In every nation, democratic elections are a momentous and weighty occurrence, and the voting system that is now in place requires the use of ballots or electronic voting machines (EVM). Transparency, poor turnout, vote manipulation, distrust of electoral organizations, fabrication of unique IDs (voting party IDs), and delays in posting results are some of the issues that arise as a result of these procedures. The matter of safety is of the utmost importance. When considering the installation of a computerized voting system, voter confidentiality has always been one of the most important concerns. There is no question regarding the system's capability to secure itself in contrast to prospective assaults and safeguard data in the face of such big choices. Utilization of blockchain technology is one approach that might be taken to resolve security concerns. The blockchain technology has an endless number of different uses that might be implemented. The technology known as blockchain is a distributed ledger that makes it possible for peer-to-peer networks all over the world to handle digital assets. In this context, distributed ledger technology represents an intriguing development. A grouping of all transactions is referred to as a block. Immutability, decentralisation, security, transparency, and anonymity are some of the outstanding properties offered by blockchain technology. The combination of blockchain technology with smart contracts has shown promise as a viable option for the development of trustworthy and open-source electronic voting systems. In this article, we demonstrate how to use blockchain technology with the help of a wallet and the Solidity programming language to build an electronic voting application. The programme was designed as a smart contract for the Ethereum network. In order to avoid having the same person vote twice, the user's wallet will only hold a certain number of tokens (gas), which will be depleted each time the user casts a vote. This article talks about the pros and cons of using blockchain technology. It also shows a practical solution in the form of a web app for voting and analyses its limits.
Cryptocurrencies allow users to securely transfer money without relying on a trusted intermediary, \nand the transparency of their underlying ledgers also enables public verifiability. This openness, \nhowever, comes at a cost to privacy, as even though the pseudonyms users go by are not linked to their \nreal-world identities, all movement of money among these pseudonyms is traceable. In this paper, \nwe present M¨obius, an Ethereum-based tumbler or mixing service. M¨obius achieves strong notions of \nanonymity, as even malicious senders cannot identify which pseudonyms belong to the recipients to \nwhom they sent money, and is able to resist denial-of-service attacks. It also achieves a much lower \noff-chain communication complexity than all existing tumblers, with senders and recipients needing \nto send only two initial messages in order to engage in an arbitrary number of transactions.
The thesis investigates how a blockchain can be used to build a decentralised public key infrastructure for the web, by proposing a custom federation blockchain relying on honest majority. Our main contribution is the design of a Proof of Stake protocol based on a stake tree, which builds upon an idea called follow-the-satoshi used in previous papers. Digital identities are stored in an authenticated self-balancing tree maintained by blockchain nodes. Our back-of-the-envelope calculations, based on the size of the domain name system, show that the block size must be set to at least 5.2 MB, while each blockchain node with a one-month transaction history would need to store about 243 GB. Thin clients would have to synchronise about 13.6 MB of block headers per year, and download an additional 3.7 KB of proof data for every leaf certificate which is to be checked.
Conventional public-key infrastructure (PKI) designs using certificate authorities and web-of-trust are not optimal and have security flaws. The properties afforded by the Bitcoin blockchain are a natural solution to some of the problems with PKI - in particular, certificate transparency and elimination of single points-offailure. Proposed blockchain-based PKI designs are built as public ledgers linking identity with public key, providing no privacy. We consider cases requiring privacy-aware PKIs, which do not link identity with public key. We show that blockchain technology can be used to construct a privacy-aware PKI while eliminating some of the problems of conventional PKI, and present PB-PKI, a privacy-aware blockchain-based PKI.
Bruno Rodrigues, Thomas Bocek, Andri Lareida, David Hausheer · 6 authors
Abstract The rapid growth in the number of insecure portable and stationary devices and the exponential increase of traffic volume makes Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks a top security threat to services provisioning. Existing defense mechanisms lack resources and flexibility to cope with attacks by themselves, and by utilizing other’s companies resources, the burden of the mitigation can be shared. Emerging technologies such as blockchain and smart contracts allows for the sharing of attack information in a fully distributed and automated fashion. In this paper, the design of a novel architecture is proposed by combining these technologies introducing new opportunities for flexible and efficient DDoS mitigation solutions across multiple domains. Main advantages are the deployment of an already existing public and distributed infrastructure to advertise white or blacklisted IP addresses, and the usage of such infrastructure as an additional security mechanism to existing DDoS defense systems, without the need to build specialized registries or other distribution mechanisms, which enables the enforcement of rules across multiple domains.
