Christoph Kinkeldey, JeanâDaniel Fekete, Petra Isenberg
BitConduite is a system we are developing for the visual exploration of financial activity on the Bitcoin network. Bitcoin is the largest digital pseudo-currency worldwide and its study is of increasing interest and importance to economists, bankers, policymakers, and law enforcement authorities. All financial transactions in Bitcoin are available in an openly accessible online ledger-the (Bitcoin) blockchain. Yet, the open data does not lend itself easily to an analysis of how different individuals and institutions-or entities on the network-actually use Bitcoin. Our system BitConduite offers a data transformation back end that gives us an entity-based access to the blockchain data and a visualization front end that supports a novel high-level view on transactions over time. In particular, it facilitates the exploration of activity through filtering and clustering interactions. We are developing our system with experts in economics and will conduct a formal user study to assess our approach of Bitcoin activity analysis.
Services known as Cryptocurrency âTumblersâ obfuscate the provenance, possession, and movement of cryptocurrencies through a process of âmixingâ . While this speaks to the cryptoanarchist philosophical roots of cryptocurrencies, it poses various forms of risks, particularly those subsumed by the anti-money laundering (AML) category. This discussion paper examines that dichotomy, between cryptoanarchism and oversight, through the Tumbler lens, so as to consider the regulation, oversight, and legality of Tumblers themselves.
We discuss Russia's underlying motives for issuing its government-backed cryptocurrency, CryptoRuble, and the implications thereof and of other likely-soon-forthcoming government-issued cryptocurrencies to some stakeholders (populace, governments, economy, finance, etc.), existing decentralized cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum), as well as the future of the world monetary system (the role of the U.S. therein and a necessity for the U.S. to issue CryptoDollar), including a future algorithmic universal world currency that may also emerge. We further provide a comprehensive list of references on cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin, the digital cryptocurrency, has been celebrated as the future of money on the Internet. Although Bitcoin does present several forward-looking innovations, it also integrates a very old concept into its digital architecture: the mining of precious metals. Even though Bitcoin explicitly invokes mining as a metaphor and gold as an example for understanding the cryptocurrency, there has been little critical work on the connections between Bitcoin and previous metalist currency regimes. The following essay proposes a historical comparison with colonial South American silver mining and the global currency regime based on the New World silver peso it created as a way to interrogate Bitcoin. The comparison with colonial South America, and specifically the silver mining economy around the Cerro Rico de PotosĂ, will help to develop a historical and political understanding of Bitcoin's stakes, including questions of resources, labor, energy, and ecology. Mining and the extractive apparatus that accompanies it always imply massive-scale earthworks that reshape the planet itself, a process known as terraforming. The PotosĂ comparison will reveal Bitcoin to form part of a similar process of digital primitive accumulation we can provisionally name cryptoforming.
The meteoric rise of Bitcoin has led to heightened investment, academic, commercial, numismatic, transactional, and practitioner interest in that cryptocurrency, as well as in the growing array of such instruments worldwide. This leads to an accentuated need for an examination of the historical evolution of Bitcoin as the seminal instrument in the development of cryptocurrencies, and this discussion paper seeks to address that gap.
Leif-Nissen LundbĂŠk, Andrea Callia DâIddio, Michael Huth
We propose the formal study of governed blockchains that are owned and controlled by organizations and that neither create cryptocurrencies nor provide any incentives to solvers of cryptographic puzzles. We view such approaches as frameworks in which system parts, such as the cryptographic puzzle, may be instantiated with different technology. Owners of such a blockchain procure puzzle solvers as resources they control, and use a mathematical model to compute optimal parameters for the cryptographic puzzle mechanism or other parts of the blockchain. We illustrate this approach with a use case in which blockchains record hashes of financial process transactions to increase their trustworthiness and that of their audits. For Proof of Work as cryptographic puzzle, we develop a detailed mathematical model to derive MINLP optimization problems for computing optimal Proof of Work configuration parameters that trade off potentially conflicting aspects such as availability, resiliency, security, and cost in this governed setting. We demonstrate the utility of such a mining calculus by solving some instances of this problem. This experimental validation is strengthened by statistical experiments that confirm the validity of random variables used in formulating our mathematical model. We hope that our work may facilitate the creation of domain-specific blockchains for a wide range of applications such as trustworthy information in Internet of Things systems and bespoke improvements of legacy financial services.
