Bitcoin as concept was coined in 2009 and can be described as a partly open and shared transactional database. What makes bitcoin unique is that for the first time, we can prove and move ownership of anything digital without a central authority. The technology facilitates many benefits, one being a worldwide, digital currency and we observe that some stores allow payments in bitcoin. Drawing on concepts from the Diffusion of Innovation theory we investigated: What are the end-users’ motivations and barriers for using bitcoin as digital currency? Through a small survey, we collected 135 answers during the summer of 2016. Our findings include that the bitcoin users embrace bitcoin due to technological curiosity, thus an individual reason. The largest group, the non-users, state that they are awaiting for others to start using bitcoin, as they question the value and security issues. We conclude that we may witness a deadlock where “everybody waits for everybody”, and that more research is needed.
Christian Badertscher, Ueli Maurer, Daniel Tschudi, Vassilis Zikas
Abstract Bitcoin is one of the most prominent examples of a distributed cryptographic protocol that is extensively used in reality. Nonetheless, existing security proofs are property-based, and as such they do not support composition. In this work, we put forth a universally composable treatment of the Bitcoin protocol. We specify the goal that Bitcoin aims to achieve as an instance of a parameterizable ledger functionality and present a UC abstraction of the Bitcoin blockchain protocol. Our ideal functionality is weaker than the first proposed candidate by Kiayias, Zhou, and Zikas [EUROCRYPT’16], but unlike the latter suggestion, which is arguably not implementable by the UC Bitcoin protocol, we prove that the one proposed here is securely UC-realized by the protocol assuming access to a global clock, to model time-based executions, a random oracle, to model hash functions, and an idealized network, to model message dissemination. We further show how known property-based approaches can be cast as special instances of our treatment and how their underlying assumptions can be cast in UC as part of the setup functionalities and without restricting the environment or the adversary.
Abstract Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.
Jan 1, 2017·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Blockchain is an emerging technology that is perceived as groundbreaking. However, blockchain presents incumbent organizations with significant challenges. How should they respond to the advent of this innovative technology, and how can they build the capabilities that are necessary to successfully engage with blockchain? In this case study, we analyze how an incumbent bank deals with the radical innovation of blockchain. We find that blockchain as an innovation is unique, because its transaction cost-lowering nature requires cooperation not only on an intra-organizational, but also on an inter-organizational level to fully leverage the technology. We develop a framework illustrating how the process of discovering, incubating, and accelerating with blockchain can look like. Our research is one of the first case studies in the area; shedding light on the organizational challenges of incumbents as they engage with blockchain. The paper provides a blueprint for business executives in their endeavor of embracing blockchain technology.
Jan 1, 2017·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Juho Lindman, Virpi Kristiina Tuunainen, Matti Rossi
Blockchain technologies offer new open source-based opportunities for developing new types of digital platforms and services. While research on the topic is emerging, it has this far been predominantly focused to technical and legal issues. To broaden our understanding of blockchain technology based services and platforms, we build on earlier literature on payments and payment platforms and propose a research agenda divided into three focal areas of 1) organizational issues; 2) issues related to the competitive environment; and 3) technology design issues. We discuss several salient themes within each of these areas, and derive a set of research question for each theme, highlighting the need to address both risks and opportunities for users, as well as different types of stakeholder organizations. With this research agenda, we contribute to the discussion on future avenues for Information Systems research on blockchain technology based platforms and services.
Jan 1, 2017·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Technological innovation and consequential decentralisation are driving forces in the ongoing evolution and increasing openness of digital infrastructures and services. One of the most discussed and allegedly disruptive innovations is the distributed database technology referred to as blockchain. Although it is still in its technological infancy, experimental adoption and customization seem to be in full progress in various potential fields of application ranging from decentralized grids for computation and storage to global financial services. However, the technology and its path of development still entail a lot of common unknowns for practitioners and researchers alike. Especially regarding the question how the technology could amend or be incorporated into the existing landscape of digital services, processes and infrastructures. Hence, in this article we develop an ontology that (1) clearly delineates common terminology, core concepts and components, their relationships as well as innovative features of blockchain technology. It further (2) connects these insights with implications for relevant types of digital market models. Our framework is of high theoretical and practical value as it provides researchers and practitioners a common basis for communication and means for guided analysis of blockchain applicability.
Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space through smart contracts. Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information that necessarily alters the informational environment. We analyze how decentralization relates to consensus quality and how the quintessential features of blockchain remold the landscape of competition. Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet distributing information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion. In general, blockchains sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes. We further discuss the implications for antitrust policies targeted at blockchain applications. Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision May 29, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein.
Like how VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) disrupted cross‐border telephony, Bitcoin will bring huge savings and improved service in cross‐border payments and will therefore create the MoIP (Money over Internet Protocol) (Pantera Capital). Anhand einiger typischer Gradmesser der Netzwerkökonomie soll in der Folge aufgezeigt werden, welche massive Entwicklung das von Satoshi Nakamoto vorgeschlagene neue kryptografische Transaktionssystem innerhalb einer Zeitspanne von gut sechs Jahren genommen hat.
…the more it is adopted by a mass of users, the more it is secured (Counterparty). Inwieweit, ob und welche Kryptowährung schlussendlich langfristig weltweit akzeptiert wird, ist Thema zahlreicher und vielfältiger Diskussionen. Innerhalb der verschiedenen Kryptowährungen hat das Bitcoin‐System eindeutig einen massiven Vorsprung. Vorstellbar ist jedoch auch analog des Konzepts des freien Wettbewerbs unter den Währungen vom österreichischen Ökonomen Friedrich August von Hayek ein Nebeneinander verschiedenster Kryptowährungen. Jeder dieser Kryptowährungen könnte ein Wert durch eine Gruppe von Menschen, die sich dafür entscheiden, dieser Währung zu vertrauen, beigemessen werden. Diese Gruppe kann durch gemeinsame demografische, geografische oder ethische Interessen definiert werden. Damit Kryptowährungen jedoch von der breiten Öffentlichkeit genutzt werden, bedarf es noch Vor allem aber braucht es Akzeptanz und Nutzung der Kryptowährungen in der breiten Öffentlichkeit und hier liefert die Gratis‐Bitcoin‐Ökosphäre, bestehend aus Hunderten Faucet‐Webseiten, einen großen Beitrag.
Talent hits a target others cannot hit, Genius hits a target others cannot see (Arthur Schopenhauer). Bereits 2013 begannen sich neue Kryptowährungsunternehmen zu formieren, die sich von der Wild‐West‐Mentalität der Mt. Gox und der Silk Road abgrenzen wollten. Die entstehenden Kryptowährungsdienstleister – großteils finanziert von US Venture Capital-Gebern – unterwerfen sich teils freiwillig den Know Your Customer (KYC) Bestimmungen der Finanzaufsichtsbehören. Gleichzeitig entstanden Kryptowährungsstartups, deren Gründer die Meinung vertraten, dass eine Kooperation mit den Finanzinstituten bzw. den Fiatwährungen statt Konfrontation wirtschaftlich sinnvoller wäre und damit begannen, neue Kryptotransaktionssysteme mit dieser Zielrichtung zu entwickeln (beispielsweise Ripple Lab vgl. auch Abschn. 14.2.). Zeitgleich – auch hier spielten die Interessen der investierten Venture-Capital-Geber eine wichtige Rolle – begannen Startups intensiv am Einsatz des Bitcoin‐Transaktionssystems für alternative Zwecke zu arbeiten. Dabei wird unterschieden in:
This paper analyses the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts in a smart grid context. Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a two-sided electricity platform market are discussed. The research is based on original data from a discrete choice experiment on electricity service contracts that was conducted with 1,892 electricity consumers in Great Britain in 2015. We estimate a flexible mixed logit model in willingness to pay space and exploit the results in posterior analysis. The findings suggest that while consumers are willing to pay for technical support services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying data and to participate in automated demand response programs involving remote monitoring and control of electricity usage. Cross-subsidisation of consumers combining appropriate participation payments with sharing of bill savings could incentivise participation of the number of consumers required to provide the optimal level of demand response. We also examine the preference heterogeneity to suggest how, by targeting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce their customer acquisition costs.
