The unique characteristics of sovereign debt finance provide fertile ground for opportunistic behavior and intractable disputes among states and their creditors. Lacking reliable contractual enforcement mechanisms and formal bankruptcy procedures, the sovereign debt restructuring process is hampered by fragmentation, costly standoffs, and unpredictable outcomes. The result is a non-system of ad hoc, decentralized negotiations and litigation that some fear is perpetually at risk of falling apart. To address these concerns, recent years have seen renewed efforts to fix sovereign debt through soft law, public-private collaboration, and informal governance mechanisms, which this Article collectively refers to as sovereign debt governance. This Article focuses on one of the most prominent proposed reforms in sovereign debt governance: the use of creditor committees to facilitate engagement between a sovereign debtor and its private external creditors. Notwithstanding the uniqueness of sovereign debt in international law and financial regulation, we explain how the debtor-creditor relationship reflects a fundamental governance challenge amidst individual distrust and collective disorder. This challenge suggests that the sovereign debt restructuring process can be improved by reforming the procedural rules and institutional frameworks that govern debtor-creditor engagement. To assess this proposition, we examine the use of creditor committees in the current era of sovereign debt, focusing on factors that influence the conduct of debtors and their creditors vis-a-vis each other. Drawing on our observations, we consider the potential value and limitations of creditor committees in the context of sovereign debt governance.
Growth as an inevitable human nature roots even in our business operation. Private entities, similarly, in seek of expansion and maybe more influence over their area of expertise, decide to go public in a certain point of time. The timing to move from private to public, indeed, is a critical factor in the future success of the business. In the traditional capitalist structure of this move, small private companies, which are defined by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission as those entities with consolidated revenue of less than $50 million per year, choose between sellout to a parent firm or Initial Public Offering (IPO). Both options have their own advantages and disadvantages. Yet, they are both complex, highly regulated, costly, and frustrating which are truly major drawbacks for small entities. Failure to go public caused by these drawbacks results in death of small businesses and loss of jobs which is followed by terrible socio-economic consequences. To avoid the conventional frustrating publicity of the private firms, in this article, utilization of cryptocurrency as the modern financial instrument is discussed. Digital currencies enable fast transition, globalization, grassroot economy, and social justice.
The popularity of crypto-assets that have become a fast-growing trend in world finances is changing the list of tools and techniques of wealth management. Being a form of decentralized digital instruments, crypto-assets (cryptocurrencies, tokenized securities and decentralized finance (DeFi) products) disrupt the conventional approaches to investment, custodial activities, and portfolio diversification. The present paper discusses how wealth management has evolved to accommodate the incorporation of crypto-assets, citing the opportunities and risks that the latter have. On the one hand, these assets mean that it is now possible to achieve a better portfolio diversification, obtain a global reach, and make investment opportunities more democratic. They, on the other hand, come up with essential dissatisfaction concerning volatility, regulatory insecurity, cybersecurity risks, and absence of structured valuation standards. The research focus is on how wealth managers are coping with the paradigm shift by integrating some digital assets into client plans, creating new advisory frameworks, as well as using enhanced analytics to manage risk and make maximum returns. The ethical and fiduciary obligation of wealth managers is highlighted because wealth managers operate in such an environment with high levels of information asymmetry and a reshaping legal framework. In addition, the paper discusses how much the adoption of the institutions as well as regulation structure and investor education play in future integration into mainstream financial management of crypto-assets. In blending scholarly studies, regulatory statements, and business activity, this paper reveals that the effectiveness of the wealth management industry under the digital age will be determined by establishing a compromise between scientifical experimentation and wisdom. In the end, crypto-assets are not only speculative tools, much more are the gears that push managers into reconsidering expired paradigms, agile approaches, and technology-based solutions to satisfy their clients whose needs and wants are not confined to the realms of a rapidly digitalizing economy.
The aim of this study is to realize an analysis of cryptocurrencies in Albania. Cryptocurrencies have experienced tremendous changes in the last years, and have often been the subject of debates. Albania is one of the countries in which seems really difficult to have the opportunity of using cryptocurrencies as a payment tool, or as an investment alternative. Throughout this investigation, we will treat some of the main difficulties and challenges of the cryptocurrency market in Albania. As the study reveals, it seems that it has not been easy for Albanian investors to use cryptocurrency as an investment alternative, or use cryptocurrency as a payment tool. Anyway, what we can emphasize is the fact that we can see some positive steps in this direction. Even though it seems a slow process, the removal of some legal restrictions related to cryptocurrencies reflects the “break” of the “walls” that were serving as a barrier for them in Albania. Only the future can show this, so the only thing that we can do is to wait for it
Abstract The European sovereign debt crisis and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic have revealed the European Economic and Monetary Union’s fragility, which essentially emanates from the inherent tension between a single monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies. To cushion economic and financial shocks and sever the sovereign-bank doom loop, different proposals to create a common public debt security have been put forward, although none of them has so far seen the light of day. Building on pertinent economic and finance scholarship, this article reviews four promising safe asset proposals from a legal perspective: Sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), E-bonds, Purple bonds, and Coronabonds. Rather than focusing on their feasibility under EU law or national constitutional law, this article compares the proposals from an investor perspective against the backdrop of the following formal and functional legal characteristics that render assets ‘safe’: governing law, dispute settlement forum, investor protection, and investor representation in sovereign debt restructurings. Against this backdrop, targeted recommendations on critical design elements of safe assets, with the aim of reconciling the economic policy objectives with the pertinent legal constraints, are advanced.