With the increase in the use of virtual currencies across the globe, the security of Bitcoin wallets has become a serious concern for the Bitcoin community. The developers are trying to implement concrete security solutions in Bitcoin wallets to ensure that no vulnerability gets exploited. However, a large number of known, as well as zero-day attacks, are launched on the Bitcoin wallets on a daily basis, resulting in a loss of bitcoins. In this regard, this paper presents a security analysis of existing Android wallets. We demonstrate how the implemented security practices can be bypassed by malicious entities, causing financial loss to Bitcoin users. As a countermeasure, we present a smart card based authentication scheme which will protect the users from all of the identified attacks.
This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof-of-work “mining” process having no central party or trusted setup. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multilayered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows one to include a Pedersen Commitment in a ring signature. This construction results in a digital currency with hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the #bitcoin-wizards IRC channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
With the widespread use of Internet, Web, and mobile technologies, a new category of applications and transactions that requires anonymity is gaining increased interest and importance. Examples of such new applications are innovative payment systems, digital notaries, electronic voting, documents sharing, electronic auctions, medical applications, and many others. In addition to anonymity, these applications and transactions also require standard security services: identification, authentication, and authorization of users and protection of their transactions. Providing those services in combination with anonymity is an especially challenging issue, because all security services require explicit user identification and authentication. To solve this issue and enable applications with security and also anonymity we introduce a new type of cryptographically encapsulated objects called BIX certificates. “BIX” is an abbreviation for “Blockchain Information Exchange.” Their purpose is equivalent to X.509 certificates: to support security services for users and transactions, but also enhanced with anonymity. This paper describes the structure and attributes of BIX certificate objects and all related protocols for their creation, distribution, and use. The BIX Certification Infrastructure (BCI) as a distributed public ledger is also briefly described.
Péter Juhász, József Stéger, Dániel Kondor, Gábor Vattay
Bitcoin is a digital currency and electronic payment system operating over a peer-to-peer network on the Internet. One of its most important properties is the high level of anonymity it provides for its users. The users are identified by their Bitcoin addresses, which are random strings in the public records of transactions, the blockchain. When a user initiates a Bitcoin transaction, his Bitcoin client program relays messages to other clients through the Bitcoin network. Monitoring the propagation of these messages and analyzing them carefully reveal hidden relations. In this paper, we develop a mathematical model using a probabilistic approach to link Bitcoin addresses and transactions to the originator IP address. To utilize our model, we carried out experiments by installing more than a hundred modified Bitcoin clients distributed in the network to observe as many messages as possible. During a two month observation period we were able to identify several thousand Bitcoin clients and bind their transactions to geographical locations.
The reputation system has been designed as an effective mechanism to reduce risks associated with online shopping for customers. However, it is vulnerable to rating fraud. Some raters may inject unfairly high or low ratings to the system so as to promote their own products or demote their competitors. This study explores the rating fraud by differentiating the subjective fraud from objective fraud. Then it discusses the effectiveness of blockchain technology in objective fraud and its limitation in subjective fraud, especially the rating fraud. Lastly, it systematically analyzes the robustness of blockchain-based reputation systems in each type of rating fraud. The detection of fraudulent raters is not easy since they can behave strategically to camouflage themselves. We explore the potential strengths and limitations of blockchain-based reputation systems under two attack goals: ballot-stuffing and bad-mouthing, and various attack models including constant attack, camouflage attack, whitewashing attack and sybil attack. Blockchain-based reputation systems are more robust against bad-mouthing than ballot-stuffing fraud. Blockchain technology provides new opportunities for redesigning the reputation system. Blockchain systems are very effective in preventing objective information fraud, such as loan application fraud, where fraudulent information is fact-based. However, their effectiveness is limited in subjective information fraud, such as rating fraud, where the ground-truth is not easily validated. Blockchain systems are effective in preventing bad mouthing and whitewashing attack, but they are limited in detecting ballot-stuffing under sybil attack, constant attacks and camouflage attack.
