Recently, blockchains have been gathering a lot of interest. Many applications can benefit from the advantages of blockchains. Nevertheless, applications with more restricted privacy or participation requirements cannot rely on public blockchains. First, the whole blockchain can be downloaded at any time, thus making the data available to the public. Second, anyone can deploy a node, join the blockchain network and take part in the consensus building process. Private and consortium blockchains promise to combine the advantages of blockchains with stricter requirements on the participating entities. This is also the reason for the comparably small number of nodes that store and extend those blockchains. However, by targeting specific nodes, an attacker can influence how consensuses are reached and possibly even halt the blockchain operation. To provide additional security to the blockchain nodes, ChainGuard utilizes SDN functionalities to filter network traffic, thus implementing a firewall for blockchain applications. ChainGuard communicates with the blockchain nodes it guards to determine which origin of the traffic is legitimate. Packets from illegitimate sources are intercepted and thus cannot have an effect on the blockchain. As is shown with experiments, ChainGuard provides access control functionality and can effectively mitigate flooding attacks from several sources at once.
Yu‐Jin Kwon, Do-Hyun Kim, Yunmok Son, Eugene Y. Vasserman · 5 authors
In the Bitcoin system, participants are rewarded for solving cryptographic puzzles. In order to receive more consistent rewards over time, some participants organize mining pools and split the rewards from the pool in proportion to each participant's contribution. However, several attacks threaten the ability to participate in pools. The block withholding (BWH) attack makes the pool reward system unfair by letting malicious participants receive unearned wages while only pretending to contribute work. When two pools launch BWH attacks against each other, they encounter the miner's dilemma: in a Nash equilibrium, the revenue of both pools is diminished. In another attack called selfish mining, an attacker can unfairly earn extra rewards by deliberately generating forks. In this paper, we propose a novel attack called a fork after withholding (FAW) attack. FAW is not just another attack. The reward for an FAW attacker is always equal to or greater than that for a BWH attacker, and it is usable up to four times more often per pool than in BWH attack. When considering multiple pools - the current state of the Bitcoin network - the extra reward for an FAW attack is about 56% more than that for a BWH attack. Furthermore, when two pools execute FAW attacks on each other, the miner's dilemma may not hold: under certain circumstances, the larger pool can consistently win. More importantly, an FAW attack, while using intentional forks, does not suffer from practicality issues, unlike selfish mining. We also discuss partial countermeasures against the FAW attack, but finding a cheap and efficient countermeasure remains an open problem. As a result, we expect to see FAW attacks among mining pools.
Steven Goldfeder, Harry Kalodner, Dillon Reisman, Arvind Narayanan
Abstract We show how third-party web trackers can deanonymize users of cryptocurrencies. We present two distinct but complementary attacks. On most shopping websites, third party trackers receive information about user purchases for purposes of advertising and analytics. We show that, if the user pays using a cryptocurrency, trackers typically possess enough information about the purchase to uniquely identify the transaction on the blockchain, link it to the user’s cookie, and further to the user’s real identity. Our second attack shows that if the tracker is able to link two purchases of the same user to the blockchain in this manner, it can identify the user’s cluster of addresses and transactions on the blockchain, even if the user employs blockchain anonymity techniques such as CoinJoin. The attacks are passive and hence can be retroactively applied to past purchases. We discuss several mitigations, but none are perfect.
