ChipmunkRing, a practical post-quantum ring signature construction tailored for blockchain environments. Building on our Chipmunk lattice-based cryptographic framework, this implementation delivers compact digital signatures ranging from 20.5 to 279.7KB, with rapid signing operations completing in 1.1-15.1ms and efficient validation processes requiring only 0.4-4.5ms for participant groups of 2-64 members. The cornerstone of our approach is Acorn Verification-a streamlined zero-knowledge protocol that supersedes the classical Fiat-Shamir methodology. This innovation enables linear O(n) authentication complexity using concise 96-byte cryptographic proofs per participant, yielding a remarkable 17.7x performance enhancement for 32-member rings when compared to conventional techniques. Our work includes rigorous mathematical security demonstrations confirming 112-bit post-quantum protection (NIST Level 1), extensive computational benchmarking, and comprehensive support for both standard anonymity sets and collaborative threshold constructions with flexible participation requirements.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) are protocols which construct cryptographic proofs to demonstrate knowledge of a secret input in a computation without revealing any information about the secret. ZKPs enable novel applications in private and verifiable computing such as anonymized cryptocurrencies and blockchain scaling and have seen adoption in several real-world systems. Prior work has accelerated ZKPs on GPUs by leveraging the inherent parallelism in core computation kernels like Multi-Scalar Multiplication (MSM). However, we find that a systematic characterization of execution bottlenecks in ZKPs, as well as their scalability on modern GPU architectures, is missing in the literature. This paper presents ZKProphet, a comprehensive performance study of Zero-Knowledge Proofs on GPUs. Following massive speedups of MSM, we find that ZKPs are bottlenecked by kernels like Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT), as they account for up to 90% of the proof generation latency on GPUs when paired with optimized MSM implementations. Available NTT implementations under-utilize GPU compute resources and often do not employ architectural features like asynchronous compute and memory operations. We observe that the arithmetic operations underlying ZKPs execute exclusively on the GPU's 32-bit integer pipeline and exhibit limited instruction-level parallelism due to data dependencies. Their performance is thus limited by the available integer compute units. While one way to scale the performance of ZKPs is adding more compute units, we discuss how runtime parameter tuning for optimizations like precomputed inputs and alternative data representations can extract additional speedup. With this work, we provide the ZKP community a roadmap to scale performance on GPUs and construct definitive GPU-accelerated ZKPs for their application requirements and available hardware resources.
Real-World Assets (RWAs) serve as a bridge between traditional financial instruments and decentralized infrastructures. By representing assets such as bonds, commodities, and real estate on blockchains, RWAs can extend the scope of decentralized finance. Industry forecasts further indicate rapid growth in tokenized RWAs after 2025, underscoring their potential role in the evolution of digital financial markets. However, in the current multi-chain environment, RWAs face challenges such as repeated authentication across multiple chains and inefficiencies arising from multi-step settlement protocols. To address these issues, we present a cross-chain framework for RWAs that emphasizes identity management, authentication, and cross-chain interaction. The framework integrates Decentralized Identifiers and Verifiable Credentials with customized attributes to support decentralized identification, and incorporates an authentication protocol based on Simplified Payment Verification to avoid redundant verification across chains. Furthermore, this paper adopts a cross-chain channel that supports efficient RWA settlements, and we refine its design so that the channel does not need to be closed immediately after each settlement, thereby reducing on-chain cost. We implement the framework and evaluate its performance via simulations, which confirm its feasibility and demonstrate improvements in efficiency for RWAs in cross-chain settings.
Gabriel Babatunde Iwasokun, Oluwaseyi Segun, Samuel Oluwatayo Ogunlana, Michael Adegoke · 6 authors
The integration of Internet of Things (IoT) devices into modern payment systems has introduced innovative functionalities, but also significant security and performance challenges. IoT devices, such as smart sensors, wearables, and automated vending machines, are typically resource-constrained yet handle sensitive financial transactions that demand robust security mechanisms. Conventional cryptographic solutions are often unsuitable for these environments due to their high computational and memory requirements. This paper presents the design of a lightweight blockchain-based model to secure IoT payment systems by leveraging the Ethereum blockchain and AES-128 encryption. The blockchain token is encrypted with AES-128 to add layer of security before being stored in a database. The model is designed to employ a decentralised digital ledger to record and validate transactions without a central authority, and the transaction is grouped into a block and linked to the preceding block through cryptographic hashes. The chain of blocks forms an immutable record that enhances transparency and security, and the distributed nature of blockchain networks, wherein multiple participants validate each transaction, minimises the risk of fraudulent activities while ensuring consensus is achieved through predefined protocols. Analysis of results from the implementation established the minimization of computational overhead and robust security measures, and was particularly beneficial where the scalability of decentralized systems is required alongside heightened security protocols.
