven, and others came to view the discussion of the WEO documents as an important element in their efforts to keep abreast of world economic developments and prospects. Direct and indirect feedback from those discussions informed the staff as to how the exercise should be improved. Driven by this policy relevance, the WEO evolved from a decentralized project that was only haphazardly model-based into a more rigorous and coordinated exercise.

James M. Boughton

No abstract is available for this record.

Katherine Samolyk

Although the recent performance of the U.S. macroeconomy is being hailed as "the longest modern peacetime expansion s n failures of depository institutions have been closely linked to certain depressed productive sectors in the country. The most stark examples can be found in the depressed farm-belt and oil-producing regions. Observations indicate that financial firms do not or cannot diversify against industry-specific risk when choosing their loan portfolios. Such behavior may be explained by extensive government regulation of the industry's scale and scope or by technological costs of intermediating credit that encourage specialized lending by region or by industry. This paper does not attempt to formally explain why depository institutions engage in specialized lending; rather, it examines some implications of regional and sectoral banking in terms of macroeconomic perf~rmance.~ It considers the short-run implications of bank-capital immobility when banks produce real services in channeling the flow of funds into investments. We illustrate how regional banking conditions can affect the mix of aggregate investment and the level of future aggregate output in the absence of macroeconomic fluctuations. Given the current deregulatory trend in structural policy changes, the nature of the financial services industries has come under intense scrutiny. Recent banking literature has formalized how financial contracts are related to imperfect information. A recurring theme has been that when information is costly, the quantity and nature of external finance has allocative consequences. Diamond (1984) demonstrates how financial intermediaries (hereafter referred to as banks) can improve the efficiency of capital markets by diversifying and thus minimizing information costs; however, perfect diversification makes bank capital and the dispersion of bank asset returns irrelevant to bank portfolio choice. These strong informational assumptions allow the intermediation process to work more smoothly than we observe. If these conditions are not met, bank capital and the risk of bank assets affect bank profitability. Bernanke and Gertler (1987) show how the inability to eliminate variability in portfolio returns implies that "health" of a'bank's balance sheet can affect the flow of funds to risky bank investments. In their model, depositors cannot observe the ex-post returns on bank projects at any cost and bank capital must absorb random asset returns; insufficient bank capital may constrain banks from investing in risky but profitable investments. In a similar framework, Samolyk (1989) examines how the interest-rate risk associated with the maturity transformation in bank portfolios affects bank asset management. This paper will analyze the implications of imperfect information for investment in a decentralized banking ~ystern.~ We present an intertemporal model of banking similar to that of Bernanke and Gertler. Bankers possess a specialized technology that allows them to channel resources to investment projects that would not be funded in direct credit markets. They also have information about their portfolio returns. Unlike Bernanke and Gertler , this analysis attempts to incorporate the notion that there is more than one productive sector in the economy. We assume that in the short run, bank