Digital currencies represent a new method for exchange -- a payment method with no physical form, made real by the Internet. This new type of currency was created to ease online transactions and to provide greater convenience in making payments. However, a critical component of a monetary system is the people who use it. Acknowledging this, we present results of our interview study (N=20) with two groups of participants (users and non-users) about how they perceive the most popular digital currency, Bitcoin. Our results reveal: non-users mistakenly believe they are incapable of using Bitcoin, users are not well-versed in how the protocol functions, they have misconceptions about the privacy of transactions, and that Bitcoin satisfies properties of ideal payment systems as defined by our participants. Our results illustrate Bitcoin's tradeoffs, its uses, and barriers to entry.
In January 3, 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto gave rise to the "Bitcoin Block Chain" creating the first block of the chain hashing on his computers central processing unit (CPU). Since then, the hash calculations to mine Bitcoin have been getting more and more complex, and consequently the mining hardware evolved to adapt to this increasing difficulty. Three generations of mining hardware have followed the CPU's generation. They are GPU's, FPGA's and ASIC's generations. This work presents an agent based artificial market model of the Bitcoin mining process and of the Bitcoin transactions. The goal of this work is to model the economy of the mining process, starting from GPU's generation, the first with economic significance. The model reproduces some "stylized facts" found in real time price series and some core aspects of the mining business. In particular, the computational experiments performed are able to reproduce the unit root property, the fat tail phenomenon and the volatility clustering of Bitcoin price series. In addition, under proper assumptions, they are able to reproduce the price peak at the end of November 2013, its next fall in April 2014, the generation of Bitcoins, the hashing capability, the power consumption, and the mining hardware and electrical energy expenses of the Bitcoin network.
C. Lemmen, P. Knight, B. Beentjes, Jeroen van der Ham · 8 authors
Land and its administration are always negatively affected during conflicts and in post-conflict contexts.This has been confirmed both in the literature and in practice.This research has shown that if land and its administration are neglected or not properly addressed after the end of a conflict, they can be a cause for a renewed armed conflict and an obstacle in the rebuilding of a post-conflict society.The author's initial research on the topic revealed that there is a relation between land administration and post-conflict state building.Therefore, the main research objective was to identify which interventions in land administration and under which circumstances facilitate postconflict state building.In order to achieve the main research objective, a qualitative research approach with a fieldwork was applied on two main case studies: Kosovo and Rwanda.Findings from the main case studies were supported with three supportive case studies: Mozambique, Cambodia and Timor-Leste, by collecting data from the literature.Empirical data and literature were used to set the theoretical propositions as: (1) a framework for rebuilding post-conflict states, and (2) interventions in land administration for post-conflict state building.For the final discussions and for the analytical generalisation correlating analyses were performed in a three-dimensional matrix, where the theoretical propositions (1) and (2) formed a skeleton of the matrix and empirical data from the main case studies constitutes the third dimension.The research first derived general findings on land, conflict and post-conflict contexts and, finally, specific findings were presented as in the framework for rebuilding post-conflict states grouped as: institutional weaknesses, economic and social problems, and serious security problems.Main findings from this research lead to conclusion that the identified interventions in land administration can be seen as facilitators of post-conflict state building.
Ryan Michael Burke, Brett Reardon, Stephen Happel, William J. Boyes
Evolved by way of an anonymous programmer, Bitcoin is a global cryptocurrency and a machine for virtual currency.The transactions take location immediately among the users minus any intermediaries.Bitcoin is an awesome mode of exchange whilst in comparison to traditional banks.Those transactions are verified through network nodes and recorded in a public dispensed ledger called blockchain.The price of bitcoins are volatile i.e. they could unpredictably boom or lower over a quick time period.They are taken into consideration excessivedanger assets whose transactions can simplest be refunded and not reversed.The bitcoin came into life in January 2009, with Satoshi Nakamoto mined the primary block of bitcoins ever.Given that then, some of supporters engaged in transactions and acquired bitcoins.International locations round the world started out accepting bitcoin as a legitimate mode of currency like the United States.However, some countries like Djibouti haven't legalized yet the usage of this foreign money due to some of reasons.The targets of this paper are to understand the awareness about the existence of bitcoins, to evaluate the perception of bitcoin as the future currency and to research the possibility of legalization of bitcoins in Djibouti.
