Bitcoin is a tremendously debated phenomenon in the world of finance and in recent the scientific literature on the topic has expanded. In this thesis,the bitcoin to US dollar exchange rate is examined through various conditional variance models to describe its highly volatile nature. We examine whether the introduction of bitcoin futurescontractsin late 2017 has had a decreasing impact on price volatility by estimatingthe unconditional variance. The log-return of the bitcoin exchange rate is analysed,and there is evidence of volatility clustering and time-varying volatility. Consequently, the variance is modelled through the GARCH(1,1), EGARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,1) modelswith innovations followingthree distributions. The in-sample selection method selectedthe EGARCH(1,1) model where innovation terms follow a generalizederror distribution as the most parsimonious model. The findings show that volatilityhas not decreased after the introduction of bitcoin futures on regulated exchanges. \nKeywords: Bitcoin, conditional variancemodelling, bitcoin futures, price volatility exchange rate, statistical analysis
Security Token Offerings (STOs) are a very recent phenomenon that has started to replace the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) one for financing companies through blockchain networks. Contrary to ICOs, which are based on “utility tokens”, STOs issue “security tokens” that are likely to achieve revenues in the same way that bonds or shares do. However, because they utilize the blockchain network, they are expected to benefit from lower intermediary and transaction costs. The objective of this paper is to examine, for the first time in financial research, to what extent this nascent market can become a liquid one, adapted for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). To address this still unexplored issue, we proceed in two stages. First, we develop the technical characteristics of security tokens. Then, we analyze the trading volumes of a very few ones, although it has proved difficult to conduct a relevant empirical analysis. Our results are that, as for ICOs, the technical nature of security tokens can greatly facilitate their listing and exchange. However, there are significant disparities in their use and, for the moment, most of them remain locked in the wallet of so-called accredited investors. As a result, the potential of the blockchain-based equity market is still uncertain: STOs are likely to represent a growing and liquid alternative to IPOs, private equity and crowd funding to finance SMEs. Nevertheless, the liquidity of their digital assets strongly depends on the quality of their issuers and on the existence of specialized trading platforms.
This dissertation includes three chapters. The first chapter investigates the impact of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet\nnormalization using a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) framework. I use counterfactual conditional forecasts to find that a reduction in asset holdings down to a level where the federal funds market is active again will reducereal GDP growth by an average of 0.18 percent per year and core inflation by a non-significant average of 0.07 percent per year under Quantitative Tightening, relative to a scenario where the Federal Reserve maintains a constant dollar amount of assets until 2024.\nThe second chapter models monetary policy using Taylor’s rule for the nominal interest-rate target and examines the difference between the actual Federal Funds Rate and the Taylor Rule model of behavior for distinct structural changes. Both a simple factor ANOVA and regime switching methods find that there were “tight” or “loose” regimes in U.S. monetary policy over the period 1965 to 2008. However, after accounting for the change in inflation measurement from CPI to PCE and then core PCE after 2004, Alan Greenspan’s tenure from 2003 to 2006 is consistent with his earlier symmetric deviations from the Taylor Rule.\nThe final chapter examines the volatility of Bitcoin exchange rates which have gained a great deal of attention since the creation of the currency. Standard measures of volatility reflect the dramatic change in the Bitcoin/US dollar exchange rate, from about $0.05 USD in 2010 to the neighborhood of $20,000 USD at the end of 2017, and down to around $5,000 USD in mid-2019. Characterizing the short-term and long-term volatility gives an impression of the volatility of Bitcoin compared to other assets, as well as implying the viability\nof Bitcoin as a medium of exchange and alternative asset.
Abstract This chapter discusses cryptocurrencies in the context of a historical overview of the evolution of money, banking, and the payment system. The chapter is organized as follows. Section I introduces the topic. Section II addresses money, payment, and payment intermediation. Section III sets out the evolution of commercial banking to facilitate national and global networks for book-based payments. Section IV addresses both electronic banking as a form of payment intermediation and the availability to the public of central bank balances as a challenge to payment intermediation. Section V examines the challenge cryptocurrencies present to state-issued currency, payment intermediation, and the roles of banks in the payment systems. The conclusion points at an irony: even as a challenge to banking, cryptocurrencies emerged as an outgrowth of an enhancement to banking.
We take this question to be isomorphic to, "What Keeps Fixed Exchange Rates Fixed?" and address it with analysis familiar in exchange-rate economics. Stablecoins solve the volatility problem by pegging to a national currency, typically the US dollar, and are used as vehicles for exchanging national currencies into non-stable cryptocurrencies, with some stablecoins having a ratio of trading volume to outstanding supply exceeding one daily. Using a rich dataset of signed trades and order books on multiple exchanges, we examine how peg-sustaining arbitrage stabilizes the price of the largest stablecoin, Tether. We find that stablecoin issuance, the closest analogue to central-bank intervention, plays only a limited role in stabilization, pointing instead to stabilizing forces on the demand side. Following Tether's introduction to the Ethereum blockchain in 2019, we find increased investor access to arbitrage trades, and a decline in arbitrage spreads from 70 to 30 basis points. We also pin down which fundamentals drive the two-sided distribution of peg-price deviations: Premiums are due to stablecoins' role as a safe haven, exhibiting, for example, premiums greater than 100 basis points during the COVID-19 crisis of March 2020; discounts derive from liquidity effects and collateral concerns.
