Blockchain has been widely adopted in the last few years even though it is in its infancy. The first well-known application built on blockchain technology was Bitcoin, which is a decentralized and distributed ledger to record crypto-currency transactions. All of the transactions in Bitcoin are anonymously transferred and validated by participants in the network. Bitcoin protocol and its operations are so reliable that technologists have been inspired to enhance blockchain technologies and deploy it outside of the crypto-currency world. The demand for private and non-crypto-currency solutions have surged among consortiums because of the security and fault tolerant features of blockchain. To introduce blockchain concepts, we survey the three most popular blockchain architectures: Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Hyperledger Fabric. We then build Gradubique, a blockchain network built on top of Hyperledger Fabric. Gradubique allows instructors from any school to post exam and course grades to the Gradubique network. Employers and graduate schools can extract transcripts from Gradubique. Security is guaranteed by the blockchain technology. Standardization and translation of transcripts can be built into the network, and the distributed nature of the network can make it virtually cost-free.
Beverley A. MacKenzie, Robert Ian Ferguson, Xavier Bellekens
In a few short years the Internet of Things has become an intrinsic part of everyday life, with connected devices included in products created for homes, cars and even medical equipment. But its rapid growth has created several security problems, with respect to the transmission and storage of vast amounts of customers data, across an insecure heterogeneous collection of networks. The Internet of Things is therefore creating a unique set of risk and problems that will affect most households. From breaches in confidentiality, which could allow users to be snooped on, through to failures in integrity, which could lead to consumer data being compromised; devices are presenting many security challenges to which consumers are ill equipped to protect themselves from. Moreover, when this is coupled with the heterogeneous nature of the industry, and the interoperable and scalability problems it becomes apparent that the Internet of Things has created an increased attack surface from which security vulnerabilities may be easily exploited. However, it has been conjectured that blockchain may provide a solution to the Internet of Things security and scalability problems. Because of blockchain's immutability, integrity and scalability, it is possible that its architecture could be used for the storage and transfer of Internet of Things data. Within this paper a cross section of blockchain consensus protocols have been assessed against a requirement framework, to establish each consensus protocols strengths and weaknesses with respect to their potential implementation in an Internet of Things blockchain environment.
Some recent trends in distributed intelligent systems rely extensively on agent-based approaches. The so-called Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are taking over the management of sensitive data on behalf of their producers and users (e.g., medical records, financial investment, energy market). Therefore, trusted interactions are needed more than ever, while accountability and transparency among the agents seem crucial characteristics to be achieved. To do so, recent trends advocate the use of blockchain technologies (BCT) in MAS. The blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that can execute programmable transaction logic, and provides a shared, immutable, and transparent append-only register of all the actions happening in the network. Although a few theoretical approaches have already been proposed, the quest for such a system consolidating BCT and MAS to guarantee privacy, scalability, transparency, and efficiency continues. This paper presents a reconciling system including BCT within the dynamics of a MAS. Such a system aims at (i) building a solid ground for trusted interactions and (ii) enabling more characterizing feature-based and trustworthy ways of computing agent reputation. The system has been tested in four scenarios with different configurations (regular executions and involving down-agents or malicious behaviors). Finally, the paper summarizes and discusses the experience gained, argues about the strategic choice of binding MAS and BCT, and presents some future challenges.
Blockchain technologies are rapidly gaining attention in the multi-agent systems (MAS) community to face critical issues such as trust, secured communications, and data consistency. In particular, the notion of smart contract can be exploited to deploy trustworthy computations automatically executed by the network in a consistent way. MAS coordination - modelling and engineering of agents interaction in a MAS - thus represents an appealing application field for smart contracts, potentially enabling fully-decentralised, trustworthy coordination. Along this line, we focus on the Ethereum blockchain technology, map it onto LINDA tuple-based coordination model, and discuss two proof-of-concept implementations of LINDA on Ethereum. We hence demonstrate conceptual and technical feasibility of blockchain-based coordination in MAS, while emphasising issues of applying the blockchain beyond accountability and identity management.