Mohammed Ziaul Haider, Tayyaba Noreen, Mishah Uzziél Salman, Marcos Dias de Assunção · 5 authors
Cross-chain bridges and oracle DAOs represent some of the most vulnerable components of decentralized systems, with more than 2.8 billion lost due to trust failures, opaque validation behavior, and weak incentives. Current oracle designs are based on multisigs, optimistic assumptions, or centralized aggregation, exposing them to attacks and delays. Moreover, predictable committee selection enables manipulation, which threatens data integrity across chains. We propose V-ZOR, a verifiable oracle relay that integrates zero-knowledge proofs, quantum-grade randomness, and cross-chain restaking to mitigate these risks. Each oracle packet includes a Halo 2 proof verifying that the reported data was correctly aggregated using a deterministic median. To prevent committee manipulation, VZOR reseeds its VRF using auditable quantum entropy, ensuring unpredictable and secure selection of reporters. Reporters stake once on a shared restaking hub; any connected chain can submit a fraud proof to trigger slashing, removing the need for multisigs or optimistic assumptions. A prototype in Sepolia and Scroll achieves sub-300k gas verification, one-block latency, and a $\mathbf{1 0} \times$ increase in collusion cost. V-ZOR demonstrates that combining ZK attestation with quantum-randomized restaking enables a trust-minimized, high-performance oracle layer for cross-chain DeFi.
Traceable ring signatures (TRSs) allow a signer to create a signature that maintains anonymity while enabling traceability if needed. It merges the characteristics of traditional ring signatures with the ability to trace signers, making it ideal for applications that demand both confidentiality and accountability. In a TRS scheme, a ring of potential signers generates a signature on a message without disclosing the actual signer’s identity. However, the identity can be traced if the signer uses the same tag for multiple signatures. This paper introduces a novel formal construction of TRS under universally composable (UC) security. We integrate verifiable random functions (VRFs) and zero-knowledge proofs for membership, employing Pedersen commitments. Our signature schemes maintain a logarithmic size while preserving the UC security guarantees. Additionally, we explore the potential to extend the property of one-time anonymity in TRS to K-time anonymity.
David Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Liu Chao · 11 authors
Abstract We revisit “silent coercion” where an adversary gains access to a voter’s credential without the voter’s knowledge in an E2E verifiable, coercion-resistant Internet voting system. We argue that in this setting, casting an intended vote is impossible since the cryptographic backend can no longer distinguish the voter and adversary. However, we affirm that the voter can still act to nullify adversarial ballots, which is preferable to inaction. We provide a new instantiation of nullification using zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computation, which improves on the efficiency of the current state-of-the-art. We also demonstrate an example voting system—VoteXX—that uses nullification. Our nullification protocol can complement new and existing techniques for coercion resistance (which all require voters to hide cryptographic keys from the coercer), providing a failsafe option for voters whose keys leak.
Abstract Verifiable encryption enables the decryption to be taken on properly generated ciphertexts, by making the encryptor provide a zero-knowledge proof. To meet the quantum-safe application requirements, such as key escrow, Lyubashevsky et al. proposed a one-shot verifiable encryption (LN17 scheme) based on the hardness of lattice problems. In their scheme, the FSwA-type zero-knowledge proof was obtained using rejection sampling on a discrete Gaussian distribution. In this paper, we present a construction of verifiable encryption that utilizes rejection sampling on bimodal Gaussian to get the associated zero-knowledge proof. Our new construction, while exhibiting a weaker soundness property than LN17 scheme, benefits from a smaller proof size, leading to a reduced size of the verifiable ciphertext. As for the weaker soundness property, it supports some applications such as key escrow where honestly generated verifiable ciphertexts are more useful to be decrypted out in the hope of doing some further computation tasks. We provide the efficiency comparison of the new construction by instantiating it with several sets of concrete parameters.