Current regulation of decentralized ledger technology leaves industry actors in confusion, facing high risk, and confronting significant disincentives to innovate. This Article argues that an endogenous regulatory approach offers an avenue for alleviating these obstacles while still providing sufficient tools for government oversight. In particular, this Article proposes regulation that is endogenous at two levels: first, in that it is created through an iterative, cooperative process involving both regulators and industry actors, and second, that it is implemented as regulation-through-code, that is, regulation written into the code itself. In so doing, this Article also investigates whether successful implementation of such an approach could disrupt the dichotomous choice between ex ante and ex post regulation in the financial and other spheres. This Article first examines the current regulatory landscape facing decentralized ledger technologies, including payments applications such as bitcoin. This Article then discusses ways in which these regulatory approaches have failed to keep pace with the technology and, as a result, are impeding innovation in a variety of sectors. This Article next outlines criteria for improving the regulatory landscape applicable to decentralized ledger technologies, evaluating alternative models of regulation in light of the criteria, and concluding that most such proposals continue to leave a regulatory lacunae. Drawing on theories of endogenous economic regulation, endogenous development, comparative law’s functional method and financial regulation, this Article attempts to fill the gap by proposing that decentralized technologies, including decentralized payment systems such as bitcoin, are robust enough to support a theory of endogenous, technology-assisted regulation.
This Note will undertake to analyze bitcoin under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)—two important sources of commercial law—to see whether any existing asset categories adequately protect bitcoin’s commercial viability. This Note will demonstrate that although commercial law dictates that bitcoin should—nay must—be regulated as a currency in order to sustain its existence, the very definition of currency seems to preclude that from happening. Therefore, this Note will recommend that we experiment with a new type of asset that receives currency-like treatment, specifically designed for cryptocurrencies, under which bitcoin can be categorized in order to preserve its commercial feasibility and to give legal regulatory clarity.
Die vorliegende Bachelorarbeit gibt einen Uberblick uber die Funktionsweise und Auswirkungen der Blockchain-Technologie auf den Wertpapierhandel. Dabei werden zunachst die essentiellen, technischen Grundlagen der Kryptografie und Dezentralisierung am Beispiel der fuhrenden Kryptowahrung Bitcoin untersucht. Danach werden die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse mit einer SWOT-Analyse auf den Wertpapierhandelsprozess angewandt und es wird die Implementierung eines Distributed Ledgers auf Chancen und Risiken fur die Finanzmarkte hin evaluiert. Als Essenz der Literaturauswertung ist festzustellen, dass die Starken der DLT nur nach Einigung auf einen technischen Marktstandard voll abgeschopft werden konnen. Die Basis der Bachelorarbeit sind aktuelle Studien und Arbeitspapiere von Regulierungsbehorden, Beratungsunternehmen und Finanzdienstleistern aus Europa und den USA zur Auswirkung der Distributed Ledger Technology auf den Wertpapierhandel sowie die Fachbucher und Arbeitspapiere von Narayanan (2016) und Nakamoto (2008) zur Funktionsweise der Blockchain-Technologie. Durch die Verknupfung von Informationstechnologie und Finanzwirtschaft erhofft sich der Autor einen interdisziplinaren Erkenntnisgewinn uber aktuelle Entwicklungen auf den Finanzmarkten.
Christian Thiel, Christopher Brown, Mario Hellenkamp, Marius Spancken
Der Abschlussbericht fasst die Ergebnisse des Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprojektes 2015/2016 im Studiengang Master of Science Wirtschaftsinformatik (FH Münster) zur Themenstellung "Kryptowährungen und Smart Contracts" zusammen. Das Projekt analysierte die Einsatzzwecke, Potenziale und Architekturen von Blockchain-Anwendungen. Des Weiteren wurden verschiedene Fragestellungen zum Nutzen der Blockchain-Technologie in modernen Geschäftsprozessen und zu den technischen Herausforderungen mittels der Entwicklung zweier Prototypen betrachtet. Der erste Prototyp realisiert eine eigene Blockchain, in der verschiedene Angriffsszenarien durchgespielt werden können. Der zweite Prototyp realisiert eine Clearinghouse-Anwendung in Form einer verteilten Smart-Contract-Implementierung (in Ethereum). Der Bericht vermittelt einen Überblick über Ansätze, Strukturen, interne Abläufe und Rahmenbedingungen aktueller Blockchain-Implementierungen. Die erzielten Ergebnisse verdeutlichen neben dem Nutzen auch die Besonderheiten und Einschränkungen der Blockchain-Technologie.
