Cryptocurrencies have seen a massive surge in popularity and behind these new virtual currencies is an innovative technology called the block chain: a distributed digital ledger in which cryptocurrency transactions are recorded after having been verified. The transactions within a ledger are verified by multiple clients or "validators," within the cryptocurrency's peer-to-peer network using one of many varied consensus algorithms for resolving the problem of reliability in a network involving multiple unreliable nodes. The most widely used consensus algorithms are the Proof of Work (PoW) algorithm and the Proof of Stake (PoS) algorithm; however, there are also other consensus algorithms which utilize alternative implementations of PoW and PoS, as well as other hybrid implementations and some altogether new consensus strategies. In this paper, we perform a comparative analysis of typical consensus algorithms and some of their contemporaries that are currently in use in modern blockchains. Our analysis focuses on the algorithmic steps taken by each consensus algorithm, the scalability of the algorithm, the method the algorithm rewards validators for their time spent verifying blocks, and the security risks present within the algorithm. Finally, we present our conclusion and some possible future trends for consensus algorithms used in block chains.
Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Bruno Biais, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni
In this paper we analyze from the game theory point of view Byzantine Fault Tolerant blockchains when processes exhibit rational or Byzantine behavior. Our work is the first to model the Byzantine-consensus based blockchains as a committee coordination game. Our first contribution is to offer a game-theoretical methodology to analyse equilibrium interactions between Byzantine and rational committee members in Byzantine Fault Tolerant blockchains. Byzantine processes seek to inflict maximum damage to the system, while rational processes best-respond to maximise their expected net gains. Our second contribution is to derive conditions under which consensus properties are satisfied or not in equilibrium. When the majority threshold is lower than the proportion of Byzantine processes, invalid blocks are accepted in equilibrium. When the majority threshold is large, equilibrium can involve coordination failures , in which no block is ever accepted. However, when the cost of accepting invalid blocks is large, there exists an equilibrium in which blocks are accepted iff they are valid.
We consider the problem of expected cost analysis over nondeterministic probabilistic programs, which aims at automated methods for analyzing the resource-usage of such programs. Previous approaches for this problem could only handle nonnegative bounded costs. However, in many scenarios, such as queuing networks or analysis of cryptocurrency protocols, both positive and negative costs are necessary and the costs are unbounded as well. In this work, we present a sound and efficient approach to obtain polynomial bounds on the expected accumulated cost of nondeterministic probabilistic programs. Our approach can handle (a) general positive and negative costs with bounded updates in variables; and (b) nonnegative costs with general updates to variables. We show that several natural examples which could not be handled by previous approaches are captured in our framework. Moreover, our approach leads to an efficient polynomial-time algorithm, while no previous approach for cost analysis of probabilistic programs could guarantee polynomial runtime. Finally, we show the effectiveness of our approach by presenting experimental results on a variety of programs, motivated by real-world applications, for which we efficiently synthesize tight resource-usage bounds.
We give a straightforward proof for the formula giving the long-term apparent hashrate of the Selfish Mining strategy in Bitcoin using only elementary probabilities and combinatorics, and more precisely, Dyck words. There is no need to compute stationary probabilities on Markov chain nor stopping times for Poisson processes as it was previously done. We consider also several other block withholding strategies.
To address the large amount of energy wasted by blockchains, we propose a decentralized consensus protocol for blockchains in which the computation can be used to search for good approximate solutions to any optimization problem. Our protocol allows the wasted energy to be used for finding approximate solutions to problems submitted by any nodes~(called clients). Our protocol works in a similar way to proof-of-work, and it makes nodes evaluate a large number of solution candidates to add a new block to the chain. A client provides a search program that implements any search algorithm that finds a good solution by evaluating a large number of solution candidates. The node that finds the best approximate solution is rewarded by the client. Our analysis shows that the probability of a fork and the variance in the block time with our protocol are lower than those in proof-of-work.