Wai Yan Maung Maung Thin, Naipeng Dong, Guangdong Bai, Jin Dong
Blockchain technology relies on consensus algorithms to resolve conflicts in Byzantine environments. New blockchain algorithms are rapidly designed and implemented without a properly conducted formal analysis and verification. In this paper, we conducted a study on Tendermint which is a proof-of-stake consensus algorithm. We verified that the consensus protocol is deadlock-free and is able to reach consensus when at least 2/3 of the network is in agreement. We also proved that a minority set of nodes that compose more than 1/3 of the network is enough to censor the majority of the network and prevent the network from reaching consensus and conclude that the algorithm has some shortcomings on availability.
The fundamental problem in digital record-keeping is establishing consensus on an update to a ledger, e.g., a payment. Consensus must be achieved in the presence of faults-situations in which some computers are offline or fail to function appropriately. Traditional centralized record-keeping systems rely on trust in a single entity to achieve consensus. Blockchains decentralize record-keeping, dispensing with the need for trust in a single entity, but some instead build a consensus based on the wasteful expenditure of computational resources (proof-of-work). An ideal method of consensus would be tolerant to faults, avoid the waste of computational resources, and be capable of implementing all individually rational transfers of value among agents. We prove a Blockchain Trilemma: any method of consensus, be it centralized or decentralized, must give up (i) fault-tolerance, (ii) resource-efficiency, or (iii) full transferability.
Many blockchain consensus protocols have been proposed recently to scale the throughput of a blockchain with available bandwidth. However, these protocols are becoming increasingly complex, making it more and more difficult to produce proofs of their security guarantees. We propose a novel permissionless blockchain protocol OHIE which explicitly aims for simplicity. OHIE composes as many parallel instances of Bitcoin's original (and simple) backbone protocol as needed to achieve excellent throughput. We formally prove the safety and liveness properties of OHIE. We demonstrate its performance with a prototype implementation and large-scale experiments with up to 50,000 nodes. In our experiments, OHIE achieves linear scaling with available bandwidth, providing about 4-10 Mbps transaction throughput (under 8-20 Mbps per-node available bandwidth configurations) and at least about 20x better decentralization over prior works.
Elvira Albert, Pablo Gordillo, Albert Rubio, Ilya Sergey
Gas is a measurement unit of the computational effort that it will take to execute every single operation that takes part in the Ethereum blockchain platform. Each instruction executed by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) has an associated gas consumption specified by Ethereum. If a transaction exceeds the amount of gas allotted by the user (known as gas limit), an out-of-gas exception is raised. There is a wide family of contract vulnerabilities due to out-of-gas behaviours. We report on the design and implementation of GASTAP, a Gas-Aware Smart contracT Analysis Platform, which takes as input a smart contract (either in EVM, disassembled EVM, or in Solidity source code) and automatically infers sound gas upper bounds for all its public functions. Our bounds ensure that if the gas limit paid by the user is higher than our inferred gas bounds, the contract is free of out-of-gas vulnerabilities.
Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in practice, mining power is quite concentrated. This fact is a persistent source of concern for the Bitcoin community. We provide an explanation using a simple model to capture miners' incentives to invest in equipment. In our model, $n$ miners compete for a prize of fixed size. Each miner chooses an investment $q_i$, incurring cost $c_i q_i$, and then receives reward $\frac{q_i^α}{\sum_j q_j^α}$, for some $α\geq 1$. When $c_i = c_j$ for all $i,j$, and $α= 1$, there is a unique equilibrium where all miners invest equally. However, we prove that under seemingly mild deviations from this model, equilibrium outcomes become drastically more centralized. In particular, (a) When costs are asymmetric, if miner $i$ chooses to invest, then miner $j$ has market share at least $1-\frac{c_j}{c_i}$. That is, if miner $j$ has costs that are (e.g.) $20\%$ lower than those of miner $i$, then miner $j$ must control at least $20\%$ of the \emph{total} mining power. (b) In the presence of economies of scale ($α> 1$), every market participant has a market share of at least $1-\frac{1}α$, implying that the market features at most $\fracα{α- 1}$ miners in total. We discuss the implications of our results for the future design of cryptocurrencies. In particular, our work further motivates the study of protocols that minimize "orphaned" blocks, proof-of-stake protocols, and incentive compatible protocols.