Steven Goldfeder, Harry Kalodner, Dillon Reisman, Arvind Narayanan
We show how third-party web trackers can deanonymize users of\ncryptocurrencies. We present two distinct but complementary attacks. On most\nshopping websites, third party trackers receive information about user\npurchases for purposes of advertising and analytics. We show that, if the user\npays using a cryptocurrency, trackers typically possess enough information\nabout the purchase to uniquely identify the transaction on the blockchain, link\nit to the user's cookie, and further to the user's real identity. Our second\nattack shows that if the tracker is able to link two purchases of the same user\nto the blockchain in this manner, it can identify the user's entire cluster of\naddresses and transactions on the blockchain, even if the user employs\nblockchain anonymity techniques such as CoinJoin. The attacks are passive and\nhence can be retroactively applied to past purchases. We discuss several\nmitigations, but none are perfect.\n
Electronic voting presents many challenges due to its multiple security requirements. Some of the challenges are related to guaranteeing voters' privacy and system's transparency, which are hard to satisfy simultaneously. Electronic voting also presents other challenges such as usability, particularly from the voter's side. We study two particular problems of electronic voting. Cast-as-intended verifiability comprises those mechanisms which assure the voter that her cast ballot corresponds to her chosen voting options. Current proposals put the verification burden on the voter, something which is undesirable in real-world elections, where both technically skilled and non-skilled voters participate. In this thesis, we introduce the concept of universal cast-as-intended verifiability, which provides mechanisms which allow any entity to check that any ballot corresponds to the voter's selections - without revealing them. We formally define what universal cast-as-intended verifiability is and we give an electronic voting protocol satisfying this property. The other problem we have studied is the problem of invalid votes in electronic elections. Since a common selling point of electronic voting is that it avoids voters inadvertently spoiling their votes, deliberately spoiled ballots appearing in the tallying phase of an electronic election can cause mistrust on the system. Indeed, election stakeholders might think that the system is flawed or that it was exploited somehow. To avoid this situation, we define the concept of vote validatability, which states the electronic voting system should be able to detect spoiled ballots before they are successfully cast. In addition to formally defining this notion, we design an electronic voting protocol satisfying this property. All these security requirements of electronic voting systems are implemented with cryptographic tools. In addition to encryption and signature schemes, another essential primitive for building electronic voting protocols is zero-knowledge proofs. Zero-knowledge proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true without leaking any other information. These zero-knowledge proofs can be used to, for example, prove that the tally of the election was done properly. Recently, Groth and Sahai constructed efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for a wide range of statements including, among others, statements appearing in electronic voting. In this thesis we give two contributions on Groth-Sahai proofs. On the one hand, we give a framework for deriving cryptographic assumptions from which to build secure cryptographic protocols. In particular, we build new Groth-Sahai proofs improving the efficiency of currently known constructions. Independently, we show how the original Groth-Sahai proofs can be extended to be compatible with even more statements, how to improve their out-of-the-box efficiency for many of these statements and how to improve their re-usability efficiency among multiple statements. Els sistemes de vot electrònic presenten molts reptes a causa dels seus múltiples requeriments. Alguns d'aquests reptes estan relacionats amb garantir la privacitat del votant i la transparència del sistema, requisits que són difícils de satisfer al mateix temps. D'altra banda, els sistemes de vot electrònic presenten altres reptes com la usabilitat, sobretot de cara als votants. En aquesta tesi estudiem dos problemes del vot electrònic. La verificabilitat "cast-as-intended" tracta d'obtenir mecanismes que garanteixin al votant que el seu vot correspon a les seves preferències. Les propostes actuals posen la càrrega de la verificació en el votant, cosa que no és desitjable en eleccions del món real, on participen votants amb diferents graus de coneixements tècnics. Nosaltres introduïm el concepte de "universal cast-as-intended verifiability", que proporciona mecanismes per a que qualsevol entitat de l'elecció pugui comprovar que qualsevol vot conté les preferències del votant que l'ha emès - sense revelar el contingut del vot. A banda de definir formalment el concepte de "universal cast-as-intended verifiability" també proposem un protocol de vot electrònic que satisfà aquesta propietat. L'altre problema que hem estudiat és el problema dels vots invàlids en eleccions electròniques. Un dels avantatges del vot electrònic és que permet evitar que els votants emetin vots nuls sense voler. Per això, si durant el recompte de l'elecció apareixen vots nuls construïts intencionadament es pot crear desconfiança en el sistema de vot. Els usuaris del sistema de vot poden pensar que el sistema té forats de seguretat o que ha estat atacat. Per evitar aquesta situació, definim el concepte de "vote validatability", una propietat dels sistemes de vot electrònic que garanteix que els vots nuls es poden identificar en el moment que s'emeten. En aquesta tesi hem definit formalment aquesta propietat i hem dissenyat un protocol que la satisfà. Tots aquests requisits de seguretat dels protocols de vot electrònic s'implementen amb eines criptogràfiques. Les principals eines que s'utilitzen són esquemes de xifrat, esquemes de firma i proves de coneixement zero. Una prova de coneixement zero permet a una entitat convèncer una altra entitat que una sentència és certa sense donar cap altra informació que la certesa de la sentència. Aquestes proves de coneixement zero es poden fer servir, per exemple, per demostrar que el recompte de l'elecció s'ha fet correctament. Recentment, Groth i Sahai han construït proves de coneixement zero que es poden fer servir per un ampli ventall de sentències com per exemple sentències que apareixen en protocols de vot electrònic. En aquesta tesi hem fet dos contribucions sobre les proves de Groth i Sahai. Per una banda donem un marc teòric que permet derivar hipòtesis criptogràfiques per construir protocols criptogràfics. En particular, construïm noves proves de Groth i Sahai millorant l'eficiència de les construccions existents. De manera independent, indiquem com les proves de Groth i Sahai es poden estendre per fer-les compatibles amb un ventall més ampli de sentències, millorem l'eficiència de les proves de Groth i Sahai per moltes d'aquestes sentències i, en particular, quan es fan servir per demostrar múltiples sentències.