Since the inception of blockchain and Bitcoin (Nakamoto (2008)), a decentralized-distributed ledger system and its associated cryptocurrency, respectively, the world has witnessed a slew of newer adaptations and applications. Although the original distributed ledger technology (DLT) of blockchain is deemed secure and decentralized, the confirmation of transactions is inefficient by design. Recently adopted, directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledgers validate transactions efficiently without the physically and environmentally costly building process of blocks (Lerner (2015)). However, centrally-controlled confirmation against the odds of multiple validation disqualifies the DAG as a decentralized-distributed ledger. In this regard, we introduce an innovative DLT by reconstructing a chain of antichains based on a given DAG-pool of transactions. Each antichain (box) contains distinct nodes whose approved transactions are recursively validated by subsequently augmenting nodes. The boxer node closes the box and keeps the hash of all transactions confirmed by the box-genesis node. Designation of boxers and box-geneses is conditionally randomized for decentralization. The boxes are serially concatenated with recursive confirmation (boxchain) without incurring the cost of box generation. Rewards (boxcoin) are paid to the contributing nodes of the ecosystem whose trust is built on the doubly-secure protocol of confirmation. A value-preserving medium of payment (boxdollar) is among numerous practical applications discussed herein.
Blockmania is a byzantine consensus protocol. Nodes emit blocks forming a directed acyclic graph (block DAG) that is subsequently interpreted by each node separately to ensure consensus with safety, liveness and finality. The resulting system has communication complexity $O(N^2)$ even in the worse case, and very low constant factors --- as compared to $O(N^4)$ for PBFT; it is leaderless; and network operations do not depend on the composition of the quorum or node stake. This makes Blockmania very efficient (leading to over 400K transactions per second on a wide area network), and ideal for dynamic membership and flexible and non-interrupted proof-of-stake protocols. A X-Blockmania variant, has $O(N)$ communication cost but also higher latency $O(\log N)$.
This project was focused on designing a tool for optimizing complex transactions in a traditional bank accounts, Bitcoin wallet accounts and Bitcoin exchanges. The challenges include transference fees eroding the amounts transferred, Bitcoin volatility and arbitrage. The tool should support hundreds of accounts with each account identifi ed by a bank or exchange, and a currency. The basic user-case, we call it Debit Scenario, appears when an account consumes it capital and has very little funding (sink or demand account), then the user set a minimum funding for the account, and we need to balance all the accounts of the network, using many currency circulations though many paths to satisfy the specifi ed funding limits. Another user case, we called it Custodian Scenario, is when certain accounts (i.e. supply or non-custodians) has upper limit on the amount of capital so we need to distribute the excess value in other accounts (i.e. demand or custodians) of the network. The problem was modelled as a multi-commodity min-cost max- flow problem with specifi c constraints including arbitrage information, and solved with linear programming. Simple and complex numerical scenarios are presented too.
Blockchain is an emerging technology that gained a lot of attention in the last years. Many different consensus protocols have been proposed to improve both the scalability and the resilience of existing blockchain. However, all these solutions have been defined for rather static settings. We propose a modular approach for analysing and comparing different consensus protocols used in blockchain under churn.
Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou, Antonella Del Pozzo, Maria Potop-Butucaru, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni
Tendermint-core blockchains (e.g. Cosmos) are considered today one of the most viable alternatives for the highly energy consuming proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Their particularity is that they aim at offering strong consistency (no forks) in an open system combining two ingredients (i) a set of validators that generate blocks via a variant of Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) consensus protocol and (ii) a selection strategy that dynamically selects nodes to be validators for the next block via a proof-of-stake mechanism. However,the exact assumptions on the system model under which Tendermint underlying algorithms are correct and the exact properties Tendermint verifies have never been formally analyzed. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, while formalizing Tendermint algorithms we precisely characterize the system model and the exact problem solved by Tendermint. We prove that in eventual synchronous systems a modified version of Tendermint solves (i) under additional assumptions, a variant of one-shot consensus for the validation of one single block and (ii) a variant of the repeated consensus problem for multiple blocks. These results hold even if the set of validators is hit by Byzantine failures, provided that for each one-shot consensus instance less than one third of the validators is Byzantine. Our second contribution relates to the fairness of the rewarding mechanism. It is common knowledge that in permisionless blockchain systems the main threat is the tragedy of commons that may yield the system to collapse if the rewarding mechanism is not adequate. Ad minimum the rewarding mechanism must be fair, i.e.distributing the rewards in proportion to the merit of participants. We prove, for the first time in blockchain systems, that in repeated-consensus based blockchains there exists an (eventual) fair rewarding mechanism if and only if the system is (eventual) synchronous. We also show that the original Tendermint rewarding is not fair, however, a modification of the original protocol makes it eventually fair.
Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antonella Del Pozzo, Romaric Ludinard, Maria Potop-Butucaru · 5 authors
The presented work continues the line of recent distributed computing community efforts dedicated to the theoretical aspects of blockchains. This paper is the first to specify blockchains as a composition of abstract data types all together with a hierarchy of consistency criteria that formally characterizes the histories admissible for distributed programs that use them. Our work is based on an original oracle-based construction that, along with new consistency definitions, captures the eventual convergence process in blockchain systems. The paper presents as well some results on implementability of the presented abstractions and a mapping of representative existing blockchains from both academia and industry in our framework.
Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, Kishori M. Konwar, Nicolas Nicolaou
Despite the hype about blockchains and distributed ledgers, no formal abstraction of these objects has been proposed. To face this issue, in this paper we provide a proper formulation of a distributed ledger object. In brief, we define a ledger object as a sequence of records, and we provide the operations and the properties that such an object should support. Implementation of a ledger object on top of multiple (possibly geographically dispersed) computing devices gives rise to the distributed ledger object. In contrast to the centralized object, distribution allows operations to be applied concurrently on the ledger, introducing challenges on the consistency of the ledger in each participant. We provide the definitions of three well known consistency guarantees in terms of the operations supported by the ledger object: (1) atomic consistency (linearizability), (2) sequential consistency, and (3) eventual consistency. We then provide implementations of distributed ledgers on asynchronous message passing crash-prone systems using an Atomic Broadcast service, and show that they provide eventual, sequential or atomic consistency semantics. We conclude with a variation of the ledger - the validated ledger - which requires that each record in the ledger satisfies a particular validation rule.
An atomic cross-chain swap is a distributed coordination task where multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains, for example, trading bitcoin for ether. An atomic swap protocol guarantees (1) if all parties conform to the protocol, then all swaps take place, (2) if some coalition deviates from the protocol, then no conforming party ends up worse off, and (3) no coalition has an incentive to deviate from the protocol. A cross-chain swap is modeled as a directed graph ${\cal D}$, whose vertexes are parties and whose arcs are proposed asset transfers. For any pair $({\cal D},L)$, where ${\cal D} = (V,A)$ is a strongly-connected directed graph and $L \subset V$ a feedback vertex set for ${\cal D}$, we give an atomic cross-chain swap protocol for ${\cal D}$, using a form of hashed timelock contracts, where the vertexes in $L$ generate the hashlocked secrets. We show that no such protocol is possible if ${\cal D}$ is not strongly connected, or if ${\cal D}$ is strongly connected but $L$ is not a feedback vertex set. The protocol has time complexity $O(diam({\cal D}))$ and space complexity (bits stored on all blockchains) $O(|A|^2)$.
Consensus protocols inherently rely on the notion of leader election, in which one or a subset of participants are temporarily elected to authorize and announce the network's latest state. While leader election is a well studied problem, the rise of distributed ledgers (i.e., blockchains) has led to a new perspective on how to perform large-scale leader elections via solving a computationally difficult puzzle (i.e., proof of work). In this paper, we present Caucus, a large-scale leader election protocol with minimal coordination costs that does not require the computational cost of proof-of-work. We evaluate Caucus in terms of its security, using a new model for blockchain-focused leader election, before testing an implementation of Caucus on an Ethereum private network. Our experiments highlight that one variant of Caucus costs only $0.10 per leader election if deployed on Ethereum.