Permissioned Blockchain has become quite popular with enterprises forming consortium since it prioritizes trust over privacy. One of the popular platforms for distributed ledger solution,Hyperledger Fabric, requires a transaction to beendorsedor approved by a group of special members known as endorsers before undergoing validation. To endorse a transaction, an endorser mentions its identity along with the signature so that it can be verified later. However, for certain transactions, difference in opinion may exist among endorsers. Disclosing the identity of an endorser may lead to conflict within the consortium. In such cases, an endorsement policy which not only allows an endorser to support a transaction discreetly, but at the same time takes into account the decision of the majority is preferred. Thus we propose an Anonymous Endorsement System which uses a threshold endorsement policy in order to address the issue. To realize at-out-of-nendorsement policy, using any of the existing threshold ring signature for our endorsement system would have violated the privacy of endorsers as either the identity or the secret key of the endorsers get revealed to the party who recombines the signature after collecting each signature share. All these factors motivated us to design a new ring signature scheme, calledFabric’s Constant-Sized Linkable Ring Signature(FCsLRS) withTransaction-Orientedlinkability for hiding identity of the endorsers. We have implemented the signature scheme in Golang and analyzed its security and performance by varying the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) modulus size. Feasibility of implementation is supported by experimental analysis. Signature and tag generation time is quite fast and remains constant irrespective of change in message length or endorsement set size for a given RSA modulus value, assuming all the endorsers generates their signature in parallel. Each verifier is required to count and check individual valid ring signature. If the aggregate is above the threshold value, stated by the endorsement policy, then it confirms that the transaction is valid. This increases the verification time depending on the threshold value, but has very little effect on the scalability since generally$t<\!\!\!<n$. Lastly, we also discuss the integration of the scheme on v1.2 Hyperledger Fabric.
Blockchain systems benefit from lessons in prior art such as fault tolerance, distributed systems, peer-to-peer systems, and game theory. In this paper we argue that blockchain algorithms should tolerate both rational (self-interested) users and Byzantine (malicious) ones, rather than assuming all non-Byzantine users are altruistic and follow the protocols blindly. Such algorithms are called BAR-tolerant [1]. To design a BAR-tolerant system, one can follow these three steps: clearly define the utility function for the rational users, prove the algorithm is such that there is no benefit from unilaterally deviating (that is, it's a Byzantine Nash Equilibrium), then prove the algorithm correct assuming the rational actors follow the protocol. We present an example attack by rational users: the gatekeeping attack, where members of a system selfishly decide to prevent newcomers from joining. This attack may affect any stake-based system where the existing members prevent newcomers from making a stake, and essentially form a cartel. We then sketch a BAR-tolerant consensus protocol for blockchain that can defend against this attack. It relies on a strict order to decide who gets to propose a new block (so there's no need to race to solve a crypto puzzle) and it relies on hardware ID tokens to make sure every computer is only represented at most once as a block proposer to mitigate Sybil attacks. It also defends against the gatekeeper attack. The BAR-tolerant approach is naturally also applicable to other blockchain algorithms.
With the vigorous development of blockchain technology represented by Bitcoin, blockchain technology has gradually surpassed the era of programmable currency and entered the era of smart contracts. Smart contracts are event- driven and stateful. With the in-depth development of blockchain technology, smart contracts use protocols and user interfaces to complete all steps of the contract process, allowing users to implement personalized code logic on the blockchain. Contract technology has the characteristics of decentralization, autonomy, observability, verifiability, and information sharing. It can effectively build programmable finance and programmable society, and is widely used in digital payment, financial asset disposal, multi-signature contracts, cloud computing, Internet of Things, sharing economy and other fields. First, it explains the basic concepts, full life cycle, basic classification, basic structure, key technologies, development status and main technology platforms of smart contracts; then discusses the application scenarios and development issues of smart contract technology, aiming to provide smart contract technology. The research and development provides reference.