A. Pinar Ozisik, George Bissias, Brian Neil Levine
We make several contributions that quantify the real-time hash rate and therefore the consensus of a blockchain. We show that by using only the hash value of blocks, we can estimate and measure the hash rate of all miners or individual miners, with quanti able accuracy. We apply our techniques to the Ethereum and Bitcoin blockchains; our solution applies to any proof-of-work-based blockchain that relies on a numeric target for the validation of blocks. We also show that if miners regularly broadcast status reports of their partial proof-of- work, the hash rate estimates are signi cantly more accurate at a cost of slightly higher bandwidth. Whether using only the blockchain, or the additional information in status reports, merchants can use our techniques to quantify in real-time the threat of double-spend attacks.
Governments around the world have been trying to implement secure and reliable e-voting (location-independent, individualized voting over the Internet) for a long time, to no avail: E-voting remains fundamentally insecure.This can change with the blockchain technology, an open, transparent, and distributed digital ledger. However, blockchain-based e-voting will only work if the blockchain-based e-voting infrastructure is truly distributed and no one entity, not even the government, controls a majority of it.
In the cryptographic currency Bitcoin, all transactions are recorded in the blockchain - a public, global, and immutable ledger. Because transactions are public, Bitcoin and its users employ obfuscation to maintain a degree of financial privacy. Critically, and in contrast to typical uses of obfuscation, in Bitcoin obfuscation is not aimed against the system designer but is instead enabled by design. We map sixteen proposed privacy-preserving techniques for Bitcoin on an obfuscation-vs.-cryptography axis, and find that those that are used in practice tend toward obfuscation. We argue that this has led to a balance between privacy and regulatory acceptance.
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have surged in popularity over the last decade. Although Bitcoin does not claim to provide anonymity for its users, it enjoys a public perception of being a privacy preserving financial system. In reality, cryptocurrencies publish users' entire transaction histories in plaintext, albeit under a pseudonym; this is required for transaction validation. Therefore, if a user's pseudonym can be linked to their human identity, the privacy fallout can be significant. Recently, researchers have demonstrated deanonymization attacks that exploit weaknesses in the Bitcoin network's peer-to-peer (P2P) networking protocols. In particular, the P2P network currently forwards content in a structured way that allows observers to deanonymize users. In this work, we redesign the P2P network from first principles with the goal of providing strong, provable anonymity guarantees. We propose a simple networking policy called Dandelion which provides quasi-optimal, network-wide anonymity, with minimal cost to the network's utility. We also discuss practical implementation challenges and propose heuristic solutions.