Roman Matzutt, Oliver Hohlfeld, Martin Henze, Robin Rawiel · 6 authors
As transaction fees skyrocket today, blockchains become increasingly expensive, hurting their adoption in broader applications. This work tackles the saving of transaction fees for economic blockchain applications. The key insight is that other than the existing "default'' mode to execute application logic fully on-chain, i.e., in smart contracts, and in fine granularity, i.e., user request per transaction, there are alternative execution modes with advantages in cost-effectiveness. On Ethereum, we propose a holistic middleware platform supporting flexible and secure transaction executions, including off-chain states and batching of user requests. Furthermore, we propose control-plane schemes to adapt the execution mode to the current workload for optimal runtime cost. We present a case study on the institutional accounts (e.g., coinbase.com) intensively sending Ether on Ethereum blockchains. By collecting real-life transactions, we construct workload benchmarks and show that our work saves 18%\sim 47%18%-47% per invocation than the default baseline while introducing 1.81%\sim 16.59%1.81%-16.59% blocks delay.
Gina Gallegos-García, Vincenzo Iovino, Alfredo Rial, Peter B. Roenne · 5 authors
In e-voting protocols, cryptographers must balance usability with strong security guarantees, such as privacy and verifiability. In traditional e-voting protocols, privacy is often provided by a trusted authority that learns the votes and computes the tally. Some protocols replace the trusted authority by a set of authorities, and privacy is guaranteed if less than a threshold number of authorities are corrupt. For verifiability, stronger security is demanded. Typically, corrupt authorities that try to fake the tally result must always be detected.To provide verifiability, many e-voting protocols use Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs (NIZK). Thanks to their non-interactive nature, NIZK allow anybody, including third parties that do not participate in the protocol, to verify the correctness of the tally. Therefore, NIZK can be used to obtain universal verifiability. Additionally, NIZK also improve usability because they allow voters to cast a vote non-interactively.The disadvantage of NIZK is that their security is based on setup assumptions such as the common reference string (CRS) or the random oracle model. The former requires a trusted party to generate a CRS. The latter, though a popular model for secure protocol design, has been shown to be unsound.We address the design of e-voting protocols that provide verifiability without any trust assumptions. We show that Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable proofs can be used for this purpose. Our e-voting protocols are private under the Decision Linear assumption, while perfect individual verifiability, i.e. a fake tally is detected with probability 1, holds unconditionally. Perfect universal verifiability requires a trusted public bulletin board. We remark that our definition of verifiability does not consider eligibility or end-to-end verifiability. First, we present a general construction that supports any tally function. Then, we show how to efficiently instantiate it for specific types of elections through Groth-Sahai proofs.
Bitcoin (BTC) is often cited as Libertarian. However, the technology underpinning Bitcoin, blockchain, has properties that make it ideally suited to Socialist paradigms. Current literature supports the Libertarian viewpoint by focusing on the ability of Bitcoin to bypass central authority and provide anonymity; rarely is there an examination of blockchain technology’s capacity for decentralised transparency and auditability in support of a Socialist model. This paper conducts a review of the blockchain, Libertarianism, and Socialist philosophies. It then explores Socialist models of public ownership and looks at the unique cooperative properties of blockchain that make the technology ideal for supporting Socialist societies. In summary, this paper argues that blockchain technologies are not just a Libertarian tool, they also enhance Socialist forms of governance.
A trustless technology, Bitcoin tries to solve issues of social coordination and economic exchange by relying exclusively on technological means. Is technology alone able to resolve the social and political concerns affecting the Bitcoin network?
