Blockchain Papers

Patrick McCorry, Siamak F. Shahandashti, Feng Hao

No abstract is available for this record.

Stefan Dziembowski, Lisa Eckey, Sebastian Faust, Daniel Malinowski

Payment channels emerged recently as an efficient method for performing cheap micropayments in cryptocurrencies. In contrast to traditional on-chain transactions, payment channels have the advantage that they allow for nearly unlimited number of transactions between parties without involving the blockchain. In this work, we introduce Perun, an off-chain channel system that offers a new method for connecting channels that is more efficient than the existing technique of ``routing transactions'' over multiple channels. To this end, Perun introduces a technique called ``virtual payment channels'' that avoids involvement of the intermediary for each individual payment. In this paper we formally model and prove security of this technique in the case of one intermediary, who can be viewed as a ``payment hub'' that has direct channels with several parties. Our scheme works over any cryptocurrency that provides Turing-complete smart contracts. As a proof of concept, we implemented Perun's smart contracts in Ethereum.

Pratyush Dikshit, Kunwar Singh

Bitcoin was introduced in a self-published paper by Satoshi Nakamoto in October, 2008[1, 2]. Bitcoin is a decentralized system which requires no central authority. In recent years, bitcoin has become increasingly accepted and used in many fields in place of physical cash. Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer network of nodes that distribute and record transactions [3]. Bitcoin transaction is a statement that Player 1 (address 1) would like to transfer some bitcoin values to Player 2 (address 2), signed by Player 1 by his private key. Transactions are verified by network nodes and confirmed in a public distributed ledger called the block chain. The block chain consists of a series of blocks in which each block contains the hashed value of subsequent block. Every bitcoin block contains a set of verified transactions that are collected from the bitcoin broadcast network. It is assumed that the majority of nodes in the bitcoin network are honest. This makes the verification done by the nodes is correct with high probability. More technically, bitcoin is an electronic-cash system based on cryptographic algorithms.

Andrew Miller, Iddo Bentov

We present cryptocurrency-based lottery protocols that do not require any collateral from the players. Previous protocols for this task required a security deposit that is $O(N^2)$ times larger than the bet amount, where $N$ is the number of players. Our protocols are based on a tournament bracket construction, and require only $O(\log N)$ rounds. Our lottery protocols thus represent a significant improvement, both because they allow players with little money to participate, and because of the time value of money. The Ethereum-based implementation of our lottery is highly efficient. The Bitcoin implementation requires an $O(2^N)$ off-chain setup phase, which demonstrates that the expressive power of the scripting language can have important implications. We also describe a minimal modification to the Bitcoin protocol that would eliminate the exponential blowup.

Jasmine Bedi, Utkarsh Wadhwa, Vivek Tomar

Cryptocurrencies which evolved with bitcoin has a decentralized structure based on the ledger which is handled via proof of work mechanism, indeed generating a monetary supply. We all agree that decentralization save us from the cruel national political system but has a limitation of computational cost involved and problem related to scalability. The idea is to introduce a new cryptocurrency named UV Coin which is a cryptocurrency framework having control of the central banks but involves distributed set of authorities to prevent double spending. This coin will maintain enough transparency. The proof of the benefits is partial centralization such as elimination of wasteful hashing and involves a scalable system to avoid double spending attack.

Ning Shi

Bitcoin system, when more than 51% computing power is controlled by a single node, the block chain can be distorted maliciously. This is called 51% attack which is a well-known potential risk that could destroy the Bitcoin system. The paper proves that under the current proof-of-work mechanism, computing power eventually will be centralized at a single node if miners are rational enough. The paper propose a new proof-of-work mechanism that improves decentralization and reduces the risk of 51% attack without increasing the risk of Sybil attack. This new mechanism introduces a series of principles such as Career open to all talents, without distinction of birth, Distribution according to labor and All Men are created equal.