Zero-knowledge Proof (ZKP), is an effective cryptographic primitive that allows one party to verify the correctness of a given statement without disclosing any additional information. It plays a central role in applications such as blockchain transactions and cryptocurrencies. However, implementations of ZKP suffer from the most time-consuming task called Multi-Scalar Multiplication (MSM). Existing works and evaluation criteria primarily emphasize speed enhancement, but overlook optimizations of area overhead. In this paper, a FPGA-based accelerator FusionMSM is designed to reduce the overall latency but also improve area overhead. We attribute the bottleneck of MSM to a three-layer pyramid, including the finite field arithmetic, point operations on elliptic curves and scheduling. For modular arithmetic, we propose an efficient and non-Montgomery modular multiplier by utilizing hybrid multiplication strategy and optimizing multi-bit LUT-based modular reduction. It obtains 1.11 x less area cost and 2.00 x speed-up versus the modular multipliers used in ZKP acceleration works. For point operations, we design a unified and fully pipelined point addition unit, which can run at 500 MHz, the highest frequency in the reported works. On top of that, we present a greedy mechanism to resolve potential collisions, which can reduce the idle cycles of the point addition unit and improve its utilization. As far as we know, FusionMSM achieves the best performance compared to other FPGA-based and ASIC-based works for the input sizes from 218 to 226. For the degree of 220, FusionMSM only needs 12.4% of time in Hardcaml, 24.54% of time in PipeMSM on FPGA, and 36.41% of time in ASIC-based work PipeZK. It also utilizes less resources, resulting in a 90.93% reduction in URAMs, 35.24% reduction in FFs and 47.59% reduction in CARRY8s. Compared to GPU-based implementations, FusionMSM delivers comparable performance but with a lower power of 24.5 W.
L. Domven, Aliyu Danladi Hina, A. M. Kwami, C. M. Miri · 5 authors
This study proposes a secure mobile voting system that integrates elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) with secure multiparty computation (SMPC) to guarantee vote confidentiality, integrity, and verifiability. Designed to enable scalable, privacy-preserving elections via mobile devices, the system authenticates voters using registered numbers and records ballots as encrypted points on an elliptic curve. Encrypted votes are published on a public bulletin board alongside zero-knowledge proofs to ensure their validity. To safeguard decryption, Shamir’s secret sharing distributes keys among trusted authorities, enabling collective tallying without exposing individual votes. The system incorporates ECC-based secret sharing, homomorphic encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs, leveraging the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for robust security. Both experimental and theoretical evaluations demonstrate that ECC significantly improves computational efficiency and scalability, making the system well-suited for resource-constrained environments. Overall, the integration of ECC and SMPC offers a practical, efficient, and secure framework for mobile elections, effectively balancing privacy, security, and performance.
Thibauld Feneuil, Matthieu Rivain, Auguste Warmé-Janville
Side-channel attacks pose significant threats to cryptographic implementations, which require the inclusion of countermeasures to mitigate these attacks. In this work, we study the masking of state-of-the-art post-quantum signatures based on the MPC-in-the-head paradigm. More precisely, we focus on the recent threshold-computation-in-the-head (TCitH) framework that applies to some NIST candidates of the post-quantum standardization process. We first provide an analysis of side-channel attack paths in the signature algorithms based on the TCitH framework. We then explain how to apply standard masking to achieve a d-probing secure implementation of such schemes, with performance scaling in O(d2), for d the masking order.Our main contribution is to introduce different ways to tweak those signature schemes towards their masking friendliness. While the TCitH framework comes in two variants, the GGM variant and the Merkle tree variant, we introduce a specific tweak for each of these variants. These tweaks allow us to achieve complexities of O(d) and O(d log d) at the cost of non-constant signature size, caused by the inclusion of additional seeds in the signature. We also propose a third tweak that takes advantage of the threshold secret sharing used in TCitH. With the right choice of parameters, we show how, by design, some parts of the TCitH algorithms satisfy probing security without additional countermeasures. While this approach can substantially reduce the cost of masking in some part of the signature algorithm, it degrades the soundness of the core zero-knowledge proof, hence slightly increasing the size of the signature.We analyze the complexity of the masked implementations of our tweaked TCitH signatures and provide benchmarks on a RISC-V platform with built-in hash accelerator. We use a modular benchmarking approach, allowing to estimate the performance of diverse signature instances with different tweaks and parameters. Our results illustrate how the different variants scale for an increasing masking order. For instance, for a masking order d = 3, we obtain signatures of around 14 kB that run in 0.67 second on a the target RISC-V CPU with a 250MHz frequency. This is to be compared with the 4.7 seconds required by the original signature scheme masked at the same order on the same platform. For a masking order d = 7, we obtain a signature of 17.5 kB running in 1.75 second, to be compared with 16 seconds for the stardard masked signature.Finally, we discuss the extension of our techniques to signature schemes based on the VOLE-in-the-Head framework, which shares similarities with the GGM variant of TCitH. One key takeaway of our work is that the Merkle tree variant of TCitH is inherently more amenable to efficient masking than frameworks based on GGM trees, such as TCitH-GGM or VOLE-in-the-Head.