Mauro Conti, E. Sandeep Kumar, Chhagan Lal, Sushmita Ruj
Bitcoin is a popular cryptocurrency that records all transactions in a distributed append-only public ledger called blockchain. The security of Bitcoin heavily relies on the incentive-compatible proof-of-work (PoW) based distributed consensus protocol, which is run by the network nodes called miners. In exchange for the incentive, the miners are expected to maintain the blockchain honestly. Since its launch in 2009, Bitcoin economy has grown at an enormous rate, and it is now worth about 150 billions of dollars. This exponential growth in the market value of bitcoins motivate adversaries to exploit weaknesses for profit, and researchers to discover new vulnerabilities in the system, propose countermeasures, and predict upcoming trends. In this paper, we present a systematic survey that covers the security and privacy aspects of Bitcoin. We start by giving an overview of the Bitcoin system and its major components along with their functionality and interactions within the system. We review the existing vulnerabilities in Bitcoin and its major underlying technologies such as blockchain and PoW-based consensus protocol. These vulnerabilities lead to the execution of various security threats to the standard functionality of Bitcoin. We then investigate the feasibility and robustness of the state-of-the-art security solutions. Additionally, we discuss the current anonymity considerations in Bitcoin and the privacy-related threats to Bitcoin users along with the analysis of the existing privacy-preserving solutions. Finally, we summarize the critical open challenges, and we suggest directions for future research towards provisioning stringent security and privacy solutions for Bitcoin.
Open access
3 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
We present the first measurement study of JoinMarket, a growing marketplace for more anonymous transfers in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Our study reveals that this market is funded with multiple thousand bitcoins and generated a turnover of almost 29.5 million USD over the course of 13 months. Assessing the resilience of the market against a well-funded attacker, we discover that in a typical scenario, a selective attack with a 90% success rate requires an investment of 14 000–54 000 USD (which is recoverable after the attack). We present economic arguments to explain the existence of this novel market for anonymity and underpin the hypothesis of heterogeneous time preference with empirical data.
Blockchain is offering new opportunities to develop new types of digital services. While research on the topic is still emerging, it has mostly focused on the technical and legal issues instead of taking advantage of this novel concept and creating advanced digital services. In this paper, we are going to leverage the open source Blockchain technology to propose a design for a new electronic voting system that could be used in local or national elections. The Blockchain-based system will be secure, reliable, and anonymous, and will help increase the number of voters as well as the trust of people in their governments.
Open access
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
This work show an avaliation about the performance of the application of Group Signature technique in Bitcoin system and a study about the anonymity and auditory. The Bitcoin’ goal is provide a virtual currency and an anonymous online transaction system. However, recent researches show that can be to break the anonymity of transactions through the chronological traceability technique in the Bitcoin transactions and analysis of network addresses. As a result of breaking anonymity of Bitcoin transactions, users’ privacy and all Bitcoin ecosystem are affected negatively. For this reason, in this work, it was proposed to include Group Signatures techniques in the Bitcoin system to increasing of anonymity in Bitcoin transactions but with audity possibility in accept time, more or less 10 minutes. The Group Signature generate a lot of dinstinct groups to dinstinct Bitcoin transactions. After to include the Group Signature technique in a modified version of Bitcoin system, we evaluated this technique in Bitcoin system through experiment in simulations. Through the experiments and statistic analysis, it was found that the approach of including the Group Signature is feasible for implementation in Bitcoin system with small groups, 500 clients. For the all cases analyzed, it was verified that the use of Group Signature in Bitcoin transactions increase the anonymity. Therefore, it was verified that the performance of Bitcoin transactions with Group Signature technique show a delay in nearly 50% less than current Bitcoin system whitout this technique. Nevertheless, in small groups with Group Signature get a better anonymity level and audity, but in big groups with more than 500 clients this technique not is good because the transactions time is over.
M. J. G. Borge, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Philipp Jovanovic, Linus Gasser · 6 authors
Permissionless blockchain-based cryptocurrencies commonly use proof-of-work (PoW) or proof-of-stake (PoS) to ensure their security, e.g. to prevent double spending attacks. However, both approaches have disadvantages: PoW leads to massive amounts of wasted electricity and re-centralization, whereas major stakeholders in PoS might be able to create a monopoly. In this work, we propose proof-of-personhood (PoP), a mechanism that binds physical entities to virtual identities in a way that enables accountability while preserving anonymity. Afterwards we introduce PoPCoin, a new cryptocurrency, whose consensus mechanism leverages PoP to eliminate the dis-advantages of PoW and PoS while ensuring security. PoPCoin leads to a continuously fair and democratic wealth creation process which paves the way for an experimental basic income infrastructure.