Roman Matzutt, Oliver Hohlfeld, Martin Henze, Robin Rawiel · 6 authors

As transaction fees skyrocket today, blockchains become increasingly expensive, hurting their adoption in broader applications. This work tackles the saving of transaction fees for economic blockchain applications. The key insight is that other than the existing "default'' mode to execute application logic fully on-chain, i.e., in smart contracts, and in fine granularity, i.e., user request per transaction, there are alternative execution modes with advantages in cost-effectiveness. On Ethereum, we propose a holistic middleware platform supporting flexible and secure transaction executions, including off-chain states and batching of user requests. Furthermore, we propose control-plane schemes to adapt the execution mode to the current workload for optimal runtime cost. We present a case study on the institutional accounts (e.g., coinbase.com) intensively sending Ether on Ethereum blockchains. By collecting real-life transactions, we construct workload benchmarks and show that our work saves 18%\sim 47%18%-47% per invocation than the default baseline while introducing 1.81%\sim 16.59%1.81%-16.59% blocks delay.

Luke Anderson, Ralph Holz, Alexander Ponomarev, Paul Rimba · 5 authors

Half a decade after Bitcoin became the first widely used cryptocurrency, blockchains are receiving considerable interest from industry and the research community. Modern blockchains feature services such as name registration and smart contracts. Some employ new forms of consensus, such as proof-of-stake instead of proof-of-work. However, these blockchains are so far relatively poorly investigated, despite the fact that they move considerable assets. In this paper, we explore three representative, modern blockchains---Ethereum, Namecoin, and Peercoin. Our focus is on the features that set them apart from the pure currency use case of Bitcoin. We investigate the blockchains' activity in terms of transactions and usage patterns, identifying some curiosities in the process. For Ethereum, we are mostly interested in the smart contract functionality it offers. We also carry out a brief analysis of issues that are introduced by negligent design of smart contracts. In the case of Namecoin, our focus is how the name registration is used and has developed over time. For Peercoin, we are interested in the use of proof-of-stake, as this consensus algorithm is poorly understood yet used to move considerable value. Finally, we relate the above to the fundamental characteristics of the underlying peer-to-peer networks. We present a crawler for Ethereum and give statistics on the network size. For Peercoin and Namecoin, we identify the relatively small size of the networks and the weak bootstrapping process.

Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Andrea Vitaletti, Apostolos Pyrgelis

No abstract is available for this record.

Shravanthi, R Pooja, Bhagya Shree J

Bitcoin is a crypto currency with several advantages over approaches. Transactions are confirmed and stored by a peer-to-peer network in a blockchain. Therefore, all transactions are public and soon solutions where designed to increase privacy in Bitcoin. Many come with downsides, like requiring a trusted third-party or requiring modifications to Bitcoin. In this paper, we compare these approaches according to several criteria. Based on survey, coin Join emerges as the best approach for anonymizing Bitcoins today.

QingChun ShenTu, Jianping Yu

To strengthen the anonymity of Bitcoin, several centralized coin-mixing providers (mixers) such as BitcoinFog.com, BitLaundry.com, and Blockchain.info assist users to mix Bitcoins through CoinJoin transactions with multiple inputs and multiple outputs to uncover the relationship between them. However, these mixers know the output address of each user, such that they cannot provide true anonymity. This paper proposes a centralized coin-mixing algorithm based on an elliptic curve blind signature scheme (denoted as Blind-Mixing) that obstructs mixers from linking an input address with an output address. Comparisons among three blind signature based algorithms, Blind-Mixing, BlindCoin, and RSA Coin-Mixing, are conducted. It is determined that BlindCoin may be deanonymized because of its use of a public log. In RSA Coin-Mixing, a user's Bitcoins may be falsely claimed by another. In addition, the blind signature scheme of Blind-Mixing executes 10.5 times faster than that of RSA Coin-Mixing.