Florian Hirner, Florian Krieger, Constantin Piber, Sujoy Sinha Roy
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are cryptographic protocols that enable one party to prove the validity of a statement without revealing any information beyond its truth. Central building blocks in many ZKPs are polynomial commitment schemes (PCS) where constructions with linear-time provers are especially attractive. Two such examples are Brakedown and its extension Orion, which enable linear-time and quantum-resistant proving by leveraging linear-time encodable Spielman codes. However, these PCS operate over large datasets, creating significant computational bottlenecks. For example, committing to and proving a degree 228 polynomial requires around 1.1 GB of data while taking 463 seconds on a high-end server CPU.This work addresses the performance bottleneck in Orion-like PCS by optimizing their most critical operations: Spielman encoding and Merkle commitments. These operations involve Gigabytes of data and suffer from random off-chip memory access patterns that drastically reduce off-chip bandwidth. We resolve this issue and introduce inverted expander graphs to eliminate random writes and reduce off-chip memory accesses by over 50%. Additionally, we propose an on-the-fly graph sampling method that avoids streaming large auxiliary data by generating expander graphs dynamically on-chip. We also provide a formal security proof for our proposed graph transformation. Beyond encoding, we accelerate Merkle Tree construction over large data sets through a scalable multi-pass SHA3 pipeline. Finally, we reutilize existing hardware components used in commitment to accelerate the so-called proximity and consistency checks during proof generation.Building upon these concepts, we present the first hardware architecture for PCS – with linear prover time – on an Xilinx Alveo U280 FPGA. In addition, we discuss the practical challenges of manually partitioning, placing, and routing our large-scale architecture to efficiently map it to the multi-SLR and HBM-equipped FPGA. The final implementation achieves a speedup of two orders of magnitude for full proof generation, covering commitment and proving steps. When combined with Virgo as an outer CP-SNARK protocol, our accelerator reduces end-to-end latency by up to 3.85x – close to the theoretical maximum of 3.9x.
Smart contracts are software that runs in blockchain and expresses the rules of an agreement between parties. An incorrect smart contract might allow blockchain users to violate its rules and even jeopardize its expected security. Smart contracts cannot be easily replaced to patch a bug since the nature of contracts requires them to be immutable. More problems occur when a smart contract is written in a general-purpose language, such as Java, whose executions, in a blockchain, could hang the network, break consensus or violate data encapsulation. To limit these problems, there exist automatic static analyzers that find bugs before smart contracts are installed in the blockchain. This so-called off-chain verification is optional because programmers are not forced to use it. This paper presents a general framework for the verification of smart contracts, instead, that is part of the protocol of the nodes and applies when the code of the smart contracts gets installed. It is a mandatory entry filter that bans code that does not abide by the verification rules. Consequently, such rules become part of the consensus rules of the blockchain. Therefore, an improvement in the verification protocol entails a consensus update of the network. This paper describes an implementation of a smart contracts application layer with protocol-based verification for smart contracts written in the Takamaka subset of Java, that filters only those smart contracts whose execution in blockchain is not dangerous. This application layer runs on top of a consensus engine such as Tendermint and its derivatives Ignite and CometBFT (proof of stake), or Mokamint (proof of space). This paper provides examples of actual implementations of verification rules that check if the smart contracts satisfy some constraints required by the Takamaka language. This paper shows that protocol-based verification works and reports how consensus updates are implemented. It shows actual experiments as well as limits to its use, mainly related to the fact that protocol-based verification must be fast and its complexity must never explode, or otherwise, it would compromise the performance of the blockchain network.
