Erica Pimentel, Emilio Boulianne, Shayan Eskandari, Jeremy Clark
ABSTRACT Presently, auditing firms are hesitant to accept mandates from companies that hold a significant amount of cryptoassets, primarily because the blockchain sector introduces novel, technically sophisticated, and risky propositions that auditors are unequipped to handle. Abrupt recusals by auditors operating in this sector have led to several enterprises being placed on cease trade by securities regulators for failure to produce audited financial statements on time, thus impeding these companies from raising capital and bringing new investments to fund innovation in this space. Through an iterative process of interviews with senior accounting professionals, structured brainstorming among a multidisciplinary team of accountants and blockchain experts, and a focus group with experienced auditors, we critically analyze the purported roadblocks to auditing blockchain firms and map them to traditional auditing practices. We urge auditors to reconsider their resistance to the blockchain sector by demonstrating that providing an audit opinion is challenging but not insurmountable.
Günlük yaşama çok hızlı bir giriş yapan kripto para birimleri bireyin hayatını çevrelemeye başlamıştır. Muhasebe bilimi açısından konuya bakıldığında incelenmesi gereken finansal açıdan hayati derecede önemli yeni durumlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunlara kripto para birimlerinin muhasebeleştirilmesi, meydana gelen kazancın vergilendirilmesi, işletmelerin bünyelerinde bulunan kripto paraların ve bu paralarla yapılan işlemlerin denetim açısından durumu sayılabilir. Bu çalışmada kripto para birimlerinin muhasebe açısından incelenerek muhasebeleştirilmesi, vergiye konu edilmesi ve denetim açısından durumunun irdelenmesi ve çeşitli önerilerde bulunulması amaçlanmaktadır.
SUMMARY A perennial challenge in the accounting profession is how to aggregate and share instances of practitioner misconduct among numerous relevant parties. At present, both the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) offer solutions for centralized collection of misconduct, but both likely experience issues with incomplete reporting from key constituents. I propose a novel use of blockchain technology to address this issue, such that all key parties in the accounting profession leverage an accountancy blockchain to aggregate and share instances of practitioner misconduct across the country on a nearly real-time basis. Such a network creates an immutable record of misconduct and allows key constituents in the accounting profession to work together and share information as peers without the risk of one party taking control of the ledger. I close by discussing blockchain-specific roadblocks to realizing this proposed model.
With innovation always comes unknowns. Blockchain technology and crypto–assets are no different. Often times, innovators are so worried about getting their product to market or scaling at mass that they overlook the legal ramifications of their innovations. As Mark Zuckerberg infamously said, “move fast and break things.” Facebook was in no way alone in this style of innovation. However, with respect to crypto–assets, the SEC has stepped in and is attempting to prevent the “break things” aspect. One of the major issues relating to crypto–assets is that many people still do not understand what they are, or how the underlying technology works. At the moment, we do not know what to classify crypto– assets as: property, commodities, or something else . If the SEC determines that crypto–assets are investment contracts, the regulation that follows is at risk of putting stranglehold on the underlying innovation and technology. It becomes an issue of balancing consumer protection and innovation for society. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. laid out a pronged test to determine whether a transaction is an investment contract, subjecting it to securities laws. This note examines the Howey Test to explain why two popular crypto–assets, Bitcoin and Ethereum, are unlikely to satisfy the Howey Test, and briefly addresses the need for clarity in this area. }
This article provides a comprehensive critique of current corporate foreign exchange risk management (FXRM) practices. The authors characterize much of FXRM as a “legacy” activity, a set of outdated, often decentralized and “earnings‐driven” methods and procedures that have not been subjected to rigorous cost‐benefit analysis at the enterprise level. And according to the authors, the costs of poorly designed and executed FXRM have increased sharply in recent decades because of the growing demand by analysts and investors for cost‐efficiency, transparency, and predictability. After discussing six ways in which the FX policy of most large multinationals fails to serve the interests of their investors and other important stakeholders, the authors offer the following: (1) a restatement of the goals of FXRM; (2) an illustration of various ways of implementing a largely (if not completely) centralized approach to FXRM; (3) a proposal for aligning performance evaluation and executive pay with the goals of FXRM; (4) suggestions for improving decision‐support tools in relation to FXRM; (5) proposals for integrating FXRM into an enterprise‐wide risk management system, which include shifting responsibility for FXRM from the Finance/Treasury group to a centralized risk committee (typically under a Chief Risk Officer who reports to the board of directors); and (6) suggestions for improving communication of a company's risk management policies and practices to investors and other stakeholders.
Blockchains represent a novel application of cryptography and information technology to ag-eold problems of financial record-keeping, and they may lead to far-reaching changes in corporate governance. Many major players in the financial industry have began to invest in this new technology, and stock exchanges have proposed using blockchains as a new method for trading corporate equities and tracking their ownership. This essay evaluates the potential implications of these changes for managers, institutional investors, small shareholders, auditors, and other parties involved in corporate governance. The lower cost, greater liquidity, more accurate recordkeeping, and transparency of ownership offered by blockchains may significantly upend the balance of power among these cohorts.
ABSTRACT This study focuses on three broad Finance organization roles: reporting, compliance, and internal control/risk management (RCCR); performance management; and strategic partner. Using data from a global survey of 832 firms, we examine the determinants of the various roles' importance and their relation with Finance effectiveness. While the effects of organizational change, market growth, international operations, firm size, decentralization, and industry on Finance responsibilities vary depending upon the role, we find little evidence of tradeoffs between the various roles. Instead, we find evidence of complementarities between roles, whereby greater emphasis on one role is associated with greater Finance effectiveness in the other roles. Additionally, we find that information system integration (ISI) not only has a positive direct impact on effectiveness in all three roles, but also interacts with the importance placed on RCCR and performance management roles to improve the Finance organization's effectiveness at carrying out these responsibilities.
This paper studies the relationship between R&D decentralization and financial performance. It examines also the impact of this decentralization on earnings management. To specify what does matter in the decentralization of the R&D we try to examine the relationship between centralization or decentralization of the R&D and the firm’s performance on one hand and the earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals on the other hand. We use two internal finance indexes (internal cash flows, internal market capital) and two mechanism of governance (stock-options, institutional investors) to explain the determinants of the R&D’s strategy.Using a sample of 160 U.S. Multinational companies (MNCs) between 2001 and 2006 our results show that MNCs decentralize their R&D for dual goal to improve firm’s profitability or performance and to help manager to manage earnings in their own interest. Moreover, despite the fact that R&D decentralization has a positive impact on performance, institutional shareholders and performance-based compensation encourage managers to decentralize their R&D in order to spur their opportunistic behavior.
The worldwide economic recession and the concomitant limited stock of finances have had an influence on the available money of every household and have also inhibited the improvement of socio-economic conditions and medicine. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) has the objective of improving the living conditions of the people with regard to housing, education, training and health care. The latter seems to be a major problem which has to be addressed with the emphasis on the preventive and promotional aspects of health care. A comprehensive health care system did not come into being property in the past because of the maldistribution of health care services, personnel and differences in culture and health care beliefs and values. The question that now arises, is how to render a quality health care service within the constraints of inadequate financing and resources. A comprehensive literature study has been done with reference to quality health care and financing followed by a survey of existing health services and finances. Recommendations are made about minimum requirements to be accepted if one were to adapt rather than die in terms of the provision of healthcare: the decentralization and rationalization of the administration of health care, the stress on and realization of effective and efficient primary health care, the acceptance of participative management in health providing organizations, the provision of financial management training for health care managers and the application of management accounting principles for the improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of management.