Central banking in an age of digital currencies is a fast-developing topic in monetary economics. Algorithmic digital currencies such as bitcoin appear to be viable competitors to central bank fiat currency, and their presence in the marketplace may pressure central banks to pursue tighter monetary policy. More interestingly, the blockchain technology behind digital currencies has the potential to improve central banks' payment and clearing operations, and possibly to serve as a platform from which central banks might launch their own digital currencies. A sovereign digital currency could have profound implications for the banking system, narrowing the relationship between citizens and central banks and removing the need for the public to keep deposits in fractional reserve commercial banks. Debates over the wisdom of these policies have led to a revival of interest in classical monetary economics.
<em>The growth of national economy encourages a significant change in the financial sector, especially a means of payment. Starting from the barter, the means then changes to be the goods or commodities, and finally the metal and paper as a raw material of money. The form of money as a means of payment continuously changes namely in the form of checks and transfer form that allow payment through transferring funds from the account balances among financial institutions, especially the banks. The economic need continuously grows so that it shifts the ways of trade transactions from conventional to internet based one that is known as e-commerce. One of the International online payment means required in an e-commerce transaction is Bitcoin. Bitcoin is an electronic coin that uses a system of peer-to-peer network that is open source. Bitcoin is not a virtual coin and not the legal means of payment in Indonesia. The legal means in Indonesia is the rupiah. It has been described in Article 1 section (2) of Act No. 7 of 2011 on Currencies that the the coin used for payment transactions in Indonesia is the rupiah.</em>
Bitcoin was recently introduced as a peer-to-peer electronic currency in order to facilitate transactions outside the traditional financial system. The core of Bitcoin, the Blockchain, is the history of the transactions in the system maintained by all nodes as a distributed shared register. New blocks in the Blockchain contain the last transactions in the system and are added by nodes (miners) after a block mining process that consists in solving a resource consuming proof-of-work (cryptographic puzzle). The reward is a motivation for mining process but also could be an incentive for attacks such as selfish mining. In this paper we propose a solution for one of the major problems in Bitcoin : selfish mining or block withholding attack. This attack is conducted by adversarial or selfish nodes in order to either earn undue rewards or waste the computational power of honest nodes. Contrary to recent solutions, our solution, ZeroBlock, prevents block withholding using a technique free of forgeable timestamps. Moreover, we show that our solution is also compliant with nodes churn.
Bitcoin is a virtual money and a new payment system which is not regulated by a central authority.Bitcoin became popular quickly and gained the ability of affecting the real economy.Being used extensively and seen as an investment tool, Bitcoin created its own market, users and investors.This study aims to shed light on Bitcoin market.To understand what Bitcoin is, the history of Bitcoin was summarized firstly and the Bitcoin system and how the protocol works was explained.Then Efficiency, Liquidity and Volatility of the Bitcoin Markets were analyzed.We concluded that the pricing of Bitcoin is too complicated; and the Bitcoin market is still vulnerable to many risks and speculation.
We are proposing two greedy and a new linear programming based approximation algorithm for the total positive influence dominating set problem in weighted networks. Applications of this problem in weighted settings include finding: a minimum cost set of nodes to broadcast a message in social networks, such that each node has majority of neighbours broadcasting that message; a maximum trusted set in bitcoin network; an optimal set of hosts when running distributed apps etc. Extensive experiments on different generated and real networks highlight advantages and potential issues for each algorithm.