M Savitha Devi, Ningthoujam Chidananda Singh, Thoudam Basanta Singh
Abstract - Blockchain enabled systems are more and more adopted in healthcare for secured processing of data, but current smart contract usage in healthcare leaks private patient data on execution. The contributions of this paper are two-fold: (1) it proposes a new framework that combines ZKPs with healthcare smart contracts/transactions to achieve full privacy preservation and (2) it discusses the security, usability, and the efficiency of the framework at the same time. Our proposed framework is based on zero-knowledge proof systems zkSNARKs (Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge) and zkSTARKs (Zero-Knowledge Scalable Transparent Argument of Knowledge) tailored for computer on medical data without revealing effectively. We conduct extensive analysis and prototype implementation to show that our framework is able to achieve perfect privacy preservation at a 1.87% computational overhead increase with respect to standard smart contracts. The system processes over 10,000 medical records with sub-second verification times and that meet the HIPAA requirements. Experimental results in diverse healthcare applications attest to the efficacy of the approach in practice, and show the substantial gain of privacy preservation (99.8% retention rate) and computational efficiency over the state-of-art algorithms. This paper bridges the gap between blockchain’s transparency and healthcare’s privacy requirements, laying the groundwork for secure and privacy-preserving blockchain based healthcare applications. Key Words: Zero-knowledge proofs, Smart contracts, Healthcare blockchain, Privacy preservation, zkSNARKs, zkSTARKs, Medical data security, HIPAA compliance
Michael Herbert Ziegler, Mariusz Nowostawski, Basel Katt
In this literature review, we critically examine the evolving landscape of privacy in blockchain systems, with a particular focus on the differentiation of privacy attacks and protective measures across three distinct layers: the on-chain layer; the off-chain layer; and on the infrastructure, i.e., peer-to-peer network layer. In this review, we categorize prevalent privacy attacks, such as transaction tracing, data leakage, and network surveillance, highlighting their implications at each layer. In addition, we evaluate a range of protective techniques, including cryptographic methods, zero-knowledge proofs, and other privacy-preserving protocols. We explore the compatibility of these privacy techniques with existing blockchain systems. By synthesizing current research and practical implementations, our aims are to provide a comprehensive understanding of privacy challenges and solutions in blockchain environments, identify gaps, and guide future developments in privacy-enhancing technologies within the blockchain ecosystem.
Statistical witness indistinguishability is a relaxation of statistical zero-knowledge which guarantees that the transcript of an interactive proof reveals no information about which valid witness the prover used to generate it. In this paper we define and initiate the study of QSWI, the class of problems with quantum statistically witness indistinguishable proofs. Using inherently quantum techniques from Kobayashi (TCC 2008), we prove that any problem with an honest-verifier quantum statistically witness indistinguishable proof has a 3-message public-coin malicious-verifier quantum statistically witness indistinguishable proof. There is no known analogue of this result for classical statistical witness indistinguishability. As a corollary, our result implies SWI is contained in QSWI. Additionally, we extend the work of Bitansky et al. (STOC 2023) to show that quantum batch proofs imply quantum statistically witness indistinguishable proofs with inverse-polynomial witness indistinguishability error.
Designing secure electronic voting systems that truly protect voter privacy, ensure vote accuracy, and allow independent verification continues to pose serious difficulties. Many current cryptographic approaches require excessive computational resources and use encryption keys that are too large for practical implementation. This paper proposes modifications to the Chaum, Pedersen and Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmakers, and Yung voting protocols by integrating elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which offers stronger security per bit and more compact key representations. The use of ECC allows for reduced parameter sizes while maintaining resistance against known attacks, including those targeting the discrete logarithm problem. We present detailed adaptations of these protocols on elliptic curves and demonstrate how they preserve core security properties such as vote secrecy, universal verifiability, and resistance to double voting under a more efficient cryptographic framework. Our findings contribute to the development of scalable, high-assurance e-voting mechanisms suitable for modern digital infrastructures. The presented modifications significantly enhance the scalability and efficiency of e-voting systems without compromising cryptographic strength.