Bitcoin is a popular alternative to fiat money, widely used for its perceived anonymity properties. However, recent attacks on Bitcoin's peer-to-peer (P2P) network demonstrated that its gossip-based flooding protocols, which are used to ensure global network consistency, may enable user deanonymization---the linkage of a user's IP address with her pseudonym in the Bitcoin network. In 2015, the Bitcoin community responded to these attacks by changing the network's flooding mechanism to a different protocol, known as diffusion. However, no systematic justification was provided for the change, and it is unclear if diffusion actually improves the system's anonymity. In this paper, we model the Bitcoin networking stack and analyze its anonymity properties, both pre- and post-2015. In doing so, we consider new adversarial models and spreading mechanisms that have not been previously studied in the source-finding literature. We theoretically prove that Bitcoin's networking protocols (both pre- and post-2015) offer poor anonymity properties on networks with a regular-tree topology. We validate this claim in simulation on a 2015 snapshot of the real Bitcoin P2P network topology.
This paper presents Prio, a privacy-preserving system for the collection of aggregate statistics. Each Prio client holds a private data value (e.g., its current location), and a small set of servers compute statistical functions over the values of all clients (e.g., the most popular location). As long as at least one server is honest, the Prio servers learn nearly nothing about the clients' private data, except what they can infer from the aggregate statistics that the system computes. To protect functionality in the face of faulty or malicious clients, Prio uses secret-shared non-interactive proofs (SNIPs), a new cryptographic technique that yields a hundred-fold performance improvement over conventional zero-knowledge approaches. Prio extends classic private aggregation techniques to enable the collection of a large class of useful statistics. For example, Prio can perform a least-squares regression on high-dimensional client-provided data without ever seeing the data in the clear.
One of the fundamental applications for a practically useful system of money is remuneration. Information pertaining to the amount of compensation awarded to different individuals is often considered sensitive, commanding a certain degree of privacy. As Bitcoin and similarly designed cryptocurrencies evolve into a recognized medium of exchange for larger swaths of the world economy, an increasing number of people will earn income in the form of blockchain-based payments. The nature of these transactions is such that the minute details of an affected individuals compensation package and spending habits will be exposed to public scrutiny. In some cases this violates cultural norms which respect the confidentiality of salaries, yet in other cases it could be regarded as providing the benefits associated with greater transparency. In this work we analyse the Bitcoin blockchain record of periodic payments accruing to an individual address in exchange for goods or services rendered. For differing levels of available information we seek to determine the extent of insights that can be gleaned about the transacting counter-parties and the privacy implications this entails.
Sistem pemungutan suara di Indonesia yang lebih dikenal dengan nama pemilihan umum (pemilu) sampai saat ini masih dilaksanakan secara manual. Dalam sistem tersebut, dibutuhkan waktu yang lama serta tenaga yang besar untuk menghitung hasil dari pemlihan umum tersebut. Sistem manual juga memiliki banyak kelemahan yang bisa dimanfaatkan oleh pihak tertentu untuk memanipulasi hasil pemilihan umum . Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, salah satu solusinya adalah dengan menerapkan sistem pemilihan umum dengan sistem berbasis perangkat elektronik yang lebih dikenal dengan istilah E-Vote . Berbagai macam metode telah diterapkan dalam sistem E-Vote untuk mengatasi kecurangan, salah satunya dengan menggunakan sistem enkripsi-dekripsi data dari pemilih ke sistem. Namun hal ini kurang efektif apabila kecurangan terjadi ketika data sudah dirubah sebelum masuk ke sistem. Dengan menerapkan mekanisme rantai kepercayaan (chain of trust) untuk mendeteksi adanya perubahan surat suara serta sistem autentikasi digital, mekanisme keamanan bagi peserta pemungutan suara bisa diwujudkan. Proses autentikasi digital menggunakan ponsel pintar dengan teknologi NFC dipadukan dengan sistem enkripsi asimetris dan digital signature . Pemilih bisa mendeteksi adanya perubahan surat suara melalui digital signature yang ada dan sistem E-Vote bisa mengenali peserta dari kunci publik yang ditawarkan oleh autentikator. Kemudian sistem E-Vote bisa memverifikasi keaslian kunci publik peserta melalui autentikasi berbasis zero-knowledge proof challenge . Hasil pilihan peserta kemudian dikirimkan ke autentikator untuk ditandatangani dan tandatangan tersebut digunakan sebagai bukti peserta telah melakukan pemilihan. Dari hasil uji coba yang dilakukan, terbukti bahwa autentikator bisa mendeteksi ketidaksamaan antara data dengan signature, dan autentikator bisa melakukan autentikasi dengan sistem E-Vote dengan tepat. Data hasil pilihan peserta bisa diverifikasi dengan signature yang ada untuk memeriksa integritas data.