Financial settlement systems have long depended on batch-oriented processing pipelines that introduce substantial operational latency, delayed reconciliation cycles, and significant infrastructure overhead, limiting their ability to support increasingly real-time financial ecosystems. With the rapid growth of digital payments, algorithmic trading, and instantaneous fund transfers, financial institutions now require settlement architectures capable of sustaining high throughput, low-latency execution while ensuring correctness, durability, auditability, and strict regulatory compliance. This paper proposes a fully streaming-based settlement architecture built on Apache Kafka Streams, which provides distributed, stateful stream processing with exactly-once semantics, deterministic event ordering, and fault-tolerant recovery, combined with Apache Cassandra as a linearly scalable, highly available distributed state store for ledger materialization and durable transaction history. We outline essential design patterns such as idempotent event handling, monotonic ordering within partitions, ledger versioning strategies, and continuous reconciliation pipelines and examine how these patterns have been validated through publicly available prototypes and industrial implementations across the financial sector. Experimental findings demonstrate that integrating Kafka Streams with Cassandra enables near-real-time settlement processing with millisecond-range end-to-end latency and predictable fault recovery while preserving strong application-level consistency, ultimately offering a resilient and future-ready foundation for modern financial settlement infrastructures.
Ankur Sharma, Felix Schuhknecht, Divya Agrawal, Jens Dittrich
Within the last few years, a countless number of blockchain systems have emerged on the market, each one claiming to revolutionize the way of distributed transaction processing in one way or the other. Many blockchain features, such as byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), are indeed valuable additions in modern environments. However, despite all the hype around the technology, many of the challenges that blockchain systems have to face are fundamental transaction management problems. These are largely shared with traditional database systems, which have been around for decades already. These similarities become especially visible for systems, that blur the lines between blockchain systems and classical database systems. A great example of this is Hyperledger Fabric, an open-source permissioned blockchain system under development by IBM. By having a relaxed view on BFT, the transaction pipeline of Fabric highly resembles the workflow of classical distributed databases systems. This raises two questions: (1) Which conceptual similarities and differences do actually exist between a system such as Fabric and a classical distributed database system? (2) Is it possible to improve on the performance of Fabric by transitioning technology from the database world to blockchains and thus blurring the lines between these two types of systems even further? To tackle these questions, we first explore Fabric from the perspective of database research, where we observe weaknesses in the transaction pipeline. We then solve these issues by transitioning well-understood database concepts to Fabric, namely transaction reordering as well as early transaction abort. Our experimental evaluation shows that our improved version Fabric++ significantly increases the throughput of successful transactions over the vanilla version by up to a factor of 3x.
We investigate a family of bugs in blockchain-based smart contracts, which we call event-ordering (or EO) bugs. These bugs are intimately related to the dynamic ordering of contract events, i.e., calls of its functions on the blockchain, and enable potential exploits of millions of USD worth of Ether. Known examples of such bugs and prior techniques to detect them have been restricted to a small number of event orderings, typicall 1 or 2. Our work provides a new formulation of this general class of EO bugs as finding concurrency properties arising in long permutations of such events. The technical challenge in detecting our formulation of EO bugs is the inherent combinatorial blowup in path and state space analysis, even for simple contracts. We propose the first use of partial-order reduction techniques, using happen-before relations extracted automatically for contracts, along with several other optimizations built on a dynamic symbolic execution technique. We build an automatic tool called ETHRACER that requires no hints from users and runs directly on Ethereum bytecode. It flags 7-11% of over ten thousand contracts analyzed in roughly 18.5 minutes per contract, providing compact event traces that human analysts can run as witnesses. These witnesses are so compact that confirmations require only a few minutes of human effort. Half of the flagged contracts have subtle EO bugs, including in ERC-20 contracts that carry hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Ether. Thus, ETHRACER is effective at detecting a subtle yet dangerous class of bugs which existing tools miss.