Bitcoin is a digital currency in which the need for a trusted third party is avoided. Instead, this digital currency is based on the concept of âproof of workâ allowing users to execute payments by digitally signing their transactions. Since electronic files can be duplicated, fraudulent transactions in the form of double-spend attacks â where users spend the same money at least twice â can happen. This paper is about attack models that can assign possible time advantage to attacker agents in the Bitcoin network. In particular, this paper presents: (i) two attack models in which partial advancement towards block production can be influenced by time and not only by the hashpower used to produce blocks of hashes, and (ii) algorithmic experimentation comparing these models against existing well-known hashrate-based attack models that do not consider time advantage. As a conclusion, this paper presents evidence on the fact that advantages are not negligible for cases in which an attacker has had enough time for secretly mining fraudulent blocks or significant control over the network. Also, the models presented in this paper help in supporting previous claims in the literature about how to correctly model and detect double-spend attacks in the Bitcoin network.
A trustless technology, Bitcoin tries to solve issues of social coordination and economic exchange by relying exclusively on technological means. Is technology alone able to resolve the social and political concerns affecting the Bitcoin network?
This paper uses a dynamic conditional correlation model to examine whether Bitcoin can act as a hedge and safe haven for major world stock indices, bonds, oil, gold, the general commodity index and the US dollar index. Daily and weekly data span from July 2011 to December 2015. Overall, the empirical results indicate that Bitcoin is a poor hedge and is suitable for diversification purposes only. However, Bitcoin can only serve as a strong safe haven against weekly extreme down movements in Asian stocks. We also show that Bitcoin hedging and safe haven properties vary between horizons.
Financial technologies embody and shape notions of social, as well as financial, worth. New digital âalt-financeâ systems, including the blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin and similar âcryptocurrencies,â are no exception: technology, rhetoric, imagined users and non-users, and a long history of sociotechnical, political, and cultural relations are all elements in a dynamic assemblage with wide-ranging consequences. This paper examines the rise and fall of one alt-finance system: MazaCoin, a Bitcoin variant intended to benefit the Oglala Lakota of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. The story of MazaCoin is one of an attempt to unite two apparently divergent sociotechnical assemblages: (1) a libertarian, elite technology of cryptocurrency, and (2) a richly traditional indigenous community with a deep desire for cultural survivance, bound up in a precarious economy left behind in the wake of more than a century of genocide.
Bitcoin, a fascinating phenomenon of crypto-technology, has emerged in financial markets as a potential alternative to standard fiat currencies. It represents unique sociotechnical \necosystem working outside of any traditional markets, and its economy is still not well understood. Dynamics of Bitcoin price proves to be quite a controversial subject, but there is a strong indication that social factors mainly influence its economy. \n \nTechnical flaws and lack of any central authority issuing and controlling this digital currency make it vulnerable to abuse. It has been associated with controversy due to frequent incidents, namely hacks, theft, scam, and illicit use, which affected its ecosystem ever since it gained popularity. \n \nThis thesis adds to the discussion about social aspects of Bitcoin economy by analysing the changes in its price volatility in the context of incidents occurring in its \necosystem. As empirically proven, those negative events have no impact on the fluctuations of Bitcoin price.
We present a novel institutional perspective on the distributed consensus and ledger technology known as blockchain. We discuss the concept of Distributed Autonomous Institutions that are able to facilitate global interactions, contracts, and value transfers, all of which are achieved without the need for the human-based third party trust. We argue that due to its properties and design blockchain technology represents a disruptive change in the modelling paradigms of socio-technical systems. Distributed trust and consensus mechanisms offered by blockchain technology represent a novel, qualitatively different, phenomenon. We present the general design principles, stakeholders, the dynamics between those stakeholders, the incentive models, and the consensus protocols currently used in blockchains, before highlighting the potential of blockchain technology to develop distributed autonomous institutions. We conclude with a discussion of challenges associated with the adoption of blockchain technology.
Aggelos Kiayias, ÎÎ»ÎŻÎ±Ï ÎÎżÏ ÏÏÎżÏ ÏÎčÎŹÏ, Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Tselekounis
We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.