Bruno M. F. Ricardo, Lucas C. Cardoso, Leonardo T. Kimura, Marcos A. Simplício · 5 authors
In 2023, Barreto and Zanon proposed a three-round Schnorr-like blind signature scheme, leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to produce one-time signatures as an intermediate step of the protocol. The resulting scheme, called BZ, is proven secure in the discrete-logarithm setting under the one-more discrete logarithm assumption with (allegedly) resistance to the Random inhomogeneities in a Overdetermined Solvable system of linear equations modulo a prime number p attack, commonly referred to as ROS attack. The authors argue that the scheme is resistant against a ROS-based attack by building an adversary whose success depends on extracting the discrete logarithm of the intermediate signing key. In this paper, however, we describe a distinct ROS attack on the BZ scheme, in which a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker can bypass the zero-knowledge proof step to break the one-more unforgeability of the scheme. We also built a BZ variant that, by using one secure hash function instead of two, can prevent this particular attack. Unfortunately, though, we show yet another ROS attack that leverages the BZ scheme’s structure to break the one-more unforgeability principle again, thus revealing that this variant is also vulnerable. These results indicate that, like other Schnorr-based strategies, it is hard to build a secure blind signature scheme using BZ’s underlying structure.
Jingcheng Zhang, Yekai Zhou, Yingxuan Ren, Man Ho Au · 9 authors
Advancements in sequencing technologies grant individuals unprecedented access to their genomic data. However, existing data management systems or protocols are inadequate in privacy protection, limiting individuals' control over their genomic information, hindering data sharing, and posing challenges for biomedical research. Therefore, demand exists for an owner-governed system fulfilling owner authority, life cycle data encryption, and verifiability simultaneously. Here, we realized Governome, an owner-governed data management system empowering individuals with real-time control over their genomic data. Governome leverages a blockchain to manage transactions and permissions, granting data owners dynamic permission management with full transparency on data usage. It uses homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs to enable genomic data storage and computation in an encrypted and verifiable form throughout its life cycle. Governome can support versatile genomic applications. We implemented and tested individual variant query, cohort study, genome-wide association study (GWAS) analysis, and forensics on 2,504 1000 Genomes Project (1kGP) genomes, demonstrating its robustness and scalability. Governome is open-source at https://github.com/HKU-BAL/Governome.
Blockchain smart contracts are pivotal to decentralized applications, yet their security remains a critical challenge. This study analyzes a dataset of 1,000 smart contracts to investigate known vulnerabilities, audit practices, and exploit patterns. The results reveal that audited contracts are significantly less prone to exploitation, with 75% exhibiting no exploit history compared to 55% of non-audited contracts. "Integer Overflow" and "Unchecked Call" were identified as the most prevalent vulnerabilities, contributing to 60% and 50% exploit rates, respectively. The study highlights the importance of transparent audit reporting, as contracts without available reports were exploited in 35% of cases. Additionally, hidden vulnerabilities in ostensibly secure contracts underscore the evolving sophistication of blockchain threats. This research emphasizes the need for robust security practices, including stricter coding standards, comprehensive audits, and advanced vulnerability detection techniques such as formal verification and machine learning. Future works aim to integrate security tools into development workflows and foster industry-wide collaboration to standardize auditing practices, thereby enhancing the security and trustworthiness of blockchain ecosystems.
This paper studies the practical aspects of adding zero-knowledge proofs of vote correctness to Internet voting, specifically to the IVXV system used in Estonia. We discuss various available alternatives and present a concrete instantiation based on Bulletproofs together with implementation details and benchmarking results. As IVXV currently uses the ElGamal cryptosystem with a 3072-bit prime modulus for vote encryption, but Bulletproofs work most efficiently on elliptic curves, a group switching solution is also implemented and benchmarked. Despite all the extra work required, our solution is very performant and well capable of sustaining the load of votes, even during peak vote submission periods.