Abstract Blockchain technology is transforming traditional financial systems. Cross-border money remittance industry is in a crossroad being challenged. The traditional SWIFT system is facing new comers like Ripple system which is based on the blockchain distributed ledger technology with its own crypto tokens. This paper conducts a SWOT analysis on both technologies to find out whether the blockchain technology has the potential to transform a traditional industry and how this may be possible. We conclude that Ripple has all of the advantages over SWIFT despite some minor issues. In short-term, SWIFT will still take the lead in the remittance market due to the economy of scale. However, in long-term, emerging technology like Ripple will eventually revolutionize the remittance industry or even other financial systems.
Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, Nicolas Nicolaou
In his PODC’2017 keynote address, Maurice Herlihy pointed out that despite the hype about blockchains and distributed ledgers, no formal abstraction of these objects has been proposed. To face this issue, in this paper we provide a proper formulation of a distributed ledger object. In brief, we define a ledger object as a sequence of records, and we provide the operations and the properties that such an object should support. We then provide a variation of the ledger – the validated ledger – which requires that each record in the ledger satisfies a particular validation rule. A (validated) ledger is distributed if it is implemented on top of multiple (possibly geographically dispersed) computing devices.
Almost all real world activities have been digitized and there are various client server architecture based systems in place to handle them. These are all based on trust on third parties. There is an active attempt to successfully implement blockchain based systems which ensures that the IT systems are immutable, double spending is avoided and cryptographic strength is provided to them. A successful implementation of blockchain as backbone of existing information technology systems is bound to eliminate various types of fraud and ensure quicker delivery of the item on trade. To adapt IT systems to blockchain architecture, an efficient consensus algorithm need to be designed. Blockchain based on proof of work first came up as the backbone of cryptocurrency. After this, several other methods with variety of interesting features have come up. In this paper, we conduct a survey on existing attempts to achieve consensus in block chain. A federated consensus method and a proof of validation method are being compared.
We give an explicit definition of decentralization and show you that\ndecentralization is almost impossible for the current stage and Bitcoin is the\nfirst truly noncentralized currency in the currency history. We propose a new\nframework of noncentralized cryptocurrency system with an assumption of the\nexistence of a weak adversary for a bank alliance. It abandons the mining\nprocess and blockchain, and removes history transactions from data\nsynchronization. We propose a consensus algorithm named Converged Consensus for\na noncentralized cryptocurrency system.\n
The minmax regret problem for combinatorial optimization under uncertainty\ncan be viewed as a zero-sum game played between an optimizing player and an\nadversary, where the optimizing player selects a solution and the adversary\nselects costs with the intention of maximizing the regret of the player. The\nexisting minmax regret model considers only deterministic solutions/strategies,\nand minmax regret versions of most polynomial solvable problems are NP-hard. In\nthis paper, we consider a randomized model where the optimizing player selects\na probability distribution (corresponding to a mixed strategy) over solutions\nand the adversary selects costs with knowledge of the player's distribution,\nbut not its realization. We show that under this randomized model, the minmax\nregret version of any polynomial solvable combinatorial problem becomes\npolynomial solvable. This holds true for both the interval and discrete\nscenario representations of uncertainty. Using the randomized model, we show\nnew proofs of existing approximation algorithms for the deterministic model\nbased on primal-dual approaches. Finally, we prove that minmax regret problems\nare NP-hard under general convex uncertainty.\n
In recent decades, there has been an increasing interest in systems comprised of several autonomous mobile robots, and as a result, there has been a substantial amount of development in the eld of Articial Intelligence, especially in Robotics. There are several studies in the literature by some researchers from the scientic community that focus on the creation of intelligent machines and devices capable to imitate the functions and movements of living beings. Multi-Robot Systems (MRS) can often deal with tasks that are dicult, if not impossible, to be accomplished by a single robot. In the context of MRS, one of the main challenges is the need to control, coordinate and synchronize the operation of multiple robots to perform a specic task. This requires the development of new strategies and methods which allow us to obtain the desired system behavior in a formal and concise way. This PhD