Abstract A recent wave of scholarship attests that the liberal world order is under threat. Although there is disagreement about the underlying reasons for this diagnosis, there are few attempts to further our understanding of how the liberal order can be reinvigorated. This paper probes the potential of blockchain technology to promote international cooperation. Blockchain technology is a data structure that enables global governance stakeholders to establish decentralized governance systems which provide high-powered incentives for enhanced cooperation. By outlining the contours of a blockchain-based global governance system for climate policy, the paper illustrates that blockchain technology holds theoretical promise to foster cooperation in three ways: leveraging new sources of information through blockchain-based prediction markets; allaying coordinating problems through reducing the cost of transactions for side payments; and allowing states and other global governance actors to make more credible commitments given guaranteed execution of blockchain-enabled smart contracts. By empowering local knowledge holders and non-state actors that traditionally lacked the means to coordinate efforts to influence global politics, blockchain technology also promises to advance an international order based on liberal values. In actuality, however, emerging blockchain-based global governance systems will fall short of the libertarian ideal of ‘fully-automated liberalism’ as their design and operation will remain under the shadow of power.
Central banks are flocking to government-backed cryptocurrency, taking full advantage of the media attention brought to Bitcoin and other digital currency. However, while government-backed cryptocurrency avoids some pitfalls presented by private cryptocurrencies, other problems are less easily sidestepped. And government-backed cryptocurrencies, if widely adopted, could present issues to the stability of the international monetary system. These problems must be addressed, and not only as they arise. Unfortunately, national and international governments have shown no real ability to deal with troubles arising from private cryptocurrency. The government-backing of such digital currency changes the calculus, permitting a new entity to deal with these problems. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the best organization to deal with the issues. This Note submits that the IMF should act quickly to take pre-emptive measures and develop a system of best practices for dealing with government-backed cryptocurrency in pursuance of ensuring a stable international monetary system.
The article is aimed at defining the process of settlements in cryptocurrencies between enterprises and its accounting display. During the research, it was found that all participants using cryptocurrencies distribute risks among themselves. Due to the non-recognition of the cryptocurrency as payment means, the NBU as a regulator has fully abnegated its powers as to this issue. The strengths and weaknesses of the use of digital assets are considered and listed; the main risks are characterized. It is proposed to use a synthetic account of the second order of 128 «Digital Assets» for account of any crypto assets, in the context of which it is possible to open analytical accounts appropriate for account of specific cryptocurrencies. For example, one may use of 128.1 to account the cryptocurrency bitcoin cache; 128.2 – to account the bitcoin cryptocurrency; 128.3 – to account the ether cryptocurrency etc. In addition, to account for cryptocurrencies stored on crypto-wallets, such as Coinomi, it is proposed to use a synthetic account of the second order of 336 «Digital wallet». The reflection in the accounts of payments with cryptocurrency for goods is considered. It is determined that modern «accounting science» allows identifying and making certain corrections to the existing account plan for the accounting display of certain objects, such as digital money, cryptocurrencies. Therefore, the information function of accountance allows to conduct a continuous, uninterrupted and inter-relational reflection of economic activity. The results of the research show that it is not necessary to neglect such a digital asset as cryptocurrency. It can be stored on digital wallets and used as payment means on the Internet for the proposed goods, works or services.
This Article IV Consultation highlights that Malta has been one of the fastest growing countries in the European Union after the crisis, because of a rapid structural rebalancing towards export-oriented services—mainly remote gaming and tourism. The authorities are now exploring new development areas around the blockchain technology. As per the authorities, domestic demand would continue to be the main driver of growth, and persistent labor market tightness might eventually put some pressure on wages and prices. They consider global protectionism as a key external risk and emphasized ongoing actions to address domestic risks related to money laundering. The report also shows that Malta’s new development areas related to the distributed ledger technology present both opportunities and risks. The IMF team stresses that policies should focus on enhancing the economy’s resilience, ensuring financial stability and integrity and making growth more inclusive. It is important to promote strong and inclusive growth by encouraging further labor market participation of women and elderly workers.