Neville Grech, Michael Kong, Anton Jurisevic, Lexi Brent · 6 authors
Ethereum is a distributed blockchain platform, serving as an ecosystem for smart contracts: full-fledged inter-communicating programs that capture the transaction logic of an account. Unlike programs in mainstream languages, a gas limit restricts the execution of an Ethereum smart contract: execution proceeds as long as gas is available. Thus, gas is a valuable resource that can be manipulated by an attacker to provoke unwanted behavior in a victim's smart contract (e.g., wasting or blocking funds of said victim). Gas-focused vulnerabilities exploit undesired behavior when a contract (directly or through other interacting contracts) runs out of gas. Such vulnerabilities are among the hardest for programmers to protect against, as out-of-gas behavior may be uncommon in non-attack scenarios and reasoning about it is far from trivial. In this paper, we classify and identify gas-focused vulnerabilities, and present MadMax: a static program analysis technique to automatically detect gas-focused vulnerabilities with very high confidence. Our approach combines a control-flow-analysis-based decompiler and declarative program-structure queries. The combined analysis captures high-level domain-specific concepts (such as "dynamic data structure storage" and "safely resumable loops") and achieves high precision and scalability. MadMax analyzes the entirety of smart contracts in the Ethereum blockchain in just 10 hours (with decompilation timeouts in 8% of the cases) and flags contracts with a (highly volatile) monetary value of over $2.8B as vulnerable. Manual inspection of a sample of flagged contracts shows that 81% of the sampled warnings do indeed lead to vulnerabilities, which we report on in our experiment.
Zaynah Dargaye, Antonella Del Pozzo, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni
The paper presents Pluralize a formal logical framework able to extend the execution of blockchain transactions to events coming from external oracles, like external time, sensor data, human-made declarations, etc. These events are by essence non-reliable, since transaction execution can be triggered by information whose veracity cannot be established by the blockchain. To overcome this problem, the language features a first-order logic and an authority algebra to allow formal reasoning and establish accountability of agents for blockchain-enabled transactions. We provide an accountability model that allows to formally prove the accountability of agents by a formal proof locally executable by each agent of the blockchain.
Sang‐Min Choi, Jiho Park, Quan Nguyen, André Cronje
We describe \emph{Fantom}, a framework for asynchronous distributed systems. \emph{Fantom} is based on the Lachesis Protocol~\cite{lachesis01}, which uses asynchronous event transmission for practical Byzantine fault tolerance (pBFT) to create a leaderless, scalable, asynchronous Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). We further optimize the \emph{Lachesis Protocol} by introducing a permission-less network for dynamic participation. Root selection cost is further optimized by the introduction of an n-row flag table, as well as optimizing path selection by introducing domination relationships. We propose an alternative framework for distributed ledgers, based on asynchronous partially ordered sets with logical time ordering instead of blockchains. This paper builds upon the original proposed family of \emph{Lachesis-class} consensus protocols. We formalize our proofs into a model that can be applied to abstract asynchronous distributed system.
Alan T. Sherman, Farid Javani, Haibin Zhang, Enis Golaszewski
We explore the origins of blockchain technologies to better understand the enduring needs they address. We identify the five key elements of a blockchain, show embodiments of these elements, and examine how these elements come together to yield important properties in selected systems. To facilitate comparing the many variations of blockchains, we also describe the four crucial roles of blockchain participants common to all blockchains. Our historical exploration highlights the 1979 work of David Chaum whose vault system embodies many of the elements of blockchains.