Pedro Moreno-Sánchez, Muhammad Bilal Zafar, Aniket Kate
Abstract The decentralized I owe you (IOU) transaction network Ripple is gaining prominence as a fast, low-cost and efficient method for performing same and cross-currency payments. Ripple keeps track of IOU credit its users have granted to their business partners or friends, and settles transactions between two connected Ripple wallets by appropriately changing credit values on the connecting paths. Similar to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, while the ownership of the wallets is implicitly pseudonymous in Ripple, IOU credit links and transaction flows between wallets are publicly available in an online ledger. In this paper, we present the first thorough study that analyzes this globally visible log and characterizes the privacy issues with the current Ripple network. In particular, we define two novel heuristics and perform heuristic clustering to group wallets based on observations on the Ripple network graph. We then propose reidentification mechanisms to deanonymize the operators of those clusters and show how to reconstruct the financial activities of deanonymized Ripple wallets. Our analysis motivates the need for better privacy-preserving payment mechanisms for Ripple and characterizes the privacy challenges faced by the emerging credit networks.
Jul 1, 2016·2016 Intl IEEE Conferences on Ubiquitous Intelligence & Computing, Advanced and Trusted Computing, Scalable Computing and Communications, Cloud and Big Data Computing, Internet of People, and Smart World Congress (UIC/ATC/ScalCom/CBDCom/IoP/SmartWorld)
Till Neudecker, Philipp Andelfinger, Hannes Hartenstein
Flooding Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks form the basis of services such as the electronic currency system Bitcoin. The decentralized architecture enables robustness against failure. However, knowledge of the network's topology can allow adversaries to attack specific peers in order to, e.g., isolate certain peers or even partition the network. Knowledge of the topology might be gained by observing the flooding process, which is inherently possible in such networks,, performing a timing analysis on the observations. In this paper we present a timing analysis method that targets flooding P2P networks, show its theoretical, practical feasibility. A validation in the real-world Bitcoin network proves the possibility of inferring network links of actively participating peers with substantial precision, recall (both ~ 40%), potentially enabling attacks on the network. Additionally, we analyze the countermeasure of trickling, quantify the tradeoff between the effectiveness of the countermeasure, the expected performance penalty. The analysis shows that inappropriate parametrization can actually facilitate inference attacks.
Permisionless decentralized ledgers ("blockchains") such as the one underlying the cryptocurrency Bitcoin allow anonymous participants to maintain the ledger, while avoiding control or "censorship" by any single entity. In contrast, permissioned decentralized ledgers exploit real-world trust and accountability, allowing only explicitly authorized parties to maintain the ledger. Permissioned ledgers support more flexible governance and a wider choice of consensus mechanisms. Both kinds of decentralized ledgers may be susceptible to manipulation by participants who favor some transactions over others. The real-world accountability underlying permissioned ledgers provides an opportunity to impose fairness constraints that can be enforced by penalizing violators after-the- fact. To date, however, this opportunity has not been fully exploited, unnecessarily leaving participants latitude to manipulate outcomes undetectably. This paper draws attention to this issue, and proposes design principles to make such manipulation more difficult, as well as specific mechanisms to make it easier to detect when violations occur.
Bitcoin is without a doubt the most successful cryptocurrency in circulation today, making it an extremely valuable target for attackers. Indeed, many studies have highlighted ways to compromise one or several Bitcoin nodes. In this paper, we take a different perspective and study the effect of large-scale network-level attacks such as the ones that may be launched by Autonomous Systems (ASes).
We show that attacks that are commonly believed to be hard, such as isolating 50% of the mining power, are actually within the reach of anyone with access to a BGP-enabled network and hijacking less than 900 prefixes. Once on path, AS-level adversaries can then partition the Bitcoin network or delay block propagation significantly. The key factors that enable these attacks are the extreme centralization of Bitcoin, both from a routing and a mining perspective, along with the fact that Bitcoin messages are sent unencrypted, without integrity guarantees.
We demonstrate the feasibility of large-scale attacks in practice against the deployed Bitcoin software and quantify their disruptive network-wide impact. The potential damage to Bitcoin is severe. By isolating a part of the network or delaying the propagation of blocks, network-level attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of attacks such as double spending. We provide several suggestions on approaches to mitigate such attacks employing both short-term and long-term measures.
As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.