Decentralized finance has evolved as a major contender for traditional banking systems over the last few years. Evolution in blockchain and cryptography technologies are the driving forces for decentralized finance’s growth. The emergence of Bitcoin in the finance system was a major driving force toward the tremendous growth of decentralized finance. However, with various platforms merging every day, the decentralized finance sector is still in its early, unorganized stages. The current decentralized finance market is chaotic. With a new “coin” being introduced almost every month, standardization is highly lacking in the system. DeFi already has several different applications available. For instance, one can purchase stable coins, or assets pegged to a national currency, on decentralized exchanges, move the assets to a lending platform that is also decentralized to earn interest, and then add the interest-earning instruments to a decentralized liquidity pool or an on-chain investment fund. DeFi enterprises frequently aim at decentralized decision-making, or governance, in everything from the user fees to the products they provide. A decentralized program may be started by one person or a small number of individuals, but as the project gathers traction, its leaders frequently try to step down and cede control to the user base. A decentralized autonomous organization that has its rules and regulations written into computer code and that may issue governance tokens, which allow its holders a voice in decisions rather than allowing the decision-making to a centralized government authority as in case of traditional finance, could represent this transition. While on one side, world governments are still trying to grasp and regulate the sector, on the other side, the technology’s reach has been very limited. Undoubtedly, the emergence of blockchain-based decentralized finance is massively influencing our current finance technology industry. In this chapter, we discuss the current growth in the FinTech industry and the blockchain-based decentralized finance sector. Furthermore, we discuss how decentralized finance can be used in the current FinTech industry.
This work conceptualizes a process for cryptocurrency to diversify traditional methods of higher education funding in the United States. Higher education funding has seemingly reached an impasse, and opinions remain divided over both which societal parties should bear the educational costs for the vast majority of Americans and how to remedy the student debt crisis. Cryptocurrency funding augments traditional revenue streams, and shifts the discussion of education costs from expenses to a more robust conversation about innovative avenues to wealth generation as a potential solution to fund the mission of American higher education. Historically, higher education has been rooted in scarcity frameworks and a type of zero-sum proposition for funding allocation, and this conceptual paper acknowledges the the central concerns of higher education funding and explores these arguments as legacy discourses rooted in career preparation, accessibility and affordability, and arguments about the need for a broad-based education versus more technical skills training. Further, an alternative model to current higher education funding models is presented to embrace technological, disruptive wealth generation based on cryptocurrency to deploy this asset class to serve education needs by funding research, students, and the academy through an illustrated conceptual framework for funding. implementation.
Much American electoral and policy debate now centers on how best to reignite the nation’s economic dynamism and rebuild its competitive strength. Any such undertaking presents an extraordinary challenge, demanding a correspondingly extraordinary institutional response. This Article proposes precisely such a response. It designs and advocates a new public instrumentality--a National Investment Authority (“NIA”)--charged with the critical task of devising and implementing a comprehensive long-term development strategy for the United States.Patterned in part after the New Deal-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in part after modern sovereign wealth funds, and in part after private equity and venture capital firms, the NIA is an inherently hybrid, public-private entity that combines the unique strengths of public instrumentalities--their vast scale, lengthy investment horizons, and explicit backing by the public’s full faith and credit--with the micro-informational advantages of private market actors. By creatively adapting familiar tools of financial and legal engineering, the NIA overcomes obstacles that ordinarily impede or discourage private investment in critically necessary and even transformative public infrastructure goods. By channeling presently speculative private capital back into the real economy, moreover, the NIA plays an important role in enhancing the resilience and stability of the U.S. and global financial systems.The Article makes original contributions not only to contemporary policy debates over how to revive America’s productive prowess and bring its financial system back into the service of the real economy, but also to current theoretical understandings of “public goods,” “market failures,” and how to provide or address them. It offers an account of what it calls “collective goods”--a broader category than orthodox public goods--as solutions to collective action problems that pervade decentralized markets, hence as goods that can be supplied only through exercises of collective agency. Our NIA proposal operationalizes this theoretical insight by elaborating a specific institutional form that such collective agency can take.
