Despite the rapid spread of Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the lack of interoperability between the systems is significantly hindering their business and societal potential. Moreover, a major challenge for wider interoperability is that the IoT systems can be owned by multiple independent entities, whose collaboration will need to be organised to ensure their interoperability. One approach for achieving this is to establish federations supported by Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs), as this enables interoperability between entities and collaboration between business platforms, thereby overcoming many technical and administrative difficulties. DLTs can provide the required transparency and immutability for management of the federations, thus increasing trust and reducing the risk of misbehaviour that could destabilise the federation. This paper presents two system dynamics simulation models, which demonstrate that the success of a federation (with or without DLT support) is inversely related to the short-term selfishness of its members, and we then proceed to show that DLTs can improve the feedback received by the federation members on their actions by promoting a common consensus, which in turn can make the federation more resilient.
Eleu Wong Ellinger, Tobias Mini, Robert Wayne Gregory, Thomas Widjaja
An increasing number of platform organizations are run by agentic algorithms. While much is known about algorithmic management on centralized platform organizations such as Uber, where human agency is limited through data-driven surveillance and control, decentralized organizing has begun to emerge in agentic IS platforms, characterized by conjoined human and algorithmic agency. We examine this shift toward decentralized organizing by analyzing multiple cases of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that leverage blockchain technology and seek to expand, not limit, collective human action while being run by agentic algorithms. The phenomenon of DAOs gives rise to a puzzle: How is collective action facilitated in agentic IS platforms when they are increasingly run by algorithms? Our findings show that agentic algorithms have the ability to facilitate collective action that is aligned around a common human purpose dynamically negotiated through adaptation of the set of algorithms running the organization. We explain how collective action is enacted in DAOs, as an example of agentic IS platforms, presenting a grounded model developed inductively based on our multiple-case study. Our study complements and extends the work of Baird and Maruping (2021) by expanding the focus of analysis of agentic IS artifacts to agentic IS platforms and considering facilitation as well as delegation. Our detailed findings about decentralized algorithmic management and decentralized management of algorithms in DAOs extend the literature on platform organizing, which thus far has paid only limited attention to the unique mechanisms at play in the context of conjoined agency.
Permissionless blockchains offer an information environment where users can interact privately without fear of censorship. Financial services can be programmatically coded via smart contracts to automate transactions without the need for human intervention or knowing user identity. This new paradigm is known as decentralized finance (DeFi). We investigate Compound (a leading DeFi lending protocol) to show how it works in this novel information environment, who its users are, and what factors determine their participation. On-chain transaction data shows that loan durations are short (31 days on average), and many users borrow to support leveraged investment strategies (yield farming). We show that systemic risk in DeFi arises from concentration and interconnection, and how traditional risk management practices can be challenging for DeFi.
Benedikt C. Eikmanns, Pascal Mehrwald, Isabell M. Welpe, Philipp Sandner
Similar to mobile operating systems, public blockchain infrastructures, such as Ethereum, represent a platform for the development of software applications. Since 2020, we observe the emergence of a rapidly evolving ecosystem of blockchain-based applications called Decentralized Finance (DeFi), which aspires to challenge traditional finance and associated business models. To explore the economic structures that constitute DeFi, we follow an interdisciplinary approach, supplementing information systems (IS) research with strategic management literature. We apply the theoretical lens of strategic groups to identify platform-specific dimensions and conceptualize DeFi as a hierarchical structured platform economy consisting of four strategic groups, namely 1) Token Management Applications, 2) Protocol Platforms, 3) Aggregation Platforms, and 4) Decentralized Financial Services Solutions. Further, we give a market overview of DeFi applications and discover archetypal attributes of the respective groups. Lastly, we present an integrated framework for the analysis of software-based platform ecosystems and derive areas for future research.
Vimal Dwivedi, Alex Norta, Alexander J. Wulf, Benjamin Leiding · 6 authors
Blockchain- and smart-contract technology enhance the effectiveness and automation of business processes. The rising interest in the development of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAO) shows that blockchain technology has the potential to reform business and society. A DAO is an organization wherein business rules are encoded in smart-contract programs that are executed when specified rules are met. The contractual- and business semantics are sine qua non for drafting a legally-binding smart contract in DAO collaborations. Several smart-contract languages (SCLs) exist, such as SPESC, or Symboleo to specify a legally-binding contract. However, their primary focus is on designing and developing smart contracts with the cooperation of IT- and non-IT users. Therefore, this paper fills a gap in the state of the art by specifying a smart-legal-contract markup language (SLCML) for legal- and business constructs to draft a legally-binding DAO. To achieve the paper objective, we first present a formal SCL ontology to describe the legal- and business semantics of a DAO. Secondly, we translate the SCL ontology into SLCML, for which we present the XML schema definition. We demonstrate and evaluate our SLCML language through the specification of a real life-inspired Sale-of-Goods contract. Finally, the SLCML use-case code is translated into Solidity to demonstrate its feasibility for blockchain platform implementations.