Money laundering can be defined as any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources (Money Laundering, 2016). It is difficult to determine the magnitude of money laundering because these illicit financial flows remain hidden (Schott, 2006). A report issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) quoted that the total of all criminal proceeds amounted to $2.1 trillion in 2009. The study also shows that âLess than 1 percent of global illicit financial flows are currently seized and frozenâ (Pietschmann & Walker, 2012). This is concerning because money laundering not only enables the operation of criminal organizations such as drug and human traffickers but can also significantly distort the economies in which they enter.\nThe Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental policy-making body that has helped to promote anti-money laundering efforts since its formation in 1989. It has issued 40 recommendations to fight money laundering and nine special recommendations to combat terrorist financing which have been adopted by 32 countries (About - Financial Action Task Force, 2016). Unfortunately, implementing these strategies has proved to be difficult for both developed and lesser developed countries. According to a study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2016, âover the last few years, in the U.S. alone, nearly a dozen global financial institutions have been assessed fines in the hundreds of millions to billions of dollars for money laundering and/or sanctions violations" (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). It stands to say that if financial institutions are having difficulties implementing frameworks to prevent and detect money laundering, then our enforcement agencies are unable to adequately address the issue as well.\nA new hurdle that enforcement agencies have had to face is the emergence of Bitcoin, as well as other cryptocurrencies, that can be described as âa digital currency and online payment system in which encryption techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, operating independently of a central bankâ (Swan, 2015). Being an often unrecognized currency, many banks and financial institutions have not had to worry about modifying their compliance programs. The biggest benefit of cryptocurrencies to money launderers is its decentralized nature. There is no governing authority, as members of the network handle issuances and payments. Once a disruptive technology, Bitcoin is beginning to lose momentum for a number of reasons and some its strongest proponents are now referring to it as nothing more than an experiment. The purpose of this paper is not to examine Bitcoin, but rather its underlying technology that has been found to be the actual value: blockchain. After providing a brief overview of the technology and the hurdles that financial institutions face when implementing anti-money laundering compliance programs, the possible ways in which blockchain can help alleviate these difficulties will be examined.
J.J. Oerlemans, Bart Custers, Ronald Pool, R. Cornelisse
Het witwassen van geld dat wordt verkregen uit cybercrime vindt in de regel plaats via digitale betalingsmiddelen. De reden daarvoor is dat het geld bij cybercrime vaak wordt verkregen via online betalingsmethoden en virtuele valuta. De hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek luidt: Op welke wijze en door welke actoren wordt geld dat wordt verkregen uit banking malware en ransomware (al dan niet digitaal) witgewassen?De deelvragen van het onderzoek luiden als volgt:Wat wordt verstaan onder het witwassen van door banking malware en ransomware verkregen geld en hoe wordt witwassen juridisch gekwalificeerd?Wat zijn digitale betalingsmiddelen, in het bijzonder virtuele valuta zoals Bitcoin, en hoe werken deze digitale betalingsmiddelen?Op welke wijze en door welke actoren wordt geld witgewassen dat: a door middel van banking malware wordt verkregen? b door middel van ransomware wordt verkregen?Wat zijn de kenmerken van actoren die betrokken zijn bij het witwassen van geld dat wordt verkregen uit banking malware en ransomware?Welke informatie over de modus operandi van actoren, die betrokken zijn het bij het witwassen van geld dat verkregen wordt uit banking malware en ransomware, is beschikbaar op het dark web?Welke rol spelen digitale betalingsmiddelen, in het bijzonder virtuele valuta zoals bitcoins, bij het witwassen van geld dat wordt verkregen uit banking malware en ransomware?
Money laundering is a growing issue which has in later years emigrated more and more to the digital sphere of Bitcoin. Its pseudonymous nature and unrigorous legal definition has made regulation a difficult challenge. This thesis provides a unique take on the Bitcoin money laundering problematique by using incentive structures in place of forced restrictions. The goal is to create, validate and analyze a game theoretic incentive model which aims to combat money laundering by increasing the transaction costs for money laundering Bitcoin users without affecting the transaction costs for the honest users. The results prove the model to be feasible, leading to the conclusion that its real-world application has the potential to combat money laundering in Bitcoin to a significant degree.
Published as: Shackelford, S., and S. Myers. 2017. âBlock-by-Block: Leveraging the Power of Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace.â Yale Journal of Law & Technology 19:334â388. \n"There has been increasing interest in the transformative power of not only crypto-currencies like Bitcoin, but also the technology underlying themânamely blockchain. To the uninitiated, a blockchain is a sophisticated, distributed online ledger that has the potential, according to Goldman Sachs, to 'change everything.' From making businesses more efficient to recording property deeds to engendering the growth of âsmartâ contracts, blockchain technology is now being investigated by a huge range of organizations and is attracting billions in venture funding. Even the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is investigating blockchain technology to 'create an unhackable messaging system.' However, the legal literature has largely ignored the rise of blockchain technology outside of its finance, securities, and copyright implications. This Article seeks to address this omission by analyzing the potential impact of blockchain technology on advancing the cybersecurity of firms across an array of sectors and industries with a particular focus on certificate authorities and the critical infrastructure context. Moreover, we examine the rise of blockchains through the lens of the literature on polycentric governance to ascertain what lessons this research holds to build trust in distributed systems and ultimately promote cyber peace."