With decentralization and urbanization, the debts of state and local governments and of quasi-public agencies have grown in importance. Rapid urbanization in developing countries requires large-scale infrastructure financing to help absorb influxes of rural populations. Borrowing enables state and local governments to capture the benefits of major capital investments immediately and to finance infrastructure more equitably across multiple generations of service users. \n \nWith debt comes the risk of insolvency. Subnational debt crises have reoccurred in both developed and developing countries. Restructuring debt and ensuring its sustainability confront moral hazard and fiscal incentives in a multilevel government system; individual subnational governments might free-ride common resources, and public officials at all levels might shift the cost of excessive borrowing to future generations. \n \nThis book brings together the reform experiences of emerging economies and developed countries. Written by leading practitioners and experts in public finance in the context of multilevel government systems, the book examines the interaction of markets, regulators, subnational borrowers, creditors, national governments, taxpayers, ex-ante rules, and ex-post insolvency systems in the quest for subnational fiscal discipline. \n \nSuch a quest is intertwined with a country’s historical, political, and economic context. The formal legal framework interacts with political reality to influence the dynamics of and incentives for reform. Often, the resolution of a subnational debt crisis unfolds in the context of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. \n \nThe book includes reforms that have not been covered by previous literature, such as those of China, Colombia, France, Hungary, Mexico, and South Africa. The book also presents a comprehensive review of how the United States developed its debt market for state and local local governments through a series of reforms that are path \ndependent, including the reforms and lessons learned following state defaults in the \n1840s and the debates that shaped the enactment of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy \nCode in 1937. Looking forward, pressures on subnational finance are likely to continue—from the fragility of global recovery, the potentially higher cost of capital, refinancing risks, \nand sovereign risks. This book is essential reading for anyone wanting to know the \nchallenges and reform options in debt restructuring, insolvency frameworks, and \npublic debt market development.
We are now in the era of the G8, although the G7 still exists as a grouping for Finance Ministers. Why do G7 finance ministries and central banks co-operate? What are the implications of this co-operation for US power and the abilities of the other six states to exercise leadership? What role do the G7 play in global financial governance? How much authority do they possess and how is that authority exercised? This is the first major monograph on the political economy of G7 finance ministry and central bank co-operation. It argues that to understand the contribution of the G7 to global financial governance it is necessary to locate the process in the context of a wider world financial order comprised of decentralized globalization. It also provides original case study material on the G7's contribution to macroeconomic governance and to debates on the global financial architecture over the last decade. It assesses the G7's role in producing a system of global financial governance based on market supremacy and technocratic transgovernmental consensus and articulates normative criticisms of the G7's exclusivity. For researchers in the fields of IR/IPE generally, postgraduate students in the field of international organization and global governance, policy makers and financial journalists this is the most extensive analysis of the G7 and the political economy of global financial governance to date.
Although the recent performance of the U.S. macroeconomy is being hailed as "the longest modern peacetime expansion s n failures of depository institutions have been closely linked to certain depressed productive sectors in the country. The most stark examples can be found in the depressed farm-belt and oil-producing regions. Observations indicate that financial firms do not or cannot diversify against industry-specific risk when choosing their loan portfolios. Such behavior may be explained by extensive government regulation of the industry's scale and scope or by technological costs of intermediating credit that encourage specialized lending by region or by industry. This paper does not attempt to formally explain why depository institutions engage in specialized lending; rather, it examines some implications of regional and sectoral banking in terms of macroeconomic perf~rmance.~ It considers the short-run implications of bank-capital immobility when banks produce real services in channeling the flow of funds into investments. We illustrate how regional banking conditions can affect the mix of aggregate investment and the level of future aggregate output in the absence of macroeconomic fluctuations. Given the current deregulatory trend in structural policy changes, the nature of the financial services industries has come under intense scrutiny. Recent banking literature has formalized how financial contracts are related to imperfect information. A recurring theme has been that when information is costly, the quantity and nature of external finance has allocative consequences. Diamond (1984) demonstrates how financial intermediaries (hereafter referred to as banks) can improve the efficiency of capital markets by diversifying and thus minimizing information costs; however, perfect diversification makes bank capital and the dispersion of bank asset returns irrelevant to bank portfolio choice. These strong informational assumptions allow the intermediation process to work more smoothly than we observe. If these conditions are not met, bank capital and the risk of bank assets affect bank profitability. Bernanke and Gertler (1987) show how the inability to eliminate variability in portfolio returns implies that "health" of a'bank's balance sheet can affect the flow of funds to risky bank investments. In their model, depositors cannot observe the ex-post returns on bank projects at any cost and bank capital must absorb random asset returns; insufficient bank capital may constrain banks from investing in risky but profitable investments. In a similar framework, Samolyk (1989) examines how the interest-rate risk associated with the maturity transformation in bank portfolios affects bank asset management. This paper will analyze the implications of imperfect information for investment in a decentralized banking ~ystern.~ We present an intertemporal model of banking similar to that of Bernanke and Gertler. Bankers possess a specialized technology that allows them to channel resources to investment projects that would not be funded in direct credit markets. They also have information about their portfolio returns. Unlike Bernanke and Gertler , this analysis attempts to incorporate the notion that there is more than one productive sector in the economy. We assume that in the short run, bank