QingChun ShenTu, Jianping Yu

The anonymity of the Bitcoin system has some shortcomings. Analysis of Transaction Chain (ATC) and Analysis of Bitcoin Protocol and Network (ABPN) are two important methods of deanonymizing bitcoin transactions. Nowadays, there are some anonymization methods to combat ATC but there has been little research into ways to counter ABPN. This paper proposes a new anonymization technology called Transaction Remote Release (TRR). Inspired by The Onion Router (TOR), TRR is able to render several typical attacking methods of ABPN ineffective. Furthermore, the performance of encryption and decryption of TRR is good and the growth rate of the cipher is very limited. Hence, TRR is suited for practical applications.

Béla Gipp, Norman Meuschke, André Gernandt

Trusted timestamping is a process for proving that certain information existed at a given point in time. This paper presents a trusted timestamping concept and its implementation in form of a web-based service that uses the decentralized Bitcoin block chain to store anonymous, tamper-proof timestamps for digital content. The service allows users to hash files, such as text, photos or videos, and store the created hashes in the Bitcoin block chain. Users can then retrieve and verify the timestamps that have been committed to the block chain. The non-commercial service enables anyone, e.g., researchers, authors, journalists, students, or artists, to prove that they were in possession of certain information at a given point in time. Common use cases include proving that a contract has been signed, a photo taken, a video recorded, or a task completed prior to a certain date. All procedures maintain complete privacy of the user's data.

Amir Lazarovich

Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning, Program in Media Arts and Sciences, 2015.

Aggelos Kiayias, Thomas Zacharias, Bingsheng Zhang

No abstract is available for this record.

Shayan Eskandari, David Barrera, Elizabeth Stobert, Jeremy Clark

Bitcoin users are directly or indirectly forced to deal with public key cryptography, which has a number of security and usability challenges that differ from the password-based authentication underlying most online banking services. Users must ensure that keys are simultaneously accessible, resistant to digital theft and resilient to loss. In this paper, we contribute an evaluation framework for comparing Bitcoin key management approaches, and conduct a broad usability evaluation of six representative Bitcoin clients. We find that Bitcoin shares many of the fundamental challenges of key management known from other domains, but that Bitcoin may present a unique opportunity to rethink key management for end users.

Nirupama Devi Bhaskar, Wanfeng Chen, LI Hai-li, David Lee Kuo Chuen

No abstract is available for this record.

Arthur Gervais, Hubert Ritzdorf, Ghassan Karame, Srđjan Čapkun

Given the increasing adoption of Bitcoin, the number of transactions and the block sizes within the system are only expected to increase. To sustain its correct operation in spite of its ever-increasing use, Bitcoin implements a number of necessary optimizations and scalability measures. These measures limit the amount of information broadcast in the system to the minimum necessary. In this paper, we show that current scalability measures adopted by Bitcoin come at odds with the security of the system. More specifically, we show that an adversary can exploit these measures in order to effectively delay the propagation of transactions and blocks to specific nodes for a considerable amount of time---without causing a network partitioning in the system. Notice that this attack alters the information received by Bitcoin nodes, and modifies their views of the ledger state. Namely, we show that this allows the adversary to considerably increase its mining advantage in the network, and to double-spend transactions in spite of the current countermeasures adopted by Bitcoin. Based on our results, we propose a number of countermeasures in order to enhance the security of Bitcoin without deteriorating its scalability.