Imagine being told that your wage was going to be cut in half. Well, that’s what’s soon going to happen to those who make money from Bitcoin mining, the process of earning the online currency Bitcoin.The current expected date for this change is 11 July 2016. Many see this as the day when Bitcoin prices will rocket and when Bitcoin owners could make a great deal of money. Others see it as the start of a Bitcoin crash. At present no one quite knows which way it will go.Bitcoin was created in 2009 by someone known as Satoshi Nakamoto, borrowing from a whole lot of research methods. It is a cryptocurrency, meaning it uses digital encryption techniques to create bitcoins and secure financial transactions. It doesn’t need a central government or organisation to regulate it, nor a broker to manage payments.Conventional currencies usually have a central bank that creates money and controls its supply. Bitcoin is instead created when individuals “mine” for it by using their computers to perform complex calculations through special software. The algorithm behind Bitcoin is designed to limit the number of bitcoins that can ever be created.All Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a public database known as a blockchain. Every time someone mines for Bitcoin, it is recorded with a new block that is transmitted to every Bitcoin app across the network, like a bank updating its online records.
Bitcoin has demonstrated there are many security improvements applicable to normal currency. As the human race expands and we colonize other planets, we have to consider how we are going to extend integral parts of of society, and that includes our currency system. Information transferring does not scale well with very large distances, entirely due to physical limitations. For example, there is a maximum speed that any information can travel, and it cannot be faster than the speed of light. In this paper we take these physical limitations into account to give treatment to the following question. Can a single crypto-currency be used across the entire universe? Trivially many currencies can be used with exchange rates but we will try to avoid this as our solution. The idea of this paper was inspired by a paper titled "The Theory of Interstellar Trade" by Paul Krugman, a Nobel Economist.
The digital currency Bitcoin has had remarkable growth since it was first proposed in 2008. Its distributed nature allows currency transactions without a central authority by using cryptographic methods and a data structure called the blockchain. In this paper we use the no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics to introduce Quantum Bitcoin, a Bitcoin-like currency that runs on a quantum computer. We show that our construction of quantum shards and two blockchains allows untrusted peers to mint quantum money without risking the integrity of the currency. The Quantum Bitcoin protocol has several advantages over classical Bitcoin, including immediate local verification of transactions. This is a major improvement since we no longer need the computationally intensive and time-consuming method Bitcoin uses to record all transactions in the blockchain. Instead, Quantum Bitcoin only records newly minted currency which drastically reduces the footprint and increases efficiency. We present formal security proofs for counterfeiting resistance and show that a quantum bitcoin can be re-used a large number of times before wearing out - just like ordinary coins and banknotes. Quantum Bitcoin is the first distributed quantum money system and we show that the lack of a paper trail implies full anonymity for the users. In addition, there are no transaction fees and the system can scale to any transaction volume.
Cryptocurrencies that are based on Proof-of-Work (PoW) often rely on special purpose hardware to perform so-called mining operations that secure the system, with miners receiving freshly minted tokens as a reward for their work. A notable example of such a cryptocurrency is Bitcoin, which is primarily mined using application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) based machines. Due to the supposed profitability of cryptocurrency mining, such hardware has been in great demand in recent years, in-spite of high associated costs like electricity. In this work, we show that because mining rewards are given in the mined cryptocurrency, while expenses are usually paid in some fiat currency such as the United States Dollar (USD), cryptocurrency mining is in fact a bundle of financial options. When exercised, each option converts electricity to tokens. We provide a method of pricing mining hardware based on this insight, and prove that any other price creates arbitrage. Our method shows that contrary to the popular belief that mining hardware is worth less if the cryptocurrency is highly volatile, the opposite effect is true: volatility increases value. Thus, if a coin's volatility decreases, some miners may leave, affecting security. We compare the prices produced by our method to prices obtained from popular tools currently used by miners and show that the latter only consider the expected returns from mining, while neglecting to account for the inherent risk in mining, which is due to the high exchange-rate volatility of cryptocurrencies. Finally, we show that the returns made from mining can be imitated by trading in bonds and coins, and create such imitating investment portfolios. Historically, realized revenues of these portfolios have outperformed mining, showing that indeed hardware is mispriced.