We analyze the market quality of centralized crypto exchanges (CEXs) and decentralized blockchain-based venues (DEXs) using a unique and comprehensive dataset. Focusing on two fundamental aspects, transaction costs and deviations from the no-arbitrage condition, we estimate the causal effect of ``gas fees'' on DEX market quality. We show that these fixed costs impose a significant burden on relatively small trades and cause persistent arbitrage deviations. Conversely, DEXs offer more competitive transaction costs for larger trades, offering a more favorable environment for institutional investors. Furthermore, we provide causal evidence that innovations aimed at enhancing the flexibility of liquidity provision in DEX markets lead to sizeable improvements in market quality.
Nazir Ullah, Waleed Mugahed Al-Rahmi, Ali Alkhalifah
It is expected that blockchain technology will bring a disruptive paradigm shift in the manner in which transactions are conducted in the manufacturing and service enterprises. By eliminating the drawbacks of trust-related issues in a business chain, the distributed database of blockchain can bring transparency with pseudonymity and irreversibility of records. In this paper, we advance the limited literature on DLT and its adoption in the manufacturing and service enterprises. The proposed model is based on the integration of three traditional adoption theories namely Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), Technology Readiness Index (TRI) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). Based on a survey of 211 experts of Pakistan, the proposed model was tested using structural equation modelling. The study result confirms that Theory of Planned Behavior and TAM play a key role in the disruptive technology implementation. It is one of the early studies on blockchain technology adoption in the manufacturing and service enterprises and the study results indicate that more manufacturing and service industries are transforming to intelligent operations. Smart manufacturing system through blockchain applications has become the focus of attention of businesses.
Bitcoin has witnessed a prevailing transition that employing transaction fees paid by users rather than subsidy assigned by the system as the main incentive for mining.
A way to enable full decentralisation in our P2P- oriented economy are ‘Smart Contracts’,a term coined by Nick Szabo.<br> These smart contracts enforce a set ofpredefined rules which are coded as logic to orchestrate agreement between different entities. .The current implementation makes the use of smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain that provides full-fledged car sharing functionalities along with various countermeasures to tackle malicious behaviour.
Carlos Roberto López Zambrano, Mario Camberos Castro
Bitcoin is part of the so-called crypto-currencies and can be defined as a universal decentralized public electronic payment system based on Blockchain technology. The problem it faces is trust in its use; therefore, the objective of this research is to analyze the factors that influence the adoption and use of Bitcoin in Mexico. For this purpose, the UTAUT2 model integrated with the trust variable, is used. The model was empirically tested by applying a survey of 106 questionnaires, under the partial least square’s method, with structural equation models (PLS-SEM). The main results indicate that performance expectation, hedonistic motivation, habit, and its decentralization; are the main factors that influence confidence for the adoption and use of Bitcoin. The results illustrate to companies and any interested party the advantages of using Bitcoin.
In this commentary, we argue that studies similar to Cennamo, Marchesi, and Meyer (2020) should distinguish four dimensions of control in blockchain governance, all of which could be more or less decentralized. For some of these dimensions, decentralization is likely beneficial, while for others centralization may be preferable. Cennamo et al. (2020) provide evidence that the initial design stages of blockchain systems benefit from centralization. Future research is needed to provide empirical insights for other dimensions of control in blockchain governance.
Zusammenfassung Blockchain verspricht, Intermediäre wie Banken überflüssig zu machen und durch dezentrale Peer-to-Peer-Netzwerke zu ersetzen. Dieser Beitrag stellt die Frage nach der Realisierbarkeit dieser Ankündigung sowie danach, welche gesellschaftlichen Implikationen damit verbunden sind. Eine historisch informierte theoretische Analyse zeigt, dass die Erzeugung von Kreditgeld durch Banken ein für kapitalistische Gesellschaften existenzieller Vorgang ist. Die Fiktion des Geldwerts bedarf ihrerseits glaubwürdiger Intermediäre, die dauerhaft in der Lage sind, die zeitliche und räumliche Stabilität des Geldes zu inszenieren. Explorative Interviews mit Akteuren im Finanzsektor in Kombination mit einer inhaltsanalytischen Auswertung von einschlägigen Blogs, White Papers und Artikeln der Wirtschaftspresse lassen vermuten, dass Blockchain Intermediäre keineswegs ausschaltet, sondern diejenigen mächtiger werden lässt, die in der Lage sind, die Technologie ihren Bedürfnissen entsprechend umzugestalten.
Gerald B. Imbugwa, Manuel Mazzara, Salvatore Distefano
Abstract In this paper, we envision to illustrate the process to be used in developing a mobile application on the smart contract. We start by looking at what other researchers have accomplished and how we can improve on what already exists. The paper highlights the requirement gathering process, the methodology for data collection to streamline and validate the requirement, the architecture and implementation phase by analyzing the technological stack to achieve the business goal.