The permissioned blockchain system has recently become popular in a wide range of scenarios, such as artificial intelligence, financial applications and the Internet of things, due to its dominance in terms of distribution, decentralization, reliability and security. However, the Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (PBFT) algorithm, which is currently adopted in such systems, sparks communication bottlenecks when the number of consensus nodes increases sharply, which seriously hinders large-scale applications. In this paper, we propose a scalable dynamic multi-agent hierarchical PBFT algorithm (SDMA-PBFT), which reduces the communication costs from O(n2) to O( n × k × log k n ). Specifically, SDMA-PBFT forms multiple autonomous systems at each agent node in which message multicasting can be efficiently carried out and the internal voting results can be effectively collected. Therefore, the design of these agent nodes facilitates the in-and-out operations of consensus nodes in the blockchain system. Simulation results show that our proposed algorithm substantially outperforms the PBFT algorithm in terms of latency. Hence, it can be applied to the permissioned blockchain system effectively and efficiently.
The celebrated Nakamoto consensus protocol [16] ushered in several new consensus applications including cryptocurrencies. A few recent works [7, 17] have analyzed important properties of blockchains, including most significantly, consistency, which is a guarantee that all honest parties output the same sequence of blocks throughout the execution of the protocol. To establish consistency, the prior analysis of Pass, Seeman and Shelat [17] required a careful counting of certain combinatorial events that was difficult to apply to variations of Nakamoto. The work of Garay, Kiayas, and Leonardas [7] provides another method of analyzing the blockchain under the simplifying assumption that the network was synchronous. The contribution of this paper is the development of a simple Markov-chain based method for analyzing consistency properties of blockchain protocols. The method includes a formal way of stating strong concentration bounds as well as easy ways to concretely compute the bounds. We use our new method to answer a number of basic questions about consistency of blockchains: Our new analysis provides a tighter guarantee on the consistency property of Nakamoto's protocol, including for parameter regimes which [17] could not consider; We analyze a family of delaying attacks first presented in [17], and extend them to other protocols; We analyze how long a participant should wait before considering a high-value transaction "confirmed"; We analyze the consistency of CliqueChain, a variation of the Chainweb [14] system; We provide the first rigorous consistency analysis of GHOST [20] and also analyze a folklore "balancing"-attack. In each case, we use our framework to experimentally analyze the consensus bounds for various network delay parameters and adversarial computing percentages. We hope our techniques enable authors of future blockchain proposals to provide a more rigorous analysis of their schemes.
Decentralization, which has backed the hyper growth of many blockchains, comes at the cost of scalability. To understand this fundamental limitation, this paper proposes a quantitative measure of blockchain decentralization, and discusses its implications to various trust models and consensus algorithms. Further, we identify the major challenges in blockchain decentralization. Our key findings are that true decentralization is hard to achieve due to the skewed mining power and that a fully decentralized blockchain inherently limits scalability as it incurs a throughput upper bound and prevents scaling smart contract execution. To address these challenges, we outline three research directions to explore the trade-offs between decentralization and scalability.
Blockchains are tamper evident and tamper resistant digital ledgers implemented in a distributed fashion (i.e., without a central repository) and usually without a central authority (i.e., a bank, company, or government). At their basic level, they enable a community of users to record transactions in a shared ledger within that community, such that under normal operation of the blockchain network no transaction can be changed once published. This document provides a high-level technical overview of blockchain technology. The purpose is to help readers understand how blockchain technology works.
Proof-of-stake (PoS) is a promising approach for designing efficient blockchains, where block proposers are randomly chosen with probability proportional to their stake. A primary concern with PoS systems is the "rich getting richer" phenomenon, whereby wealthier nodes are more likely to get elected, and hence reap the block reward, making them even wealthier. In this paper, we introduce the notion of equitability, which quantifies how much a proposer can amplify her stake compared to her initial investment. Even with everyone following protocol (i.e., honest behavior), we show that existing methods of allocating block rewards lead to poor equitability, as does initializing systems with small stake pools and/or large rewards relative to the stake pool. We identify a \emph{geometric} reward function, which we prove is maximally equitable over all choices of reward functions under honest behavior and bound the deviation for strategic actions; the proofs involve the study of optimization problems and stochastic dominances of Polya urn processes, and are of independent mathematical interest. These results allow us to provide a systematic framework to choose the parameters of a practical incentive system for PoS cryptocurrencies.