Current regulation of decentralized ledger technology leaves industry actors in confusion, facing high risk, and confronting significant disincentives to innovate. This Article argues that an endogenous regulatory approach offers an avenue for alleviating these obstacles while still providing sufficient tools for government oversight. In particular, this Article proposes regulation that is endogenous at two levels: first, in that it is created through an iterative, cooperative process involving both regulators and industry actors, and second, that it is implemented as regulation-through-code, that is, regulation written into the code itself. In so doing, this Article also investigates whether successful implementation of such an approach could disrupt the dichotomous choice between ex ante and ex post regulation in the financial and other spheres. This Article first examines the current regulatory landscape facing decentralized ledger technologies, including payments applications such as bitcoin. This Article then discusses ways in which these regulatory approaches have failed to keep pace with the technology and, as a result, are impeding innovation in a variety of sectors. This Article next outlines criteria for improving the regulatory landscape applicable to decentralized ledger technologies, evaluating alternative models of regulation in light of the criteria, and concluding that most such proposals continue to leave a regulatory lacunae. Drawing on theories of endogenous economic regulation, endogenous development, comparative law’s functional method and financial regulation, this Article attempts to fill the gap by proposing that decentralized technologies, including decentralized payment systems such as bitcoin, are robust enough to support a theory of endogenous, technology-assisted regulation.
<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In Bitcoin system, transactions are prioritized according to transaction fees. Transactions without fees are given low priority and likely to wait for confirmation. Because the demand of micro payment in Bitcoin is expected to increase due to low remittance cost, it is important to quantitatively investigate how transactions with small fees of Bitcoin affect the transaction-confirmation time. In this paper, we analyze the transaction-confirmation time by queueing theory. We model the transaction-confirmation process of Bitcoin as a priority queueing system with batch service, deriving the mean transaction-confirmation time. Numerical examples show how the demand of transactions with low fees affects the transaction-confirmation time. We also consider the effect of the maximum block size on the transaction-confirmation time.
The high volatility in financial markets in developing and developed countries increases investors interest in new forms of investment assets. One of these forms are cryptocurrency and the most common of them -Bitcoin. The article examines the attractive features of virtual currency and crypto-technology. The article presents the statistical and comparative analysis of the spread and use of Bitcoin. The article identifies the threats and risks arising from the decentralization of the payment system.
Open access
Economic and Technological Developments in Russia
Economic Development and Digital Transformation
Economic, Social, and Public Health Issues in Russia and Globally
In Bitcoin system, transactions are prioritized according to attributes such as the remittance amount and transaction fees, and transactions with low priority are likely to wait for confirmation. Because the demand of micro payment in Bitcoin is expected to increase due to low remittance cost, it is important to quantitatively investigate how the priority mechanism of Bitcoin affects the transaction-confirmation time. In this paper, we analyze the transaction-confirmation time by queueing theory. We model the transaction priority mechanism of Bitcoin as a priority queueing system with batch service, deriving the mean transaction-confirmation time. Numerical examples show how the demand of transactions of low remittance amount affects the transaction-confirmation time. We also consider the effect of the maximum block size on the transaction-confirmation time.
Studies of resilience highlight the tension between actions that allow a firm – and a system – to be robust and those that allows it to be flexible. Studies suggest that an entrepreneurial firm will prioritize flexibility, given resource constraints. However, what occurs when a number of firms are embedded in a common socio-technical system and an extreme event affects them collectively? This paper tests whether existing theory about resilience predicts the responses of entrepreneurs in such a system, with reference to an extreme event in the Bitcoin socio-technical system: the much-publicized bankruptcy of Mt.Gox, a key player. It relies on in-depth interviews with 8 entrepreneurs in Europe, triangulated with other data. We find that robustness is the dominant strategy for those interviewed. This is partly because the firms rely on pooled resources supplied by the collective, and partly because robustness builds trust, giving the firms a competitive advantage.