Feroz Ahmad Ahmad, Prashant Kumar, Gulshan Shrivastava, Med Salim Bouhlel

ON 12 JANUARY 2009 a pseudonymous entity signed a transaction that instructed a distributed network to transfer a small amount of digital currency to Hal Finney, one ofthe key figures of the cypherpunk movement. After a few minutes, the transaction was recorded on a distributed public ledger, permanently updating the balance ofbothparties. This transaction— the first Bitcoin transaction—marked the beginning of a new era of decentralized payment systems, ushering in a variety of financial Services that do not depend on any centralized clearinghouse or other financial middleman. Bitcoin is regarded by many as a powerful technological innovation that could disrupt many sectors, in the realm of finance and beyond. But the underlying technology on which the network operates, the Bitcoin blockchain can do much more than that. Just as the internet did in the early-1990s, blockchain technology carries with it a whole new range of promises concerning how decentralization can support and promote individual freedoms and autonomy. Blockchain proponents believe that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency platforms will revolutionize mechanisms of value exchange in the same way that the internet transformed information sharing, by providing a platform for people to exchange digital resources, in a secure and decentralized manner without the need to rely on any intermediary or trusted authority. But this revolutionary potential also carries with it serious implications for censorship, intellectual property, and the regulated flow of information. A blockchain is a decentralized database of transactions maintained by a distributed network of computers, which all contribute to the verification and the validation of transactions. Once accepted, these transactions are recorded inside a “block” of transactions, which incorporates a reference to previous blocks. This creates a long chain of blocks—a “blockchain”—that stores the history of all transactions in a chronological order. Every block contains information about a particular set of transactions, a reference to the preceding block in the blockchain, and the answer to a complex mathematical puzzle that is used to validate the data associated with that block. A copy of the blockchain is stored on every computer in the network, making it virtually impossible for anyone unilaterally to modify the data stored on this decentralized database: if anyone tries to modify any transaction the fraud will be immediately detected by all other network participants.

Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivan Pustogarov

Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase transaction unlinkability. We present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user pseudonyms to the IP addresses where the transactions are generated. Our techniques work for the most common and the most challenging scenario when users are behind NATs or firewalls of their ISPs. They allow to link transactions of a user behind a NAT and to distinguish connections and transactions of different users behind the same NAT. We also show that a natural countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the bitcoin network. Our attacks require only a few machines and have been experimentally verified. We propose several countermeasures to mitigate these new attacks.

Assaf Shomer

We calculate the probability of success of block-hiding mining strategies in Bitcoin-like networks. These strategies involve building a secret branch of the block-tree and publishing it opportunistically, aiming to replace the top of the main branch and rip the reward associated with the secretly mined blocks. We identify two types of block-hiding strategies and chart the parameter space where those are more beneficial than the standard mining strategy described in Nakamoto's paper. Our analysis suggests a generalization of the notion of the relative hashing power as a measure for a miner's influence on the network. Block-hiding strategies are beneficial only when this measure of influence exceeds a certain threshold.

Nicolas T. Courtois, Lear Bahack

Bitcoin is a "crypto currency", a decentralized electronic payment scheme based on cryptography. Bitcoin economy grows at an incredibly fast rate and is now worth some 10 billions of dollars. Bitcoin mining is an activity which consists of creating (minting) the new coins which are later put into circulation. Miners spend electricity on solving cryptographic puzzles and they are also gatekeepers which validate bitcoin transactions of other people. Miners are expected to be honest and have some incentives to behave well. However. In this paper we look at the miner strategies with particular attention paid to subversive and dishonest strategies or those which could put bitcoin and its reputation in danger. We study in details several recent attacks in which dishonest miners obtain a higher reward than their relative contribution to the network. In particular we revisit the concept of block withholding attacks and propose a new concrete and practical block withholding attack which we show to maximize the advantage gained by rogue miners. RECENT EVENTS: it seems that the attack was recently executed, see Section XI-A.

Motoki Kitahara, Junpei Kawamoto, Kouichi Sakurai

In the digital world, so many copyrighted works are made in an illegal way because it is easy to keep and copy. Digital Rights Management has proposed to prevent this theft. Contents providers often bring in one server who has charge of managing the normal user, but there are some problems that it flocks to the server. Against this problem, P2P based DRM system has considered. All users can transfer the encrypted content to other users, so the content server does not have to load so much traffic from users. As a problem with this method, it is hard to figure out usage situation of contents because P2P based system is divided into many pieces of users. In this paper, we propose a new P2P based DRM system using Bitcoin protocol, which is one of the electric commerce. Bitcoin protocol, timestamp server saves all transactions to prevent double spending. We can bring out all usage situations to apply this system.

Campbell R. Harvey

No abstract is available for this record.