Countries like Estonia, Norway or Australia developed electronic voting systems, which could be used to realize parliamentary elections with the help of personal computers and the Internet. These systems are completely different in their design and their way to solve the same problem. In this thesis, we analyze some of the largest real-world systems, describe their building blocks and their general design to focus on possible problems in these electronic voting systems. Furthermore, we present a template for an e-voting system, which we designed to try to fulfill the preliminaries and requirements of a secure electronic voting system. We use the experiences and the building blocks of existing systems to combine them to another more secure system. Afterwards, we compare our concept with real-world systems to evaluate the fulfillments of the requirements. Conclusively, we discuss the occurring problems when designing a secure system. Peer-to-peer networks provide many advantages, like decentralization, which might be applicable to electronic voting systems. Therefore, we take a look on the distributed database called blockchain and the usage in a peer-to-peer voting system. Our contribution to this topic is a modification of the proof-of-stake, which enables the usage of common devices, like smartphones or tablets, for the blockchain verification and inclusion of new ballots to the chain. This proof does not need much computing power and has a lower carbon footprint than the proof-of-work in the Bitcoin protocol.
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have surged in popularity over the last decade. Although Bitcoin does not claim to provide anonymity for its users, it enjoys a public perception of being a `privacy-preserving' financial system. In reality, cryptocurrencies publish users' entire transaction histories in plaintext, albeit under a pseudonym; this is required for transaction validation. Therefore, if a user's pseudonym can be linked to their human identity, the privacy fallout can be significant. Recently, researchers have demonstrated deanonymization attacks that exploit weaknesses in the Bitcoin network's peer-to-peer (P2P) networking protocols. In particular, the P2P network currently forwards content in a structured way that allows observers to deanonymize users. In this work, we redesign the P2P network from first principles with the goal of providing strong, provable anonymity guarantees. We propose a simple networking policy called Dandelion, which achieves nearly-optimal anonymity guarantees at minimal cost to the network's utility. We also provide a practical implementation of Dandelion.
[B]lockchain technology provides a cryptographically secure and transparent method for transferring “digital assets.” Although blockchain technology is most commonly recognized as the technology that underpins virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, it may also hold the key to facilitating secure online elections in America. To preface the need for blockchain voting, Part II addresses the current problems with voting in the United States. Part III provides an elementary explanation of blockchain. Parts IV and V outline current election laws and explain how implementing blockchain voting would very likely comply with these laws. Transitioning to a new voting system, however, does not come without challenges. Thus, the remainder of Part V outlines valid concerns with and counterarguments against blockchain voting. Part VI advocates for congressional action, tracing the failed regulation of Bitcoin back to the lack of uniform guidance. The time is ripe for modernization, yet current proposals for online voting lack the sophistication necessary to implement a secure and trusted system. Thus, Part VII of this Comment proposes that Congress pass a bill authorizing the use of blockchain voting and incentivizing states to modernize voting systems using this innovative technology.
Bitcoin has emerged as the leading cryptographic currency since its inception in 2009 and at the time of writing holds a market capitalization of $28.4 billion. This ever-increasing figure has attracted adopters seeking to advance their investments, often leaving purely technical aspects on the sidelines. As is the case with any innovative technology, misconceptions are plentiful and information is not always conclusive. The research effort presented in this paper consists of a quantitative study seeking to address the subject of user anonymity in the Bitcoin network by employing an online survey on one of the most prominent Bitcoin forums. This includes 50 eligible participants, whose motivation is derived through the application of temporal motivation theory. The survey seeks to form an understanding of user attitudes towards the aspect of anonymity by following a methodological approach for exploring common tendencies among the representatives and will serve as the underlying data set from which conclusions can be drawn. Furthermore, this paper will present a literary study of the actual state of anonymity in this peer-to-peer technology by reviewing current findings highlighted in the area, thus presenting a comprehensive view of anonymity in the Bitcoin network, which will contrast the user study.