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to\nEthereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a\nburned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the\ngame-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some\nalternative designs.\n
Abstract Existing information systems research thoroughly explains how task-technology fit and appropriation affect performance on an individual or group level. This was appropriate for many years, as technology is typically used to fulfill a certain task on these levels. Today, however, companies are tightly interconnected and rely on business networks to develop, produce, and deliver products and services. They collaboratively engage in joint implementation and utilization of new technologies that are applied and integrated into their business processes. These technologies, such as the newly introduced blockchain technology, operate across business networks and, thus, unfold their benefits not only on an individual or group level, but ideally on a network level. On this level, though, knowledge of the application and performance of information technology is still scarce. To drive the performance of technology in such networks, we investigate the impact of fit and technology appropriation on a network level. Due to the technology’s expected impact and characteristics, we select blockchain technology to explore potential factors, impacting fit, appropriation and, in turn, performance. We draw upon a set of interviews with experts that have implemented blockchain solutions in large business network settings. Based on our analysis, we propose a comprehensive model elevating the Fit-Appropriation Model to a network level. We contribute to the general understanding of technology utilization and performance by extending existing theory to a network-level perspective. Using insights on blockchain implementations as our empirical base, we also provide guidance to business leaders, intending to connect their partners through blockchain technology.
What is an economic platform? I address this question by focusing on the case of cryptocurrency exchange platforms. The research draws on interviews with platform actors, fieldwork in one exchange, and computational text analysis of the terms of service of all cryptocurrency exchanges in the world. I argue that cryptocurrency exchange platforms go beyond market processes by fulfilling a variety of functions including banking, infrastructure development, gift-giving, barter, money making, payment system operation, software production, security providing, and centralized extra-blockchain accounting. I propose the concept of “stack” to describe such a process of socio-digital economization that takes place in these data money exchanges. Demonstrating that it is inadequate to describe platforms as mere digital infrastructures, devices, places or markets, I argue that cryptocurrency exchange platforms can best be understood as economization stacks that weave multiple layers and types of interaction, and facilitate an empirically observable range of variegated economic activities.
Daniel Trabucchi, Antonella Moretto, Tommaso Buganza, Alan MacCormack
The importance of platform‐based businesses in the modern economy is growing continuously and becoming increasingly relevant. Specifically, the deployment of digital technologies has enhanced the applicability of two‐sided business models, enabling companies to act not just as builders and owners of assets, but also as orchestrators of external resources. Management research has, therefore, focused increasingly on the unique aspects of this model. At the center of a two‐sided platform there is a platform provider that enables a transaction between the sides, reducing the relative transaction costs. However, in recent years, a new technology emerged that challenges some of the underlying assumptions of this model: the blockchain. Blockchain enables the creation of a peer‐to‐peer network that is able to authenticate transactions, upon which applications and services may be built. It allows users to conduct transactions without the need for a central platform. We explore how blockchain technology reshapes two‐sided platforms, focusing in particular on the role of the platform provider. The research is based upon multiple case studies, using an inductive approach to explore this emerging phenomenon. Our findings show there is a significant shift in the role of the central player that links the two sides of a transaction using blockchain. We frame this as a shift from a “platform provider” to a “service provider,” leveraging the blockchain as a Platform‐as‐a‐Service. Our work examines the peculiarities of this model, unveiling new dynamics in these businesses. Specifically, we show that different variables must be considered to classify two‐sided platforms using blockchain. Furthermore, the essential characteristics of two‐sided platforms must also be enlarged. For example, traditional platform theories emphasize the importance of cross‐side network externalities in creating value. In blockchain‐enabled platforms however, we show the use of “tokens” play a key role in creating different types of externalities between the two sides.
The recent emergence of blockchains may be considered a critical turning point in organizing collaborations. We outline the historical background and the fundamental features of blockchains and present an analysis with a focus on their role as governance mechanisms. Specifically, we argue that blockchains offer a way to enforce agreements and achieve cooperation and coordination that is distinct from both traditional contractual and relational governance as well as from other information technology solutions. We also examine the scope of blockchains as efficient governance mechanisms and highlight the tacitness of the transaction as a key boundary condition. We then discuss how blockchain governance interacts with traditional governance mechanisms in both substitutive and complementary ways. We pay particular attention to blockchains’ social implications as well as their inherent challenges and limitations. Our analysis culminates in a research agenda that explores how blockchains may change the way to organize collaborations, including issues of what different types of blockchains may emerge, who is involved and impacted by blockchain governance, why actors may want blockchains, when and where blockchains can be more (versus less) effective, and how blockchains influence a number of important organizational outcomes.
Xiao Fan Liu, Xin-Jian Jiang, Si-Hao Liu, Chi K. Tse
Cryptocurrencies gain trust in users by publicly disclosing the full creation and transaction history. In return, the transaction history faithfully records the whole spectrum of cryptocurrency user behaviors. This article analyzes and summarizes the existing research on knowledge discovery in the cryptocurrency transactions using data mining techniques. Specifically, we classify the existing research into three aspects, i.e., transaction tracings and blockchain address linking, the analyses of collective user behaviors, and the study of individual user behaviors. For each aspect, we present the problems, summarize the methodologies, and discuss major findings in the literature. Furthermore, an enumeration of transaction data parsing and visualization tools and services is also provided. Finally, we outline several future directions in this research area, such as the current rapid development of Decentralized Finance (De-Fi) and digital fiat money.