thesis aims to study the coordination of multi-robot systems, in particular, addresses the problem of the distribution of heterogeneous multi-tasks. The main interest in these systems is to understand how from simple rules inspired by the division of labor in social insects, a group of robots can perform tasks in an organized and coordinated way. We are mainly interested on truly distributed or decentralized solutions in which the robots themselves, autonomously and in an individual manner, select a particular task so that all tasks are optimally distributed. In general, to perform the multi-tasks distribution among a team of robots, they have to synchronize their actions and exchange information. Under this approach we can speak of multi-tasks selection instead of multi-tasks assignment, which means, that the agents or robots select the tasks instead of being assigned a task by a central controller. The key element in these algorithms is the estimation ix of the stimuli and the adaptive update of the thresholds. This means that each robot performs this estimate locally depending on the load or the number of pending tasks to be performed. In addition, it is very interesting the evaluation of the results in function in each approach, comparing the results obtained by the introducing noise in the number of pending loads, with the purpose of simulate the robot's error in estimating the real number of pending tasks. The main contribution of this thesis can be found in the approach based on self-organization and division of labor in social insects. An experimental scenario for the coordination problem among multiple robots, the robustness of the approaches and the generation of dynamic tasks have been presented and discussed. The particular issues studied are: Threshold models: It presents the experiments conducted to test the response threshold model with the objective to analyze the system performance index, for the problem of the distribution of heterogeneous multitasks in multi-robot systems; also has been introduced additive noise in the number of pending loads and has been generated dynamic tasks over time. Learning automata methods: It describes the experiments to test the learning automata-based probabilistic algorithms. The approach was tested to evaluate the system performance index with additive noise and with dynamic tasks generation for the same problem of the distribution of heterogeneous multi-tasks in multi-robot systems. Ant colony optimization: The goal of the experiments presented is to test the ant colony optimization-based deterministic algorithms, to achieve the distribution of heterogeneous multi-tasks in multi-robot systems. In the experiments performed, the system performance index is evaluated by introducing additive noise and dynamic tasks generation over time.
Don Perugini, Dennis Jarvis, Stefan Reschke, Don Gossink
Military operations typically involve cooperation of various military, government and commercial organizations from various nations. In order to coordinate these autonomous organizations, a social mechanism is required that facilitates deliberative planning and task allocation in decentralized, open and dynamic environments, and enables agreements via a legal contracting process. In this paper, we present (a component of) such a mechanism, called the legal agreement protocol (LAP). Agents that plan using LAP must plan with partial observability that is the customer is only aware of proposals (capabilities) that suppliers choose to send. This makes it difficult for the customer to determine the (minimum/average) expected cost of any unallocated sub-tasks in its search. In this paper, we present and compare various heuristics that allow the customer to dynamically determine the expected cost for sub-tasks as proposals are received during planning. We show that different heuristics have tradeoffs in terms of quality of solution and search effort (efficiency of search and quantity of communication). The number of distributed agents involved in planning also influences the effort required to search. More agents increase communication, but provide more information (observability) about agents' capabilities to be utilized by the heuristics
A currently popular systems research project is to explore the possibilities and problems for computer system organization that arise from the rapidly falling cost of computing hardware. Interconnecting fleets of mini- or micro-computers and putting intelligence in terminals and concentrators to produce so-called "distributed systems " has recently been a booming development activity. While these efforts range from ingenious to misguided, many seem to miss a most important aspect of the revolution in hardware costs: that more than any other factor, the en_ ~ cost of acquiring and operating a free-standing, complete computer system has dropped and continues to drop rapidly. Where a decade ago the capital outlay required to install a computer system ranged from $150,000 up into the millions, today the low end of that range is below $15,000 and dropping. The consequence of this particular observation for system structure comes from the next level of analysis. In most organizations, decisions to make capital acquisitions tend to be more centralized for larger capita] amounts,