Maria Nuțu, Giorgi Akhalaia, Răzvan Bocu, Maksim Iavich
Commitment schemes represent foundational cryptographic primitives enabling secure verification protocols across diverse applications, from blockchain systems to zero-knowledge proofs. This paper presents a systematic survey of vector, polynomial, and functional commitment schemes, analyzing their evolution from classical constructions to post-quantum secure alternatives. We examine the strengths and limitations of RSA-based, Diffie–Hellman, and lattice-based approaches, highlighting the critical shift toward quantum-resistant designs necessitated by emerging computational threats. The survey reveals that while lattice-based schemes (particularly those using the Short Integer Solution problem) offer promising security guarantees, they face practical challenges in proof size and verification efficiency. Functional commitments emerge as a powerful generalization, though their adoption is constrained by computational overhead and setup requirements. Key findings identify persistent gaps in adaptive security, composability, and real-world deployment, while proposed solutions emphasize optimization techniques and hybrid approaches. By synthesizing over 90 research works, this paper provides both a comprehensive reference for cryptographic researchers and a roadmap for future developments in commitment schemes, particularly in addressing the urgent demands of post-quantum cryptography and decentralized systems.
Aug 24, 2025·Proceedings of the 31st ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 2, 2026
Thomas Gassmann, Stefanos Chaliasos, Thodoris Sotiropoulos, Zhendong Su
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are the cornerstone of programmable cryptography. They enable (1) privacy-preserving and verifiable computation across blockchains, and (2) an expanding range of off-chain applications such as credential schemes. Zero-knowledge virtual machines (zkVMs) lower the barrier by turning ZKPs into a drop-in backend for standard compilation pipelines. This lets developers write proof-generating programs in conventional languages (e.g., Rust or C++) instead of hand-crafting arithmetic circuits. However, these VMs inherit compiler infrastructures tuned for traditional architectures rather than for proof systems. In particular, standard compiler optimizations assume features that are absent in zkVMs, including cache locality, branch prediction, or instruction-level parallelism. Therefore, their impact on proof generation is questionable. We present the first systematic study of the impact of compiler optimizations on zkVMs. We evaluate 64 LLVM passes, six standard optimization levels, and an unoptimized baseline across 58 benchmarks on two RISC-V-based zkVMs (RISC Zero and SP1). While standard LLVM optimization levels do improve zkVM performance (over 40\%), their impact is far smaller than on traditional CPUs, since their decisions rely on hardware features rather than proof constraints. Guided by a fine-grained pass-level analysis, we~\emph{slightly} refine a small set of LLVM passes to be zkVM-aware, improving zkVM execution time by up to 45\% (average +4.6\% on RISC Zero, +1\% on SP1) and achieving consistent proving-time gains. Our work highlights the potential of compiler-level optimizations for zkVM performance and opens new direction for zkVM-specific passes, backends, and superoptimizers.
The dawn of the disruptive quantum computing scenario marks a serious threat to the existence of traditional cryptosystems. With laws such as Shor’s, capable of factoring large integers in polynomial time, and Grover’s, able to speed up brute-force key searches, these attacks make conventional public-key infrastructures increasingly vulnerable, whereas even symmetric ciphers lose good measure of their strength. In this article, we focus on an elaborative description of a patented method for quantum-secure key generation, wherein Qabbalah (QBLH) complexity is utilized in the geometric-symbolic realm, in conjunction with magic number squares, phi/pi coordinate weighting, and tetrahedral trinary state encoding. The proposed system of TriGate QBLH Quantum-Safe Encryption converts seed inputs to multidimensional keys that resist linear algebraic attacks owing to non-linear permutations, irrational constant weighting, and topological complexity. Normally, pseudo-random number generators spatialize entropy in Euclidean geometry, as opposed to the present technique that places entropy in a completely non-Euclidean domain, where classical as well as quantum adversaries find it hard to traverse. We describe the method in detail, present its benefits over lattice- and hash-based post-quantum schemes, and walk through an example of its implementation. Consideration is also given to its potential integration with PQC standards, blockchain authentication, and decentralized finance applications. The system fuses symbolic mathematics, such as the 231 Gates of QBLH, with trinary logic mapped onto tetrahedral states to not only create encryption keys but also verifiable geometric signatures. This represents a paradigm shift toward geometric cryptography, which may be a viable method to realize scalable and trustworthy digital infrastructure in a quantum-threatened environment.