... This interdisciplinary article discusses the potential consequences due to distributed ledger technology (DLT), tokenization as well as the emergence of new kinds of firm stakeholders, ie the crypto-assets holders, on the governance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as of publicly traded companies. Since early 2016, a new way of issuing assets and raising funds has rapidly emerged as a major issue for FinTech founders and financial regulators. Frequently referred to as initial coin offerings, initial token offerings (ITO), token generation events (TGE) or simply ‘token sales’, we use in our article the terminology initial crypto-asset offerings (ICO), as it describes more effectively than ‘initial coin offerings’ the vast diversity of assets (utility tokens, security tokens, crypto-currencies) that could be created and which goes far beyond the sole payment instrument issue. An ICO can be summarized as follows: a new method to issue assets, frequently to raise funds, through the offer and sale by a group of developers or a company to a crowd (ie investors or contributors) of ad hoc crypto-assets (also coined as ‘tokens’) specifically created and issued on a distributed ledger, sometimes preceded by an early sale of the crypto-assets called ‘pre-sale’, for the purpose of launching a business or of developing ad hoc asset functions/features and/or governance of projects based, in several cases, on the distributed ledger technology, typically in exchange for pre-existing ‘mainstream’ crypto-assets, such as Bitcoin and Ether among others, or fiat currencies. Perceived by several entrepreneurs as a less burdensome way of fundraising, at least 25 billion dollars have been raised between March 2016 and August 2018 through ICOs only.1
И.И. Баринов, Vadim Arasev, Andreas Fackler, Vladimir Komendantskiy · 7 authors
In this paper we introduce POSDAO, a Proof of Stake (POS) algorithm implemented as a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). It is designed to provide a decentralized, fair, and energy efficient consensus for public chains. The algorithm works as a set of smart contracts written in Solidity. POSDAO is implemented with a general purpose BFT consensus protocol such as Authority Round (AuRa) with a proposer node and probabilistic finality, or Honey Badger BFT (HBBFT), leaderless and with instant finality. Validators are incentivized to behave in the best interests of a network through a configurable reward structure. The algorithm provides a Sybil control mechanism for managing a set of validators, distributing rewards, and reporting and penalizing malicious validators. The authors provide a reference POSDAO implementation, xDai POSDAO, which uses xDai as a stable transactional coin and a representative ERC677 token (STAKE) as a staking token. The reference implementation functions on an Ethereum 1.0 sidechain and utilizes the AuRa consensus protocol. Assets are bridged between the Ethereum mainnet and the xDai POSDAO network using several instances of the POA TokenBridge.
Despite the past decade’s rapid innovation in adapting blockchain technology to new uses, financial intermediation remains elusive except in basic and highly collateralized forms. We introduce the concept of the technical frontier to delimit the kinds of interactions that can feasibly be structured algorithmically among pseudonymous agents, as on a blockchain, and show that lending and financial intermediation – unlike monetary exchange – lie outside it, even in simple forms. The path forward for truly blockchain-native financial applications, therefore, must involve the integration of real-world identity information in order to disincentivize defection. We discuss several potential technologies for doing so, and conclude that such integration is possible without compromising pseudonymity, provided real-world identity is available in the breach.
Decentralized finance has evolved as a major contender for traditional banking systems over the last few years. Evolution in blockchain and cryptography technologies are the driving forces for decentralized finance’s growth. The emergence of Bitcoin in the finance system was a major driving force toward the tremendous growth of decentralized finance. However, with various platforms merging every day, the decentralized finance sector is still in its early, unorganized stages. The current decentralized finance market is chaotic. With a new “coin” being introduced almost every month, standardization is highly lacking in the system. DeFi already has several different applications available. For instance, one can purchase stable coins, or assets pegged to a national currency, on decentralized exchanges, move the assets to a lending platform that is also decentralized to earn interest, and then add the interest-earning instruments to a decentralized liquidity pool or an on-chain investment fund. DeFi enterprises frequently aim at decentralized decision-making, or governance, in everything from the user fees to the products they provide. A decentralized program may be started by one person or a small number of individuals, but as the project gathers traction, its leaders frequently try to step down and cede control to the user base. A decentralized autonomous organization that has its rules and regulations written into computer code and that may issue governance tokens, which allow its holders a voice in decisions rather than allowing the decision-making to a centralized government authority as in case of traditional finance, could represent this transition. While on one side, world governments are still trying to grasp and regulate the sector, on the other side, the technology’s reach has been very limited. Undoubtedly, the emergence of blockchain-based decentralized finance is massively influencing our current finance technology industry. In this chapter, we discuss the current growth in the FinTech industry and the blockchain-based decentralized finance sector. Furthermore, we discuss how decentralized finance can be used in the current FinTech industry.