Alexia Maddox, Supriya Singh, Heather A. Horst, Greg Adamson
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are a recent socio-technical innovation that seeks to disrupt the existing monetary system. Through mundane uses of this new digital cash, they provide a social critique of the centralized infrastructures of the banking industry. This paper outlines an ethnographic research agenda for this new digital frontier of social practice and exchange and the human affordances of engaging with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Firstly we argue that the use of Bitcoin can be seen as acts of social resistance and a form of social mobility that harnesses the emergent, serendipitous and dynamic properties of digital community. We then outline the disruptive nature of borderless, affordable and instantaneous international transfers within social practice. Finally, we identify the possible permutations of trust that may be found in the technical affordances of Bitcoin and how these relate to user (pseudo)anonymity, cybertheft, cyberfraud, and consumer protection. Bringing together these three key areas we highlight the importance of understanding the ordinary (rather than extra-ordinary) uses of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. We contend that focusing upon users interactions with Bitcoin as a system and culture will shed light upon mundane acts of socio-technical disruption, acts that critique and provide alternative financial exchange practices to the economic and regulatory financial infrastructures of the centralised banking industry.
Alexander Chepurnoy, Mario Larangeira, Alexander Ojiganov
Bitcoin is the first successful decentralized global digital cash system. Usefulness of the mining process requiring a lot of computational resources to be wasted, though, remains disputable. One of possible alternatives for useful Proof-of-Work schemes, Permacoin, is using non-interactive proofs of a static dataset retrievability thus providing a mechanism to store a huge dataset being spread across miners collectively.
In this paper we present a new consensus protocol for Bitcoin-like peer-to-peer systems, where the right to generate a block is given to the party which provides non-interactive proofs of retrievability for the past state snapshots. This Proof-of-Work scheme has better resistance to specialized hardware than Bitcoin and Permacoin. Unlike blockchain systems being used today, a network using the protocol of ours is safe if majority of nodes are rational in terms of storing full blocks. By using that we also show that one useful application of our protocol is the construction of a prunable blockchain system without a security loss.
Alexander Chepurnoy, Mario Larangeira, Alexander Ojiganov
Bitcoin is the first successful decentralized global digital cash system. Its mining process requires intense computational resources, therefore its usefulness remains a disputable topic. We aim to solve three problems with Bitcoin and other blockchain systems of today by repurposing their work. First, space to store a blockchain is growing linearly with number of transactions. Second, a honest node is forced to be irrational regarding storing full blocks by a way implementations are done. Third, a trustless bootstrapping process for a new node involves downloading and processing all the transactions ever written into a blockchain. In this paper we present a new consensus protocol for Bitcoin-like peer-to-peer systems where a right to generate a block is given to a party providing non-interactive proofs of storing a subset of the past state snapshots. Unlike the blockchain systems in use today, a network using our protocol is safe if the nodes prune full blocks not needed for mining. We extend the GKL model to describe our Proof-of-Work scheme and a transactional model modifications needed for it. We provide a detailed analysis of our protocol and proofs of its security.
Bitcoin mining presents a significant economic incentive for efficient hashing and broadcast of data, both parameters stemming from the Proofs of Work used to advance the network. This incentive has led to the development of Bitcoin specific application specific integrated circuits and centralized mining pools, undermining the decentralized motivations behind Bitcoin's design. In addition, the imminent block reward halving threatens the profitability of mining at any scale. Some work has been done in formal models for miner profitability, but existing models do not account for conditions such as the pricing of off-peak power and diverse investment strategies regarding sunken costs. There is also a lack of formal study of how the profit model changes as mining scales from the individual to the industrial level. Given the lack of analysis of these conditions, there are alternative models for profitable or net zero mining that operate at smaller, and therefore more desirable, scale.