In this article, we review the recent developments in the digital currency landscape. We survey the economic drivers that led to the creation of digital currencies and show that they are a natural step in the evolution of means of payment. We overview two major classes of digital currencies, cryptocurrencies and platform-based digital currencies and discuss how the design of such currencies affects the incentives of their users and ultimately their popularity. Finally, we discuss competition in the digital currency market.
At Bitcoin’s peak in November 2013, there were 93,000 global transactions made in a single day. These users purchased everyday items such as personal services, food, and real estate. This alone suggests that Bitcoin is not primarily used as a long-term investment tool, but rather is used as a currency and a vehicle for global transactions. Congress and the IRS should regulate it accordingly. Representative Stockman’s Virtual Currency Reform Act offered an attempt to negate the IRS decision and officially classify Bitcoin and other virtual currencies as currency instead of property. A tax reclassification would alleviate typical users’ many inconveniences caused by burdensome accounting and tax reporting. A reclassification would also allow and encourage the use of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies because imposing a sales tax on transactions similar to everyday currencies is a small change that most users would not find prohibitive or restrictive. While it is evident that there needs to be some form of IRS taxation of virtual currencies, attempting to classify Bitcoin according to existing tax principles is challenging and ineffective.\nAlthough this is new technology and subsequently uncharted territory for many doctrines of law, the technology should be embraced and encouraged to prosper. For example, typical sales tax on transactions made on the internet are currently an unsolved dilemma. It gets even trickier trying to throw virtual currencies into the mix. Between complex tax law, jurisdictional issues, and the constant globalization of our economy, challenging legal questions will arise. Classifying certain Bitcoin transactions for a sales tax instead of a capital gains and losses tax is the first step in the right direction toward answering these difficult questions and encouraging the use of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies to further global trade in the future.
This paper reports the outcome of a series of interviews and focus group meetings with professionals working in post-trade processing and the provision of mutual distributed ledger services. The objective was to elicit and document views on three research hypotheses about the potential impact of mutual distributed ledger technology (‘blockchain’) on post-trade processing global securities markets. \n\nThese hypotheses are (a) on the appropriate access to mutual distributed ledger; (b) on whether change would be piecemeal or ‘big bang’; and (c) on the extent to which applying mutual distributed ledger in securities settlement would require major changes in business processes. Our research finds that while the use of blockchain to validate operational data in mutual distributed ledgers can yield substantial reductions in both cost and risk, the concept of data sharing itself is far from new. Current interest in mutual distributed ledgers has established significant momentum, but there is a danger of building unrealistic expectations of the extent to which the technology on its own will address the underlying need for co-ordination of business processes both within and between firms. Achieving all the potential benefits from mutual distributed ledgers will require board level buy-in to a substantial commitment of time and resource, and active regulatory support for process reform, with relatively little short term payoff.
The decentralized digital currency Bitcoin - and its underlying "blockchain" technology - has created much excitement in the technology community, but its potential for building truly empowering social and solidarity-based finance has yet to be tested. This paper provides a primer on the basics of Bitcoin and discusses the existent narratives about the technology´s potential to facilitate remittances, financial inclusion, cooperative structures and even micro-insurance systems. It also flags up potential points of concern and conflict; such as the tech-from-above "solutionism" and conservative libertarian political dynamics of some of the technology start-up community that surrounds Bitcoin. As a way of contrast the paper considers "blockchain 2.0" technologies with more overtly communitarian ideals and their potential for creating "cooperation at scale". It concludes with suggestions for future research.
We analyze how network effects affect competition in the nascent cryptocurrency market. We do so by examining early dynamics of exchange rates among different cryptocurrencies. While Bitcoin eventually dominates this market, our data suggest no evidence of a winner-take-all effect early in the market. Indeed, for a relatively long period, a few other cryptocurrencies competing with Bitcoin (the early industry leader) appreciated much more quickly than Bitcoin. The data in this period are consistent with the use of cryptocurrencies as financial assets (popularized by Bitcoin), and not consistent with winner-take-all dynamics. Toward the end of our sample, however, things change dramatically. Bitcoin appreciates against the USD, while other currencies depreciate against the USD. The data in this period are consistent with strong network effects and winner-take-all dynamics. This trend continues as at the time of writing.